REMARKS

GENERAL CURTIS E. LEMAY

AT COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB -- JANUARY 1956

INDEX OF CHARTS
AND
OF ADDENUM

CHART NO.

NINE BASIC POINTS ON WHICH WE ALL AGREE

1. THE PREVENTION OF AGGRESSION

2. THE AIR POWER BATTLE

3. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY OFFENSIVE

4. THE OFFENSIVE FORCE

5. DEFENSE AFTER OFFENSE

6. INTERCONTINENTAL CAPABILITY

7. CENTRALIZED CONTROL

8. THE PRINCIPLE OF SECURITY

9. THE PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMY OF FORCE

10. WHERE ARE WE ACTUALLY HEADED IN THE AIR FORCE

11. FSPO 65-1 TAC (BY WINGS)

12. FSPO 65-1 TAC (GRAPH - NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT)

13. FSPO 65-1 ADC (BY WINGS)

14. FSPO 65-1 ADC (GRAPH - NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT)

15. FSPO 65-1 SAC (BY WINGS)

16. FSPO 65-1 SAC (GRAPH - NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT)

17. COMPARISON OF FSPO 65-1 FOR TAC, ADC AND SAC

18. WHERE THE SOVIETS ARE HEADING

19. SOVIET BOMBER PRODUCTION

20. SOVIET HEAVY BOMBER PRODUCTION

21. FORCE TABULATION '59 WAR GAME

22. FORCE TABULATION '60 WAR GAME

23. RESULTS '59 WAR GAUE

24. RESULTS '60 WAR GAME

25. IRBM COVERAGE

26. WE ARE VIOLATING OUR OWN AGREED PRINCIPLES

27. THE PRINCIPLE OF THE OBJECTIVE

28. THE PRINCIPLE OP THE OFFENSIVE

29. THE PRINCIPLE OF MASS

30. THE PRINCIPLE OF SECURITY

31. THE PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMY OF FORCE

32. WHAT KIND OF A FORCE AND ORGANIZATION SHOULD WE HAVE?

33. WHAT CAN WE DO TO ACHIEVE A FORCE AND ORGANIZATION WE REQUIRE?

34. RECOMMENDATIONS

35. RECOMMENDATION A

36. RECOMMENDATION B

37. RECOMMENDATION C

ADDENDUM

A. SPECIFICATIONS FOR SAC MISSILES

B. SPECIFICATIONS FOR TAC MISSILES

C. SPECIFICATIONS FOR ADC MISSILES

D. COST ESTIMATES FOR VARIOUS ITEMS OF EXPENDITURES THAT MAY BE USEFUL IN A GENERAL DISCUSSION

REMARKS
GENERAL CURTIS E. LeMAY
AT COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE
WRIGHT PATTERSON AFB — JANUARY 1S56

The decision made in 1946 to provide the United States Air Force with an atomic striking force probably stands as one of the most prudent military decisions in American history. This was a wise decision because it resulted in the United States going to the offense and building a potent military deterrent to war. Our capability to lay down a devastating atomic offensive has been recognized by the world as the force that has prevented general war for the past decade. However, during the past ten years there have been such major developments that I believe we are again at the position where equally crucial decisions are required.

First, by 1953 or certainly by 1960, according to Intelligence estimates, Russia will for the first time possess the capability of causing unacceptable damage to the United States. Of course I am referring to her long range atomic striking capability.

Second, it appears that in this time period Russia can effectively deny us the use of forward areas. Here I am thinking of the large numbers of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles which she is forecasted to have by 1960.

Third, during the period 1960-65, both USSR and the United States will be in a position to integrate Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles into their striking force.

There is still another situation which has developed that should cause us some concern. It is that the Russians will continue to talk peace, and there are too many people that believe them. This could seriously affect the forces we are given. We must keep this in mind when making our decisions. Before we talk about the decisions to be made, I would like to review with you some basic points on which we all have agreed.

(Chart) NINE BASIC POINTS ON WHICH WE ALL AGREE

1. (Chart No. 1 ) The Prevention of Aggression: The United States is committed to a policy of peace. That is, our military power will be utilized primarily to prevent aggression. However, if war cannot be prevented on terms acceptable to the United States, the Air Force must insure that we win — no matter how it starts or how hollow the victory might be.

2. (Chart No. The Air Power Battle: The first requirement or objective of our Air Force is to win both phases of the Air Power Battle — the deterrent phase and the combat phase. The deterrent phase of the Air Power Battle is being fought now. The deterrent phase that I am talking about is the day to day appraisal both sides must make to determine relative military strengths. There can be no doubt — at such time as Russian forces have the ascendancy over our forces, and it is to her advantage to attack us, she will attack. We must have such a force in being that for Russia to attack the United States would mean committing national suicide.

3. (Chart No. 3) The Destruction of the Enemy Offensive : We all know that the best way to destroy an enemy air offensive force is to attack it in its most vulnerable situation — on the ground before it is launched.

4. (Chart No.4) The Offensive Force: We have previously agreed that the best way to prevent or deter war, and certainly to win one, is to maintain a suitable offensive posture.

5. (Chart No. 5) Defense after Offense: We have previously agreed that we should provide as good a defense as can be afforded after the requirements of the offensive force are satisfied.

6. (Chart No. 6 ) Intercontinental Capability: We have agreed that the offensive force should have a predominantly intercontinental capability. This requirement was to be provided on a first priority basis.

7. (Chart No. 7 ) Centralized Control: We also know and agree that in order to achieve maximum flexibility, control of offensive air power must be centralized. Piecemealing our force to meet the needs of local commanders compromises the inherent advantages of air power. This principle of air power employment must not be ignored if we are to bring to bear the maximum force at the decisive point at the right time.

8. (Chart No.8) The Principle of Security: The force must not be so vulnerable to enemy action as to compromise its strike capability or reliability.

9. (Chart No. 9) The Principle of Economy of Force : Economy of force dictates that the maximum portion of the force be capable of participating in the decisive battle.

Now, we are agreed on our objectives and basically on the means of attaining them. These policies and principles I believe to be sound now and in the foreseeable future — and I am not ready to abandon them. But, let's take a look at where we are heading.

(Chart No. 10 ) WHERE ARE WE ACTUALLY HEADED IN THE AIR FORCE?

The projected force we will have to support the principles and policies we have outlined can best be analyzed by a review of USAF's Force Structure and Program Objectives 1957-1965. This is a review of the wing strength of TAC, ADC, and SAC from 1957 to 1965:

(Chart No. 11) FSPO 65-1 TAC FORCE. As is indicated on this chart, the TAC force reduces slightly in total number of wings — a reduction of four wings from 1957 to 1965. There is an appreciable reduction in fighter bombers with an increase in short range missiles.

On the next chart, which reflects the number of delivery vehicles, (Chart No. 12) FSPO 65-1 TAC, the TAC force actually is growing between 1957 and 1965 — with the growth being in short range missiles.

The composition of the TAC force is such that it has very little capability against air power targets that threaten the United States. Further, the TAC force is tied inflexibly to forward operations and is subjected to the dictates of theater commanders and to international agreements. Just at the critical time of the Air Power Battle these forces are committed for both conventional and atomic support of ground force operations which will be defensive in nature. Not only is this force placed in a most vulnerable position, but also it is subjected to the vagaries of foreign political support. Our Allies may refuse permission to launch atomic attacks from their territories. I do not consider it necessary nor wise that TAC forces continue to be provided to specific land areas in support of political commitments. Instead, forces stationed within the continental limits of the United States can be applied against commitments made to defense alliances.

For the ADC Force (Chart No. 13) FSPO 65-1 ADC. This force increases in sise by 1965 from 34 to 43 Interceptor Wings. There is a slight decrease in total number of aircraft wings with a large increase in total numbers of Missile Wings.

On the next chart (Chart No. 14) FSPO 65-1 ADC, the growth of ADC is more evident. This chart reflects the total number of delivery vehicles programmed. As can be noted by the bottom two areas on the chart, the number of interceptor aircraft remains relatively the same. There is a great increase in the number of missiles, as indicated by the top two areas. This change in composition from manned interceptors to interceptor missiles can be expected to increase further ADC's capability of knocking down Russian bombers. However, we all know that no reasonable increase in force will make it possible for ADC to stop the enemy from inflicting prohibitive damage on us. For this reason we have agreed that defense of the United States against air attack should be accomplished primarily by destroying the enemy offensive capability at its base, and secondarily by airborne interceptions. As we get into the ICBM phase of warfare, the only defense we will have will be the offensive force. The major benefits to be derived from any air defense system are early warning and sufficient threat of attrition to force the enemy to employ less than optimum tactics. In determining the depth of the air defense system, care must be exercised to assure that it is not extended to a point where the cost of such a system renders it liable to the effects of the "law of diminishing returns." Examination of exhaustive studies concerning our programmed defense system for 1960 reveals that it will cost four to five times as much to destroy a B-52 as it costs to get the bomber over the enemy target system. This is assuming that the bomber force is between 500 and 1,000 and that they are employed in an optimum fashion from an air defense standpoint. It is Important to note that costwise, an offense comparable to the proposed 1960 defense would amount to a force of 34 B-52 wings, 45 UE, with supporting tankers on single wing bases. In developing such a defense system against air attack, it must be recognized that no system will be capable of effecting prohibitive losses against a well-coordinated, determined offensive force that has prepared itself for the penetration. Therefore, the air defense system must be restricted to that which can be made available without prejudice to the development, equipping, and maintaining of an offensive system of such size and configuration as will insure a favorable outcome to war, in the event it should fail to deter the war.

Let us now look at the SAC force in some detail. (Chart No. 15) FSPO 65-1 SAC STRIKE FORCE. The apparent reduction in size from 45 wings in 1957 to 30 wings in 1965 does not adequately reflect the tremendous loss in combat potential which will occur. This next chart (Chart No. 16) FSPO 65-1 SAC FORCE portrays in numbers of delivery vehicles what is to happen to the SAC force. This chart shows the total number of SAC delivery vehicles, programmed by year, with the color green indicating fighters, red indicating mediums, orange indicating heavies, and blue indicating missiles. The percentage of the total SAC strike force by type of vehicle is shown for the years 1957, 1960, and 1965. As can be seen, 13 medium bomb wings, having a real and demonstrated combat capability, are being phased out and are being replaced by missiles. By 1965, 55% of the force will be missiles. These missiles can in no sense compensate for this loss in SAC's combat potential. Now, I'm just as anxious as anyone to get a missile into the inventory that will improve or increase our capability, but even if these missiles meet their specifications and time schedules, they could not be depended upon to any acceptable degree In winning the air battle . Furthermore, they could play only a minor role in achieving destruction to the target system as a whole. I agree with Secretary Quarles' recent statement that in the foreseeable future the manned bomber will remain the preferable way of doing the job. He recommended missiles as an auxiliary — or supplement to — rather than a replacement for the manned bomber. And this is the thing that really concerns me: We are not "augmenting" the manned bomber force with the missile, we are "replacing" the bomber with a weapon of questionable capability.

As a summary of my discussion on "Where We are Actually Headed in the Air Force," let us look at this chart (Chart No. 17) COMPARISON OF FSPO 65-1 for TAC, ADC, AND SAC. This includes the total number of aircraft and missiles for the three commands. It shows the growth trends of ADC and TAC, and the static condition of SAC; and it shows the differences we will have in 1965 in numbers of delivery vehicles. Our defense effort is growing and if we added the Army and Navy defense forces as well as their highly vulnerable short range offensive forces, this chart would more dramatically portray the trend toward a defense posture at the expense of the long range offensive capability.

(Chart No. 18) WHERE THE SOVIETS ARE HEADING

Now, let us review where the Soviets are heading.

It should be recalled that Intelligence agencies have frequently under-estimated the development of Soviet air power. Knowing this, experience dictates that we accept Intelligence estimates as fairly conservative or at least representative of the minimum job facing us.

An analysis of current estimates indicates the following significant improvements in Soviet capability.

First, an increasing Soviet long range offensive force.

During the Air Show last summer, the Soviets disclosed that they have long range bomber aircraft comparable to our own. They seem to have recognized that as they acquire the advantages of long range offensive weapons, the existing power relationship will alter, giving them a better bargaining position. As to production capability, the following chart reflects the estimate of Soviet bomber production through 1953 as accepted by the Joint intelligence Committee. (Chart No. 19) SOVIET BOMBER PRODUCTION. The production estimates of jet and turbo-prop bombers of the United States and the Soviets. The time period represented Is from now to mid-1953. It is at once apparent that the current numerical superiority of the United States will have been reduced to parity by the Soviets at the end of the time period. At this time any superiority we may appear to have over the Soviet Long Range Air Force will be purely that of deliverability. But this next chart reveals a more significant trend — dispelling even the appearance of superiority. This next chart shows Soviet heavy bomber production. (Chart No. 20) SOVIET HEAVY BOMBER PRODUCTION. Based on these same production estimates, this chart compares only the projected heavy bomber inventories of the United States and the Soviets during the same time period. And here is the actual key to strategic air superiority until such time as a proven intercontinental ballistics missile force is available. We agree with the JCS position stated in their mid-range plan for 1 July 1957 that — as the nuclear weapons situation tends to balance — the ability to deliver becomes the over-riding consideration. We must face the fact that the key to supremacy is not found in the total number of bombers a force possesses; but rather, that it is in the ability of the force to deliver a decisive blow under the most adverse conditions. In the same time period of which we speak, that ability will be determined primarily by the intercontinental bomber. By mid-1959, Soviet production capacity will be able to augment the long range air army with at least 300 follow-on heavy bombers each year thereafter. These will certainly be high performance aircraft with supersonic dash capability and it is entirely possible that a nuclear power bomber will be in the early stages of production. How much larger the force grows after 1959 seems to me to be related to Soviet success in developing an effective ICBM.

Both of these charts point out the fact that the Soviets will have the advantage in heavy long range offensive aircraft from 1958 on. Our air power deterrent position will be jeopardized from 1958 on.

It is difficult to appreciate our loss of ascendancy unless one looks at the results. Every year we war game our programmed forces against the estimated enemy forces five years in the future. I have extracted comparative data from our war games for 1959 and 1960. I think these extracts highlight what we mean when we say we are losing the ascendancy.

(Chart No. 21) FORCE TABULATION 59 WAR GAME. This chart is the force tabulation for our 1959 war game. It was based on joint estimates which were firm in late 1954. You will note that we held a slight advantage in gross number of aircraft. The next chart, (Chart No. 22) FORCE TABULATION 60 WAR GAME., reflects the force tabulations for the 1960 war game. The advantage in gross numbers of aircraft has definitely swung to the Soviet — and the significant shift is in the heavy bomber category.

The next chart, (Chart No. 23) RESULTS 59 WAR GAME, indicates the results of a war in 1959 with the Soviet taking the initiative. As you can see from the forces regaining, we have no hope of winning such a war. The next chart, (Chart No. 24) RESULTS 60 WAR GAME, reflects the status of the forces after the initial atomic exchange in a war in 1960. There is no hope at all of victory in this time period either. The important thing, however, is that the enemy, because he has emphasized his intercontinental capability, can launch a tremendous force on his first wave in 1960. Although we can conceivably deliver a counterblow of less than 400 weapons on him, we are through — the war is over. We may have hurt him — but he has decimated us. If this predicted shift in supremacy actually occurs, it can be anticipated that the U. S. Air Force will fail in its deterrent role.

(Chart No. 25) INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE. Another significant Soviet advance which intensifies my concern as long as we are dependent on overseas bases, is the forecasted quantities and capabilities of their Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile. By 1960, the Soviets should have 1,000 medium range ballistic missiles which will give them adequate coverage of all our UK, Spain, and Mediterranean bases, as well as Thule, Keflavik, and the Alaskan complexes. Joint Intelligence estimates indicate that these missiles will have a 3-mile CEP with 3 MT yield. Little, if any, warning can be expected, thus aircraft within missile range will probably be lost and the bases rendered untenable. This, in addition to a large proportion or Soviet medium jet bombers which have the capability of destroying our forward bases, causes me to question our dependence upon these bases to support the strike .force. Certainly from 1960 onward, we must plan to launch our offensive force from the relatively more secure ZI and Canadian bases.

In the discussion thus far, I have outlined nine basic points on which we all have agreed; I have analyzed our program to determine where we are heading, and I have reviewed where the Soviets are heading.

Let us examine our force structure program in the light of the principles on which we have agreed. I propose to demonstrate the following:

(Chart No. 26 ) WE ARE VIOLATING OUR OWN AGREED PRINCIPLES

1. (Chart No. 27) THE PRINCIPLE OF THE OBJECTIVE: A major portion of our force either cannot by design --or will not because of limitations — be able to participate effectively in the decisive battle. Unless it remains entirely clear to the Russians that we do have the force with which we can win the decisive phase of the Air power Battle, we cannot expect to deter aggression for much longer. FSPO 65-1 does not, in my opinion, provide such a force.

2. (Chart No. 28) THE PRINCIPLE OF THE OFFENSIVE: Offensive forces with demonstrated capabilities and resolute actions are the only means by which our objectives can be attained. Successful offense brings victory; successful defense can now only lessen defeat. The advantages of offense can be achieved only when the means available are sufficient to provide a reasonable chance for success. Compared to the resources available to the Air Force, and compared to the Russian long range offensive forces, our emphasis on the offensive force is falling far short of our stated aim. It is obvious from the build-up for pure defense of the United States and the defense of the overseas land areas that we are detracting from our ability to meet higher priority offensive requirements.

3. (Chart No. 29) THE PRINCIPLE OF MASS. Although our objective of winning the Air power Battle is sound, both the operational control of our offensive potential and Its tactical limitations compromise our ability to bring the mass of our force to grips with Russia's long range striking power.

4. (Chart No. 30) THE PRINCIPLE OF SECURITY. The disposition of our forces to fight, dictated by their composition and concept of employment, makes It mandatory that to operate from forward areas just at the time the enemy can effectively deny us these areas. Without a predominantly intercontinental capability, it is impossible to properly secure the strike force.

5. (Chart No. 31) THE PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMY OF FORCE. Our efforts to satisfy all requirements within our limited resources have resulted in none being completely satisfied and in fact are resulting in a force which is incapable of gaining a decision at any point. Not only will all our expenditures have been wasted If we are put to the test, we will fail to win the war.

These violations of our own principles make it impossible to get the most for our defense dollar.

(Chart No. 32) WHAT KIND OF A FORCE AND ORGANIZATION SHOULD WE HAVE?

We agree basically on the requirement to destroy the enemy's air power in the shortest possible time after the outbreak of hostilities. The decisive phase will be settled quickly, and the force that destroys the opponent's air power undoubtedly will be victorious in the over-all conflict. Any military action other than that taken to destroy the enemy's air power will be secondary. The Soviet target system and the enemy's posture have a direct bearing on the total Allied offensive air power required.

Let us remember that the Soviets made the mistake of countering our long range offensive capability by concentrating on the defense. We were not greatly concerned by their air defense capabilities. Now that they have started to concentrate on a long range offensive force we should not be panicked into a defensive posture. We must build up our own offensive capabilities to counter balance his offense.

Our offensive force must be first designed to satisfy cur over-all world strategy. It is important to remember that general war means our heartland will be under attack. The success of our tactical and theater forces in their battles with the enemy's tactical forces will have little or no effect upon survival of the United States against Russia's intercontinental bombardment. We must concentrate on a

force designed to protect the U.S. in a general war. If a specialized task, such as a local war, is then required, this properly constituted offensive force can accomplish the specialized task without compromising its capability, and thus still constitute the deterrent to a general war. As in the past, theater type local war commitments will probably continue to be levied against the long range offensive force, and, in view of the vulnerability of forward bases, the capability to operate from less vulnerable areas appears necessary. SAC's ability to strike such targets is well established. SAC already has a sizeable list of such targets and the list is growing steadily. For example, SACEUR recently asked us to hit 23 additional targets which we picked up the first of January. We had already agreed to strike 33 targets for SACEUR.

I am well aware of the tremendous pressures brought to bear on the Secretary and the Chief of Staff for tactical air power to be assigned directly to theater commanders. It is our duty as the senior air advisors to the Nation to convince those in authority that air power assigned to theater commanders is an unnecessary compromise of U. S. security. The President and the Nation have expressed their confidence in and dependence on air power as the principal deterrent to any military aggression. We must accept the blame if this air power is improperly used.

The Tactical Air Command and the Strategic Air Command must be in such a state of readiness as to insure early and decisive engagement in the air battle. The attack of air battle objectives in the Soviet union will require close coordination and control of all attacking units. This coordination and control can best be exercised by a single commander. This commander should report through the Chief of Staff, USAF, to the joint Chiefs of Staff. The present practice of training units in the continental United States within the Tactical Air Command, deploying these units to overseas areas where they are placed under the command and operational control of respective JC3 unified commanders, and employing these forces in accordance with theater requirements, can never achieve optimum effectiveness of offensive air power. I believe there should be within the United States Air Force a single offensive air command charged with maintaining an immediate capability to participate in worldwide offensive air warfare on whatever scale may be required. In an all-out war subsequent to the Air Battle phase, the offensive force in its entirety can be employed in supporting land and naval advancements if required.

The entire offensive force should be equipped with the best weapons systems which can be produced and these systems should be continuously Improved and maintained in the inventory at a rate at least commensurate with the build-up of the enemy's offensive capability.

(Chart No. 33) WHAT CAN WE DO TO ACHIEVE A FORCE AND ORGANIZATION WE REQUIRE?

Mere affirmation of principles such as we have been discussing are of little value unless backed up by the resolution and the capability to abide by them. We must here today make the crucial decisions I have been discussing and take actions which will give us the force and organization in the period 1960-65 to most effectively cope with the enemy situation.

Of course, if there were no questions about the availability of funds, our problem would be simplified. We must face the fact that we probably are not going to get much more money for the Air Force. We also know that this business is getting more expensive each year. What we've got to do is to plan on taking the money out of our own hide. We must establish a priority list for fulfilling our requirements and must recognize that low priority requirements will not be satisfied.

The budget figures were not available to me to compare our defense and offense expenditures, nor was I able to obtain the cost figures on the programmed force. Lacking this information, I can only generalize in my statements. I believe that our defense commitments have reached such proportions that they are causing a cutback in our required offensive force. We are not affording priority in FSPO 65-1 for the offensive that we claim is our aim.

Certain economies can be realized in combining our offensive force, by reducing our dependence upon overseas operations, and by designing the force to satisfy the critical Air Power Battle requirements. Only if we adhere to an over-all priority schedule which supports our stated aims can we achieve within the resources made available to us an Air Force structure which can adequately cope with the growing Russian threat during the 1960-1965 time period.

In summation, I recommend that:

(Chart No. 34) RECOMMENDATIONS

A. (Chart No. 35) We start now building an intercontinental bombardment capability by 1960-1S65 that will guarantee a favorable position to the united States — both in a cold aid a hot war.

B. (Chart No. 36) This offensive force be combined into one offensive command under the control of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, as the Executive Agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

C. (Chart No. 37) This force be financed by savings and economies resulting from concentrating on an offensive posture as opposed to meeting all demands to a limited and unsatisfactory degree.

These are the crucial decisions we must make today in full recognition of the hardships they will impose on us individually and jointly.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ADDENUM

A. SPECIFICATIONS FOR SAC MISSILES

B. SPECIFICATIONS FOR TAC MISSILES

C. SPECIFICATIONS FOR ADC MISSILES

D. COST ESTIMATES FOR VARIOUS ITEMS OF EXPENDITURES THAT MAY BE USEFUL IN A GENERAL DISCUSSION

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

SAC

STRATEGIC MISSILES (180 Aircraft)

1.

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

SM-62 (Snark)




1

1

1

1

1

1

SM-64A (Navaho)






1

2

2

3

SM-65 (Atlas)





1

2

2

3

3

Totals




1

2

4

5

6

7

All are long-range, surface-to-surface strategic missiles. (Top Secret)

2.

SM-62

SM-64A

SM-65

Range

5,500 KM

5,500 MM

5,500 NM

Speed

0.94 Mach

3.25 Mach

30 Mach

Altitude

50,000 Ft

90,000 Ft

500 NM

Accuracy

50%-2 NM

50%-2 NM

5 NM CEP

Warhead

7,000#

7,000#

3,500 #

Launch Time

3.5 Hrs

8-16 Hrs

2-6 Hrs

Gross Weight (Launch)

49,000#

290,000#

240,000#

Guidance System

Inertial-Celestial

Inertial

Radio/Inertial (Secret)

3.

SNARK

NAVAHO

ATLAS

Average Cost per Unit/# of Units (a)

*$0.5 Million/140

?

**$1.2 Million/1,000

(a) Does not include warhead or launch site. (Secret)

SOURCES:
1. FSPO 65-1,
2. USAF Standard Aircraft Characteristics.
3. *Rand Project RK 1184 - Cost for Snark System.
4.**Rand Project RM 1451 - Cost for WS 107A System.

A

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

TAC

TAC BOMB (48 Aircraft)

1.

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

B-66

1









B-57

4

3

3

3

3





B-47

1

3

3

3

3

3

1



TB-X/B-58






3

5

6

6

Totals

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

6

TAC Missile (480 Aircraft)

TM-61

(1-2)

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

TM-X





1

3

4

4

4

Totals

(1-2)

2

2

2

3

5

6

6

6

(Top Secret)

2.

TM-61

TM-X

Range

690 NM

?

Speed

0.9 Mach

?

Altitude

44,000 Ft.

?

Accuracy

1,000 Ft.

?

Warhead

3,050 #

?

Launch Time

1.5 Hours

?

Gross Weight (Launch)

12,660 #

?

Guidance System

Radio-Line of Sight

?

(Secret)

3.

TM-61

TM-X

Cost per Unit (a)

$90,000-$200,000


(a) Does not include warhead or launch site. (Secret)

TAC Recon Aircraft

RF-84F (b)
RF-101 (b)
RF-104
RF-105
RB-66
TRX-1
TRX-2

(b) Programmed for special weapons capability

SOURCES:
1. FSPO 65-1.
2. USAF Standard Aircraft Characteristics.
3. TAC Requirements Division, Hq SAC.

B

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

ADC

INTERCEPTOR MISSILE

1.

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

IM-70 (960 A/C)



2

3

5

7

7

7

7

IM-99 (480 A/C)




1

2

4

6

8

10

Totals



2

4

7

11

13

15

17

(Top Secret )

2.

IM-70 (Talos)

IM-99 (Bomarc)

Range

100 NM

125 NM

Speed

2.5 Mach

1,437 knots

Altitude

70,000 Ft

60,000 ft

Accuracy

50%

50% within 50 ft.

Warhead

H.E.
(special weapon follow-on)

300#

Launch Time

2 Min


Gross Weight (Launch)

7,360 #


Guidance System

Radio/Radar seeker


(Secret)

3.

IM-70

IM-99

Average Cost per Unit/ # of Units (a)

?

$150,000-$175,000 Without Warhead

(a) Does not Include warhead or launch site. (Secret)

SOURCES:
1. FSPO 65-1.
2. USAF Standard Aircraft Characteristics.
3. TAC Requirements Division, Hq SAC.

C

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ADDENUM TO CINCSAC PRESENTATION FOR
USAF COMMANDERS' CONFERENCE
Ramey AFB
23-25 January 1956

27 December 1955

1. Attached are cost estimates for various items of expenditures that may be useful in a general discussion. These figures were obtained from D/Comptroller who stetes that these are the best figures available end are useful to show magnitude only but cannot be applied with any validity to a particular type of aircraft. (Uncl)

2. A review of D/Comp figures (Incl 1) on the comparative costs of obtaining the force shown in FSPO 65-1 for SAC, TAC, and ADC indicates that the FSPO force exceeds in many instances the present AF annual budget. The following is a quick reference chart showing the projected total of investment and operating costs in billions taken from Incl 1: (Secret)


57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

SAC

$8.05

$8.03

$9.1

$3.9

$1.5

$2.8

$5.1

$3.7

$3.6

TAC

$2.4

$5.4

$6.6

$4.6

$4.2

$4.7

$4.5

$3.1

$2.9

ADC

$2.4

$4.1

$5.1

$5.9

$6.8

$9.6

$7.6

$6.7

$3.4

3 Cmd Total

$12.9

$17.5

$21.0

$14.6

$12.6

$17.1

$17.2

$13.6

$9.9

3. Inclosure 2 is a breakdown of the FY 56 Program showing percentage each command received directly. The following is a quick reference chart showing (a) the total in billions, (b) the percentage distribution figures to major elements and (c) the percentage of support being given to SAC indirectly from other commands: (Secret)

Major Mission Element

(a)
Mission Element Total (Billions)

(b)
Percent of 56 Budget

(c)
Percent of 56 Budget Supporting SAC

SAC

$3.92

22.1%


TAC

$2.08

11.7%


Continental Def Forces

$2.18

12.3%


Continental AC&W

$0.78

4.4%


O/S AC&W

$0.07

0.4%


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Major Mission Element

(a)
Mission Element Total
(Billions)

(b)
Percent of 56 Budget

(c)
Percent of 56 Budget
Supporting SAC

O/S Oper

$1.19

6.7%


Training

$1.95

11.0%

(No FY 56 figures - FY 55 - 16.44%)

MATS

$0.81

4.6%

(No FY 56 figures - FY 55 - 13.9%)

Depst Support

$1.47

8.3%

28.7%

R&D

$2.01

11.3%


Air Reserves

$0.24

1.4%


Air Natl Guard

$0.23

1.3%


Security Svc

$0.09

0.5%


Hq USAF

$0.21

1.2%


MDAP and Others

$0.45

2.5%


Total

$17.74



Less Funds from Other Sources

$2.00



Obligating Auth

$15.73



4. In the SAC study, Feb 54, "Force Requirement for SAC in the Thermonuclear Age," it had been determined that SAC could have the 40 heavy wing force by 1965 at the cost of $6 billion/year beginning 1957 (cost per B-52 - $7.2 million). D/Comptroller has made a new study on the cost of obtaining the 40 heavy wing force by 1961, Incl 3, using $14,470,000 as cost per B-52 (taken from USAF Peacetime Planning Factors Manual). The following is a quick reference chart showing the cost per year to obtain the 40 Wing Force by 1961 using $14.4 million cost/B-52 and using $7.5 million cost/B-52 (Rand Study) beginning in 1955: (Secret)

Total Cost to Develop, Maintain & Operate 40 Heavy Wing Force (Billions)


55

56

57

58

59

60

61

7 Yr Total

$14.4 Million/B-52

1.48

3.07

10.94

11.93

14.74

17.38

18.89

78.47

$7.5 Million/B-52

1.13

2.37

8.48

9.47

12.28

14.57

16.08

44.43

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5. Listed below are some approximate costs for aircraft and missiles as computed using sources indicated. Personnel, spare parts and other support not included.

Type A/C

Cost per A/C

A/C per Wing

Cost per Wing

SAC

B-52

$8,857,000

45

$398,565,000

F-101A

$2,630,000

75

$196,950,000

SM-62 (SNARK)

$500,000

180

$90,000,000

SM-65 (ATLAS)

$1,200,000

180

$216,000,000

ADC

F-102A

$3,780,000

75

$283,500,000

F-102B

$4,475,000

75

$335,625,000

IM-99 (BOMARC)

$175,000

480

$84,000,000

TAC

F-100

$877,000

75

$65,610,000

F-105

$2,439,000

75

$182,925,000

F-104

$3,675,000

75

$275,625,000

TM-61 (MATADOR)

$150,000

480

$72,000,000

Sources:
1. FSPO 65-1.
2. USAF Peacetime Planning Factors Manual.
3. Rand Project RM 1184 - Cost for SNARK.
4. Rand Project KM 1451 - Cost for WS 107A.
5. T.O. 00-25-30, 1 June 55.

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