Smug Alert

Written by Bucherm on Wednesday, December 28, 2011 at 8:56 pm

Spencer Ackerman posted a pretty smug blog entry on Wired.com about how China refurbing the Varyag isn’t that big of deal. Some of the whoppers:

  • “It’s more like the aircraft carrier equivalent of buying a used car.”
  • “but it’s conspicuous that the first Chinese aircraft carrier can’t defend itself[lacking SSMs] from seaborne threats.”
  • “There’s only one of them”

It’s a used car.
Incorrect, it’s a partially complete car that was purchased and finished by another organization. It’s worth remembering that the Varyag didn’t even have functioning engines when it was purchased and towed to China. While the *hull* may be old, indications are that the Chinese have poured new wine into an old bottle. Most of the major components are going to be reasonably new.

It’s lacking defense against seaborne threats
This is a particularly baffling statement to make. For decades the major carrier navies, with the exception of Russia, have centered the defense of their carrier around escorts and the aircraft being carrier, not weapons systems themselves. American carriers have air defense weapons, with little consideration given to the carrier fighting off major surface threats. China not adding SSMs to their aircraft carrier is not a particularly egregious oversight, and reaching for that is grasping at straws.

There’s only one of them
Well, yes, but China is also building two more. So what if the Varyag is just one? There are more on the way, and even if the next two are Varyag-ish in airwing size, that means they can bring a more formidable carrier wing to the table than any other country except the US, Russia, and possibly France. (If you think the QEs are going to set sail with anything close to their designed limit I have a bridge to sell to you in Brooklyn). Ackermans argument here seems to be that…if you have zero carriers, but you can’t get three in service at the same time…then it’s better to stay at zero carriers?

The Varyag isn’t the prettiest belle at the ball. But for the needs of China, it’s just fine as a training ship and for showing the flag in the Western Pacific. That anyone could shrug his arms and go “it ain’t a big deal” is baffling. Of course it’s a big deal. Is it a big enough deal to fly into a panic over? Maybe not, but let’s not pretend that it isn’t a big step forward in the capabilities of the country that is effectively the #2 guy on the planet.

Categories: Carriers, Plotholes, Ships

Deathstars and Star Destroyers, Aircraft Carriers(and DDGs) and LCSs.

Written by Bucherm on Tuesday, September 13, 2011 at 6:52 pm

If you’re a milblog nerd, you probably saw the “article” on the poor state of the Deathstar program in the Star Wars trilogy by a LTC in the USAF last week. There were a few whoppers in the article, not the least the claim that the second Deathstar didn’t fire it’s primary weapon. It also didn’t take long for the usual suspects to begin to make the inevitable comparisons about how we “can’t afford Deathstars” and that small, “cheap” programs(like the LCS, or something like it) are needed. Being a sci fi nerd with a sign hanging on my life that says ‘CONDEMNED’, I wonder which Star Wars movies these guys watched.

The Original Deathstar
The original Deathstar(going solely by the movies and movie novelizations, if we include the various EU novels we’ll be here all day) took approximately 20 years to build, not counting the years of design work that went into it before actual construction began. When it was finally finished it sought out the Rebel Alliance base and was destroyed by a half trained jedi due to a serious design flaw. The author of the original article, and many of the milbloggers who picked up on it, took it as a sign that the original Deathstar program was a failure.

(1)This ignores that the Deathstar deployed without escorts, or more importantly, without deploying it’s many thousands of starfighters. It would be like a modern American CVN sailing into the Western Pacific unescorted and without deploying it’s aircraft for defense and then everyone being shocked, yes, shocked, that the Chinese were able to sink the carrier with cheap shorebased missiles and fighters. It would be like the RN Grand Fleet of WW1 deploying into the North Sea without destroyers for escort and then watching a inexpensive U-boat sink a very expensive battleship. Of course, the Deathstar was largely able to provide it’s own fighter screen but Grand Moff Tarkin opt against it, possibly because he wanted to prove that “his” Doctrine was the way of the future, and traditional naval assets were no longer needed. The Deathstar was heading into potential disaster no matter how you wiggled it.

(2)The Deathstar had a serious design flaw, and it’s likely the designers were well aware of it. The Rebel Alliance, who probably didn’t have a whole heck of a lot of aeronautical engineers in it, were able to spot the design flaw quickly. Staff officers on the Deathstar were able to bring up the plans for the station and eyeball the flaw quickly. It beggers the belief that the designers weren’t well aware of the flaw. So why was it there? Well, given that the original Deathstar took 20ish years to build, a strong argument could be made that it was intended to be a jobs program first, and a weapons system second. Possibly part of the Imperial Clone Wars Recovery Act. Someone signed off on the design knowing full well that a well aimed shot could blow the whole thing up…but they just didn’t care. Perhaps because they assumed any sane commander would deploy the stations fighter screen.

The Second Deathstar
The second Deathstar was much larger, and had a much more effective primary weapon. The design flaw in the first had been deleted. It also was very close to completion after only 3 years of construction, in secret, in orbit of a backwater, with only one company contracted for the logistics. It destroyed several major combatants of the Rebel fleet before it was destroyed itself. Despite this, the article and the milbloggers who picked up on it again pan it as a failed program. Indeed, because it didn’t destroy any planets it didn’t “fire it’s planet-busting weapon once”!

(it did, several times).

A complaint is made by the usual suspects that the program was a failure because it had an lightly defended external shield generator while it was under construction, and that it was destroyed with fighters zooming into the uncompleted superstructure to blow up the primary reactor. Again, I wonder which Return of the Jedi these guys saw. The Empire clearly placed a premium on the construction of it being secret and fast, so much so that the Rebels were unable to pin down the locale until the Emperor deliberately leaked the information. A minimalist approach to the garrison was probably necessary for to maintain it being secret. The construction site was, in fact, extremely secure thanks to it’s secrecy.

As for complaints about it being destroyed with it being half built, that’s a bit like saying that the Jean Bart was a terrible battleship because the Massachusetts managed to shoot it to ribbons while it was immobile and incomplete. If the Jean Bart, by some quirk of fate, destroyed the Massachusetts then people would be impressed. As it is no one is surprised that a stationary, halfcompleted battleship was mission-killed. So why is this the case with the Second Deathstar, which still managed to gouge a hole in the Rebel Wall of Battle?

By any stretch, the second DS program was well run with the end product being a good one.

Deathstars, Star Destroyers, Aircraft Carriers, LCS

A Balanced fleet of high end warships is always needed...


Inevitably, comparisons have been made about how the US should be spending less money on Deathstars and more money on more practical assets. Unfortunately, this ignores a pretty vital fact: in the SW movies the Empire(and the Republic before it) spends an enormous sum of money on smaller, “practical” assets. The wedged-shaped combatants known colloquially as “Star Destroyers” are useful in fleet actions, are motherships for small craft, can carry troops for ground operations…hmm, does this sound familiar?

...whether in space or at sea


The Galactic Empire, like the United States, also was in possession of several capital ships in addition to the Deathstars(“There’s a lot of command ships Luke.”). Big expensive warships are big and expensive, but are needed for a balanced fleet. Crappy little modified luxury ships(whether rebel or American) are of dubious worth in highly kinetic operations. Going the el cheapo route is the route you pick if you know you can’t win in a standup fight. And once you go down the road, it’s hard to ride the ramps and turn around.

Categories: Oops, Plotholes, Science Fiction, Space

Blogtastic

Written by Bucherm on Thursday, July 7, 2011 at 5:02 pm

Anyone read the latest turd to float up from Wired’s “Danger Room” blog? In it Ackerman complains that the USN is turning their vessels(both comissioned and in service) into “floating Gitmos”. What a horrible turn of events!

Except, hmm, that isn’t how it works. In both the instances mentioned the POIs in question were taken into custody by the USN, and the USN, perhaps expressing a bit of a turf fight, detained the POIs on the ships while they tried to figure out what the hell to do with them. This has gone on for several years. At least since my own 2004-2005 deployment. Gitmo USN vessels ain’t. Indeed, that the Obama Administration feels secure enough to try Warsame in a Federal court stateside(certain individuals have predictably reacted to the news) says a lot about the method of interrogation used. I suspect if the suspect if there is reason to think that Warsame was waterboarded or otherwise mistreated the federal court case would be DOA.

So why am I angry about this blog entry? Well…I don’t think that Ackerman&Axe are that bright. They and other Danger Room bloggers have ridden on Wireds coattails, and are “respected bloggers” insomuch as they snagged other folks who were visiting the site for other reasons. The freelance version of Danger Room, “War is Boring” is just as disappointing. They post interesting news items (and, more importantly, pretty pictures and graphics) and then post whoppers like the story I started out with, or claiming that the aircraft carrier is obsolete(because the Libyan campaign is going so poorly the French and British are reduced to converting gators into ersatz CVLs with attack helicopters), or whining that there wasn’t a LCS on hand to evacuate US citizens from Libya when the State department used a chartered ferry instead…Ryan could name a few others. Now people think the USN is in the bizness of waterboarding people because of them.

Which isn’t to say that other, meatier, blogs don’t produce some real boners. I don’t always agree with Galrahn, but at least there’s a method to his madness. Some of his contributors are real loons, however, and view everything in a “us vs. them” mentality…which means serious maritime security reform is DOA in the public consciousness. Alright. Done ranting.

Categories: Carriers, Plotholes, Ships

Blamin’ Barry

Written by Bucherm on Saturday, June 4, 2011 at 7:48 pm

So, one of the podcasts I listen to while I hike is “Mid Rats”, which is surely the only maritime security podcast worthy of the description. Tomorrow they are having on two scallywags by the names of Mackenzie Eaglen and Bryan McGrath to talk about the a paper(here) they put up on The Heritage Foundations website. They also posted a “adaption” of the paper in The Weekly Standard( over here). Go ahead and give both a look over. Notice any differences?

Sometime to bear in mind, THF bills itself as a non-partisan think tank(It isn’t, not in anyway that matters,but I digress), and TWS is a blatant partisan periodical, one that they own up to. When I was in Borders this afternoon I opened up an issue and first page I landed on had Paul Ryan throwing a line to a drowning woman labelled “Medicare” with a Donkey trying to stop him. Yup. Just pointing out what the two are so we can set the mood. See the differences yet?

I’ll help you out. In the THF paper the authors dance around naming politicans as the people hypothetically at fault for a hypothetical future. Possibly because, again, the THF bills itself as a non partisan thinktank. There’s a brief statement that the USN has shrunk 15% since 1998(implying that Bush 2 was on watch for most of the shrinkage) but then goes on to state that it’s gonna get worse because of the end of supplemental funding(in other words, someone is the bad guy for holding the DOD to a budget. I wonder who?). In the TWS adaption, the authors flat out lay the hypothetical rump-USN at the feet of Obama and Panetta. No mention at all of the steady decline in hull numbers since the Reagan Administration, apperently Barry and Leon just woke up one day and decided to bring us to this state. They are solely at fault.

So, why am I mad?

Because no one other than policy nerds are going to read the actual THF article. The groundlings at TWS are going to read the TWS adaption and go “yup yup durr…socialist Democrats”. It won’t even cross their hivemind that Bush, Clinton, Bush again, and Reagan were the ones that got us to our current fleet levels. And of course, they’re going to assume that Obama(who, as we all know, is a socialist defeatocrat), the guy who expanded the drone war in central asia and surged in Afghanistan, is going to respond to the PLAN become more capable by burning down the USN. The authors are trying to frame the public debate in a “us”(patriotic national-security minded Republicans) vs. “Them”(socialist cowardly Democrats) narrative.

I might add, if you want to spread the gospel of Sea Power TWS is a poor place to do it. Those guys are gonna vote for (more)defense spending everytime. You need to convince the readers of perodicals like Mother Jones and Cable news hosts like Rachel Maddow. Rachel Maddow, incidently, has been flown out to a LHD and she had the time of her life. I imagine this is a conversation she would be more than happy to have.

Anyway, this won’t stop me from listening to Midrats, should be interesting to see if the hosts ask them why they named names in one edition of the “thought problem” but not the other.

Categories: Carriers, Plotholes, Ships, Strategy

Previously on Battlestar Afghanistan…

Written by Ryan Crierie on Saturday, May 7, 2011 at 8:53 pm

(Above Photo Originally Found here at the Jawa Report)

Doesn’t OBL’s profile in this still from a videotape we recovered in his hideout remind you of one Saul Tigh, circa New Caprica?

A better comparison to remind you is:

Categories: Science Fiction, Television

Nuclear Weaponry and Terrorists

Written by Ryan Crierie on Friday, May 6, 2011 at 10:40 pm

A night or two ago, I was thinking about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons complex after I read THIS

A senior Al-Qaeda commander claimed that the terrorist group has hidden a nuclear bomb in Europe which will be detonated if Bin-Laden is ever caught or assassinated. The US authorities uncovered numerous attempts by Al-Qaeda to obtain nuclear materials and fear that terrorists have already bought uranium. Sheikh Mohammed told interrogators that Al-Qaeda would unleash a “nuclear hellstorm”.

Now, TERRORISTS [tm] getting the Bomb has been a pretty well-worn trope of scaremongers ever since 9/11, so I decided to think about how a terrorist group could credibly find itself in possession of a device.

There are two routes to obtaining a device:

  • Build your own device.
  • Steal one.

Both routes are equally hard and improbable.

For the ‘build your own device’ route; you first need to get the fissile, and that kind of stuff is tightly controlled. There’s also the fact that for a device that doesn’t need a lot of fissile (implosion), you need some very specialized parts that have no other possible civilian use.

Stealing one…that’s easier said than done.

In both cases, any significant success, whether you steal 10 kg of Pu239 or a tactical nuclear device from a storage depot, you will get a significant amount of attention from the authorities and your remaining life is likely to be brief and exciting.

But what if the authorities were in on it with you?

I thought about that and as usual, my gaze fell onto Pakistan.

  • We know that Pakistani strategic goals have in the past centred around the creation of terrorist groups to attack India.
  • We know that A.Q. Khan used Pakistani military aircraft “on his own time”, or so the Pakistanis claim, to “personally” deliver centrifuge parts and plans to North Korea.
  • We know that Pakistan has successfully tested a series of nuclear devices of varying configurations back in ’98 — Chagai-I and -II.
  • We know that the North Koreans somehow made a gun type device fizzle not once but twice.

So onto my proposition:

What if the Norks actually have working bombs?

What if their bombs are actually exact replicas of the designs used in Pakistan’s Chagai-I and -II tests via the A.Q. Khan ring?

What if the Nork 2006 and 2009 tests were instead a covert North Korean/Pakistani joint program to develop a plutonium gun device?

Looking around, my admittedly crude understanding of nuclear devices is that the reason why we haven’t seen Pu239 Gun devices is due to the length of the gun barrel required in order to slam the two chunks together fast enough to avoid a fizzle.

The extreme barrel length required is one reason why the THIN MAN bomb was quickly abandoned by the MED; as a Pu239 device on it’s principles would be far too long to fit into a B-29’s bomb bay.

But what if your device isn’t intended to be delivered by a tactical aircraft/missile?

What if your concept is to develop a simple plutonium gun device that can have large amounts of components fabricated “in country” near the target?

Plutonium is much more ideal in every way as bomb material — because even in the worst case, you only need about 12~ kg of it, as opposed to 60~ kg of HEU.

The significantly reduced amount of fissile required also makes it much easier to obfuscate your own fissile inventories. For example, you could easily write off a small amount of plutonium each month as “processing losses” and slowly build up a “black” inventory over several years.

Plutonium also is significantly easier to acquire. You only need to chemically reprocess spent nuclear fuel rods from nuclear power plants to get the plutonium, as opposed to building very large U235 enrichment factories, which AFAIK Pakistan does not have.

If you’re following my chain of thought and haven’t gone “This guy is a total loon.”, it raises the following question:

“What happens when North Korea manages to make the Plutonium Gun Device Work, proving the concept?”

They’ve had tests at three year intervals, so we’re due for another Norkish test sometime in 2012ish.

It also fits in with the long standing Pakistani use of terrorist groups as a strategic weapon against India, and has the following points going for it:

  • While the US has a fairly extensive detection network of radiological detectors around our major entry points and at random transport infrastructure points; India as far as I know, does not. This makes it easier to smuggle in the fissile material into India and get it near the ultimate target.
  • If the device is assembled near the target with the majority of components fabricated nearby; then it means that after a nuke is popped in India; Pakistan can produce a detailed inventory of their nuclear devices and account for each one in excruciating detail, throwing enough FUD on the matter.
  • India may not have the necessary technical assets to determine the composition of the radioactive by-products in the fallout.
  • Pakistan’s leadership may discount the efficiacy of radioactive ‘fingerprinting’ or plan to obfuscate it.

Obfuscation could be accomplished by blending your home-grown plutonium with some from North Korea. You could even try looking through your fissile cupboard for some of the fissile material that you received from foreign companies to assist your civilian nuclear program such as BNFL (British Nuclear Fuels plc).

This way, when the USAF’s WC-135Ws fly over the radioactive cloud, there’s no big blaring sign pointing that says PAKISTANI PLUTONIUM, but smaller signs that say PAKISTANI, NORTH KOREAN, and BRITISH (!!!) PLUTONIUM.

As I see it, this would result in the following items:

1.) The Radiological/Radiochemisty boys are pretty bright and I have no doubt they’ll eventually figure out the exact proportions of fissile contributors for the device. It just will take a bit longer than it would from a single source — and delays are important — the longer you delay a response, the less likely a response will happen.

2.) You spread the ‘responsibility’ (so to speak) over multiple nations. While India or the United States would be willing to do a complete retaliatory strike on Pakistan in response for a “terrorist” bomb using Pakistani Fissile; do you also take out North Korea if you find Nork fissile in the bomb too? Like result #1, this is also aimed at reducing the likelihood of a response.

The Pakistanis might be thinking that they can obfuscate the issue enough to escape the worst repercussions.

One possible avenue would be to try and tie it up in the United Nations by trying to invoke the provisions against Genocide, because if there was a US or Indian nuclear response, the Pakistani population would effectively be destroyed.

Another avenue would be to argue that a “small minority” did it. Of course, this “minority” would quickly be rounded up and executed publically to try and defuse international anger.

From an ISI point of view, expending 5,000 or so useful assets (anti-Indian terrorists) in favor for killing tens of thousands of Indians and crippling a major Indian port would be a pretty good tradeoff.

Finally, the big question:

Why would Pakistan do something like this?

Pakistan has openly had nuclear devices since 1998.

They’ve more than had enough time to absorb the strategic implications of such possession (See Stuart Slade’s Essay The Nuclear Game (One))…

…yet they continue to outright fund and support major terrorist attacks on India with terrorist groups they own lock stock and barrel — the ISI helped formulate and provided operational support for the Bombay Massacre.

(It is expected that the Tahawwur Hussain Rana trial in Chicago set to begin around 15 May will result in the ISI being explictly named as being Rana’s handler, providing the money and logistical support for Rana and Headley to help set up the attack via providing reconnaisance and other services for LeT.)

Pakistan simply hasn’t learned, or refuses to learn how you play the Nuclear Game.

The world is willing to paper over a couple dead people, or maybe a few dozen (Rote Armee Fraktion killings from a group backed by the KGB and STASI) in the name of international unity and to prevent a larger war, but they won’t paper over massacres such as Bombay indefinitely.

PS: A night ago in conversation with a friend, I drew parallels between the Bombay Massacre of 2008 and the Assassination of Franz Ferdinand in 1914. The parallels are pretty striking:

1.) Terrorist Group backed by Nationality B attacks Nationality A’s citizens, killing a lot of people and/or someone Very Important [tm].

2.) Nationality A demands to Nationality B that Terrorist Group be turned over to them.

3.) Nationality B goes “What terrorist group?”

4.) ???

5.) WAR.

Categories: Live, Nuclear Weapons, Strategy

The dubious utility of delaying news of OBL’s demise…

Written by Ryan Crierie on Wednesday, May 4, 2011 at 10:08 pm

Apparently post-partisan bounce unity across the political divide in America lasts about four days. This means that if we make first contact with aliens, Washington DC will be all super fun for only about eight days.

But anyway, some people are critical over Obama revealing we got him so early, so fast.

They argue that Obama should have held onto the information for about 24-48 hours, so we could roll up some networks based on the information we got.

The problem with the premise of holding onto the information long enough to recycle it into actionable intelligence to kill someone important is the fact that Pakistan plays both sides in the GWOT.

OBL was found hiding inside a safehouse about 800 metres from the grounds of the Pakistani Military Academy; and the safehouse was owned by Hizbul Mujahedeen.

If you’ve never heard of them, don’t worry. Nobody really does, except for India.

Why?

Because the Hizbul Mujahedeen was created by the Pakistani ISI in 1989 to wage war on India inside Kashmir.

The Pakistani security forces secured the compound probably about 15-20 minutes after we lifted off.

They would have found:

1.) 20~ people all zip-tied in the middle of the compound or on the street, many of them OBL’s relatives.
2.) 3-4~ people inside in pools of their own blood with known links to OBL.
3.) Low grade circumstantial evidence that OBL was staying there that we missed (with just 40 minutes, we couldn’t take the place apart completely).
4.) A large pool of blood missing a body.

If the Pakistani security services were merely corrupt, the evidence that Bin Ladin was the target and that he was either seriously wounded or killed would leak relatively rapidly. Just look at how the Pakis already sold a bunch of holiday snaps of the dead guys to Reuters. Al Quaeda does monitor the internet, you know?

However, the fact that we found him in a compound owned by an ISI-created group moves them from the ‘corrupt’ category to the ‘actively aiding’ category.

Once it became obvious that the Emir was no longer amongst his fellows and had been removed by the Great Satan; elements within the ISI would have begun spreading the news amongst their own terror networks; and Al Quaeda would have gotten the message as well to go to ground and disperse.

Either way, I feel that sitting on the news would only have bought about 1-2 hours more of operationally valuable time to kill HVT’s — and that just isn’t enough time for our guys to land and begin the initial task of sifting through the information we got.

Categories: Live, Strategy

What do we do now with Pakistan?

Written by Ryan Crierie on Monday, May 2, 2011 at 7:15 pm

I always had assumed that Osama Bin Laden was hiding somewhere in the Pakistani FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) right on the border with Afghanistan in a relatively smallish city. He’d be far enough from central authority and with enough allies amongst the tribes in the region to let him avoid authority when needed.

The distance from any governmental power centers would also let him exploit his contacts with various segments of the Pakistani Military/Intelligence apparatus safely — e.g. have the local ISID chief on his payroll for only $30k a year.

But with the news that he was killed in a location only 30 miles NE of Islamabad, and about 800-1000m from the Pakistani version of West Point in a fairly biggish mansion, and had been there for at least a year or more…

…serious questions must be asked about Pakistan’s willingness to be a credible partner in counter-terror efforts.

For one, the Pakistani military would be checking up on anyone who owns land that close to PMA Kakul if nothing else for counter terror efforts to protect the military academy.

Second, being so close to such a center of power for the government means that a fairly broad spectrum of the Pakistani military/intelligence circle would have been there — too many people for him to effectively bribe.

Third, the house was not really covert once you started looking at it. Costing $1m or more; no phone or internet; but with two satellite dishes? A lot of the walls around it were…okay; because rich people can get paranoid. But the 7 foot high privacy wall around the balcony??? Or the fact that they burned their trash instead of placing it on the street like the rest of their neighbors.

All of it just adds up to render Pakistani claims that they did not know he was there totally uncredible.

It’s quite clear that a large part of the Pakistani government has decided where they stand, and it’s with the terrorists. But their words are BACKED UP WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS (to quote Civilization).

So…what do we do with Pakistan?

Categories: Live, Strategy

We got the Son of a Bitch!

Written by Ryan Crierie on Sunday, May 1, 2011 at 11:06 pm

Osama Bin Laden is DEAD. DEAD. DEAD.

Obama authorized special forces to GO ON THE GROUND in PAKISTAN outside of ISLAMABAD. At a mansion they exchanged small arms fire and BLEW HIS DAMN HEAD OFF.

TAKE THAT YOU S.O.B!!!

(note, my birthday is 9/11, so yeah, permit me some vigor here).

Sidenote: Obama’s speech was ok. Nothing superawesome, though I did like how Obama ended his speech with the closing line from the Pledge of Allegiance.

That said, Obama took a big risk here — he earned his pay 500 percent — because he took the EXTREME political risk of sending in a ground SOF team into Pakistan…especially right near Islamabad of all places after the Raymond Davis incident.

This could have ended up as Desert One II — it was that risky politically. But he still signed off on the Kill Order. So mad props to him for that.

While I was watching CNN (ugh, Geraldo on FNC at this time of night); I noticed that a spontaneous demonstration was occuring outside the WH while we waited for the speech with people waving our flag, shouting USA USA and singing the national anthem.

I’ve also heard that at the Mets-Phillies game crowd chanted USA! USA! as news spread amongst them.

Brings a tear to me eye.

Even though some people think I’m to the right of Genghis Khan….mad props to Barry tonight:

PS: Maybe we warned the royals? Notice how the Newlyweds were going to honeymoon in Jordan, and how they delayed that?

PPS: I’m surprised this didn’t leak. It shows we can keep secrecy when we feel like it.

Categories: Live

The Legality of War

Written by Ryan Crierie on Sunday, March 20, 2011 at 3:24 pm

After years of listening to the thunderous blasts from certain corners declaring the Iraq War as an illegal war, it’s interesting to note that Bush took his time for Iraq/Afghanistan; dotting the i’s and crossing the t’s legally as U.S. Law required.

Going to war against Afghanistan, when the case was easily open and shut — Bush took the time to legally set it up through PL-107-40 Joint resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.

PL-107-40 Bill Content Here

House: 420-1
Senate: 98-0

Then later in Iraq, he waited for Public Law 107-243 — Joint resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq.

PL-107-243 Content Here

House: 297-133
Senate: 77-23

The Libyan Uprising began around 15 February. It’s now 20 March. Obama pretty much had 15-20 days to set up the legal framework for US action with Congress, but he didn’t, instead relying on the United Nations as the sole arbiter of legality.

This is what **I THINK** Obama’s train of thought was:

“Instead of getting in a messy conflict with Congress, I’ll use the War Powers Act as my legal authorization to get the 30-60 days I need before I need to go to those people.”

Besides, we should be in and out of this place before the 30-60 days are up, with the Europeans doing the heavy lifting while we just provide logistical support.”

Then the JCS walk in the door to the Oval Office and proceed to give him a detailed briefing on how the European Militaries can’t do anything unless the U.S. provides a significant ‘first day’ airstrike capability of over a hundred missiles and stealth bomber strikes to kick the door in for the Europeans.

If the Libyan conflict is still going on in about 30 days, things should begin to get very interesting for Obama in Congress.

There’s already a small group of liberal progressive democrats who are calling for his impeachment over this.

Categories: Strategy