MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

10 June 1958

1. The file material herein was kept in AFXSC at the request of the Chief of Staff.

2. This Material, particularly the Board Report, remains both sensitive and of record value,

3. Accordingly, on departure of the undersigned, this material is transferred to the office of the Chief of Staff.

4. There is one additional copy of the "Report of the Board of Officers" — (McConnell Report) — in Gen LeMay's possession.

/S/
ROBERT C. DIXON
Colonel, USAF
Asst for NSC Affairs
DCS/Plans & Programs

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

19 November 1957

SUBJECT: Commanders' Conference, 4-7 November 1957

1. On 14 October 1957 the Chief of Staff summoned certain Major Commanders and retired officers to a Hq USAF Conference to run from 4 November to 7 November 1957. (List of Conferees, Incl 1.)

2. The purpose of this Conference was to examine Air Force programs and objectives, with particular emphasis on the 1960-1970 period, in the light of the following documents:

a. Air Force Objectives Paper (Incl 2).

b. Report of a Board of Officers, pursuant to Letter, Vice Chief of Staff, 23 August 1957. (SFCVC 42 Special File) (Copy available in AFXSC.)

3. The Conference Agenda is attached as Incl 3. A set of reference documents, copies of the Chief of Staff's presentations, etc., is available in AFXSC.

4. Trends and analyses of the Conference discussions are attached at Inclosures 4 and 5.

5. The Conference had suggestions for amendment of the objectives paper cited in paragraph 2a above. The Conference rejected the report mentioned in paragraph 2b above. As a result no formal statement of Air Force objectives was approved; however, the Chief of Staff indicated the need for such a statement to be developed after the Conference and based thereon. (Action underway in DCS/PuI to accomplish this.)

6. The Conference agreed on certain positive statements proposed by the Chief of Staff (Incl 6), Majority views along the following lines were informally agreed upon:

a. TAC must be adequate to support commitments, specialize in local war, participate in general war.

b. SAC must be maintained and improved.

c. ADC must remain an Air Force Mission

d. SAC and TAC must concentrate on their respective missions and not compete.

e. There is no current feasibility to a single offensive force.

f. There is no current need to propose sweeping reorganization changes in roles, missions, or Department of Defense functions. (Chief of Staff considers this an. inevitable subject in the near future. D/Plans considering the problem,)

g. Missiles must be brought on faster and substituted for manned aircraft where possible. (Initially for B-47.)

h. IRBM's to allies is a useful, valuable method of increasing the allied capability.

i. The Air Force program in Streamline III Revised is inadequate.

j. An Air Force program, responsive to new developments and responsibilities, must be available, over and above Streamline III, for presentation during the current budget hearings.

k. The study of astronautics, as the future realm of the Air Force, must be supported.

7. In an effort to come to grips with the actual program, the Conference directed the compilation of a new program and considered this on 7 November. The Secretary of the Air Force attended this meeting during the latter portion.

8. This draft program (known as 59X) was sketched in hastily with the intent of including SAC, TAC, and ADC requirements as presented at the Conference. No precise agreement on it was reached. The Chief of Staff indicated that he expected only general discussion, with qualitative and quantitative refinement to be done by Hq USAF.

9. The Secretary of the Air Force's remarks on this program (59X) indicated general agreement with the augmentations to Streamline III Revised as contained in individual packages. He doubted the feasibility of advancing proposals for a large B-52 force and indicated the B-58 might be more saleable. He considered SAC alert and improved effectiveness a better proposal than an increased B-52 force. He stressed the missile aspect of the program.

10. The Chief of Staff's conclusion stressed progress on a broad front, including all Air Force mission areas, based on a united internal effort and effective efforts to gain understanding and support.

11. A copy of the recorders' notes of the Conference is on file with the Secretary, Air Force Council, Hq USAF.

12. Queries should be addressed to AFXSC, DCS/P&P.

/S/
ROBERT J. DIXON
Colonel, USAF
Asst for NSC Affairs
DCS/Plans & Programs

6 Incls
       1. List of Conferees
       2. AF Objectives Paper (not attached)
       3. Conference Agenda (not attached)
       4. Memo for ACCS, dtd 6 Nov 57, s/Dixon
       5. Memo for AFCCS, dtd 7 Nov 57, s/Cary
       6. Positive Statements

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SAC BRIEFING CONDENSED

1. Under Streamline III, in 1961, the following alert force is indicated:

585 bombers, 28% B-52.
380 tankers, 40% KC-135.
51 missiles.

a. In 1961 SAC alone can destroy 37% of 439 critical DGZ's under whatever war gaming assumptions were used.

b. In 1961 other forces can destroy 16% of the target list - this may be a total of 53%.

2. Under SAC recommended force structure, the following alert force is indicated:

630 bombers, 40% B-52 (an increase of 45 aircraft).
530 tankers, 64% KC-135 (plus 173 tankers).
66 missiles, 45 ICBM.

a. In 1962 SAC alone can destroy 71% of 466 critical DGZ's under whatever war gaming assumptions were used.

b. In 1962 presumably other forces can make a contribution.

3. The 62 SAC force is:

17 - B-52 wings              plus 6
2 - B-58 wings                plus 2
25 - B-RB 47 wings        minus 3
1 - ICBM
1/2 – Titan
2 - Snark
2 - IRBM

30 squadrons – KC97
53 squadrons - KC-135

Penetration aids
2 Strat support

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SAC

1. The validity of any exact number of DGZ's as a hard core "must".

2. The validity of a 1962 requirement for 15 minutes early warning in view of SAC's apparent lack of confidence in its own missiles.

3. The need for a major build-up in the B-52/KC-135 force, which can not be completed until well after large quantities of missiles are available both to the U. S. and the USSR.

4. The need to spend large sums on ''modernizing" (including penetration aids) current aircraft, as opposed to concentrating on bringing in new types of weapons.

5. The value of additional aircraft and wings relative to major improvement in the alert and penetration capability of present forces.

6. The validity of assuming complete surprise worldwide.

7. The validity of SAC's assessment of the contribution of other forces.

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6 November 1957

W

- SAC sized to meet political requirements.

LeMay

- Don't agree - size of forces to defend country is military business.

W

- Military requirements come from political aims.

Leach

- 5 min to political aim is 5 minutes - lead time for SAC is 5 years.

Power

- Guaranteed preventive blow forces 3-4 times size retaliation isn't clean cut.

Weyl

- Force is retaliation - mixed.

Spaatz

- Accept nothing less than what we think is necessary.

LeMay

- I agree - retaliation - how many people mean it can't believe we're going to let it happen.

O'D

- Look at immediate period - 2-3 years of grace look at future - force with will - get so strong we can force disarmament - urge the seriousness - use initiative - break relations -

S,

- Ideal time to tell the people where we stand -better job of selling.

LeMay

- PIO can't do it - have to clearn with DOD.

Power

- People scared - ask for what you want.

Spaatz

- Int. show A-N not alive to threat we have to tell 'em.

Power

- Sprague Committee will recommend what SAC is asking for...people will too.

Spaatz

- Democrats will be running the government.

Power

- Truman is on our side.

Part

- Use intelligence with time phasing - Attack Russia today and we'll lose our hats - millions dead here -to sell pre-emptive attack will take over two years.

LeMay

- If we become convinced we're not going to sit.

Pat

- We'll sit there - be prepared to absorb first blow.

LeMay

- Can't take the first blow and do anything.

Power

- Don't we deter?

Spaatz

- Overwhelming strength.

Power

- Reduce SAC and it'll be put back by the people.

Whit

- Both parties have to go for deterrence power - SAC - ADC latter small but have to have it.

W

- People say SAC is too large.

S

- Take SAC-ADC - give up TAC gotta take care of Array - Navy.

Power

- Give allies IRBM -

Leach

- If the situation from 45-49 war not one in which Soviets would slow down to Baruch plan - never get them to slow down.

Power

- We didn't nave the power in 49 - had it in 53.

LeMay

- Even with overwhelming power politic don't use it -if we don't have the power then we're really sunk.

Everest

- Don't argue about preventive war - what we must have is deterrent posture what the best Air Force is, is the problem not a competition between SAC & TAC - outline minimum forces - particularly TAC -to meet commitments - that is a small percent of Air Force dollars - with exception of LR X big % is in SAC.