23 January 1958

WDTQ

MEMORANDUM TO WDT COLONEL TERHUNE

Reference: Meeting between Colonel Terhune, Colonel Norton, Dr. Dunn and Colonel Hall on 21 January

SUBJECT: "Q" Program Schedules

1. At a meeting on 21 January attended by Colonels Terhune, Norton and Hall and Dr. Dunn, a series of discussions occurred resulting in agreements relative to the objectives and schedules of the "Q" Program. It is the understanding of WDTQ that the essential elements of these agreements include:

a. A TBM will be made available for overseas TAC operation with first delivery out of R&D stock occurring in July 1961.
b. An ICBM will be made available for SAC operation from continental USA with first delivery from R&D stock by July 1962.
c. That provision of each of these missiles will be initiated from production sources one year after first delivery from R&D stock.

2. The agreements enumerated above were felt to be based upon a recognition that unless expeditious action is taken to supply a TBM fulfilling the requirements of GOR #161, POLARIS will probably be procured for this purpose.

3. Procurement of POLARIS for this purpose, in the opinion of WDTQ, would almost certainly very seriously compromise any projected Air Force program aimed at employing large numbers of solid rocket missiles in the operational pattern currently associated with Project "Q". This is so because of the necessity to greatly augment the capacities of both the solid rocket industry and the inertial guidance industry to meet these demands. Use of these industries to produce components for a materially accelerated POLARIS program involving land-base use will largely preclude the possibility of developing the peculiar characteristics of guidance and power plant elements which would be required to exploit the low cost potentialities of the "Q" concept.

4. In light of these agreements, it is requested that RW be informed of the TBM and ICBM schedules involved to minimize friction in the accomplishment of this program.

5. This office would like to reiterate that failure to vigorously prosecute the TBM program might have the gravest consequences on the solid ICBM program.

EDWARD H. HALL, Colonel, USAF
Assistant for Weapon System "Q"

WDTQ 58-13