OCRers Note: The following page excerpts came from “History of Headquarters, Strategic Air Command 1961: SAC Historical Study No. 89”. You can read the full article HERE. The reason I chose not to OCR it all, was due to poor page quality overall, and a lot of it was just “the usual”.

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Pages 3 to 4

The SAC force included three ZI numbered air forces commanded by lieutenant generals: Eighth Air Force, Lieutenant General Hunter Harris, Jr.; Fifteenth Air Force, lieutenant General Archie J. Old, Jr.; and Second Air Force, Lieutenant General John D. Ryan. The 1st Strategic Aerospace Division was commanded by Major General Joseph J. Preston; the Sixteenth Air Force by Major General David Wade; the 7th Air Division by Major General Edwin B. Broadhurst; and the 3rd Air Division by Major General William C. Kingsbury.

Subordinate commands conducted peacetime air operations within the following areas of responsibility:

Second Air Force - East of 95° west longitude from US-Canadian border to the Pole and west of a line drawn north on 81° west longitude from the US-Canadian border to 60° north latitude, east to 66 west longitude, and north to the Pole.

Eighth Air Force - Greenland, west of 35° west longitude; and in Canada east of a line drawn north on 61° west longitude from the US-Canadian border to 60° north latitude, east to 68° west longitude, and north to the Pole.

Fifteenth Air Force - Pacific (east of International Date Line); Alaska; and Canada (west of 95° west longitude).

Sixteenth Air Force - Area east of 35° west longitude, west of 90° east longitude, and south of 47° north latitude.

3rd AIR Division - Far East (west of the International Date Line and east of the 90° east longitude.

7th Air Division - United Kingdom; Iceland; east of 35° west longitude and north of 47° north latitude.

To direct the strategic offensive should SAC Headquarters become inoperative, the command established alternate headquarters at each of the three ZI numbered air forces and in the airborne command post (ABNCP). An alternate CINCSAC would assume command under these conditions:

Condition ALFA - When SAC Headquarters has been destroyed and this fact confirmed through visual or radar inspection by the airborne command post.

Condition BRAVO - When it has been positively determined that the command of SAC units and direction of SAC EWO forces cannot emanate from General Power, CINCSAC, or Lieutenant General McConnell, the Vice CINCSAC.

Effective 1 October 1961, the following general officers were designated successors to CINCSAC (in order of succession): (1) Lieutenant General John P. McConnell, Vice CINCSAC; (2) Lieutenant General Archie J. Old, Jr., Commander, Fifteenth Air Force; (3) Lieutenant General Hunter Harris Jr., Commander, Eighth Air Force; (4) Lieutenant General John D. Ryan, Commander, Second Air Force; and (5) CINCSAC Airborne.

The last named was the general officer designated as the Airborne Emergency Action Officer aboard the ABNCP. The designated successors would constantly maintain the capability to assume command.

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Page 57

No formal SAC program existed to disperse medium units, but unit inactivations and conversions had gradually made the majority of medium bases single wing stations. Only five of 18 medium bomber bases had two wings assigned in December 1961; there had been no change since June.

The command achieved an added degree of dispersal by sending B-47s to selected civilian and military airfields within the United States, end by deploying to overseas bases. By July 1961, the "Clutch Pedal" dispersal operation was a year old and had become routine. Two aircraft per wing flew (without weapons) to a dispersal base every quarter,. remained for 12 to 72 hours to familiarise crews and maintenance personnel with the base, and returned to their home base.

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Page 93

Production Rate. An Increased Atlas production rate had been advocated by the command late in 1960. The rationale behind the suggested rise from 10 to 14 missiles each month was the predicted impact upon the operational program as veil as the need for additional missiles for operational sites and training. On 6 January 1961 USAF approved a production capacity of 12 missiles per month.

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Page 99

At the close of June 1961, 24 of 60 Thor missiles were on 18-minute alert, 15 were on 25-minute alert, and 8 could he launched in six hours. Eleven more possessed an emergency combat capability (ECC).

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Page 103

The SAC supported an ASM-B-52 program which called for 22 squadrons of B-52F, G, and H models equipped with the Skybolt (46 UE) and 17 squadrons of B-52C, D, and E aircraft with the .Hound Dog (23 UE).

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Page 111

The RSB-70 would be deployed in a combat configuration at all times. An alert strike team composed of one RSB-70 and one KC-135 to provide refueling, maintenance, spares, and expendables would provide the ready strike potential. The RSB-70 would be equipped with a support pod. This pod would provide simultaneous engine starts and carry limited aircraft spares. Each RSB-70 wing would have a main operating base for providing maintenance, supply, training, and housing; and four military bases for dispersal. Approximately five alert strike teams would operate from each main base and five from each primary dispersal base in peacetime. About 65 per cent of all RSB-70s assigned to combat units would be maintained on ground and air alert at all times. "During periods of tension, the alert strike teams would be deployed to pre-selected dispersal bases. The RSB-70 strike teams would be directed to loiter under positive control, in selected areas, enroute to the secondary dispersal bases.

(Sources: IOM, DPLBC. to DOR. et al., "RSB-70 Operational Plan," 3 Nov 61, with 2 Atchs: (1) Outline of RSB-7o Operational Plan, and (2) Concept of Operations RSB-70 Weapon System.)

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Page 117

The R-47s and the E-47s were the old RB-47s redesignated.

The redesignation was necessary to clearly distinguish reconnaissance Stratojets from bombers to lessen the propaganda potential should another one be shot down by the Russians. The modified B-47s were redesignated in August 1961 as follows:

RB-47H to R-47H
RB-47K to R-47K
RB-47E to E-47

ERB-47K to ER-47H

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Page 158

The command's combat crews possessed a standardized EWO execution package, termed the "Combat Mission Folder" (CMF), containing a Jet Navigation Chart (JNC), an Operational Navigation Chart/World Aeronautical Chart (ONC/WAC), and the Series 200 Air Target Chart (ATC).

A typical EWO mission beginning at high altitude required the use of the JNC. As the sortie progressed, and if the aircraft descended, the navigator changed to the ONC.

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Page 184

Crew Performance - Bombing

High Altitude


Release #1

Release #2

Type Crew

Runs

R/F

CEA

Runs

R/F

CEA

Select

12

100%

948

12

91.6%

2,879

Senior

11

100%

934

11

100%

964

Type Acft

Runs

R/F

CEA

Runs

R/F

CEA

B-47

12

100%

888

12

91.6

2,517

B-52

11

100%

1,000

11

100

1,359

Low Altitude


Release #1

Release #2

Type Crew

Runs

R/F

CEA

Runs

R/F

CEA

Select

13

92.3%

1,810

13

(Illegible)

4,067

Senior

10

90%

1,580

10

(Illegible)

2,900

Type Acft

Runs

R/F

CEA

Runs

R/F

CEA

B-47

11

81.8%

2,238

11

72.7%

6,491

B-52

12

100%

1,183

12

100%

873

SOURCE: Extract, from Final Report, 1961 Combat Competition, in DXIH.

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Page 186

Air Refueling Times


Minimum

Maximum

Average

B-47/KC-97

3:53

11:36

5:23

B-47/KC-135

7:45

9:48

8:36

B-52/KC-97

5:40

8:57

6:37

B-52/KC-135

9:10

11:38

9:59

B-47 Crossover

1:45

5:33

4:01

B-52 Crossover

3:31

5:03

4:16



Disconnects
(Number of disconnects experienced by bomber crews with each type tanker)


0

1

2

3

4 or more

B-47/KC-97

5

4

2

1

0

B-47/KC-135

2

4

0

0

0

B-52/KC-97

0

8

2

1

0

B-52/KC-1353

3

1

1

1

0

SOURCE: Extract, from Final Report, 1961 Combat Competition, in DXIH.