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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

ECJC-J

APO 128, New York, N. Y.
22 September 1961



SUBJECT: USCINCEUR Unilateral Planning for Use of Tripartite Forces with Respect to Berlin (TS)

TO: Joint Chiefs of Staff
       Washington 25, D. C.



1. (TS) References:

a. JCS 1227, 24 August 1961.
b. USCINCEUR letter ECJC-J, 30 August 1961, subj: Augmentation of USCINCEUR Forces (TS).
c. USNMR SHAPE message ALO 762, 2 September 1961.
d. USCINCEUR message ECJDL 9-91093, 5 August 1961.
e. USCINCEUR message ECJCO 9-92076, 25 August 1961.
f. USAREUR message SX 4856, 17 August 1961 (to DA).
g. USCINCEUR message ECJCJ 9-100857, 21 August 1961.
h. USCINCEUR message ECJCP 9-90985, 3 August 1961 as amended by ECJCP 9-91119, 7 August 1961.
i. USCINCEUR letter ECJCJ,, 24 July 1961, subj: Revision US Unilateral Berlin Contingency Plans (U).

2. (U) The inclosed outline plans A through D are submitted in accordance with reference a. Upon direction by the JCS complete USCINCEUR Operational Plans will be prepared and numbered.

3. (TS) Prior to setting forth the indications directed by Part III A of reference a, I should like to express certain general comments, some of which are of direct application to our planning for the various contingencies which might arise in the Berlin situation and which have already been provided to the Department of Defense in connection with the subject of JCS 1364-61:

"2. I fully appreciate and support the need to create a position from which we would be able to respond, within reasonable limits, to any form of Soviet aggression in the NATO area, forcefully, but in such a way as to minimize the risk of general war. I believe, however, that realistic planning must seek to exploit our strengths without overlooking our weaknesses; above all, it must weigh immediate needs against interests of the long-term defense posture of the West, While preparing to exploit any favorable developments, we must avoid convincing ourselves that the possible is probable. We must not confuse the wish with the fact. We should therefore consider, very carefully, our ability to enforce a gradual, controlled development of the battle, and not overestimate the extent to which we can dictate the Soviet response, particularly in a situation where it is unlikely that we would have the initiative. To assume that we could exercise independent, unilateral control over the battle would be as wrong in 1961 as it was wrong in 1953 to speak of 'a time and place of our own choosing.'
"3. Based upon the principle that it is sound practice to be confident in execution but questioning and concerned in planning, I am disturbed by what may be overoptimism with respect to:
"a. The alternatives that will, in fact, become available to U3 by measures that essentially meet force goals previously established by NATO as the minimum required for an effective defense of Europe, with nuclear support when necessary.
"b. What more we can achieve, because of the conventional force build-up envisioned, in terms of either deterring Soviet action against our access routes to Berlin, inducing them to reopen access if it is denied, or actually forcing a reopening of access against determined opposition.
"c. Our ability to defend Western Europe against a massive conventional attack by the Soviet Bloc for as much as a month or more, without having to resort to the use of nuclear weapons.
"d. The impact of the measures which we propose to take on both the short-term and long-term efforts of our Allies.
"4. Our force posture should be such as to permit us to respond to the whole range of the Soviet threat. In this connection, the credibility of the deterrent can be destroyed by emphasizing a policy that could be construed by the Soviets as permitting them to become involved, and then, if they decide the risks are too great, to disengage. That there is a real possibility of such a misconception is evidenced by the question in the minds of some of our Allies as to our concepts and our policy. It is absolutely essential that the Soviets be forced to act and move at all times in full awareness that if they use force they risk general war with nuclear weapons.
"5. The Soviet capability to augment forces in Europe is clearly greater than ours. Our build-up to the 30 division level will, greatly increase our flexibility, extend the period over which we could defend successfully and raise the threshold at which nuclear weapons would have to be introduced into the battle. It will not, however, provide a real basis for assurance that we could successfully sustain a defense against massive conventional attack for an extended period of time. It certainly will not permit us to consider conducting any major conventional offensive operations against determined Soviet resistance.
"6. While not wishing to overestimate Soviet capabilities or to underestimate our own, we must recognize that the Soviets may well start with superior forces, will almost certainly have the initiative and would enjoy superiority in conventional air operations from the outset. Assuming a normal Allied combat loss rate, to gain and maintain air superiority over Western Europe presents a serious problem for the Alliance. Under this condition, our conventional defenses and our ability to carry out atomic defense plans would deteriorate quickly.
"7. Lastly, we must keep in mind the fact that our NATO strategy must be generally acceptable to our Allie3 if they are to have either the will to face up to possible military operations or the inclination to build up their forces, Unreasonable as such an interpretation would be, any policy which might appear to suggest trading . large areas of Europe for time in which to seek to avoid the spread of war to the U.S. , or which appears to deny the use of capabilities and weapons which might divert or destroy the Soviet threat to European lives and territory, will have hard going. I am sure you agree that nothing we do should suggest that our goal is to confine the fight for Allied rights in Europe to Europe. Nor should the measures we take to meet the Berlin crisis give encouragement to independent national atomic defense efforts on the argument that, when faced with a real threat, the U.S. will hesitate to commit any and all forces to NATO's defense.
"8. I fully endorse the strengthening of our capabilities and our efforts to get our Allies to do likewise. I have always advocated a posture here in Europe which would provide an appropriate response across the full range of threats, and thus one which must be based upon a balance of conventional and nuclear forces. I fully agree with the principle of using the minimum adequate force and employing it in such a way as to minimize the risk of nuclear war. If the deterrent is-to have any validity, however, it must be clear to everyone at all times that we are prepared, first, to fight, and, second, to use atomic weapons if necessary. Whether we like it or not, in these times no operation, regardless of how limited, can have real credibility except in the context of a nuclear threat, direct or implied. "

4. (TS) With the foregoing as a background, I refer next to the objective stated in JCS 1227: "To overcome East German/USSR opposition to Allied access to Berlin to the maximum extent of the capability of the corps. " Considering the available GDR/USSR forces in East Germany alone, the forces envisioned in the enclosed plans could not possibly force a reopening of ground access against determined Soviet opposition. Although a limited salient could be created and perhaps maintained for a short period, it could not be held “for a period of 15-20 days” if the Soviets resolved to drive us out and used the necessary force and weapons to do so. Certainly, however, we could force a fight, and in doing so determine the extent to which the Soviets would be willing to go in order to deny Allied access to Berlin. We would also present with unmistakable clarity to the Soviets the enormous risks involved in continued denial of Allied access to Berlin and perhaps, thereby, gain the opportunity and necessary time for further negotiation.

5. (TS) JCS 1227 further states: "Full scale operations, moreover, would probably be approached through a series of steps of progressively increasing severity" as well as saying in a general manner that military operations should be planned along a progressive vein with the US and her Allies gaining and holding the initiative, I must re-emphasize that the Soviets may not accede to increasing the tempo of the conflict through a series of progressive steps, nor will they necessarily keep the conflict localized; therefore, if the execution of any of these plans is directed we must be prepared for the possibility of explosive escalation from limited conventional conflict to general nuclear war in a matter of minutes or hours. Accordingly, we must make every possible preparation for this eventuality prior to implementation of any of these plans.

6. (TS) It will be necessary to utilize NATO staffs, at least the Tripartite membership, in implementation of these plans. To do otherwise would seriously prejudice ACE's ability to deal with general war, if this should be the final outcome. The urgent requirement for close coordination of unilateral, Tripartite and NATO planning is self-evident.

7. (TS) With specific reference to Part III A of reference a, the following additional comments are offered:

a. Estimate of results of implementation of each of attached plans, and the risks involved (from a military standpoint on either a Tripartite or unilateral basis).

(1) As a general statement applicable to each of the four plans, the major risk involved, aside from the possibility of explosive escalation to general nuclear war, lies in the ability of the Soviets to seize the initiative in the use of nuclear weapons, or in enlarging the arena of employment of conventional weapons, either of which could result in a serious degradation of ACE's ability to carry out its general war tasks.

(2) Plan A.

(a) In implementing Plan A, if tactical surprise were obtained, it is considered that a penetration could be made along the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn as far as, the Elbe River, and that this penetration could be held for up to three days.

(b) Implementation of Plan A risks the destruction of the ground and air forces involved. In such an eventuality, SACEUR's general war posture, as it presently exists, would be degraded at a minimum by loss of the equivalent, of one US division and the weakening of command and control resulting from the loss of one corps headquarters.

(3) Plan B.

(a) In implementing Plan B, if tactical surprise were obtained, it is considered that a penetration could be made as far as the Elbe River, and that this penetration could be held for up to five days.

(b) Implementation of Plan B risks the destruction of the ground and air forces involved. SACEUR's present general war posture would remain essentially unchanged. The net gain in ground strength of one US division could be offset by losses in air strength and by undue concentration of communications and combat support in one area.

(4) Plan C.

(a) In implementing Plan C it is considered that a salient approximately 45 km deep and 50 km wide could be established in East Germany astride the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn and could be maintained for a period of approximately 7 days.

(b) Implementation of Plan C risks destruction of fifty percent of the ground and air forces committed. The remainder of the forces committed would have lost considerable effectiveness and command and control mechanisms would have been unduly oriented to the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn salient. SACEUR's present general war posture would have been slightly degraded.

(5) Plan D.

(a) In implementing Plan D assigned tasks can be executed on a diminishing scale for a period of approximately 15 days.

(b) Implementation of Plan D risks the military defeat and destruction of forces committed. This could be accomplished by the USSR/GDR without their having to resort to the use of nuclear weapons. The capability to execute SACEUR's Atomic Strike Plan would not be degraded by implementation of this plan.

b. Estimate of degradation of nuclear capability. No finite estimate can be given concerning the degradation of ACE's capability in the event of implementation of these plans. The degree of this degradation would be dependent upon a number of variable factors including: dispersal of nuclear weapons and strike aircraft, sanctuaries, extent of enemy conventional or nuclear air operations, duration of operations prior to either general war or cessation of hostilities, forces committed, both enemy and friendly, and the precise development of the battle. Degradation would occur whether the attack was by conventional or nuclear means.

c. Listing of ACE targets recommended for inclusion in atomic plans of external forces. Certain targets are listed in reference c which cites a special means message from LEMAY to LEMNITZER, 021116Z Sep 61. I am developing a further list of targets to be included in the attack plans of external forces. This list is being developed on the basis of the nature of the target, its threat to ACE, and the characteristics of external delivery forces. However, many of the targets in the ACE regional atomic plans cannot be covered by external forces.

d. Critical requirements. See Inclosure No. 1.

e. Recommendations for the use of "classified ammunition."

See references d, e and f.

2 Inclosures:
1. Critical Requirement
2. Outline Plans A, B, C and D

/s/
LAURIS NORSTAD
General          USAF
Commander in Chief



COPIES FURNISHED:
    COFS USA
    CNO
    COFS USAF
    CMC
    CINCUSAREUR
    CINCUSNAVEUR
    CINCUSAFE
    CINCLANT
    CINCPAC



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USEUCOM TS SER 4414



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INCLOSURE 1

(TS) Critical requirements to include units, logistic support and supplies, facilities and the like.

a. United States Army Europe.

(1) Units - Critical requirements: The following are required in the theater prior to implementation of plans:

(a) 3,000-man augmentation for mechanization of three infantry divisions. (Reference 1h)
(b) 17,040 man fillers for current units. (Reference 1h)
(c) Round-out units as requested in Tab A, Incl 2, reference 1b.
(d) Port package as contained in Tab B, Incl 2, reference 1b.
(e) Divisional augmentation plus supporting units as indicated below:
1. Plan A- Tab C, Incl 2, reference 1b (2 division augmentation).
2. Plan B - Tabs C and D, Incl 2, reference 1b (4 division augmentation).
3. Plan C - Tabs C, D and E , Incl 2, reference 1b (6 division augmentation).

(2) Support, supplies and facilities . Support as outlined in Tab A, Incl 4, reference 1b and in reference i. is required prior to implementation of plans,

b. United States Air Forces in Europe.

(1) Units. Augmentation as contained in Tab F, Incl 2, reference 1b is required in theater prior to implementation of plans. (Supporting elements must accompany augmentation units).

(2) Support, supplies and facilities .

(a) Support as outlined in Tab B, Incl 4, reference 1b for units deployed to bases in paragraph A, Tab F, Incl 2, reference 1b, and war consumables outlined below are required.

(b) Units deployed to bases listed in paragraphs b and c, Tab F, Incl 2, reference 1b, require all unit support equipment, unit mission equipment (including vehicles and ground support) and JEFM capability to accompany units. This requirement is in addition to the support outlined in Tab B, Incl 4, reference 1b.

(3) War consumables. Employment in a conventional role will be limited by a critical shortage of pylon assemblies and external tanks for both augmentation forces and currently assigned units. 

(4) Class Va. Current assets available estimated to support five (5) days conventional operations for augmentation depending on sortie rates established. Increased supplies to provide 35 days level must be in theater prior to implementation of plans.

c. Host Governments.

The success of all plans under consideration will be dependent upon obtaining adequate facilities and services from host governments concerned. This matter is being pursued as outlined in Joint State Defense message number 1338, dated 6 September 1961.





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OUTLINE PLAN

1. INTELLIGENCE

2. ASSUMPTIONS

3. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

PLAN A
PLAN B
PLAN C
PLAN D

4. FORCES AVAILABLE

PLAN A
PLAN B
PLAN C
PLAN D

5. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS



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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
Supporting JCS 1227
Outline Plans "A," "B," "C," "D"

1. (TS) MISSION

Tripartite forces (US forces unilaterally) conduct operations against GDR/USSR military forces in East Germany to overcome opposition to Allied ground access to Berlin; and if confronted with superior Communist forces, to establish and maintain a salient in East Germany for a period of 15-20 days.

2. (S) GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

a. Political Reaction.

(1) In the period preceding the signature of a Soviet-East German "peace treaty" and the closure of the Berlin access routes by the East Germans, Moscow would be expected to proceed in a manner which would provide a legalistic case to be propagandized throughout the world. Then, any military build-up by the West in preparation of a probe action would be cited by the Bloc diplomats and propagandists as preparation for aggression against the "legitimately sovereign German Democratic Republic." The cases of the Japanese Peace Treaty and the creation of the Federal German Republic would be cited as parallel actions taken by the West, Action in the UN claiming that the West was preparing for a breach of peace would be likely. All such moves would be intended to put the Western Powers in an untenable position before world opinion and cause them to defer physical action to reopen access routes.

(2) In Bloc planning and policy making, the Soviets would hold supreme authority. Decisions as to the reactions and responses of the East German and other Satellite regimes would be made in the Kremlin. The East German leadership would be assured that full Soviet logistic and other support would be provided to the East German forces, in the event that they were committed to operations against Western Forces. The Warsaw Pact Organization and individual Satellite regimes and their forces would be utilized in a manner the Kremlin calculated would be of the greatest advantage in the situation.

(3) The bulk of the population in East Germany is sympathetic toward the West, but a small portion of the population, comprising the members and sympathizers of the SED (Communist Party) and others who consider their personal well being to be dependent upon the survival of the Communist regime, would be outraged at any Western threat to use force against the GDR. East German sympathizers could not be expected to make any significant contribution to the Western effort although some acts of passive resistance, localized strikes and uprisings, and sporadic sabotage could be expected. A sharp increase in the number of persons seeking to flee across the West German border could be anticipated, but sufficient Communist forces would probably be available to restrict the numbers actually reaching the Federal Republic. The repressive measures undertaken in the GDR, beginning 13 August 1961, to prevent the flight of East Germans to the West have made escape nearly impossible, but have served to expand greatly the anti-regime sentiments of the population. Thus, the willingness of the population to harass GDR/Soviet efforts and assist the West is increasing,

3. THE ENEMY SITUATION

a. East German Forces.

(1) General. The East German military ground forces consist of the National Peoples Army and the Garrisoned Security Forces. The army consists of two tank and four motorized rifle divisions, two artillery regiments, two AAA regiments and service support units. The current army strength is 75,000 men. The security forces consist of four different types of security regiments with the total strength of 60,000 men.

(2) Locally Available East German Forces. With present deployment the East German Army could initially oppose a Tripartite/ US advance along the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn with seven infantry battalions supported by two artillery batteries, two mortar batteries, and one tank company; oppose an advance along the Kassel-Magdeburg axis with six infantry battalions and one tank battalion supported by one artillery battalion equivalent.

(3) Reinforcements.

(a) The East German forces initially available along the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn can be reinforced with three motorized divisions, one tank division and two SAP regiments. Along the Kassel-Magdeburg axis, the East Germans can reinforce in the vicinity of Sondershausen with one tank division, one motorized rifle division and five SAP regiments. If only the Helmstedt-Berlin axis is used these latter forces can also be used to reinforce in that area. The deployment of these forces to the Helmstedt area can be completed within 28 hours.

(4) Combat Potential. The East German Army line divisions are presently at 85% strength but could be brought to wartime strength by transferring BSP personnel and recalling reservists prior to closing of the access routes. The political stability of the East German Army is still subject to some doubt, but it is not considered a significant weakness in the situation under study. Operationally, the EGA is weak in artillery. There are indications that this deficiency is being improved with the addition of multiple round rocket launchers to the artillery regiments. Probably the most serious weakness of the EGA is their critical shortage of integral logistical support. It is doubtful that the Soviets would commit the EGA without arranging to provide full logistical support.

b. Soviet Ground Forces. The Soviet Army strength in East Germany (GSFG) consists of six armies containing 10 tank divisions and 10 motorized divisions with supporting troops. These forces represent a significant threat of direct intervention if the Soviets deem the situation warrants. The GSFG forces are so located to permit rapid deployment to oppose any Tripartite/US advance. Five divisions can be committed in the Helmstedt area within 10 hours. The Soviets are capable of reinforcing their troops in East Germany with an additional 20 divisions within 4 or 5 days. The Soviet Forces possess both nuclear weapons and delivery means.

c . East German Air Forces.

(1) The East German Air Force (EGAF) has an estimated strength of 7,500 men and more than 200 jet fighters. The entire EGAF jet fighter forces, training and transport regiments are concentrated on 10 airfields which with a few exceptions are located in the extreme eastern portion of East Germany. The primary role of the EGAF is to provide air defense with a secondary role of ground support.

(2) Combat Potential. The over-all combat effectiveness of the EGAF is considered fair to good in an air defense role and poor to fair in a ground support role . If the EGAF was committed without Soviet support, it is estimated that the EGAF could not support sustained air operations for more than one week to 10 days.

d. Soviet Air Forces. The Soviet 24th Tactical Air Army in East Germany is the largest and best equipped Russian unit of its kind serving outside the USSR. This organization, totaling 1,024 aircraft, has the capability to carry out all types of ground support, air defense, and interdiction missions. These forces could be immediately reinforced by 260 jet fighters and 24 jet bombers now stationed in Poland. An estimated force of 1,500 aircraft could be deployed within 10 days to support campaigns in Western Europe. Additional augmentation from naval and Long Range Aviation medium bomber forces is also possible.

4. (TS) ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. Enumeration of Enemy Ground Capabilities.

(1) Against a Single Tripartite/US Axis along the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn:

(a) Delay on successive positions to the Elbe River, vicinity Magdeburg, with seven infantry battalions supported by one artillery battalion equivalent and one tank company.
(b) Defend along the east bank of the Elbe River with the forces enumerated in (a) plus one tank regiment.
(c) Reinforce (a) or (b) with the balance of the army-four motorized rifle divisions, two tank divisions, and seven SAP regiments.

(2) Against a Tripartite/US Use of, or Threat of Use, a Second Avenue of Approach from Kassel-Magdeburg. Under this condition the East Germans can:

(a) Delay along the Hclmatedt-Berlin Autobahn with forces enumerated in paragraph (1)(a) concurrent with delaying the advance along the Kassel-Magdeburg axis with six infantry battalions and one tank battalion supported by one artillery battalion-equivalcnt.
(b) Reinforce in the vicinity of Magdeburg with the three motorized rifle divisions, one tank division and two SAP regiments concurrent with reinforcing the delaying forces along the Kassel-Magdeburg axis in the vicinity of Sondershausen with one motorized rifle division, one tank division, five SAP regiments and one BSP brigade.

(3) In the event of employment of Soviet forces in addition to the East German forces, the Soviets could oppose an advance along the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn with four tank and four motorized divisions and, concurrently oppose an advance along the Kassel-Magdeburg-Berlin axis employing three tank and four motorized divisions

(4) The commitment of the fifteen divisions in (3) above leaves five divisions available as reserve forces to insure the defense of the remainder of East Germany.

b. Enumeration of Enemy Air Capabilities.

(1) The East German Air Force is capable of the following:

(a) Ground support of the East German Army.
(b) Interdiction and reconnaissance operations within jet fighter range of East Germany.
(c) Defending East German air space with jet fighters, SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery over operating airfields and areas of ground force operations.
(d). Conducting ECM operations against Allied aircraft.

(2) Soviet Air Forces.

(a) Giving massive support to the EGAF air operations to include supplies, maintenance, replacement and augmentation aircraft, and technical/operational personnel, advice and services.
(b) Providing volunteer crews and aircraft to include types not now in the EGAF inventory.
(c) Carrying out by direct participation all types of operations to include the use of conventional and nuclear weapons.
(d) Carrying out strikes against targets on the European continent, and in the Mediterranean Sea, Middle East and North Africa, with jet light bombers, jet medium bombers, jet and turboprop heavy bombers, air-to-surface missiles with ranges up to 350 nautical miles and surface-to-surface missiles with ranges from 150 to 1, 100 nautical miles employing conventional, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

5. (TS) CONCLUSIONS

a. Neither the Soviet nor the puppet leadership of East Germany is prepared to accept defeat on what they consider a fundamental point of national interest by passive acceptance of a Tripartite or unilateral US military solution to the problem of maintaining access to Berlin.

b. The Soviets may elect a course of action aimed at localizing any military clash, while they seek an advantageous political solution to the crisis in some desired negotiating forum. Nevertheless, the probability exists that increasing force levels may trigger an explosive escalation if the Soviets are determined to oppose since neither the Soviets nor the West can guarantee a level of restraint which would bar escalation. In any case the Soviets will commit sufficient East German and/or Soviet forces to defeat decisively tripartite or US unilateral forces on East German territory, Sufficient forces are available in the forward area to achieve this objective without resorting to the initiation of nuclear weapons.

c. If West German troops participated in the Allied penetration of East German territory, the Warsaw Pact would be invoked, and the Soviet forces probably would be employed openly. Polish and Czechoslovak forces would also become available, but their early use is not considered likely.

d. The probability of adoption of various courses of action by the East German and Soviet forces would be dependent upon the political decisions made by the US and Allied nations and by the USSR as the situation develops. The following are believed to represent the most probable courses of military action.

(1) Based on a political decision to oppose with military forces, and seek a political settlement, the East Germans would harass, impede, and attempt to deny access to all movements along the Helmstedt-Berlin axis and then defend at the Elbe River with the objective of forcing the issue into a negotiating forum.

(2) Based on a political decision to oppose a Tripartite/ US force of one or two divisions, East Germany would defend the Elbe River with forces available, and with full Soviet support less than open commitment of USSR forces.

(3) Based on a political decision to oppose a force of corps size, Soviet forces would be prepared to reinforce East German forces as necessary to include the provision of military assistance openly. In the event of open commitment of Soviet combat forces, the objective of these forces operating in conjunction with the East German forces, would be the decisive defeat of invading Tripartite or unilateral US forces and the ejection of these forces from East Germany.

(4) In the event Tripartite or unilateral US forces establish a salient in East Germany astride the Western end of the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn, Soviet forces would reinforce East German forces in sealing off the salient, mass the bulk of their strength to the north and initiate limited offensive action to create a salient deep in the North European Plain, thereby threatening the northern flank of NATO.

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2. (TS) ASSUMPTIONS.

a. Prior to the decision to use military force for the purpose of restoring air and ground access to Berlin or other essential rights, the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and France have agreed to accept the risk of general war and will undertake appropriate measures to insure that they are prepared for this contingency.

b. Appropriate NATO authorities hive been informed of the Tripartite decision to use military force and have been request ed to take immediately all necessary measures in preparation for general war, should this be the result.

c. One or more of the Tripartite operations ("FREE STYLE", "TRADE WIND", or "JUNE BALL"), or U.S. unilateral operations to determine Soviet/GDR intentions will have been implemented.

d. The following UK and French forces will be available for this plan.

(1) One UK Brigade.
(2) One French reinforced infantry division.
(3) Two UK tactical fighter squadrons.
(4) One UK RECON squadron.
(5) Two French tactical fighter squadrons.
(6) Necessary support for above forces. 

e. Logistical support will be a national responsibility.

f. Nuclear weapons will be employed only if:

(1) They are used against Allied forces.
(2) Necessary to avoid defeat of major military operations,
(3) A deliberate political decision is made to employ them.

g. Special release procedures will be established for the release of nuclear weapons in support of this operation.

h. In executing this plan, the capability to execute essential general war tasks will be maintained by NATO.

i. Attainment of the political objectives will result in a cessation of offensive operations.

j. NATO forces other than Tripartite will not participate in operations in East Germany in the execution of this plan.

k. NATO nations will permit use of facilities necessary for the support of this plan.

l. Prior to execution of this plan on a Tripartite basis, authority will have been obtained to deploy nuclear weapons and delivery forces into France to facilitate continued coverage of SACEUR ASP scheduled targets.

m. The U.S. will be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons to the extent that such use will enhance the military effectiveness of the operation. Decision as to their use is reserved for the President.

n. In the event that French and UK forces are not made avail- able for execution of this plan, the U.S. will be prepared to execute it unilaterally, and will be prepared to substitute U.S. forces for the French and UK forces not made available.

o. At least ten (10) days will be available for redeployment of units, logistical preparations and establishment of communications before execution of this plan (Plan A)(Plan B)(Plan C).

p. SACEUR will provide the ground and air commanders and staffs for the execution of this plan (PlanA)(Plan B)(Plan C), and the air commander and staff for the execution of (Plan D).

q. In the event that UK and French forces are not employed in the execution of this plan (Plan A)(Plan B)(Plan C), USCINCEUR will provide the ground and air commanders and staffs required for its unilateral (U.S. ) execution. 

r. In the event that UK and French forces are not employed in the execution of this plan (Plan D), CINCUSAFE will provide the commander and staff required for its unilateral (U. S. ) execution. 

s. USCINCEUR forces will be augmented from CONUS by 1 armored division and 1 infantry division, essential supporting troops, plus 24 tactical fighter squadrons, 4 reconnaissance squadrons, 2 C-124 squadrons and 1 tactical control group (Plan A only).

t. USCINCEUR forces will be augmented from CONUS by 1 armored division, 3 infantry divisions, 1 corps headquarters and essential supporting troops, plus 24 tactical fighter squadrons, 4 reconnaissance squadrons, 2 C-124 squadrons and 1 tactical control group. (Plan B only)

u. Following assumptions apply to Plan C only:

(1) USCINCEUR forces will be augmented from CONUS by 1 armored division, 2 airborne divisions, 3 infantry divisions, 1 corps headquarters and essential supporting troops plus 24 tactical fighter squadrons, 4 reconnaissance squadrons, 2 C-124 squadrons and 1 tactical control group.
(2) The USSR, is not willing to escalate the conflict to that degree necessary to prevent establishment of the Mittel-land Canal - Elbe River salient in East Germany.
(3) In the establishment of the Mittellard Canal - Elbe River salient in East Germany other NATO forces will protect the flanks to that degree necessary to preclude GDR/ USSR envelopment or encirclement of the sailent.

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3. (TS) CONCEPT OF OPERATION - PLAN A.

a. Mission.

Tripartite forces (U.S. forces unilaterally) conduct military operations against GDR/USSR military forces in East Germany to overcome opposition to Allied ground access to Berlin.

b. Execution.

(1) Concept.

(a) SACEUR will provide Tripartite ground and air commanders and staffs. 

(b) Forces consisting of a reinforced corps, supported by tactical air, attack along the Helmstedt-Berlin axis toward Berlin to overcome opposition to Allied ground access to Berlin.

(c). Tactical air support of ground operations and air defense of ground forces and installations will be provided to the maximum extent practicable. In addition to air support of ground operations, progressive air battle actions as contained in Plan D may be conducted concurrently. 

(d) Use of nuclear weapons will be avoided or deferred, as long as possible , even though opposed by Soviet forces, in order to prevent escalation of the conflict. Nuclear weapons will be used only if authorized by the President. Such employment against the enemy will be considered only in the following circumstances:

1. When they are used against Tripartite or Allied forces.
2. When their use is necessary to avoid defeat of major military forces.
3. When a political decision has been made to employ them.

(e) Chemical and biological weapons will be used only if authorized by the President.

(f) Plans will provide for air defense and for the safeguarding of deployed nuclear capabilities .

(g) Allied forces will be prepared to halt operations at any time and disengage as directed.

(h) In the event that French and UK forces are not made available, U.S. forces will be prepared to execute the operation unilaterally.

(i) In the execution of the operations contemplated herein, the capability to carry out essential general war tasks will be maintained.

(j) Coordination with U .K. and French forces not authorized until directed by USCINCEUR.

(2) USAREUR.

(a) On order provide forces for attack along Helmstedt-Berlin axis to overcome opposition to Allied ground access to Berlin.

(b) Be prepared to employ tactical nuclear weapons as provided for in paragraph 3b(1)(d)

(c) Be prepared to halt military operations at any time and disengage. 

(d) Be prepared to substitute U.S. forces for UK or French forces not made available. 

(e) In the event UK or French forces are not employed in the execution of this plan, provide U.S. ground force commander and staff.

(f) Be prepared to execute SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan and Atomic Strike Plan if escalation of violence occurs to that extent.

(3) USNAVEUR.

(a) Increase ASW surveillance.

(b) Deploy to vicinity of general war positions.

(c) Be prepared to increase nuclear delivery forces on alert.

(d) Be prepared to control or close the Turkish Straits.

(e) Be prepared to conduct operations, to include surveillance, reprisals and destruction, of USSR/GDR shipping and naval forces.

(f) Be prepared to employ tactical nuclear weapons as provided for in paragraph 3b(1)(d).

(g) Be prepared to execute SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan and Atomic Strike Plan if escalation of violence occurs to-that extent.

(4) USAFE.

(a) On order provide forces for air action as directed to include any combination of the following:

1. Conduct reconnaissance flights through the central air corridor by non-tactical aircraft and expand coverage to include reconnaissance from within the northern and southern air corridors as required.
2. Establish a 24-hour visual and photo reconnaissance coverage of the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn and contiguous areas with tactical reconnaissance aircraft deviating from the central air corridor as required to produce necessary intelligence. Reconnaissance will be expanded to include East German air bases if indicated.
3. Place an armed reconnaissance force over the advancing ground forces.
4. Establish a mixed armed reconnaissance/ air-defense force to be airborne in vicinity of western approach to Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn.
5. Establish airborne strike forces to be immediately available for close air support ope rations as required. Additional forces will be placed on ground alert to be available on an on-call basis .
6. Make close air support strikes on GDR/ USSR ground forces as requested by ground force commander.
7. If GDR/USSR air forces enter into battle and attack air or ground forces, strike primary and secondary air bases in East Germany where GDR/USSR forces are deployed. If only GDR air forces enter into battle, strike only bases where GDR forces are deployed, to include bases jointly occupied by GDR and USSR air units.
8. Gain and maintain air superiority as required in support of the ground battle.

(b) Be prepared to halt operations at any time and disengage.

(c) Be prepared to substitute U.S. forces for UK or French forces not made available.

(d) In the event UK or French forces are not employed in the execution of this plan, provide U.S. air commander and staff.  

(e) Be prepared to employ tactical nuclear weapons when directed.

Be prepared for execution of SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan and Atomic Strike Plan if escalation of violence occurs to that extent.

(5) Berlin Command.

Execute defense of West Berlin in accordance with Allied Operational Instruction Number 7, Allied Staff Berlin.

(6) Coordinating Instructions.

(a) Existing COC/ACOC procedures will apply.

(b) Direct coordination between CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSNAVEUR and CINCUSAFE authorized.

(c) Coordination with non-U.S. forces not authorized until directed by USCINCEUR.

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OUTLINE PLAN - PLAN B

PLAN B IS IDENTICAL TO PLAN A WITH THE FOLLOWING EXCEPTION:

Under ASSUMPTIONS, paragraph 2 t applies. There will be two (2) U.S. divisions available to strengthen ACE's general war posture in event of Tripartite execution of this plan and one (1) U.S. division for this purpose in event of U.S. unilateral execution.













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3. (TS) CONCEPT OF OPERATION - PLAN C .

a. Mission.

Tripartite forces (U .S. forces unilaterally) conduct military operations against GDR/USSR military forces in East Germany to overcome opposition to Allied ground access to Berlin; and if confronted with superior Communist forces, to establish and maintain a salient in East Germany for a period of 15-20 days.

b. Execution.

(1) Concept.

(a) SACEUR will provide Tripartite ground and air commanders and staffs.

(b) Forces consisting of one reinforced corps, supported by tactical air, attack along Helmstedt-Berlin axis toward Berlin to overcome opposition to Allied ground access to Berlin. Should GDR/USSR forces prevent Allied access to Berlin, a salient into East Germany will be established and maintained for 15-20 days to a minimum depth of the Mittelland Canal - Elbe River area. Phases of operations generally as follows:

1. Phase I. Forces attack to overcome opposition to Allied ground access to Berlin.
2. Phase II. Establish and maintain a salient in East Germany to a minimum depth of Mittelland Canal - Elbe River. (This Phase assumes forces unable to accomplish Phase I.)

(c) Tactical air support of ground operations and air defense of ground forces and installations will be provided to the maximum extent practicable. In addition to air support of ground operations, progressive air battle actions as contained in Plan D may be conducted concurrently. 

(d) Use of nuclear weapons will be avoided or deferred, as long as possible, even though opposed by Soviet forces in order to prevent escalation of the conflict. Nuclear weapons will be used only if authorized by the President. Such employment against the enemy will be considered only in the following circumstances:

1. When they are used against Tripartite or Allied forces.
2. When their use is necessary to avoid defeat of major military forces.
3. When a political decision has been made to employ them.

(e) Chemical and biological weapons will be used only if authorized by the President, 

(f) Plans will provide for air defense and for the safeguarding of deployed nuclear capabilities.

(g) Allied forces will be prepared to halt operations at any time and disengage as directed. 

(h) In the event that French and UK forces are not made available, U.S. forces will be prepared to execute the operation unilaterally.

(i) In the execution of the operations contemplated herein, the capability to carry out essential general war tasks will be maintained. 

(j) Coordination with non-U .S . forces not authorized until directed by USCINCEUR.

(2) USAREUR.

(a) On order provide forces for attack along Helmstedt-Berlin axis to overcome opposition to Allied ground access to Berlin. Should GDR/USSR forces prevent Allied access to Berlin, a salient into East Germany will be established and maintained for 15-20 days to a minimum depth of the Mittelland Canal - Elbe River area.

(b) Phasing for operation will be as set forth in paragraph 3b(1)(b) above.

(c) Be prepared to employ tactical nuclear weapons as provided in paragraph 3b(1) (d) above,

(d) Be prepared to halt military operations at any time and disengage.

(e) Be prepared to substitute U.S. forces for UK or French forces not made available. 

(f) In the event UK or French forces are not employed in the execution of this plan provide U.S. ground force commander and staff.

(g) Be prepared for execution of SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan and Atomic Strike Plan if escalation of violence occurs to that extent.

(3) USNAVEUR.

(a) Increase ASW surveillance.

(b) Deploy to vicinity of general war positions.

(c) Be prepared to increase nuclear delivery forces on alert.

(d) Be prepared to control-or close the Turkish Straits.

(e) Be Prepared to conduct operations, to include surveillance, reprisals and destruction, of USSR/GDR shipping and naval forces.

(f) Be prepared to employ tactical nuclear weapons as provided for in paragraph 3b(1)(d).

(g) Be prepared for execution of SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan and Atomic Strike Plan if escalation of violence occurs to that extentt.

(4) USAFE

(a) On order provide forces for air action as directed to include any combination of the following:

1. Conduct reconnaissance flights through the central air corridor by non-tactical aircraft and expand coverage to include reconnaissance from within the northern and southern air corridors as required.
2. Establish a 24-hour visual and photo reconnaissance coverage of the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn and contiguous areas with tactical reconnaissance aircraft deviating from the central air corridor as required to produce necessary intelligence. Reconnaissance will be expanded to include East German air bases if indicated.
3. Place an armed reconnaissance force over the advancing ground forces.
4. Establish a mixed armed reconnaissance/air defense force to be airborne in vicinity of western approach to Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn.
5. Establish airborne strike forces to be immediately available for close air support operations as required. Additional forces will be placed on ground alert to be available on an on-call basis.
6. Make close air support strikes on GDR/ USSR ground forces as requested by ground force commander.
7. If GDR/USSR air forces enter into battle and attack air or ground forces, strike primary and secondary air bases in East Germany where GDR/USSR forces are deployed. If only GDR air forces enter into battle, strike only bases where GDR forces are deployed, to include bases jointly occupied by GDR and USSR air units.
8. Gain and maintain air superiority as required in support of the ground battle.

(b) Be prepared to halt operations at any time and disengage.

(c) Be prepared to substitute U.S. forces for UK or French forces not made available. 

(d) In the event UK or French forces are not employed in the execution of this plan, provide U.S. air commander and staff.

(e) Be prepared to employ tactical nuclear weapons when directed.

(f) prepared for execution of SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan and Atomic Strike Plan if escalation of violence occurs to that extent.  

(5) Berlin Command.

Execute defense of West Berlin in accordance with Allied Operational Instruction Number 7, Allied Staff Berlin.

(6) Coordinating Instructions.

(a) Existing COC/ACOC procedures will apply.

(b) Direct coordination between CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSNAVEUR and CINCUSAFE authorized.

(c) Coordination with non-U .S . forces not authorized until directed by USCINCEUR.



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3. (TS) CONCEPT OF OPERATION - PLAN D.

a. Mission.

Tripartite forces (U. S. forces unilaterally) conduct air operations against GDR/USSR military forces in East Germany to overcome opposition to Allied access to Berlin, and against selected targets and areas outside of East Germany as specifically directed.

b. Execution.

(1) Concept.

(a) SACEUR will provide Tripartite air commander and staff.

(b) Air forces conduct air operations independently or in support of Plans A, B and C to overcome opposition to Allied access to Berlin, employing as directed a selection of varying degrees of air involvement.

(c) Phases of operation will be generally as follows:

1. Phase I. Maintain access to Berlin via air corridor by:
a. Institution of airlift plans with air cover.
b. Conduct of air-to-air battles in general area of the corridors to include attacks on air defense installations.
2. Phase II. In the event Phase I fails to maintain access, the following applies:
a. Air-to-air battles may be extended to include areas outside the corridors to include attacks on GDR airfields, associated ground targets, and air defense installations.
3. Phase III. Should Phases I and II fail to persuade the Soviets to restore essential rights the following actions will be instituted:
a. Initiate such action as necessary to gain air superiority against GDR/USSR air forces in East Germany.
b. Air superiority operations against Poland and Czechoslovakia will be initiated in the event these countries are not considered as sanctuaries.
4. Phase IV. Nuclear operations.
a. Small-scale tactical nuclear operations designed to demonstrate U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons. The initial use of nuclear weapons must be clearly restrained in order to minimize the risk of a pre-emptive attack on the U.S. and/or our Allies and to demonstrate Western intentions to confine the use to military targets. These targets will be located outside the USSR, subject to destruction by relatively low-yield weapons, and of military significance with minimum associated loss of civilians. Suitable targets will include, but not be limited to, a Soviet military aircraft over Allied territory or international waters, a Soviet artillery battery committed against either U.S. or Allied forces, a Soviet warship at sea committing or involved in a hostile act, or a Soviet airbase in East Germany.
b. Limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons to destroy Communist military targets.
(1) This selective use of tactical nuclear weapons is intended to reduce Soviet military power and to increase Soviet appreciation that the U.S. would use these weapons on a wider scale or would launch strategic forces if the Soviets do not reopen access to Berlin. It will demonstrate restraint in order to minimize danger of pre-emptive attack on the U.S. and/or our Allies, while emphasizing Western intentions to confine nuclear weapons to military targets.
(2) Targets will be located outside the USSR and produce minimum civilian losses. Suitable targets would include Soviet airbases, Soviet warships, Soviet troop concentrations or military installations in proximity to Allied forces, and large-scale tank attacks on Allied forces.
c. Targeting for and attacks on Soviet nuclear delivery systems capable of striking the United States and our Allies in Western Europe, should be separated from the foregoing plans in order to avoid forcing Soviet attacks on the United States, but readiness to strike such targets quickly and effectively must be maintained.

(d) Use of nuclear weapons will be avoided or deferred, as long as possible, even though opposed by Soviet forces, in order to prevent escalation of the conflict. Nuclear weapons will be used only if authorized by the President. Such employment against the enemy will be considered only in the following circumstances:

1. When they are used against Tripartite or Allied forces.
2. When their use is necessary to avoid defeat of major military forces.
3. When a political decision has been made to employ them.

(e) Chemical and biological weapons will be used only if authorized by the President.

(f) Plans will provide for air defense and for the safeguarding of deployed nuclear capabilities.

(g) Allied forces will be prepared to halt operations at any time and disengage as directed.

(h) In the event that French and UK forces are not made available, U.S. forces will be prepared to execute the operation unilaterally.

(i) In the execution of the operations contemplated herein, U.S. posture for general war will be maintained.

(j) Coordination with non-U. S. forces not authorized until directed by USCINCEUR.

(2) USAREUR.

(a) Be prepared for execution of SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan and Atomic Strike Plan if escalation of violence occurs to that extent.

(3) USNAVEUR.

(a) Be prepared for execution of SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan and Atomic Strike Plan if escalation of violence occurs to that extent.

(4) USAFE

(a) On order provide forces to conduct air operations as set forth in paragraph 3b(1)(c) of Concept (Phases of Operation independently or in support of Plans A, B, and C.

(b) Be prepared to halt operations at any time and disengage.

(c) Be prepared to substitute US forces for UK or French forces not made available.

(d) In the event UK or French forces are not employed in the execution of this plan provide US air commander and staff.

(e) Be prepared for execution of SACEUR's Emergency Defense Plan and Atomic Strike Plan if escalation of violence occurs to that extent.

(5) Berlin Command

(a) Be prepared to execute defense of West Berlin in accordance with Allied Operational Instruction Number 7, Allied Staff Berlin.

(6) Coordinating Instructions

(a) Existing COC/ACOC procedures will apply.

(b) Direct coordination between CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSNAVEUR and CINCUSAFE authorized.

(c) Coordination with non-US forces not authorized until directed by USCINCEUR.

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4. (TS) FORCES AVAILABLE - PLAN A.

a. Those forces assigned USCINCEUR as of 1 Sep 61.

b. Augmentation U. S. forces from CONUS.

(1) Army
(a) One infantry division
(b) One armored division 
(2) Air Force
(a) Twenty-four tactical fighter squadrons
(b) Four reconnaissance squadrons
(c) Two C-124 squadrons
(d) One tactical air control group 

c. UK and French forces 

(1) Army
(a) One French reinforced infantry division
(b) One UK brigade
(2) Air Force
(a) Two UK tactical fighter squadrons
(b) One UK reconnaissance squadron
(c) Two French tactical fighter squadrons

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4. (TS) FORCES AVAILABLE - PLAN B.

a. Those forces assigned USCINCEUR as of 1 Sep 61.

b. Augmentation U.S. forces from CONUS.

(1) Army
(a) Three infantry divisions
(b) One armored division
(c) One corps headquarters and essential supporting troops.
(2) Air Force
(a) Twenty-four tactical fighter squadrons
(b) Four reconnaissance squadrons
(c) Two C-124 Squadrons
(d) One tactical air control group

c. UK and French forces.

(1) Army
(a) One French reinforced infantry division
(b) One UK brigade
(2) Air Force
(a) Two UK tactical fighter squadrons
(b) One UK reconnaissance squadron
(c) Two French tactical fighter squadrons

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4. (TS) FORCES AVAILABLE - PLAN C.

a. Those forces assigned USCINCEUR as of 1 Sep 61.

b. Augmentation U.S. forces from CONUS.

(1) Army
(a) Three infantry divisions
(b) Two airborne divisions
(c) One armored division
(d) One corps headquarters and essential supporting troops
(2) Air Force
(a) Twenty-four tactical fighter squadrons
(b) Four reconnaissance squadrons
(c) Two C-124 squadrons
(d) One tactical air control group

c. UK and French forces.

(1) Army
(a) One French reinforced infantry division
(b) One UK brigade
(2) Air Force
(a) Two UK tactical fighter squadrons
(b) One UK reconnaissance squadron
(c) Two French tactical fighter squadrons

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4. (TS) FORCES AVAILABLE - PLAN D.

a. Those air forces assigned USCINCEUR as of 1 Sep 61.

b. Augmentation forces from CONUS.

(1) Twenty-four tactical fighter squadrons
(2) Four reconnaissance squadrons
(3) One tactical air control group

c. UK and French forces.

(1) Two UK tactical fighter squadrons
(2) One UK reconnaissance squadron
(3) Two French tactical fighter squadrons

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5. (TS) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.

a. Tripartite Option

SACEUR will exercise operational command over forces involved in this operation through established NATO command channels, using existing ACE communications facilities and control procedures and augmented as appropriate by national means.

b. U.S. Unilateral Option

USCINCEUR will exercise operational command over U.S. Forces involved in this operation through CINCUSAREUR and CINCUSAFE. USAREUR/USAFE COC/ACOC procedures will apply.









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