USNRDL-TR-659
16 July 1963

CIVIL DEFENSE UTILIZATION OF SHIPS AND BOATS

by

W.H. Van Horn
D. Freund

U.S. NAVAL RADIOLOGICAL
DEFENSE LABORATORY
                                   
SAN FRANCISCO CALIFORNIA 94135

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COUNTERMEASURES EVALUATION BRANCH
R. Cole,
Head

MILITARY EVALUATIONS DIVISION
C. F. Ksanda, Head

===============================

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

This report was prepared for the Office of Civil Defense, Department of Defense, under Project Order OCD-05-62-212 (Research Subtask 1154A). This work is listed on the USNRDL Technical Program Summary for Fiscal Years 1963, 1964, and 1965 (Report BUSHIPS 3920-3 of 1 November 1962) as Program B-1, Problem 6.

OCD REVIEW NOTICE

This report has been reviewed in the Office of Civil Defense and approved for publication. Approval does not signify that the contents necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Office of Civil Defense.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors are appreciative of the early work done by B. Rubenstein, OCD,and COL A.B. Butterworth. The services of the Engineering Branch, USNRDL,and J. Pond, in particular, in connection with the shielding studies is appreciated.

AVAILABILITY OF COPIES

Requests for additional copies by agencies or activities of the Department of Defense, their contractors certified to DDC (formerly ASTIA), and other government agencies or activities should be directed to the Defense Documentation Center for Scientific and Technical Information, Cameron Station, Alexandria, Virginia.

All other persons and organizations should direct requests for this report to the U . S. Department of Commerce, Office of Technical Services, Washington 25, D. C.

/S/
D. C. Campbell, CAPT USN
Commanding Officer and Director

/S/
Eugene P. Cooper
Scientific Director

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ABSTRACT

Various ways in which ships and boats might supplement the overall civil defense program were investigated. Both merchant and reserve ("mothball") fleet ships were considered for the part they might play in a lifesaving, life-sustaining civil defense capacity. Data for two port cities were analyzed to obtain information on population distribution and shipping activity. Engineering feasibility studies were made of the use of ships as personnel shelters and the availability of ships' utilities for use by shore installations. The protection offered from nuclear fallout radiation was calculated for two classes of ships. It was concluded that ships and boats could provide evacuation or fallout-shelter facilities, or both, before or during a nuclear attack. For the postattack situation, ships could serve as headquarters, hospitals, living quarters, storehouses, and prime producers of electrical power and potable water. It is recommended that further studies be made of selected port cities to determine how ships and boats could best be used to supplement present civil defense capabilities of these cities.

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SUMMARY PAGE

The Problem

A serious shortage of suitable fallout shelter spaces exists in many areas of the country. Further, shortages of food, fuel supplies, electrical power, and potable water might occur following a nuclear attack. Might ships and boats be used to help alleviate these shortages? This study was undertaken to assess the use of merchant ships, boats, and ships of the reserve ("mothball") fleets in the present civil defense program.

Findings

With sufficient warning of a nuclear attack, merchant ships and boats could evacuate up to 12,500,000 persons from target areas. In addition;, Naval reserve fleets with only minor modifications could be used to house another 500,000 persons. Further, at a cost of about $90 per occupant, 800 of the Liberty ships (currently being scrapped at the rate 50 per year) in the Maritime Administration's reserve fleets could be converted into ship shelters that would accommodate an additional 8,000,000 persons.

In the immediate postattack phase, passenger ships, converted Liberty ships, and surplus battleships could be used for civil defense headquarters, hospitals, communication centers, etc. Tankers in the reserve fleets could be used, at modest cost, to store some 8,000,000 barrels of fuel which would be a substantial adjunct to the 50,000,000 barrels of fuel that might be salvaged from merchant tankers surviving the attack. An alternate use of the 800 Liberty ships in the reserve fleets would be to store sufficient wheat at widely scattered locations to feed 60,000,000 people for 6 months. Merchant ships could supply the minimum water requirements of large segments of the population. Ships in the reserve fleets could be activated to provide 400,000 kw of electrical power to shore installations.

Successful utilization of ships and boats for civil defense functions can be achieved if (1) the intended uses are well defined and documented, (2) all cognizant government agencies agree to participate in such utilization, and (3) ships intended for such use are promptly diverted from the scrap program.

Recommendations

One or two port cities should be selected for a detailed study-to determine how ships and boats might be integrated most effectively and efficiently in existing civil defense plans.

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CONTENTS

ABSTRACT
SUMMARY PAGE
LIST OF FIGURES
LIST OF TABLES
FRONTISPIECE - SUISUN RESERVE FLEET

SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PROBLEM AND BACKGROUND
1.2 OBJECTIVES
1.3 CIVIL DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS AS A FUNCTION OF TIME

SECTION 2 BASIC CRITERIA AND DATA

2.1 WEAPON EFFECTS

2.1.1 Fallout Radiation Dose
2.1.2 Blast and Thermal Effects

2.2 STATISTICAL DATA

2.2.1 Commercial Shipping
2.2.2 United States Population Distribution: 1960
2.2.3 Selected Data for Port Cities.

2.3 SHIP MOVEMENT WITHIN THE PORT OF NEW YORK

SECTION 3 CIVIL DEFENSE USE OF SHIPS AND BOATS BY VESSEL TYPES

3.1 GENERAL

3.2 ACTIVE SHIPS

3.2.1 Port Operation, Emergency Evacuation, and Ship Availability
3.2.2 Passenger Ships
3.2.3 General Cargo Ships
3.2.4 Tankers
3.2.5 Small Vessels and Boats

3.3 INACTIVE SHIPS

3.3.1 National Defense Reserve Fleets (NDRF)
3.3.2 Liberty Ships
3.3.3 S4 Type
3.3.4 General Cargo Ships
3.3.5 Passenger, Troop and Hospital Ships
3.3.6 Tankers
3.3.7 Naval Reserve Fleets
3.3.8 Miscellaneous

SECTION 4 CIVIL DEFENSE UTILIZATION OF SHIPS AND BOATS - BY FUNCTION

4.1 GENERAL

4.2 SHIPS FOR LIFESAVING

4.2.1 Active Ships
4.2.2 Inactive Ships

4.3 SHIPS AS STOREHOUSES

4.3.1 Active Ships
4.3.2 Inactive Ships

4.4 SHIPS AS FLOATING UTILITIES

4.4.1 Active Ships
4.4.2 Inactive Ships

SECTION 5 CONCLUSIONS

SECTION 6 FUTURE RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REFERENCES

APPENDIX A RADIATION DOSE STUDIES

APPENDIX B GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF REDUCTION-FACTOR CALCULATIONS FOR FALLOUT GAMMA RADIATIONS

APPENDIX C SAN FRANCISCO POPULATION DENSITY AND POPULATION MOBILITY STUDY

APPENDIX D NEW YORK AND SAN FRANCISCO PORT STUDIES OF SHIPPING

APPENDIX E PROPOSED CONVERSION OF EC2 (LIBERTY) SHIPS TO PERSONNEL SHELTERS

APPENDIX F SURPLUS SHIP EMPLACEMENTS FOR SHELTERS AND CIVIL DEFENSE

APPENDIX G THE UTILIZATION OF ACTIVE AND INACTIVE MERCHANT VESSELS AS FLOATING UTILITIES AND AS LIQUID STORAGE FACILITIES

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LIST OF FIGURES

1. Ship Utilization as a Function of an Attack Time Continuum

2. Radiation Dose Studies - 5 MT Weapon Yield

3. One Year Doses to Occupants of Various Type Vessels Downwind from a 5-MT Burst

4. Principal Waterways of the United States and Locations of the MARAD and Navy Reserve Fleets

5. United States Population Distribution: 1960

6. The Port of New York Showing General Cargo Waterfronts

7. Daily Totals of All Ships (Except Tankers) in the Port of New York

8. Perspective View of the SS INDEPENDENCE Showing Deposit Radiation Reduction Factors at Various Points

9. Inboard Profile of an Unmodified Liberty Ship Showing Radiation Reduction Factors for Deposit Radiation at Various Points

10. Accommodation Plan of the Second Deck of a Liberty Ship Converted for Shelter Use

11. Inboard Profile of a Converted Liberty Ship Showing Deposit Radiation Reduction Factors at Various Points

12. Potential Ship Emplacement Conditions

A.1 Radiation Dose Studies - 1-MT Weapon Yield

A.2 Radiation Dose Studies - 20-MT Weapon Yield

A.3 Hotline Radiation Dose from Several Sources to Occupants of a Beached Converted Liberty Ship Downwind from a 5-MT Land-Surface Burst

A.4 One Year Doses to Occupants of Various Type Vessels Downwind from a 1-MT Land-Surface Burst

A.5 One Year Doses to Occupants of Various Type Vessels Downwind from a 20-MT Land-Surface Burst

C.1 San Francisco Population Areas

C.2 Time for Evacuees to Reach San Francisco "Loading Zones "- Daytime

C. 3 Time for Evacuees to Reach San Francisco "Loading Zones" - Nighttime

D.1 Number of Ships in the Port of San Francisco During the Period: 29 May 1962 - 11 June 1962

D.2 Pier Activity in the Port of San Francisco During the Period: 29 May 1962 - 11 June 1962

D.3 Daily Totals of General Cargo Vessels in the Port of New York

D.4 Ship Stay-Time at Selected Harbors of the Port of New York During the Period: 21 July 1962 -13 August 1962

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LIST OF TABLES

1. Permissible Distances Prom Land-Surface Bursts for a Beached Converted Liberty Ship With a Washdown System

2. 1960 Annual National Summary of Inbound Waterborne Commerce in Units of Millions of Net Tons (NT)

3. Resident Population, Waterborne Commerce, and Fallout Shelter Spaces Available in the 25 Largest United States Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA)

4. Detailed Population, Waterborne-Commerce, and Fallout-Shelter Data for Certain United States Ports

5. Civil Defense Utilization of Maritime and Naval Vessels

6. Statistics on U.S. Ships - by Category

7. Some Characteristics of Several Types of Merchant Ships

8. Storage and Utility Data for Three Types of Passenger Vessels

9. Selected Data for Several Classes of General Cargo Vessels

10. Waterborne Movement of Petroleum Products for Calendar Year 1960

11. Selected Data for Several Classes of Commercial Tankers

12. Summary of Vessels in the United States National Defense Reserve Fleet

13. Comparative Costs of Ship Shelters in Various Emplacement Conditions

14. Costs for Storage of Wheat on Surplus Liberty Ships

15. Estimated Costs for Floating and Conventional Power Plants and Conventional Shoreside Steam Installations

C.1 San Francisco Daytime and Nighttime Populations By Area

D.1 Selected Statistics for Various Ports

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Aerial View of the National Defense Reserve Fleet: Suisun Bay, California This fleet covers an area of 84 city blocks.
(Photo courtesy Maritime Administration)

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SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 PROBLEM AND BACKGROUND

As a part of its overall study of suitable shelters throughout the nation, the Office of Civil Defense (CCD) is interested in determining possible shelter spaces that might be available through unconventional sources, including ships and boats. Ships and boats were also to be considered for other possible civil defense uses, including food and supply storage, electricity generation, water purification, and civil defense headquarters. The purpose of this study then is a broad one, intending to delineate the possible civil defense applications of ships and boats, and to evaluate the ultimate usefulness of these vessels in the national civil defense effort.

Callahan et al.1 investigated the possibility of using ships and boats as fallout shelters. The vessels would be anchored in the middle of large bodies of water to reduce the radiation contribution from the fallout-contaminated shore while reducing that from fallout deposited in the water because of the shielding characteristics of the water. They found that a reduction factor (*) of 0.01 could be obtained by various combinations of river width, off-shore distance, and depth. For example, for an average depth of 50 ft; the vessel would have to be anchored near the middle of an 1800-ft-wide river to obtain a reduction factor of 0.01. The river must be at least 17 ft deep (with on associated width of 3000 ft or more) in order to attain a reduction factor of 0.01.

(* The reduction factor is defined as: dose rate at the sheltered location, 3 ft above the deck” divided by “dose rate at 3 ft above an infinitely contaminated land surface”)

Callahan et al. did not consider concomitant radiation either from fallout deposited on the deck of the vessel or from transit radiation from the radioactive cloud passing overhead.

In broad terras, Callahan et al. showed that evacuation of persons by ships and boats would provide an estimated 2,000,000 to 5,000,000 shelter spaces, for the entire nation. Of particular interest was the distribution of these potential ship and boat shelter spaces in areas where conventional basement shelters were often totally inadequate due, in many cases, to the presence of high water tables.

Rubenstein2 investigated in some depth the possible use of the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), which is under the jurisdiction of the Maritime Administration (MARAD), for civil defense purposes. That report, based on an ad hoc study by representatives from Department of Agriculture, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, MARAD, and CCD, recommended that scrapping of surplus ships in the NDRF be discontinued until the desirability of the following proposals could be fully evaluated:

(1) The Department of Agriculture would distribute surplus food strategically among all the states, using NDRF vessels where feasible.

(2) The Public Health Service would consider the use of NDRF vessels for emergency hospitals and for warehousing medical supplies.

(3) The National Association of State Civil Defense Directors would undertake a pilot study to determine the feasibility of using NDRF ships for emergency operations at the state and local level for civil defense training centers, as auxiliary electric-power installations, etc.

The Public Health Service recently completed a study3 in which they concluded that the conversion of surplus EC-2-S-C1 (Liberty) ships for the accommodation of mobile medical-care facilities was not desirable; land storage of medical supplies seemed more advantageous. A preliminary study by the Public Health Service in 1957 had reached similar conclusions, but also suggested the possibility of using commercial passenger ships for emergency hospital centers. The objections to using surplus Liberty ships include the cost of conversion, cost of maintenance, and the possible difficulty in moving the ships into population centers after attack.

The Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory has studied the feasibility of using obsolete SS-212 (GATO) class submarine hulks as protective shelters.4 They estimated that, for $60,000, a suitably modified submarine hulk could be moved into a dredged slip in a beach area and covered with sand. The resultant shelter, equipped with a new entrance, an electrical system, and a ventilation layout, would provide 138 bunk spaces, protection against airblast overpressures of 130 psi, and radiation protection equivalent to 8 ft of sand cover. Although deemed economically feasible, no subsequent action has been taken because the total number of surplus hulks is quite small—less than 50.

1.2 OBJECTIVES

This study was conducted to evaluate all ways in which every available ship and boat might be used to support the civil defense effort. More specifically, investigations were to be made of (1) the feasibility of using ships and boats as fallout shelters or, alternatively, for evacuation; (2) the use of reserve fleets, either in situ or as otherwise deemed practical; (3) the use of ships for storage of food, fuel, and other strategic supplies; (4) the capabilities of ships to provide utilities to shore installations; and (5) the use of ships as civil defense headquarters, hospitals, or communication centers.

To attain these objectives, it was necessary to consider the type of fallout situation that might be encountered, the availability of ships and boats, the shielding characteristics of ships and boats, the evacuation of person to loading points, the costs involved in the various proposed uses, and the probable nationwide potential.

It is not the intent of this report to suggest ways in which ships can compete with shore-based shelters, warehouses, utilities, etc. Rather, the emphasis is on how ships can supplement existing shore installations as necessary or furnish the desired service when shore facilities are totally inadequate. In brief, this report discusses how the unique characteristics of ships and boats can best be utilized in the civil defense effort.

1.3 CIVIL DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS AS A FUNCTION OF TIME

Depending on the attack time continuum civil defense activity will vary greatly, being essentially nil before an attack, reaching a maximum during and just after an attack, and gradually tapering off in the recovery period. Figure 1 illustrates, for ships and boats, the interrelationship of these factors. In the preattack period, ships and boats should be available for normal usage or, in the case of reserve fleets, available within a designated period for their normal duty. Prior to, during, and just after an attack, ships and boats, if they are to have value for civil defense, should serve a life-saving function, that is, save the lives of people from the effects of the attack itself. This function can conceivably be effected by removing people from the attack situation (evacuation) and/or protecting them from the effects of the attack (shelter). After this initial period, ships may then assist in life-sustaining operations, serving as hospitals, monitoring centers, etc. or in providing essential services, such as water, food, fuel, and electricity. Ultimately, the ships and boats should again become available for normal service. This report discusses the applicability of ships and boats for these two broad life-saving and life-sustaining functions, and points up the problems created by these functions with respect to normal usage.


Fig. 1 Ship Utilization as a Function of an Attack Time Continuum

The introduction of the concept of evacuation as a means of saving lives is not intended to imply an endorsement of this concept; rather it is a necessary assumption if ships and boats are to be considered for any major life-saving role.

[However, a recent report5 suggests that, in a variety of strategic situations evacuation of civilian populaces over a period of hours or days would appear to be an acceptable practice.]

In addition, current doctrine calls for the evacuation of ships to sea, which may be compatible with the concept of personnel evacuation as discussed in this study.

A generalization that is used throughout the report for convenience is the term, 2-wk shelter staytime. The reader should realize that "2 wk" is not a magic number that speaks for any given fallout situation. The time that persons may be required to spend in a shelter could vary from a few hours in some instances to several months in rare cases. Another simplification that is used in this report is that of reporting doses over a 1-yr period. Obviously no individual will remain aboard a ship in a particular location for 1 yr. However, the error introduced by the 1-yr dose value is less than 10% for shelter staytimes of 2 wk or longer; that is, an individual receives approximately 90% of the first year's dose in the first 2 wk after fallout occurs. Those readers who might be interested in more information on staytimes and dose calculations are referred to the manual, Radiological Recovery of Fixed Military Installations.6

SECTION 2

BASIC CRITERIA AND DATA

This section discusses fallout radiation dose, radiological countermeasures, airblast, and thermal radiation; presents statistical data on commercial shipping and population distribution in the United States and selected data on certain major ports; and discusses ship movement in the Port of New York.

2.1 WEAPON EFFECTS

2.1.1 Fallout Radiation Dose

[The data of this section are based on Appendix A which also includes studies for 1 and 20 MT bursts.]

The free-field fallout radiation dose at a point offshore from a land surface nuclear burst can come from 4 sources, 3 of which are interrelated. The transit dose is that received from the radioactive cloud as it passes overhead; this dose is independent of other doses and of the surface over which the cloud travels. As the radioactive cloud passes it deposits radioactive particles. If these particles settle on the deck of a ship it is defined as the deck deposit dose; if the particles settle on an adjacent land surface it is defined as the land deposit dose. Finally, if the particles settle on the water surrounding the ship it constitutes the waterborne dose. This water-borne dose can be further subdivided into a water settling dose, which is a short-term dose received only during the time that the particles are falling from the surface of the water to the bottom of the water medium, and a water solution dose, a long-term dose, which results from dissolution of a portion of the radioactivity as the particles fall through the water. (See Appendix A for further details.)

To determine the relative importance of land deposit, deck deposit, and waterborne dose, a contribution factor, which is dependent on the placement of the ship in relation to the land and water areas, must be calculated for each source. Finally, in order to determine the dose to a person on a vessel, we must consider the structural shielding of the vessel itself as well as the time over which the particular radiation contributes to the total dose. Transit radiation will penetrate the ship from all sides, but only while the cloud is passing near the vessel. Deck-deposit radiation will penetrate from the weather surfaces of the ship from the moment of contaminant deposition until the contaminant is removed by washdown or decontamination. Land-deposit radiation will penetrate the ship or boat from the moment of deposition until the land surface is decontaminated. Waterborne radiation will penetrate primarily through the hull, the water-settling component contributing only during the period of actual fallout, the water-solution component remaining as a contributor for an indefinite time or until dispersed by tidal action and dilution.

Figure 2 depicts the various components of the free-field radiation dose received up to 1 yr after burst time as a function of downwind distance along the hotline for a 5-MT land-surface burst. A 100% fission yield and a 15-knot effective wind are assumed. Smaller fission yields would result in proportionately smaller doses. A 5-MT nuclear burst is discussed here and elsewhere in the text as a representative case, whereas 1-MT and 20-MT nuclear bursts are discussed in Appendix A. These three weapon yields bracket the range of yields most frequently anticipated for a nuclear attack. Comparison of the 1-MT and 20-MT radiation-dose components in Appendix A with those of Fig. 2 reveal that the component curves are essentially the same shape. In addition, for a given component of the total dose, there is usually no more than a 50% increase in the total free-field radiation dose received at a given downwind distance along the hotline even when the total weapon yield increases from 1 MT to 20 MT. However, the fallout contour pattern for a 20-MT burst would be significantly larger than that for a 1-MT burst. Thus, a 20-fold increase in weapon yield would result in moderately higher component doses (and dose rates) spread out over a much larger area.

Shielding and Washdown

Figure 3 shows the 1-yr radiation doses to occupants of (1) a boat with a washdown system, (2) the SS INDEPENDENCE with a washdown system, and (3) a converted Liberty ship* with a washdown system, along with the assumed conditions and shielding factors for these three cases.

[* - This refers to a Liberty ship that has been modified to serve as a fallout shelter for 10,000 persons for a period of at least 2 wk. Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the proposed modifications. A converted Liberty ship shelter most probably would be beached on a shore, as shown in Fig. 12b, near a shelter-deficient population center.]

Actual doses would he proportionately less than those shown if the fission yield is less than 100%. Further, an actual fallout model must be consulted to determine the total radiation dose for points downwind but not on the hotline.


Fig. 2 Radiation Dose Studies - 5 MT Weapon Yield
Various Components of the Free Field Radiation Dose Received up to One Year After Burst vs Downwind Distance Along the Hot Line


Fig. 3 One Year Doses to Occupants of Various Type Vessels Downwind from a 5-MT Burst

Appendix A describes in detail the computations and assumptions used to obtain the values of Fig. 3 and also Figs. A.4 and A.5 for 1-MT and 20-MT land-surface bursts. In essence, the 3-ft free-field radiation dose is modified to account for the shielding afforded by the given vessel, for the effectiveness of the washdown system, and for each component of the free-field radiation dose. By continually flushing deposited fallout overboard, a washdown system will reduce the dose by as much as 90%.

Figure 3 indicates that a converted Liberty ship beached on shore and the SS INDEPENDENCE at sea provide about an equivalent degree of protection against radioactive fallout. People aboard either ship would not receive excessive fallout radiation doses (no more than 300 r in 1 yr) at 6 miles downwind from a 5-MT land-surface burst. A small boat would provide the same degree of protection (a 300-r 1-yr dose*) only at 50 miles downwind distance.

[The permissible dose limit suggested by the sponsor is 150 r for any period between 1 mo and 1 yr. This value is arbitrarily doubled when considering a case, such as Fig. 3, where a fission yield of 100% is assumed.]

However, the small boat does provide definite protection, since the 1-yr free-field dose at this location (Fig. 2) would be over 7000 r. In perspective then, a converted Liberty ship would be best utilized close to a target area; a large passenger liner (with washdown) could safely evacuate personnel to sea even if high fallout-radiation levels were encountered; larger boats (with washdown) could be used to protect people beyond the blast and fire-damaged areas but still within the high fallout-radiation areas.

2.1,2 Blast and Thermal Effects

The blast and thermal effects resulting from a nuclear burst would significantly affect the civil defense use of ships. A given blast overpressure may cause structural damage and loss of a vessel that was to have functioned as a floating warehouse. Thermal radiation may render the washdown system on a ship inoperable, thereby permitting lethal deposit-radiation doses below decks. Decisions on ship locations, the uses to which ships might be put in a given location, the extent of ship preparation or modification for civil defense purposes, and many other factors depend greatly on the maximum permissible weapon effects considered tolerable in a given situation as well as on the type of vessel involved and the attack situation anticipated.

For the specific case of a beached converted Liberty ship equipped with a washdown system capable of removing 90% of the deposited fallout, Table 1 presents, the closest distances from ground zero that this ship might be positioned for each of three weapon yields. The maximum allowable conditions for blast, thermal, and fallout-radiation effects determine the closest distance at which a ship would protect its occupants. In the case cited in Table 1, fallout radiation determines the closest distances for all three yields.

Similar tables drawn up for a wide variety of attack conditions, vessel types, vessel uses, etc. might be used as aids in determining the optimum use of ships for civil defense purposes. For example, if other permissible radiation doses are decided on, the data presented here, in 2,1.1, and in Appendix A could be used to calculate either the closest distance of approach for a given variety of shielding conditions, or the shielding protection required for personnel at a given shelter location.

2.2 STATISTICAL DATA

2.2.1 Commercial Shipping

Table 2 summarizes the 1960 commercial shipping in the United States in terms of the volume of usable ship space available on various classes of vessels. This summary of ship potential by volume of usable ship space is significant, since waterborne-commerce summaries are frequently in terms of weight of cargo handled. The available volume is used here because it is considered more significant for civil defense purposes.

Four items in this table are especially noteworthy. Nearly 23% of the volume of usable ship space for the contiguous United States is concentrated in self-propelled passenger and dry-cargo ships on the Atlantic Coast, and all self-propelled passenger and dry-cargo vessels accounted for nearly 50% of the total volume of ship space in this country. Further, all usable volume of non-self-propelled vessels accounted for only 22% of the national usable ship volume. Tankers, self-propelled and non-self-propelled, accounted for 28% of the usable ship volume.

Figure 4 indicates the completed and projected channel depths in the principal waterways of the United States. These depths give some indication of the type of ship traffic that might be handled in a waterway or port as well as the limitations or difficulties that might be encountered when moving vessels from one location to another for civil defense purposes. Also shown are the locations of the various Maritime Administration and Naval Reserve Fleets.

Table 1
Permissible Distances From Land-Surface Bursts for a Beached Converted Liberty Ship With a Washdown System

Yield (MT)

BLAST (a)

THERMAL (a)

FALLOUT RADIATION

Maximum Allowable Dynamic Pressure (psi)

Distance (Mi)

Maximum Allowable Thermal Radiation (cal/sq cm)

Distance (Mi)

Maximum Allowable 1-Yr Dose (b) (r)

Distance (c) (Mi)

1

5

1.7

> 500

< 1.7

300

2

5

5

3.0

> 500

< 3.0

300

6

20

5

4.7

> 500

< 4.7

300

9

a. Glasstone, S., ed. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, April 1962, pp. 175, 135, and 365. Dynamic pressures of 5 psi will cause moderate damage to a ship, while thermal radiation in excess of 500 cal/sq cm will only cause blistering of painted surfaces. However, if plastic pipe and linen firehose are components of the washdown system, failure of these components would undoubtedly occur at high thermal levels.

b For a 100% fission yield.

c Values for hotline obtained from Figs. 3, A.1, and A.2.

Table 2
1960 Annual National Summary of Inbound Waterborne Commerce in Units of Millions of Net Tons (NT) (a)
(One NT Equals 100 Cubic Feet of Usable Ship Space)

LOCATION

SELF-PROPELLED VESSELS

NON-SELF-PROPELLED VESSELS (c)

TOTALS (b)

Passenger and Dry Cargo

Tanker

Towboat or Tugboat

Dry Cargo

Tanker

ATLANTIC COAST

440.5

159.2

23.7

115.4

53.6

797.9

GULF COAST AND THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER SYSTEM

118.0

146.3

12.3

103.0

77.8

518.9

GREAT LAKES

321.8

12.5

2.2

23.6

7.3

370.6

PACIFIC COAST

146.9

55.4

8.7

24.3

24.0

259.9

TOTAL (National Summary)

1027.2

373.4

46.9

266.3

162.7

1947.3

A Waterborne Commerce of the United States, Calendar Year 1960, Corps of Engineers, Department of the Army.

B This column does not necessarily represent the sum of the figures given for self-propelled and non-self-propelled vessels since various miscellaneous vessels are included in this total.

C Non-self-propelled vessels, which are normally moved by tugboats or towboats, include barges and lighters.

2.2.2 United States Population Distribution: 1960

Figure 5 shows the 1960 population distribution for the United States; outstanding is the non-uniformity of the population distribution. There is an extremely heavy population concentration in the northeast United States and a much greater concentration of people in the eastern half of the United States than in the western half except for a heavily populated strip of land along the Pacific Coast. By superimposing Fig. 5 on Fig. 4, one can see that there is an extremely good chance of finding large harbors or navigable waterways in just those locations where the population is most heavily concentrated. This distribution is quite reasonable, since it is those places with good water transportation facilities that one might expect to grow into centers of commerce and industry and to acquire large populations.

Table 3 lists the 25 most populous Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA's) in the United States, along with their ranks, resident populations, short tons of commerce handled in 1960, and the number of fallout shelter spaces (reduction factor < 0.01) available in each. The resident populations of these SMSA's represented approximately one-third of the United States' resident population for 1960. The resident population listed for an SMSA may or may not represent an actual daytime or nighttime population (see Table 4).

Table 3 indicates that (1) there is a positive correlation between the number of short tons of commerce handled in a given SMSA and the SMSA's resident population, (2) there is a shortage of shelter spaces having reduction factors equal to or less than 0.01 in most SMSA's and (3) 23 of the 25 most populous SMSA's are port cities located on the Atlantic, Gulf, or Pacific Coast or on an inland waterway.


Fig 4 Principal Waterways of the United States and Locations of the MARAD and Navy Reserve Fleets


Fig. 5 United States Population Distribution: 1960

Table 3 Resident Population, Waterborne Commerce, and Fallout Shelter Spaces Available in the 25 Largest United States Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA)a

SMSA

SMSA Rank (b)
(By population)

SMSA Resident Population (b)

Tons (2000 lb) of Waterborne Commerce Handled in 1960 (c)

Fallout Shelter Spaces (Reduction Factor < 0.01) (d)

New York, N.Y.

1

10,695,000

153,199,000 (e)

l6,031,000 (f)

Los Angeles-Long Beach, Calif.

2

6,743,000

31,892,000

1,644,000

Chicago, Ill.

3

6,221,000

39,055,000

6,496,000

Philadelphia, Pa. - N.J.

4

4,343,000

1+9,634,000

2,260,000

Detroit, Mich.

5

3,762,000

27,478,000

1,136,000

San Francisco-Oakland, Calif.

6

2,783,000

29,116,000

952,000

Boston, Mass.

7

2,589,000

19,020,000

1,471,000

Pittsburgh, Pa.

8

2,405,000

6,581,000

1,131,000

St. Louis, Mo.-Ill.

9

2,060,000

9,092,000

792,000

Washington, D.C.-Md. - Va.

10

2,002,000

2,686,000

2,2l4,000 (g)

Cleveland, Ohio

11

1,797,000

17,801,000

824,000

Baltimore, Md.

12

1,727,000

43,420,000

574,000

Newark, N.J.

13

1,689,000

see note e

523,000

Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.

14

1,482,000

4,597,000

811,000

Buffalo, N.Y.

15

1,307,000

17,704,000

327,000

Houston, Texas

16

1,243,000

57,133,000

230,000

Milwaukee, Wis.

17

1,194,000

8,519,000

382,000

Paterson-Clifx.on-Passaic, N.J.

18

1,187,000

see note e

130,000

Seattle, Wash.

19

1,107,000

16,614,000

302,000

Dallas, Texas

20

1,084,000

not a port

280,000

Cincinnati, Ohio-Ky.

21

1,072,000

7,430,000

616,000

Kansas City, Mo.-Kans.

22

1,039,000

1,374,000

668,000

San Diego, Calif.

23

1,033,000

2,136,000

83,000

Atlanta, Ga.

24

1,017,000

not a port

287,000

Miami, Fla.

25

935,000

1,612,000

169,000

A An SMSA is composed of the entire population living in the area in and around a relatively large central city, and may also refer to the area itself. The activities of this population form an integrated social and economic system. For the Bureau of the Budget's established definition, see pp. XXIV and XXV of the United States Census of Population: 1960 (see footnote b).

B U.S. Bureau of the Census. U.S. Census of Population: 1960. Number of Inhabitants, United States Summary. Final Report PC(1)-1A, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1961 (pp. 1-117, Table 36).

C Waterborne Commerce of the United States, Calendar Year 1960. Corps of Engineers, Dept. of the Army.

D National Shelter Survey: Phase I. Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, Washington 25, D.C.

E The tonnages for the Newark, N.J. SMSA and the Patterson-Clifton-Passaic, N.J. SMSA are included in the New York, N.Y. SMSA.

F Approximately 85%of these shelter spaces are in the Borough of Manhattan.

g Approximately 90% of these shelter spaces are in Washington, D.C.

2.2.3 Selected Data for Port Cities

Table 4 lists and helps to correlate a mass of data about certain selected ports. This table is meant to suggest possibilities for future analysis of the civil defense use of ships. The type of data presented here might be gathered for any location in the country and for any specific city, region, or SMSA.

Table 4 shows that the resident, daytime, and nighttime populations are distinctly different. A "satisfactory" number of fallout shelters at any SMSA would depend on which one of these populations one was interested in sheltering, as well as the distribution of these shelters within the SMSA. For example, the New York, N.Y. SMSA has more shelter spaces (Table 3) than residents (Table 4), but this situation does not mean that all these residents could be sheltered. Brooklyn has a large deficit of shelter spaces, whereas Manhattan has such a huge surplus of spaces that there is an overall surplus of shelter spaces. This situation is also true in the Washington, D.C.-Md.-Va, SMSA, because most of the shelter spaces are located in the large government buildings in downtown Washington, D.C. (Manhattan and Washington, D.C., each contain approximately 85% of the shelter spaces in their respective SMSA's.)

Civil defense use of ships would be complicated at ports, such as Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn, and Buffalo, N.Y., that are closed during the coldest winter months. All of the other ports listed in Table 4 normally have a year-round navigation season.

The columns in Table 4 listing net tons (100 cu ft) of waterborne commerce and the principal cargo handled in each port together give an idea of the type and volume of waterborne commerce at selected locations throughout the United States. This and similar information should be useful in helping to select and evaluate those locations in the United States where the civil defense use of ships might be a significant and valuable adjunct to any other civil defense activity.

2.3 SHIP MOVEMENT WITHIN THE PORT OF NEW YORK

Intensive studies were made of the Ports of New York and San Francisco and are reported in Appendices C and D. These studies were made to obtain pertinent information bearing on the civil-defense use of ships at certain specific ports. Highlights of the Port of New York study are presented here both to indicate the types of information that might be of interest at any given port and to present such information for one highly significant port.

Table 4 (part 1) Detailed Population, Waterborne-Commerce, and Fallout-Shelter Data for Certain United States Ports

PORT

SMSA Rank (a) (By Population)

POPULATION DATA FOR GIVEN SMSA OR COMPONENT AREA

FALLOUT SHELTER SPACES (Reduction factor < 0.01) (c)

Resident (b)

Daytime (c)

Nighttime (c)

Brooklyn, New York (part of NY, NY SMSA)

see note (d)

2,627,000

3,343,000

2,803,000

1,051,000

Manhattan, New York i (part of NY,NY SMSA)

See note (d)

1,698.000

4,507,000

2,359,000

13,528,000

Los Angeles-Long Beach, Calif.

2

6,7^3,000

8,476,000

7,148,000

1,644,000

Chicago, Ill.

3

6,221,000

---

--

6,496,000

San Francisco-Oakland, Calif.

6

2,783,000

4,124,000

3,365,000

952,000

Boston, Mass.

7

2,589,000

3,417,000

3,107,000

1,471,000

Pittsburgh, Pa.

8

2,405,000

2,545,000

2,480,000

1,131,000

St. Louis, Mo.-Ill.

9

2,060,000

--

--

792,000

Washington, D.C.-Md. - Va.

10

2,002,000

2,625,000

2,528,000

2,214,000

Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.

14

1,482,000

--

--

811,000

Buffalo, N.Y.

15

1,307,000

1,235,000

1,380,000

327,000

Houston, Texas

16

1,243,000

---

--

230,000

Seattle, Wash.

19

1,107,000

302,000

New Orleans, La.

27

868,000

327,000

Norfolk-Portsmouth, Va.

44

579,000

526,000

573,000

165,000

Jacksonville, Fla.

58

455,000

--

--

135,000

Table 4 – Part 2 - INBOUND WATERBORNE COMMERCE IN UNITS OF NET TONS (NT) (e) (one NT equals 100 cu ft of usable ship space)



PORT

SELF-PROPELLED VESSELS

NON-SELF-PROPELLED VESSELS

TOTAL OF ALL INBOUND VESSELS (g)

Passenger and Dry Cargo Vessels

Tankers

Passenger and Dry Cargo Vessels

Tankers

Brooklyn, New York (part of NY,NY SMSA)

83,992,000

3,709,000

21,373,000

4,481,000

124,628,000

Manhattan, New York (part of NY,NY SMSA)

32,173,000

1,075,000

21,423,000

1,670,000

59,823,000

Los Angeles-Long Beach, Calif.

16,229,000

9,752,000

325,000

1,271,000

27,655,000

Chicago, Ill.

10,023,000

748,000

8,012,000

3,214,000

22,488,000

San Francisco-Oakland, Calif.

21,850,000

6,586,000

858,000

3,460,000

34,179,000

Boston, Mass.

8,405,000

6,525,000

298,000

1,116,000

16,559,000

Pittsburgh, Pa.

9,000

None

4,940,000

665,000

6,610,000

St. Louis, Mo.-Ill.

25,000

None

2,250,000

1,750,000

4,430,000

Washington, D.C.-Md. - Va.

188,000

464,000

1,085,000

369,000

2,18l,000

Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.

13,000

None

1,140,000

888,000

2,240,000

Buffalo, N.Y.

9,019,000

382,000

105,000

217,000

9,750,000

Houston, Texas

10,716,000

13,172,000

5,613,000

4,953,000

34,852,000

Seattle, Wash.

28,672,000

2,787,000

3,621,000

1,505,000

37,842,000

New Orleans, La.

17,230,000

7,954,000

6,619,000

9,204,000

42,108,000

Norfolk-Portsmouth, Va.

24,344,000

5,450,000

1,497,000

2,182,000

33,765,000

Jacksonville, Fla.

2,426,000

3,011,000

621,000

549,000

6,692,000

Table 4 Part 3

PORT

NAVIGATION SEASON (e,f)

PRINCIPAL CARGO HANDLED IN PORT (e) (Percent by weight of total port cargo)

3%-10%

10% - 20%

20% - 40%

> 40%

Brooklyn, New York (part of NY, NY SMSA)

all year

misc. comm., sand, coal, iron + steel

petroleum and related products

Manhattan, New York (part of NY,NY SMSA)

all year

---

misc. commodities, pet. prod.

coal and lignite

Los Angeles-Long Beach, Calif.

all year

iron + steel, industrial chemicals

petroleum and related products

Chicago, Ill.

all year

corn, limestone

pet. and related prod., sand, rock

coal, iron ore + concentrates

San Francisco-Oakland, Calif.

all year

shells

petroleum and related products

Boston, Mass.

all year

coal

petroleum and related products

Pittsburgh, Pa.

all year

sand, gravel

pet. + related items, iron + prod.


coal and lignite

St. Louis, Mo.-Ill.

all year

steel + related products, cement

pet., coal, grain, sand, rock

Washington, D.C.-Md. - Va.

All year

sand, rock, gravel

petroleum and related products

Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.

4 Apr -2 Dec

grains

pet. + rel. items, sand, rock, coal

Buffalo, N.Y.

23 Apr -17 Dec

petroleum and related products

limestone, paper, grains

iron ore and related products

Houston, Texas

ail year

grains

shells

petroleum and related products

Seattle, Wash,

all year

grains

sand, rock

pet. + products, wood + wd. prods.


New Orleans, La.

all year

grain, food, sulphur, chem., shells

petroleum and related products

Norfolk - Portsmouth, Va.

all year

grains

petroleum and related products

coal

Jacksonville, Fla.

all year

wood + prods., gypsum foods

petroleum and related products

Footnotes to Table 4

A -- U .S. Bureau of the Census. U.S. Census of Population: 1960. Number of Inhabitants, United States Summary. Final Report PC-(1)-1A. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., 1961 (pp. 1-117, Table 36).

B. Reference in a, above, pp. 1-100, Table 31.

C. National Shelter Survey: Phase I. Department of Defense, Office of Civil Defense, Washington 25, D.C. Among other data available from this Survey are the total number of buildings, the number of buildings rejected, the shelter spaces in various other categories, etc.

D. This port is only a component area of the New York, N.Y. Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA).

E. Waterborne Commerce of the United States, Calendar Year 1960, Corps of Engineers, Dept. of the Army. Certain data from this source were recompiled, estimated, or averaged to obtain other statistics.

F. Ports of the World, 16th Ed., Shipping World Limited, London, England (1962). For the purposes of this tabulation, the navigation season is defined as that part of the year when there is at least one outlet (via river, ocean, lake, etc.) from the given port. If only the port is navigable for intraport traffic and all port outlets are closed, the port is listed as closed for that period of time.

G. This column does not necessarily represent the sum of the figures given for self-propelled and non-self-propelled vessels, since tugboats, towboats, and some miscellaneous vessels are included in this total.

Figure 6 gives a comprehensive picture of the most significant of the 28 harbors that comprise the Port of New York. The most important feature to he noted is the heavy concentration of port activity in a relatively few harbors. This situation is even more extreme than that indicated, since, at any given harbor (for example, Brooklyn), some piers or groups of piers are much busier than others. If port activity is measured in terms of the number of ships docking, then Brooklyn accounts for 46% of the shipping activity in the entire Port of New York, and Manhattan accounts for another 17%. Thus, these two harbors alone account for nearly two-thirds of all the shipping activity in the Port of New York.

Figure 7 shows extremely wide fluctuations in the daily ship total from one part of the week to the next. The numbers of ships in port exhibit a midweek maximum and a weekend minimum; these within-week fluctuations are far greater than any week-to-week fluctuations.

For the year 1961, the Port of New York Authority reports that, of the commercial deep-sea ships entering the Port of New York, 50% are general-cargo common carriers, 27% are tankers, 18% are specialized or industrial carriers, and 5% are passenger vessels. The total number of ships in port at any given time ranges from a low of 90 ± 20% over weekends to a maximum of l80 ± 20% during the middle of the week.

One-half of the ships entering the Port of New York stay less than 2 to 3 days, and very few ships stay longer than 8 to 10 days. This "staytime" or "turn-around time" is a function of the type of vessel and varies from a low of 1 to 2 days for tankers to 2.5 to 3.5 days for passenger vessels to 3.5 to 4.5 days for general-cargo common carriers. Specialized vessels vary widely from 1.5 days for container ships to 8 days for vessels carrying scrap metal.

In conclusion, on any given day, one can expect in the Port of New York 45 to 90 general-cargo common carriers, 24 to 48 tankers, 16 to 32 specialized carriers, and 5 to 10 passenger vessels. The sum total of all these vessels represents a definite civil defense potential that might be utilized in a wide variety of ways.


Fig. 6 The Port of New York Showing General Cargo Waterfronts


Fig. 7. Daily Totals of All Ships (Except Tankers) in the Port of New York Based on Data Obtained from
The Journal of Commerce and Commercial

SECTION 3

CIVIL DEFENSE USE OF SHIPS AND BOATS BY VESSEL TYPES

3.1 GENERAL

Ships can be broadly classed as either active, meaning that they are in service and carrying cargo from port to port, or inactive, meaning that the ships are inoperable and decommissioned in a reserve or "mothball" fleet. Both active and inactive ships can, in turn, be categorized by vessel types—passenger or troop ships, general cargo ships, tankers, small boats, and naval ships. In this section, the civil defense potential of each specific type of vessel is discussed separately within the two broad categories: active and inactive.

Civil defense use of ships and boats can be broadly classified according to the following six life-saving and life-sustaining functions: (1) "as is" shelters—used as fallout shelters without any modification, but providing additional stocks of food and water; (2) evacuation—used to transport people from a target area to a less hazardous location; (3) converted shelters—modified prior to attack to improve their shelter potential; (4) civil defense headquarters or hospitals—making limited prior provisions for such use; (5) floating warehouses—used to store food, equipment, water, fuel, etc., prior to attack without subverting the basic mission of the vessel; and (6) floating utilities— used to provide electrical power and potable water to shore installations with either the existing shipboard equipment or added equipment.

The remainder of this section discusses evaluations of the potential civil defense uses for each ship type. Table 5 summarizes the several combinations possible and indicates the probable usefulness of each combination. Starting with 3.2.2, Table 5 should be used as a guide by the reader.

3.2 ACTIVE SHIPS

3.2.1 Port Operation, Emergency Evacuation, and Ship Availability This section of the study is concerned with ships in port that might he used for civil defense purposes. Since the majority of such ships would normally be under foreign flags, there is some doubt of their availability in time of crisis. However, we have made the simplifying assumption that all ships and boats in port would be available for emergency use. Ships and boats are generally classified according to net tonnage, an ambiguous term since 1 net ton is actually defined as 100 cu ft of cargo-carrying capacity; however, for our analysis, this definition of capacity was used. We have no good Information on the distribution of ships according to capacity, but the data in Table 6, derived from Ref, 1, are considered good approximations. The relatively few ocean-going ships account for most of the capacity. Boats, although numerous, have limited total capacity.

Table 5 Civil Defense utilization of Maritime and Naval Ships

Table 6

CATEGORY

SIZE RANGE

PERCENT BY NUMBER

PERCENT BY CAPACITY

Ocean-going

1000-80,000 tons

1

84

Inland

5-1000 tons

7

15

Boats

16-28 ft

92

1


TOTAL

512,000

19,000,000 tons of 100 cu ft

Quantitative analysis has been devoted primarily to ocean-going vessels because of their overwhelming importance on a capacity basis and their more desirable characteristics for civil defense use.

Port Operation

Ports, which in a metropolitan area may include many separate facilities (see Fig. 6 for example), are extremely complex operations. The piers likewise, and supporting functions, such as tugs, barges, and elevators, may be publicly or privately owned and operated. Ships using the port are under private ownership and may be under almost any flag. Yet superimposed upon this complex situation is the Captain of the Port, a Coast Guard official, who in peacetime holds almost complete control of ship movement into and out of the port. The Coast Guard is concerned also with ship safety, security of the port (a function of interest also to the Maritime Administration), welfare of seamen, etc, A quasi-official organization, the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), representing the shipping industry and insurance brokers, determines the seaworthiness of a ship and its crew. The Coast Guard and the ABS controls on passenger traffic are very rigid and preclude the use of ships in any other than a prescribed manner. However, in the event of hostilities the U.S. merchant fleet, including vessels under foreign flags of convenience, would come under the control of the Maritime Administration, which would became responsible for their utilization.

Emergency Evacuation of Active Ships From a Port

Each U.S. port has a port dispersal plan, prepared by the Coast Guard, that delineates what action is to be taken in the event of a yellow alert or other suitable warning. All known incoming ships would be alerted to remain at sea, and all ships in port that could readily be moved would be dispersed out to sea as rapidly as possible. These dispersal plans are designed to save the ships; any effort to superimpose a lifesaving mission on these plans would require a complete evaluation of the relative importance of ship saving and lifesaving. These aims are not necessarily incompatible, but difficulties can be foreseen. For example, if a ship could be ready to put to sea within 2 hr after an alert, but people were still loading, which mission would have priority: ship saving or life saving? In this report, we can only point out that these difficulties do exist; we have assumed for our analysis that the civil defense function of lifesaving has the higher priority.

Ships, after reaching the comparative safety of the open seas, would be directed, probably by the Navy, to rendezvous at some designated location or at a "safe harbor" (a port or location that had been deemed to be far enough removed from probable targets to be safe from direct or indirect weapon effects). At this time, the Office of Emergency Transportation of the Department of Commerce would serve as a utilization czar, using the framework of the MARAD, for all American ships, including those flying foreign flags of convenience.7 Claimant agencies, which include the CCD, would make their requirements known to MARAD and, if approved, would receive a use order for the necessary vessel(s). The Navy would then become responsible for the movement of the vessels to their assigned stations. Presumably, civil defense requirements would receive high priority; however, if probable requirements could be agreed upon before an emergency arises, better and more expeditious utilization for civil defense functions might result.

Ships in port for loading or unloading always maintain a standby crew that provides security and mans the engineroom to provide the necessary power for ship operations. Theoretically the standby crew could, if necessary, man the ship and take it to sea; actually they would almost always he assisted by off-duty crewmen on board or by crew members who returned to the ship upon suitable notification.

Motorships powered by diesel engines are widely used by many foreign lines, and can become operational almost at the flick of a switch; motorships might be able to be seabound in less than an hour after a warning. Steamships are widely used by American lines and on all larger ships. In port, only one boiler is normally fired; this boiler could provide sufficient power to "limp" out of port, but additional boilers would have to be activated for normal steaming operations. Most steamships could be underway within 2 hours, although at reduced speed, but some might require considerably longer times. If a ship were loading cargo or fuel, additional time might be required.

Since the number of tugs in a port is small in relation to the number of ships, it might be necessary for many ships to move out under their own power; this could be done, with some risk, by most smaller ships. Pilots, too, could be in short supply, but again most captains are competent to pilot their vessels, particularly if they are following other ships. Normally, no unsurmountable traffic problems would be anticipated in the dispersal of many ships to sea; however, movement at nighttime or in foul weather would increase the probability of collision between ships, or of a ship going aground.

A ship suddenly ordered to sea might be in any state of readiness. It may have just refueled and taken on supplies so that it might be well prepared for a prolonged trip or, it might have just arrived from a long voyage and have little fuel and few supplies left. In the latter case, however, it would undoubtedly have enough fuel left to carry it out to sea where, if necessary, it could sit "dead" until it was refueled. Food and water for the crew would probably never be completely depleted by the end of a voyage. Thus, under most circumstances, ships could be dispersed to sea within a few hours after notification to move.

Availability and Accessibility of Active Ships

Subsection 2.3 and Appendix D discuss in some detail the availability of ships in the ports of New York and San Francisco. Generalizing from these data it becomes apparent that ships do not represent firm shelter spaces because the number and types of ships in a given port will vary greatly from day to day making prediction of available space unreliable.

[Firm shelter spaces are those that can be counted upon in all circumstances.]

Further, the pattern of the location of ships within the port can vary considerably. These variations suggest that ships should be considered for use only as shelters for persons working on or about the ship or for those in the immediate vicinity. Because waterfronts are generally in industrialized areas of low population density, it is unlikely that the indigenous population would overwhelm the available space on ships. However, if people from the nearby residential or business districts descended on the ships, the capacity of ships in port would be totally Inadequate. In Appendix C, an analysis was made of the time required for all segments of the population of San Francisco to reach a waterfront "loading area" by foot. It was found that 1 hour after warning, 86% of the daytime or 63% of the San Francisco nighttime population would have reached a loading area. If we limit the evacuees only to those who work in the section of the city adjacent to the active piers, we still find that with a 1-hr warning, 47% (430,000 persons) of the daytime population or 17% (130,000 persons) of the nighttime population would reach the 10 to 20 ships that might be in port. The large difference between the daytime and nighttime figures is due to an assumed slower response time at night and to the redistribution of the population in nonworking hours.

The situation might not be much different in most other port cities, since industrial waterfronts are often flanked by high-density residential areas. We cannot make categorical statements, however, because we have not studied such cities as New Orleans where there is a long, accessible waterfront and a population small in comparison to the average shipping capacity in the port.

If ships were to be used for sheltering persons in numbers much in excess of their normal crew complement, provisions would have to be made for supplemental food and water stores. Such supplies would logically be stored on or near frequently used piers where, in the event of need, the evacuees could carry individual rations aboard whichever ship was in port at the time of the alert.

3.2.2 Passenger Ships

Passenger ships range from the passenger-cargo type which may carry as few as 13 passengers, to the giant liners, such as the UNITED STATES, which carry a complement of 3100 passengers and crew (see Table 7). Ships which carry fewer than 100 passengers will be considered under general cargo ships. The giant liners, although of large capacity individually, are few in number and the ports at which they call are restricted to one or two in the nation. The medium-size liners in the 15,000 to 25,000 gross-ton range are of most interest for civil defense applications because they call in many U.S. ports and are more numerous.

Table 7 Some Characteristics of Several Types of Merchant Ships

Type

Name

Dimensions

Tonnage (100 cu ft)

Complement

Length (Ft)

Breadth (Ft)

Depth (Ft)

Gross

Net

Passengers

Crew

Passenger

QUEEN ELIZABETH

987

119

68

83,000 (est.)

50,000 (est.)

2300

1200

Passenger

UNITED STATES

917

102

39

53,300

28,600

2000

1100

Passenger

INDEPENDENCE

638

89

38

23,800

11,200

1000

575

Passenger

PRESIDENT WILSON

573

76

29

15,500

7,780

760

340

Passenger-Cargo

SANTA BARBARA

441

63

37

8,360

4,920

52

83

Cargo

Liberty

418

57

37

7,200

4,380

--

4-0

Cargo

Victory

436

62

38

7,600

4,550

--

48

Cargo

Mariner

530

76

31

12,600

7,500

12

57

The total number of ocean-going passenger ships of U.S. flag in service is about 20. This number, of course, does not represent the total number of passenger vessels of all flags that might be in all the ports of the nation at a given time; however, it is probable that the number would be of this order, that is, 10 to 30. Let us consider now what the possible usefulness of passenger vessels is in various civil defense applications (cf. Table 5).

"As Is" Shelters and Evacuation. Since passenger vessels are designed to house people for extended periods, the basic question is not "How?" but "How many?". The QUEEN ELIZABETH, which carries a total complement of 3500 in normal service, was converted during World War II to transport 20,000 troops; however, this increase in capacity by a factor of 6 was accomplished only with considerable modification of her interior. Callahanl et al, using data based on evacuation of refugees, estimated that a ship can carry 1 person per net ton of capacity for periods of up to 2 wk; at this rate the QUEEN ELIZABETH could carry about 50,000 occupants. In a well-documented case in the evacuation of Pusan, Korea, during the Korean conflict, a Victory ship carried 14,000 Koreans, landing them 24 hr later at a safe harbor. Feeding was not attempted, conditions were primitive, and sanitation was indecorous. It is said that even today this ship can be recognized by the lingering odor. An apocryphal story also adds that, shortly after this incident, the captain retired from the sea to enter a monastery.

It would be safe to assume that for evacuation purposes a passenger liner could carry up to 6 times its normal complement if food and water supplies were adequate. The only way to ensure adequate food supplies for such overcapacity would be to stock civil defense type dry rations near the boarding area and have each evacuee carry his own rations aboard. This arrangement would present no hardship since a 2-wk supply of survival biscuits for one person could be containerized in a volume of less than 1 cu ft, and would weigh about 20 lb. Water should present no problem, since modern passenger vessels maintain appreciable stored water supplies using their own distillation equipment (Table 8 gives some actual capacities). By reducing the water consumption to 0.5 gal/day/person, the stored supplies would be ample.

If 6 times the normal complement were aboard a ship, bunking space would be inadequate even using 3 sleeping shifts per 24 hr (so-called "hot bunking"). The deficiency could be met either by bedding people down in the public rooms on furniture, the floor, or on previously stocked emergency bedding. A 2-wk stay under such conditions would not be pleasant but it would be survival.

Table 8 Storage and Utility Data for Three Types of Passenger Vessels (a)


PRESIDENT WILSON

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

INDEPENDENCE

Full load draft, ft,

31

25

30

Total fuel oil capacity, gal.

1,200,000

850,000

2,260,000

Potable water capacity, (normal) gal.

100,000

78,000

200,000

Total potential water capacity, gal.

390,000

160,000

285,000

Total water distillation capacity, gal/day.

182,000

121,500

240,000

Fuel consumption gal/day. (c)

4,500

6,400

12,600

Maximum excess electric power available for shore use, kw.

15,000 (b)

1,700 (dc)

4,000

Fuel consumption gal/day. (c)

41,500

8,800

17,600

Number of vessels of type in service

2

1

2

A. From Appendix G.

B. Primarily from turboelectric propulsion generators.

C. Assumes main propulsion generator is in partial or full service.

Complications arise when a fallout situation is superimposed on the evacuation scheme. It is improbable that the loaded ship would remain in a port anticipating attack, but the ship might be caught in fallout on its way to sea or even at some distance at sea. If this occurred, much of the space allocated to housing persons, particularly in the superstructure, would be unsafe for personnel until after the fallout had ceased and decontamination had been accomplished. Figure 8 shows the shielding factors at three locations along the midline of the SS INDEPENDENCE. Using as a conservative value a reduction factor of 0.02, Figure 3 shows the distances downwind from a 5-MT land-surface burst at which occupants would receive a given radiation dose. As an example, for the idealized wind structure and 100% fission yield assumed, the occupants of the ship would theoretically receive 200 r by the end of 1 year at a downwind distance of 40 mi. Actually, the dose received would not be this high, since the real wind structures would tend to disperse the fallout more widely, lowering the peak intensities. Account must also be taken of the fact that the fission yield of the weapon employed would probably be less than 100%. Thus, If the weapon were assumed to have only a 50% fission yield, the doses would be reduced by a factor of 2.

In an impending attack situation it would be difficult to predict the time of fallout occurrence and the amount of fallout likely to be encountered but if such a situation seemed probable, the following precautions should be taken:

1. All evacuees should be crowded into the better protected spaces on the ship for the few hours fallout might be anticipated.

2. The washdown system, if the ship is so equipped, should be readied; the ventilation system should be prepared for shutdown.

3. The watch on the bridge should be prepared to "lay to" on very short notice, descend to protected spaces below if fallout occurs, and remain there until such time as it is safe to resume steaming operations from the bridge.

Once the ship has reached the safety of the open sea, it will come under the control of a cognizant agency that will either direct it to a safe harbor or otherwise see to the disposition of the ship and its occupants.

No census was attempted of the number of inland or intracoastal passenger steamers that are normally used for pleasure and entertainment purposes. Such vessels are widely distributed and undoubtedly represent an appreciable passenger capacity. In addition, they are normally stationed in port for as long as the port is open, at least 7 or 8 months out of the year. They do have decided shortcomings, however, including:

1. They generally have no overnight accommodations and are not equipped to handle a crowd for more than a few hours.

2. They are of light construction and would offer essentially no protection against fallout.

3. They are limited in the amount of maneuvering they could undertake to evade fallout.

In summary, such pleasure steamers could he used to evacuate persons from probable target areas, but only with considerable risk to the evacuees from subsequent fallout; and, the evacuees might be stranded and starved on the ill-prepared steamers.


Fig. 8 Perspective View of the SS INDEPENDENCE Showing Deposit Reduction Factors at Various Points
(Reduction Factors were obtained by the method described in App. B)

Converted Shelters. Since passenger ships do not represent firm shelter spaces, no consideration should be given to spending additional effort and money in converting them into shelters. At best they are expedient shelters.

Civil Defense Headquarters or Hospitals. Passenger ships that survived the attack phase of a nuclear attack could serve as mobile platforms from which a variety of life-sustaining civil defense functions could be performed. A ship, preferably one not loaded with evacuees, could be moved to the very edge of population centers to serve a variety of needs. It is unlikely that ship movement would be impeded for any length of time by debris in the channel. For example, if the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco were to collapse, it would fall into 200 ft of water; any structural members extending into the channel could probably be disposed of in short order by demolition experts.

Because piers are hard targets, it is likely that ships could be moved in and moored at the edge of areas of heavy blast damage, coincidentally probable centers of high need. The ships could take advantage of the inherent shielding of the water, although decontamination of piers and adjacent land areas would be necessary. Once tied up at a dock, or even moored offshore but accessible by small craft, ships could function as headquarters for recovery operations, clearing houses for displaced persons, etc.

Ships tied up at a dock could use their own limited hospital facilities for handling the injured, but unless additional hospital supplies were available, the scale of operation would have to be very limited. If Public Health Service civil defense hospital units were available, they might be adaptable to shipboard erection, using the many large public rooms.

The ship, if supplied with fuel, could furnish most or all of the requirements a field hospital would demand. No attempt has been made to quantify the compatibility of a civil defense field hospital and a ship, since this effort falls under the purview of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, but it does appear that plans for passenger ship utilization for hospital purposes might well be further evaluated.

Floating Storage. Passenger ships do not represent any excess storage capability, since they are designed to be self-sufficient little cities. However, those stores they normally carry for their own consumption could, in time of emergency, be rationed to provide for many more persons than originally intended. The stored water on a liner such as the SS INDEPENDENCE could, for example, be rationed at the rate of 0.5 gal/day/person, serving 30,000 people for 14 days. Here again, though, passenger vessels should not be considered as firm sources of supplies, since, even if present in a port, they might be low on stores. The fuel that a ship carries is generally adequate only for its own continued activity; furthermore, such fuel is of a quality generally unusable in shoreside power plants. Table 8 and Table I, Appendix G, give further details of passenger vessel storage capacity.

Floating Utilities. In an emergency, passenger vessels would be excellent sources of potable water and might be good sources of electric power. All three of the liners shown in Table 8 can produce large amounts of potable water each day in their evaporators with the expenditure of relatively small amounts of fuel. The potential of a ship, such as the SS INDEPENDENCE, for supplying the potable water needs of a refugee population is indeed significant. At the minimum ration of 0.5 gal/day per person, approximately one-half million people could be sustained. The use of shallow-draft tankers or barges for distribution would, in addition, appreciably increase the potential area of coverage.

The excess electrical power available for shore use varies from the virtually useless direct current (1700 kw) of the PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT to the entire alternating current output of the PRESIDENT WILSON (15,000 kw). The SS INDEPENDENCE, a more typical case, could supply 4000 kw, AC. Although this amount may sound quite impressive, it must be brought into perspective. Consolidated Edison Company, which serves New York City, has generating capacity of roughly 5,000,000 kw. If, in an emergency, it were possible to cut the demand back to only 1% of this value and somehow distribute it where needed, 50,000 kw would still be required. This amount is far in excess of the power available from a ship. Further, complications arise when considering the distribution of power from a ship; the ship generates power at 450 v. which must be increased through suitable transformers to match the line voltage of the system, usually 12,000 v. However, it is true that communities have depended from time to time on ship-generated power using temporary connections, and it might be feasible to so serve critical functions in a widespread disaster area. It would appear more practicable though, to limit the distribution of the power from a ship to some small nearby sector so that elaborate transformers and connections would not be required.

The problem of transferring the power from the ship to shore is slight if the ship is docked at a modern pier that has provisions for the interchange of power. In other situations, particularly if the ship is moored more than 200 feet from shore, the hookup will be considerably complicated. For these longer distances, underwater cable would be the only possible hookup. The installation of such cable would not be a simple task even if a special boat were available.

The fuel requirements for power generation are relatively low and represent quite efficient utilization of available fuel. A shoreside steam plant produces, on the average, 500 kw/hr per barrel of fuel oil;8 the rates for the WILSON and INDEPENDENCE are 375 and 250, respectively.

3.2.3 General Cargo Ships

General cargo ships, commonly called freighters, constitute the major portion of the traffic in most ports. Freighters may have five or more separate holds, some of which may be refrigerated space ("reefers"); they are generally adaptable to carrying a variety of cargos. The net tonnage (a measure of volume) of such ships may vary from 1000 tons for some of the very small foreign ships up to 7500 tons for the Mariner, the newest class cargo vessel in the American fleet. Freighters can legally carry up to 12 passengers, and many do so. Specialized ships may also be found in most ports and predominate in some ports. Such ships are built to carry only one type of cargo (iron ore, coal, bananas, automobiles, etc.). The bulk material carriers, because of their design and utilization, appear to have little or no civil defense usefulness; the others will be grouped and discussed with general cargo ships. Pertinent data on several classes of cargo ships are given in Table 9.

The number of general cargo freighters in a port will fluctuate considerably, as shown in Appendix D, Fig. D.3. Further, the type and amount of cargo on a ship might be a limiting factor for civil defense usage. Thus, freighters cannot be predicated for any firm civil defense usage; however a previously formulated plan could ensure that such potential as they do possess would be utilized.

Table 9 Selected Data for Several Classes of General Cargo Vessels (a)

Item

Victory

C3 (old)

C3 (1960)

Mariner (1960)

Mariner (1960)

Length, ft.

455

492

492

563

563

Breadth, ft.

62

67.5

73

76

76

Depth, ft.

38

42.5

42

44.5

44.5

Full load draft, ft.

28.5

28.5

28

30

31.5

Cargo capacity, tons (2240 lb)

7436

9690

10,700

13,000

12,000

Total fuel oil capacity, gal.

800,000

450,000

750,000

850,000

770,000

Potable water capacity (normal), gal.

31,500

23,000

20,000

67,000

15,000

Total potential water capacity, gal.

117,000

675,000

490,000

320,000

775,000

Total water distillation capacity, gal/day

10,800

11,100

14,000

24,000

13,000

Fuel consumption, gal/day

1200

1230

730

1260

680

Maximum excess electric power available for shore use,kew.

300 (dc)

400 (dc)

800

800

800-2100

Fuel consumption, gal/day

2400

3000

4850

4850

4850-10,000

Number of vessels of class in service.

--

--

40

32

30

A. From Appendix G.

"As Is" Shelters and Evacuation. A freighter has accommodations for about 50 crew members and, often, for 12 passengers. Even utilizing hot bunking and available space in the few public rooms, a typical freighter would be unable to house more than 300 or 400 evacuees, and that with considerable discomfort. Moreover, all living spaces are either in the superstructure or just below the main deck and offer practically no shielding from fallout. For these reasons, it would appear logical to limit the lifesaving utilization of freighters to crew members and to any laborers working on the ship at the time of the alert.

In certain circumstances and locations, the use of freighters for local evacuation might be considered. In this case, evacuees might fill to capacity the main deck and 'tween-decks spaces that are cargo-free. A ship of the C3 class might be able to transport 10,000 persons short distances. In a port such as Hew Orleans, a ship loaded to capacity could steam upstream or downstream some 50 or 100 miles and land the evacuees in some safer area. Hopefully, the evacuation route would evade any fallout, since the ship itself would provide little shielding (see Fig. 9). After discharging the evacuees, the ship could continue to a designated safe harbor for assignment.

If the ship is about to be, or is caught in, fallout, the crew can drop anchor, secure the main engines, cut out the unnecessary boilers, button up the weather envelope, and go below to the engine room and shaft alley for the duration of fallout.

Converted Shelters. Any effort to modify cargo ships for passenger carrying service would subvert their basic assignment. Such a conversion is deemed unacceptable.

Civil-Defense Headquarters or Hospitals. The large spaces in the 'tween decks of freighters might have usefulness in some civil defense applications. For example, with suitable lighting and improvised access ladders, such spaces could be turned into large offices, monitoring headquarters, etc. However freighters, especially older ones, have limited electrical generating capacity so that the number of activities that could be headquartered on a ship might be limited. Improvised sanitary facilities would also have to be provided.

If no suitable buildings survived the airblast and fire, a civil defense field hospital might be installed in the large open spaces available in the 'tween decks spaces. Most freighters would have the necessary utilities for the functioning of such a hospital.


Fig. 9 Inboard Profile of an Unmodified Liberty Ship Showing Radiation Reduction Factors for Deposit Radiation at Various Points
(Reduction Factors were obtained by the method described in App. B)

Floating Storage. The cargo a freighter carried at the time of attack might represent a real asset to national survival in the post-attack period. Consequently, the cargo of each vessel should be documented as soon as it arrives at a safe harbor and the resulting tabulation used to employ any useful materials in the best interest of the nation. Such disposition would involve agreement between MARAD, the military, CCD, and, If feasible, the owners of the cargo. In toto, such cargo could represent a significant lifesaving capability, and preplanning should be instigated to ensure that this potential is not overlooked in the event of attack.

Freighters do not carry quantities of fuel and water much in excess of their own requirements and are not deemed sources of these commodities However, stores could be rationed to serve a much larger population than that of a ship's crew. Certain classes of ships have appreciable tank capacity—normally used for transporting edible oils, etc.—that could be converted for storage or transportation of water. However, the converted tankers would probably be useful in civil defense only in a secondary role.

Floating Utilities. It can be seen from Table 9 that the newer cargo ships have a definite capability to provide both water and electric power to shore points. However, the quantities are insufficient to suggest this capability as a primary use for cargo ships. Moreover, if these ships were used for hospitals, headquarters, etc., available utilities would be fully used. The older cargo ships and most foreign ships, produce either DC power, which is unusable at most shore installations, or else insufficient power. The relatively small evaporator capacity coupled with the large storage capacity suggests that tanks might be filled while the ship cruised at sea, and the potable water transferred to shore installations upon arriving in port.

3.2.4 Tankers

Tankers range in size from the supertankers capable of carrying some 800,000 barrels of oil, down to the now obsolescent T2's of World War II, with a capacity of about 150,000 barrels. In many ports, tankers represent about a quarter of the total traffic. These oceangoing tankers are supplemented by a number of shallow-draft smaller vessels for intracoastal or inland use, many of which are non-self-propelled, for instance, barges, which must be towed. Most tankers carry only crude or refined petroleum products, although specialized tankers, which can carry ammonia, molasses, edible oil, wine, etc., are in service. Tankers, because of their excessive draft (some have a 50-ft draft), often anchor in midchannel and unload through pipelines or by lighters to shore, A tanker can unload its three or foor major products simultaneously and in a matter of a few hours.

"As Is" Shelters and Evacuation. Tankers carry 40 to 50 crew members, and some have space for up to the legal limit of 12 passengers. Aside from these spaces, however, there is hardly even "standing room" aboard for possible evacuees. Tankers are designed to ride low in the water; consequently, the deck is often awash on a fully loaded tanker in moderately gentle seas. An open raised catwalk allows crewmen to get from one end of the ship to the other when necessary. Such a design obviously precludes using tankers for even the most elementary evacuation purposes. At best, a tanker could accommodate its crew plus the various workers who might be employed at the terminal* The lowest level in the engineroom would be the only possible shelter space in the ship; however, because of the placement of the engines in the stern of the ship, the degree of shielding obtainable there might be mediocre.

Converted Shelters; Civil Defense Headquarters. Tankers have little or no civil defense potential as converted shelters, headquarters, etc.

Floating Storage. Petroleum and petroleum products constitute about 40% of the total tonnage of waterborne commerce (Table 4). This tonnage also represents a stored reserve that would be available after the attack, except for those tankers damaged or destroyed by the direct weapon effects. Prompt evacuation of tankers from ports and diversion of those at sea to safe harbors would act to save these important ships and their equally important cargo. However, about one-third of this potential reserve (Table 10) would be on small er domestic-internal vessels or barges, and unless preplanning is thorough, many of these vessels might be caught in areas of heavy physical damage.

Definite problems may arise in selecting the best utilization of petroleum reserves that have survived the attack. Refined products (gasoline, diesel, etc.) would have only to be allocated and dispersed for use. The residual fuels (Bunker C, etc.) are generally usable only in large stationary or marine engines so that allocation and distribution would be the only concern. Crude oil, which accounts for about one-third of the potential shipborne reserve, could be delivered to a refinery for processing. What is to be done, however, if the refinery is damaged by the attack? The crude oil could either be stored in available space, transported to another refinery that could utilize the particular grade of crude, or used unrefined to fuel large stationary or marine engines.

[A crude oil is not necessarily usable in a nearby refinery, since refineries are designed around one type of crude.]

For life-sustaining operations, this latter use might be very valuable, since crude oil could be burned directly to provide steam, electricity, and water during the early recovery phase. Decisions for such use would depend on the immediate situation, but guidelines should be developed and promulgated.

The use of general-purpose tankers for the movement of water supplies into destitute areas does not hold much merit. First, the ships have an important mission in hauling petroleum products and second, the tanks, even if carefully cleaned, would probably contaminate any water subsequently carried. Only if special coatings were applied to the walls of the tanks could the potability of the delivered water be assured. However, certain tankers now in commercial service would seem to be nearly ideal for water carrying service. The ANGELO PETRI, for example, is a modified T-2 tanker fitted with stainless steel cargo tanks throughout, with a total capacity of 2,500,000 gallons. This ship, which normally carries wine and other edible products, could transport sufficient water to maintain a substantial population.

Table 10 Waterborne Movement of Petroleum Products for Calendar Year 1960
(Net traffic in 1000's of tons of 2,000 pounds)

Type/Movement

Crude Oil (b)

Refined Products (c)

Residuals (d)

Total

Foreign (a)

68,363

11,028

42,345

289,452

Domestic-Coastwise

39,175

106,488

22,053

Domestic-Internal

34,962

83,645

31,106

149,713

Total

142,500

201,161

95,504


A Predominately imports.

B Commodity code 511.

C Commodity codes 507,510,512,513,518,519,520, and 522.

D Commodity codes 514 and 516; most could be used to fire stationary or marine engines.

Source: Table 2 of Ref. 16.

Floating Utilities. Tankers have limited usefulness as sources of potable water both because their evaporator units are quite small and because these units are of the relatively inefficient single-pass type. However, this capacity might be used as an adjunct to the primary mission. For example, a tanker while crossing the Pacific with a load of petroleum products could be using its excess evaporator capacity to fill 2 or 3 (of its 40) tanks that had been converted for water storage. Also, a tanker used primarily for power generation in port could simultaneously produce potable water.

The auxiliary generating capacity of the larger, modern tankers, could produce appreciable power for use on shore. However, the T2 tankers of World War II vintage are driven by turbo-electric propulsion, which is so designed that the entire electrical output can be used shoreside. In the past, several T2's have had the misfortune to split in two on occasion the stern containing the engines has been salvaged and beached, there to serve the electric needs of nearby communities for extended periods. No unusual problems, aside from the customary ship-to-shore hookup were encountered with such use of a T2. As can be seen from Table 11, a T2 fully loaded with fuel that could be used in its boilers (practically any petroleum product but gasoline) could run for almost 10 months as an isolated generating plant. Simultaneous use of the evaporator plant would have little effect on this time. This combination of power production and built-in fuel supply suggests that T2 tankers be allotted a high priority for postattack power generation and that the larger tankers be reserved for continued operation as fuel transports.

Table 11 SELECTED DATA FOR SEVERAL CLASSES OF COMMERCIAL TANKERS8

Item

T-2

Post WW II Tankers

30 DWT (c)

45 DWT

60 DWT

Length, ft

533

661

725

825

Breadth, ft

68

90

100

110

Depth, ft

39

45

50

60

Full load draft, ft

30

34

36-38

42-46

Cargo capacity, tons (of 2240 lb)

15,640

32,000

45,000-50,000

60,000-80,000

Total fuel oil capacity (for ship operation), gal

620,000

850,000

1,670,000

1,670,000

Cargo capacity, fuel oil, gal (maximum) (b)

4,350,000

9,750,000

14,000,000

52,300,000

Potable water capacity (normal), gal

36,400

35,500

~30,000

~30,000

Total water distillation capacity, gal/day

7800

12,000

18,000

18,000

Fuel consumption, gal/day

870

1350

2000

2000

Maximum excess electric power available for shore use, kw

5400

600

1000

1000

Fuel consumption, gal/day

16,700

4000

5600

5600

No. of vessels of class in service

50

450

150

150

A. From Appendix G.

B. Capacity would be very slightly less for water.

C. Dead weight tons.

3.2.5 Small Vessels and Boats

Small vessels—those in the 5-ton to 1000-ton class—number perhaps 35,000 and are widely scattered throughout the nation. Most are used in inland or coastal commercial service although a few, including fishing boats and yachts, are routinely in service, at sea. Most of the vessels in Inland or coastal commercial service, including barges, lighters, tugs, etc., do not appear to have significant civil defense usage except in their very necessary support functions. Ocean-going fishing boats and yachts, which represent only a small fraction of the class, are considered in connection with pleasure boats.

Pleasure boats—less than 5 tons—are estimated to number 4,500,000 for the country.9 However, only about 12% (estimated 550,000) of these are designed to house four or more people for overnight or longer. Most of these boats are the inboard-engine type, and all are at least 16 ft in length.10 Few of these larger boats are intended for, or ever given, service at sea. They are primarily for use in inland areas or sheltered coastal regions; civil defense utilization should recognize this limitation. Within these limits, though, these larger boats could well serve as supplemental, or even firm, shelter spaces for a widely scattered, but highly selective population.

What little shielding protection boats offer from fallout can be effectively increased by the installation of a simple washdown system. After the cessation of fallout, boats can take advantage of the shielding offered by anchoring off shore in the middle of a deep body of water. Figure 3 shows the radiation dose that might be received aboard a small boat at various downwind distances from a 5-MT land-surface burst. Even with a washdown system, it seems likely that occupants of a boat could receive a fatal radiation dose even 20 miles downwind from the point of burst. For this reason the mobility of the craft is of great importance. Prior evaluation of probable target areas could locate probable safe harbors for boats at reasonable distances from normal berths. Thus, in the face of an attack, boat owners could load their families and friends in their boat and head for the nearest safe harbor, laying to there for as long as necessary. Such a course of action would require prior preparation and might well include the installation of a washdown system to provide better protection from fallout. With sufficient provisions, a family group could live on a larger boat for 2 wk.

Certain negative factors may vitiate much of the value of larger boats as shelters; these include:

1. Inaccessibility of the boat to the owner at the time of alert or attack. Many people do not live close to the place at which their boat is docked.

2. Environmental conditions that prevent the use of the boat. Foul weather, frozen waters, or even the darkness of night may make movement of the boat impractical or impossible.

3. Excessive deposition of fallout on the boat even with the best planning and navigation.

4. Occurrence of piracy or other acts of lawlessness.

5. Damage of the boat by the attack.

The multitudinous smaller boats scattered throughout the nation could conceivably be used to ferry people from population centers to good shelters (perhaps caves) along adjacent waterways. However, the problems mentioned for the larger boats become compounded, and it appears probable that such a mass evacuation attempt might serve only to expose people needlessly.

Larger sea-going craft, which should also be equipped with a wash-down system, appear relatively promising as supplementary shelters. Fishing craft, for example, could sustain a number of people in addition to the crew and would be less subject to the negative factors outlined above. Such craft could also simultaneously fulfill their normal role of food suppliers.

Boats offer no usable capacity for headquarters, storage, or utility generation.

3.3 INACTIVE SHIPS

3.3.1 National Defense Reserve Fleets (NDRF)

Large numbers of U.S. ships, merchant and naval, are not currently in active service for several reasons. Some ships are always in shipyards undergoing major repair or modification, and would be unavailable in an emergency. Some merchant ships may be laid up in a dead state for extended periods "because of economic and business factors; these ships could be made available with 1 or 2 day's notification providing operating crews were available. Most inactive ships, however, are to be found in two major reserve fleets: the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) under MARAD and the Naval Reserve Fleet under Bureau of Ships, U.S. Navy, Department of Defense. The former fleet is composed primarily of commercial-type vessels; the latter of naval ships. These two fleets will be discussed in detail in the next subsection.

The MARAD maintains 8 reserve fleets at those locations shown on Fig. k. One of the largest fleets—and typical of many of the fleets-is the one located at Suisun Bay, about 40 miles northeast of San Francisco. An aerial view of this fleet is shown in the frontispiece. Table 12 indicates the diversity of the vessels found in the Suisun fleet. A considerable number of these ships belong to the Navy, which rents space from MARAD. This arrangement has been made because these particular Navy ships, mostly support types (personnel or cargo transports), do not require the relatively expensive mothball preservation the Navy uses on its fighting ships.

Let us consider now the modus operandi of a reserve fleet, such as the one at Suisun Bay. The site selected must be out of active shipping channels, yet accessible via them. The location must not intrude on commercial fishing waters. Sufficient depth must be available to float the ships. The bottom material must be suitable for anchoring, and tidal action cannot be too strong. The water cannot be too saline, or preservation becomes very difficult and expensive. Because of such requirements the reserve fleets usually are located in rather remote areas, which is normally satisfactory since only a small crew of maintenance personnel have occasion to regularly commute. The land approach to the Suisun fleet, for example, is a narrow, twisting two lane road that stretches over salt flats, ending at the headquarter ship. From there, the fleet is accessible by one of the four or five patrol boats or tugs that the custodial and maintenance personnel use. The roving patrols, which operate 24 hr a day to keep off sightseers, thieves, etc., and to check for any signs of ship leakage, make a round trip of the fleet in a little over an hour. An individual ship can be boarded only from the ends of the rank, using the small floating dock and steel ladder way provided there. All ships in between must be crossed, through unlit passageways, to reach the desired ship; thus, it may require 15 min to reach a more remote ship in a rank of 30 ships.

The preservation technique used on vessels in the NDRF varies, depending on the priority assigned, that is, how available the vessel must be for reactivation. (There are six priority classifications as well as a nonpriority, or "ready for scrapping," classification.)

Table 12 Summary of Vessels in the United States National Defense Reserve Fleet (a)

RESERVE FLEET NAME AND LOCATION (b)

VESSEL TYPE

TOTAL

ATLANTIC COAST

GULF COAST

PACIFIC COAST

Hudson River

James River

Wilmington

Beaumont

Mobile

Astoria

Olympia

Suisun Bay

Jones Point, N.Y.

Lee Hall, Virginia

Wilmington North Carolina

Beaumont, Texas

Bay Minette, Alabama

Astoria, Oregon

Olympia Wash.

Benicia, Calif.

GENERAL CARGO










Liberty

949

91

143

144

128

191

114

33

105

Victory

181

34

27

--

13

25

23

23

36

S4-SE2-BE1

25

2

2

8

2

3

1

4

3

Others

262

38

37

15

32

39

152

34

53

TOTALS

1417

165

209

167

175

258


94

197

PASSENGER & TROOPERS










Victory

123

4

65

8

1

5

2

8

30

Liberty

18

--

--

--

--

--

--

--

18

S4-SE2-BD1

15

--

1

3

--

--

--

4

7

Others

105

12

36

--

5

--

6

16

30

TOTALS

261

16

102

11

6

5

8

28

85

TANKERS










T2

47

--

12

--

15

1

--

9

10

Others

30

--

2

--

6

3

3

2

14

TOTALS

77

--

14

--

21

4

3

11

24

HOSPITAL SHIPS










Liberty

6

--

3


-

--

2

-

1

Others

1

--

--

-

-

-

-

-

1

TOTALS

7

--

3

-

-

-

2

-

2

DISTILLING SHIPS










Liberty

2


1

--

--

-

1


--

T2

2

--

1

--

--

-

-

1

1

TOTALS

4

--

2

--

--

-

1

1

1

NAVY OWNED VESSELS IN TEMPORARY FLEET CUSTODY (c)

96

4

23

--

12

2

--

23

32

GRAND TOTAL

1766

181

330

178

202

267

166

134

308

A. United States Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, Division of Ship Custody, 30 June 1962.

B See Fig. 4, Map of Principal Waterways of the United States, for the location of each of these fleets.

C These vessels are not included in the grand totals.

Priority ships, although completely dead, are under a continuous maintenance program to protect exterior and interior surfaces as veil as the engineroom components. Such ships, if supplied with utilities (light, heat, water, and sanitation), sleeping accommodations (most ships have bunks but no mattresses) and rations, would be habitable without further cleanup. Nonpriority ships, which may have received no maintenance for 5 or more years, present a less palatable picture and some preliminary work would be required to meet minimum habitation standards.

Ships in the NDRF are given periodic engine maintenance. They carry sufficient fuel and water supplies aboard to permit them, after an in situ recommissioning by assigned crews (requiring 48 to 72 hours), to steam to a shipyard where the vessel could be completely reactivated for sea duty. Although this concept seems workable, it is definitely limited by the number of crews that could be recruited, by the quantity of spare parts aboard the ship itself, and the capacity of available shipyards. Realistically, after an enemy attack, most of the ships in a reserve fleet could be expected to remain in place (unless moved by tugs to another storage area) and would be available as short term shelters.

3.3.2 Liberty Ships

Liberty ships, some 2000 of which were built in World War II, comprise the majority of ships in the NRDF. Of the total of approximately 900 now in the fleet (see Table 12) 250 are priority ships, 400 have recently been placed under the Emergency Ship Program for limited maintenance, and the rest just sit, unattended, awaiting scrapping. Currently, about fifty Liberties a year are scrapped at an average sale price of $40,000 each; the original cost was $2,400,000. When the Liberties are. gone, the next lowest priority ships, probably the C1's be scrapped.

"As Is" Shelters. Liberty ships possess little or no "as is" shelter potential both because of their inherent structural characteristics and their locations in MARAD reserve fleets. Reiterating, the deficiencies of an NRDF for emergency housing of an evacuee populace are:

1. The fleet is usually not readily accessible by a land route from population centers.

2. Movement of evacuees to the ship is possible only with small boats.

3. Boarding a rank of ships and reaching the desired position in a given ship represents a possible major bottleneck. Even if thousands of small boats brought evacuees to the ships, access is only through one or two points of entry for all ships in a rank.

4. The ships are dead and have no facilities for housing or feeding people.

Liberty ships, in addition to the corporate shortcomings of reserve fleets, were designed as cargo carriers and the only housing space is in the deck house where there is little protection from fallout radiation. To think of funneling evacuees into a dark dead ship and having them climb down the oil-covered rungs of a steel ladder into the bowels of a mammoth hold is ludicrous. Of course, the holds have no sanitation, lights or ventilation. Even if, somehow, it appeared to be the best choice of shelter available, an inspection of Fig. 9 shows that the shielding afforded by a Liberty ship, with the possible exception of the engine room area (which is also the most accessible, but could hold very few people), may be no better than that of a well-built office building. In summary, Liberty ships hold no merit as "as is" shelters.

Converted Shelters. A Liberty ship, because of the open construction of its cargo holds, could be modified for shelter purposes. Furthermore, since these ships are surplus, unusual concepts can be considered. Figure 10 shows a proposed accommodation plan of the second deck of a Liberty ship converted to provide accommodations for approximately 5100 persons and to afford an average protection factor against fallout of 0.005 (0.0005 with washdown). The shielding factors for deck-deposit radiation at various points within the ship are shown in Fig. 11. Appendix E lists in some detail the modifications and costs for the indicated conversion. Basically, a 4 inch concrete shield has been placed on the main deck of the vessel and two additional decks have been laid throughout the ship, including the engine room whose components have been removed to provide additional shelter space.

[A 4 inch layer of concrete was used in order to provide a minimum reduction factor of 0.015 on the second deck of the ship shelter. Coupled with a 90% efficient washdown system, the overall reduction factor on the second deck would be 0.0015, It is conceivable that the need for the concrete deck could be eliminated by crowding everyone onto the lower decks while the radiation was most intense, but since the cost of the concrete deck is only 6% of the entire conversion cost (App. E), this expedient does not seem warranted.]

The layout of the living areas is oriented to survival standards; there are no frills. The design capacity of 5066, based on an average of about 12 sq.. ft. per person, could be doubled using hot bunking without affecting the stability of the ship. The modified vessel would be entirely self-contained and could house its occupants for 2 wk or more. Power for the washdown system (which can be run intermittently after fallout ceases to reduce the heat load from the occupants), the lighting and ventilation systems, and the sanitation and firefighting systems (which use sea water) is provided by two 100-kw diesel generators. Fuel and water supplies, far in excess of anticipated needs, can be readily stored on the vessel. The design ventilation rate is 10 cfm per person which would be cut to 4 cfm per person while the washdown system was operating. No analysis was made of the total heat load, but it is probable that in warmer climates additional ventilation or air conditioning would be required. No provisions have been made for cooking in this shelter; the use of dry rations has been assumed. Areas have been set aside for a hospital, a headquarters, and segregation. The sleeping spaces in the ship are subdivided into units, each accommodating up to 350 persons (700 persons with hot bunking). No attempts have been made to promote the inter-accessibility of various parts of the ship; rather, it is visualized that persons would generally remain in the section to which they were originally assigned. However, as the radiation hazard abated, evacuees could move into the deck house, and perhaps even onto the main deck, thus alleviating overcrowding below decks.


Fig. 10 Accommodation Plan of the Second Deck of a Liberty Ship Converted for Shelter Use


Fig- 11 Inboard Profile of a Converted Liberty Ship Showing Deposit Radiation Reduction Factors at Various Points
(Reduction factors were obtained by the method described in App. B)

The conversion of the Liberty ship involves removal of the masts, king-posts, and other unnecessary protuberances from the main deck, but does not involve the deck house where the living quarters are normally located. It is contemplated that this area would be made available to the community in which the ship shelter is to be located. A fairly minor expenditure of funds could convert the existing facilities into civil defense offices, police headquarters, etc, or, at somewhat more expense, into a community recreation center. A swimming pool, tennis courts, etc., could be placed on the main deck without subverting the use of the space below while adding to the usefulness and acceptability of the ship to the community. Such dual service would also provide security for the ship, which is a most necessary item.

The interior of the ship (the shelter spaces), would normally be closed to the public but maintained in a state of readiness. This condition could be most easily maintained by dehumidifying the shelter space so that corrosion would be practically eliminated. Routine maintenance, which could be done by city personnel, would involve periodic checks on the condition of the food and water supplies (the latter might have to be changed every 3 to 6 months), the operation of the dehumidifying system and the functioning of the two diesel generators. Automatic sensing devices would be employed for fire and leak detection. The built-in fire protection system should be capable of handling any fires that might occur although such fires are rare occurrences in dead, ships.

A converted Liberty ship could be used in a number of different situations and locations, particularly since its 9-ft draft (empty) would allow it access to most of the larger cities of the U.S. (Fig. 4). However, since it would have to be moved by tug, the distance it would be desirable to move it would be limited.

This complete dependence of a ship shelter on outside motive power strongly suggests that postattack plans envisage the loaded ship remaining in situ despite the fact that better shielding could be obtained by movement to midchannel. (Even under good conditions, it would take several tugs several hours to move a moored or beached dead ship into a new position. ) Nor is it practical to speak in terms of permanently mooring a ship in midchannel because then the personnel loading problem would be insurmountable. Further, the possible use of the main deck and superstructure of the ship to the community is lost unless the ship is permanently moored or beached for ready access. Since a beached ship would not provide so much shielding protection as a ship moored in midchannel, the shielding must be increased; hence the suggested 4-in concrete deck cover.

Several placement methods appear possible, the choice depending primarily on the location selected. The simplest placement would be at an existing pier which would most probably be near an area of high population density (business or residential, or both). Unfortunately, however, suitable piers (of fireproof concrete construction) are at a premium, and rent for tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars a year. Nevertheless, in some locations and especially where civic interest is aroused, the use of a pier might be possible. The advantages, in addition to accessibility and loading ease, are: ready sources of water and electricity, immediate availability, and the ultimate release of the pier for cargo handling. Figure 12-a and drawing No. 1, Appendix F, illustrate a ship shelter at a pier.

The emplacement method which would be applicable in most locations is beaching one or more ship shelters (as shown in Fig. 12-b) near a population center. The manner in which a ship shelter is beached would depend on the selected site; the simplest case is one in which the converted Liberty is pushed by tugs onto a sandy shore, there to rise and fall with the tide. In the more complicated case illustrated in Drawing No, 2, Appendix F, a slipway would be dredged permitting the ship shelter to be beached with its bow about 100 ft inshore of the high water mark. Once the ship was in location, backfill would be placed against the bow to promote stabilization against abnormal tidal action and/or blast effects.


Fig. 12 Potential Ship Emplacement Conditions

A paved access road and a parking area, which would serve for both civic activities and a disaster event, would be constructed. Electrical power would be brought in either from existing utility lines or provided by an adjacent generator set. Fresh water would preferably come from a drilled well, which could also serve as an auxiliary supply to the ship during an emergency. Three or more ships could be beached adjacent to each other and interconnected to form a shelter complex, permitting the interchange of utilities. Drawing No. 3 of Appendix F shows such an arrangement for three ships.

In some locations, a ship shelter might be landlocked by first floating the ship into a dredged slip longer than the length of the ship and then backfilling on all sides. Such an arrangement might be used where harbor space is at a premium or where beaching is not feasible because of soil considerations. However, the higher cost of such an operation overbalances the advantages of this usage. Drawing No. 4, Appendix F, shows a landlocked ship.

It is noteworthy that two battleships have been successfully landlocked in recent years, and serve as state monuments; these have attracted much public attention. The Battleship TEXAS, emplaced almost 15 yr ago adjacent to the Houston Ship Channel, has survived the full force of several hurricanes. The most recent, Carla, in September of 1961, brought tides of an estimated 15 feet that lifted the TEXAS 5 or 6 ft out of her bed but redeposited her, undamaged, as the wind and tides subsided. The NORTH CAROLINA, landlocked across from Wilmington, N.C., adjacent to the Cape Fear River, was emplaced in 1961 in what was then a swamp. The ship has since become a major tourist attraction and a large parking lot has been constructed next to it. No difficulty has been experienced with respect to the stability of the ship, but the parking lot has a tendency to revert to swamp.

A final case, shown in Fig. 12-d is a battleship which has been completely buried underground to provide a civil defense headquarters. A battleship was chosen for this usage because (1) a few obsolete battleship are now available; (2) a battleship inherently has the structural strength to withstand the weight of the overburden; and (3) the design of a battleship is adaptable to headquarters-shelter use. The design criteria for such an installation, shown in detail in Drawing No, 6, Appendix F, are the ability to withstand 35-psi overpressure and to afford a shielding factor of 0.001. Prior to emplacement, the entire superstructure of the battleship is removed, all top openings are sealed, and internal strengthening members are added. The hull is then floated into a dredged slipway, in a manner similar to that described for the landlocked ship. The slipway is sealed off and a sand slurry is pumped around and under the ship to form a sand foundation. (Because of hydrostatic pressure the ship cannot be placed too low in its final resting place.) Finally, the excess material from the dredging operation is mounded over the ship to bury it to a minimum depth of 5 ft; access tunnels from the surface lead to the now buried structure. The cost of such an emplacement at Norfolk, Va. is estimated to be $525,000, almost seven times as expensive as beaching one Liberty ship-shelter. To this figure must

be added the costs of conversions within the battleship. It is estimated that this conversion cost would be one-third to one-half that of the conversion of the Liberty ship. Thus, for approximately $1,000,000, a community could obtain an excellent blast shelter capable of housing vital functions as well as many evacuees, (5,000 to 10,000 as a rough approximation). Other classes of ships, such as cruisers and aircraft carriers, which might become surplus in the foreseeable future, could also be similarly emplaced.

The comparative costs of ship shelters in various emplacements are listed in Table 13. The cost of the Liberty ship conversion is so high that differences in the costs of emplacement methods are relatively insignificant. The average cost per occupant, when the ship shelter is at maximum occupancy of 10,000 persons, is about $92 for any coastwise location in the country. A buried battleship used only to house personnel would compare favorably in cost at approximately $100 per person but would provide considerably more protection against both blast and radiation.

[According to Ref. 11, an NRDL-type underground shelter would cost from $142/person for the most-austere 10-psi shelter to $198/person for the least-austere 35-Psi shelter, based on 100 man occupancy.]

In summary, converted Liberty ships appear to have considerable merit as ship shelters, especially in those areas where existing shelters are inadequate and local construction conditions, such as high water tables, preclude use of underground shelters. Another probable benefit of ship shelters is the unlikelihood of involvement in a firestorm. Ship shelters would always be bounded by water on one side, and in most emplacement conditions, they would be located at the fringe of any built-up areas. Hence, the lack of combustible materials in the vicinity of the ship would mitigate against a firestorm.

Civil Defense Headquarters. A Liberty ship could probably be converted to serve as either a civil defense headquarters or a civil defense hospital at little or no additional cost. However, the former usage would seem to merit a truly blast-resistant shelter, such as a buried battleship. Although the Public Health Service does not countenance use of ships as hospitals, certain modifications (at admittedly high costs) might make such usage more attractive. We can only recognize that such utilization is possible.

Floating Storage. Approximately 100 Liberty ships at three NDRF locations (Astoria, Hudson River, and James River) are now used for the storage of grain. In this program, reactivated in 1953, the deep holds of a sound Liberty ship are partially filled with wheat (approximately 7000 tons or 233,000 bushels) and then the ship is moored, in the NDRF, with other grain-filled ships. Department of Agriculture personnel monitor the wheat continually, checking for insect infestation, water leakage, mildew, etc., and periodically, in the eastern fleets, the wheat is turned to promote aeration. The keeping quality of the grain is apparently excellent, some ships having been loaded with the same cargo for six or more years with the wheat showing little or no deterioration according to protein and moisture content. If, on occasion, trouble is spotted, it is necessary move the ship to a grain elevator, which may be many miles away, and unload the entire hold, salvaging as much grain as possible. Since loading and unloading costs are an expensive part of this program, as can be seen from Table 14, it is desirable to load and unload ships infrequently.

Table 13 Comparative Costs of Ship Shelters in Various Emplacement Conditions


Liberty Ship Berthed at Pier

Liberty Ship Beached on Shore

Liberty Ship Landlocked

Buried Battleship

1 Ship

3 Ships

Cost of Ship Conversion, $

860,000

860,000

2,580,000

860,000

500,000 (est)

Emplacement Cost, $

25,000*

80,000

180,000

124,000

525,000

Total Cost, $

885,00*

940,000

2,760,000

984,000

1,000,000 (est)

Minimum Occupancy

5,100

5,100

15,200

5,100

5,000 (est)

Maximum Occupancy

10,000

10,000

30,000

10,000

10,000 (est)

Cost at Maximum Occupancy, $/Person

88*

94

92

98

100 (est)

Estimated Reduction Factor (with washdown)

0.0005

0.0005

0.0005

0.0015

< 0.001

* Does not include yearly pier rental.

Table 14 Costs for Storage of Wheat on Surplus Liberty Ships
(Average for 1953-60 from Ref. 2.)


East Coast Fleet

West Coast Fleet

Loading costs, ¢/bushel per year

5.57

7.22

Unloading costs, ¢/bushel per year

7.60

10.34

Storage costs, ¢/bushel per year

4.48

5.20

Just within recent months, the Department of Agriculture has made the decision, quite unexpectedly, to phase out grain storage on ships in the two east coast fleets. This reversal of policy has resulted from the discovery of subtle downgrading in the stored wheat, which has resulted in sales at 10% or more below the market price. This downgrading does not involve the nutritional value of the wheat, but it does affect the baking qualities for breadmaking. A re-evaluation of this program, in terms of civil defense requirements is in order, since these grain reserves on ships have long been thought of as mobile granaries for any possible disaster. It is conceivable that this program might be continued under CCD aegis in order to maintain this important reserve. It should be understood that, even though the grain so stored is not suitable for first quality bread products, it is entirely adequate, nutritionally speaking, for feeding survivors after a nuclear attack. Further, a market for this downgraded wheat will continue to exist in those nations that use wheat in a less refined manner than ours. However, the question should be asked: Is wheat the best grain to store for possible disaster use?

Recent studies of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Western Regional Research Laboratory (WRRL) suggest that bulgur, a deglutinized form of wheat which stores very well and requires little or no cooking prior to consumption, may be a more ideal food.12 Bulgur costs almost a cent a pound to prepare from wheat. Although it has a longer storage life than wheat, unlike wheat, it has practically no resale value. Thus, assuming bulgur was stored for 10 years and sold for an 80% loss whereas wheat was rotated every 5 years and sold at a 10% loss, the comparative yearly costs of storing these two commodities would be:

Wheat

Net cost of wheat

$0.40/bushel

Storage Costs for 10 Yr

0.448

Loading and Unloading (Twice)

0.263

Total

$1.11/bushel
or
11.1 cents per bushel per year

Bulgur

Total cost of Bulgur

$2.10/Bushel

Storage Costs for 10 Yr

0.448

Loading and Unloading (Once)

0.131

Total

$2.68/bushel
or
26.8 cents per bushel per yr

These approximate figures indicate that the storage of bulgur would be considerably more expensive for civil defense use. However, as previously noted, bulgur is an available food and needs no cooking— hence no fuel— probably an important consideration in any postattack situation. If the additional cost can be tolerated, this concept can be carried further and consideration could be given to the bulk storage on ships of a pelletized survival ration of the type developed by WRRL. Further research would be necessary regarding the stability of this ration, its adaptability to bulk storage, and its cost (estimated to be 10 cents a pound in bulk).12

If a food-storage program were undertaken by OCD, the question of the optimum distribution of such food stores would arise. Keeping grain ships in their present locations in the NDRF has definite advantages, including centralization of inspection effort and lowered ship maintenance costs. However, even if the full storage capacity of the three established grain fleets was fully utilized, distribution in a postattack situation could present an overwhelming problem. For example, a study13 has shown that, under certain attack patterns, San Francisco would be completely cut off from rail transportation for some time, during which period food stocks could become dangerously low. Movement of a grain-laden Liberty ship from the Astoria NDRF to San Francisco to alleviate such a shortage would require 4 to 6 days if a sea-going tug were available. However, many major metropolitan areas, including San Francisco, are within 150 miles of established reserve fleets and it would seem plausible to use such fleets as bases for food-storage centers whenever possible. For example, the present facilities at the Naval Reserve Fleet at San Diego could accommodate sufficient grain ships to provide an emergency food reserve for both the Los Angeles and San Diego metropolitan areas. Distribution could probably best be accomplished by off-loading the grain onto barges and lighters, which could then supply numerous coastal-points.

[Small vacuum-type grain unloaders operated by diesel engines are commercially available and would be well suited for this task.]

There are certain waterside metropolitan locations, however, that are isolated from established facilities. Such waterside areas could also utilize Liberty ship storage, although at additional effort and expense, by the establishment of small fleets at scattered locations. Figure 12-c illustrates how a nest of six ships moored together in midchannel for stability and safety, might appear. In this arrangement a security watch would be maintained at all times on the ships, and ship-maintenance and grain-inspection personnel would commute to the site as required.

Two significant costs enter into expanding the grain-storage program to meet civil defense needs: site construction and maintenance. The 28-ft draft of a loaded grain ship -would require additional dredging at most fleets operated by the Maritime Administration. The estimated cost for such dredging for a six-ship emplacement is $275,000 (App. F); amortized over a 10-yr period, this expenditure would represent 1.97 ¢/bushel per yr. Additional expenditures would be required for site acquisition if established facilities were not used. Maintenance costs in the reserve fleet would be in line with present costs; in smaller nests, the costs might be at least 50% higher. Thus, the cost of storing wheat under a civil defense sponsored program would range from the present 11.1 ¢/bushel per yr up to at least 16 ¢/bushel per yr. In contrast, the cost of storing wheat inland under the Uniform Grain Storage Agreement is 13.5 ¢/bushel per yr; over a 10 year period the estimated total cost would be 14.3¢/bushel per yr.

Ships loaded with grain have a potential for the storage of other civil defense material in the 'tween deck space of approximately 170,000 cu. ft. This storage space might be better utilized if dehumidified to prevent the deterioration of stored items. Also, if the grain holds were dehumidified, it could conceivably increase the storage life of the grain appreciably. Liberty ships so equipped would then truly be used for floating storage.

Storage of water or fuel on Liberty ships shows no merit, and can certainly be more profitably done on other types of vessels.

Floating Utilities. Liberty ships offer insignificant electrical-generating capacity (60 kw, DC) and little water distillation capacity (9000 gal/day); hence, their activation for such use is not recommended. However, the Liberty hull can serve as the vehicle for power-generation or water-distillation plants. The most recent such conversion involves a Liberty ship, the WALTER F. PERRY, which, under a recently announced 17.4 million dollar contract between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Martin Company, will be converted into a floating nuclear power plant. Briefly, the Liberty hull will be cut in two, and a new midsection containing the reactor will be inserted. A great deal of versatility is designed into the power plant so that it can produce 11,274 kva at 50 cycles or 13,259 kva at 60 cycles, all at 13,800 volts; this voltage can then be transformed upwards to match the shoreside voltage. The obvious advantage of a floating nuclear power plant is its ability to generate power indefinitely without the need for fuel supply lines. The Strategic Army Command currently has floating power plants in operation in two harbors, one at Thule, Greenland and the other at Okinawa. Table 15 lists comparative costs for floating power plants and conventional shoreside steam installations.

Table 15 Estimated Costs for Floating and Conventional Power Plants and Conventional Shoreside Steam Installations8

ITEM

FLOATING

SHORESIDE

Nuclear (Martin)

Nuclear (b)

Conventional (b)

Conventional (c)

Conventional (d)

Conventional (d)

Output, KWe

11,500

10,000

10,000

34,500

10,000

100,000

Original cost, millions of $

17.4

11.0

4.7

8.1

---

Cost, $/installed KW

1510

1100

470

235

210

115-170

Operating cost, mil/KW

----

19.4

14.2

---

5.1-5.3

---

A. None of these cost figures are corrected for inflationary factors.

B. From NYO-2945, Study of Remote Military Power Applications, Report No. 9 - Inchon Korea, 1960. Prepared by Kaiser Engineering.

C. Specifications for Conversion of a Liberty Ship to a 34,500 KW Floating Power Plant, 15 Dec 1954. Philadelphia District, Corps of Engineers.

D. B.G.A. Skrotzki and W.A. Vopat, Power Station Engineering and Economy. McGraw Hill, New York. Pages 608, ff.; p. 666.

Two Liberty ships and two T2 tankers, fitted out as distilling vessels, remain in the NDRF. The evaporator plants on each of these Liberty ships can produce 63,000 gal/day of potable water which can then be stored in the 2,500,000-gallon tank capacity of the vessel. Although the distillation capacity of these ships is significant, it is important to note that passenger vessels and troop transports have appreciably greater water-producing capacity and that they utilize the more efficient double-effect evaporators.

3.3.3 S4 Type

The S4-SE2-BD1 and S4-SE2-BE1 class ships were built for the Navy in World War II as shallow-draft attack transports and attack cargo ships, respectively. Because of their light construction they proved unusable for peacetime commercial, service and, consequently, were placed in the NDRF after the war. The S4's are nonpriority ships, and the 40 in the NDRF will ultimately be sold for scrap. Of the 40 S4's, 15 are S4-SE2-BD1 troop carriers and 25 are S4-SE2-BE1 cargo carriers. Reactivation would be a difficult problem because of a shortage of spare parts; perhaps cannibalization of one or more ships would be necessary.

Shelters and Civil Defense Headquarters. An S4 attack transport designed originally to carry about 1100 troops could be made into a habitable shelter merely by renovation of the existing facilities. At some additional cost, the capacity would be increased 30-50%. However, the light construction of this ship would probably require much additional shielding and internal strengthening. Further analysis would be required before any firm recommendations could be made as to the advisability of using S4 vessels for shelters and/or headquarters.

Floating Storage. The S4 attack cargo ship, in attaining its goal of a shallow draft, sacrificed its carrying capacity. Consequently water and fuel capacity are small and even the cargo space is limited. Use for storage is not recommended.

Floating Utilities. The S4's are of most interest for floating utilities because of their propulsion systems—twin turboelectric generators. Unfortunately, these generators cannot be used at maximum power, because the cycle rate is too high; however, they can be throttled back to produce 3600 kw at 60 cycles. Fuel consumption would then be about 375 kwh per barrel of fuel, or 9,700 gal of fuel per 24 hr. The ship would have to be refueled about once a month since it has a fuel storage capacity of only 410,000 gal.

Removing a ship from the reserve fleet and reactivating the engineroom components, including the evaporators, is estimated to cost $325,000 and to require 25 days. Allocating this entire cost to the generating capacity of 3600 kw, the cost per installed kw is found to be $90. This cost compares favorably with the cost of building new floating power plants at $235 to $470 per installed kw (Table 15). However, because of the age of this equipment, maintenance costs would be expected to be higher and equipment reliability poorer.

S4's have an appreciable water-distillation capacity (20,000 gal/ day) which could operate simultaneously with the power-generating system. The S4's should be studied in more detail to determine the costs involved in their utilization as shelters, headquarters, and floating power stations. Further, the study should ascertain the relative merit of reactivating these ships prior to attack vs holding them until a need develops.

3.3.4 General Cargo Ships

Cargo ships in the NDRF appear to have only one role they might play in the civil defense effort: storage. Cargo ships in the fleet have no "as is" shelter potential, and they cannot be considered for any type of converted use because they have an assigned priority. Such utilities as a cargo ship has would never be justification for reactivating it. Priority cargo ships can be used for grain storage as some Liberty ships are used, although such utilization has limitations. Priority cargo ships have two or more 'tween decks that decrease the deep hold space in which grain is stored. Further, these ships have an assigned mission that might detract from such a secondary use. Basically, however, priority ships can be used for the storage of grain or other civil defense materiel, but probably only if the ships remain in their present locations in the reserve fleet.

3.3.5 Passenger, Troop and Hospital Ships

In the NDRF there are 7 hospital ships, about 10 troop ships which are basically passenger vessels and about 250 cargo-type ships, which have been modified, to varying degrees, to carry troops. Although responsibility for reactivation of these ships is divided between MARAD and the Navy, all could be expected to be used as troop transports in the event of war. Of all the vessels in the NDRF, ships in this class would come the closest to serving as "as is" shelters, since the basic living accommodations are present. It is conceivable, for example, that a limited number of evacuees equipped with bedding, food, and water could reside in the lower compartments of a passenger vessel until outside radiation levels dropped to acceptable levels. With some preplanning and at considerable expense, these ships could be made into quite satisfactory "as is" shelters — although the problem of getting people to the ship would still exist. Minimum modifications that would be required include: activation and regular maintenance of emergency generator sets on all ships to provide a modicum of light within the ship; stockpiling of bedding, food, and water; installation of additional access platforms to the ships; and installation of self-powered washdown systems. Further study would be required to determine the feasibility, usefulness, and cost of any such program.

Since all ships in this class have an assigned priority and, presumably, a mission in the event of a national emergency, it is difficult to assess their postattack life-sustaining role. If available and if reactivated, many of these vessels could be used for headquarters floating hospitals, emergency housing, power generation, etc. A better understanding of the relative importance that civil defense might have in a postattack situation would be required for any further speculation.

3.3.6 Tankers

Tankers in the reserve fleet, like their counterparts in active service, have no potential usefulness as shelters or headquarters. Inactive tankers could, however, make an important contribution to the nation's fuel reserve, particularly of those fuels likely to be in short supply. Currently, NDRF tankers are stored empty. Should not this capacity in the 77 tankers in the NDRF be used for the storage of petroleum products? Several arguments against such use include:

1. A fire hazard would be created.

2. Additional dredging would be required to accommodate the increased draft of the loaded tankers.

3. The tankers might be targets themselves.

These objections, all valid, can be answered as follows:

1. The fire hazard can be reduced greatly by storing liquids of low combustibility. Significantly, a Stanford Research Institute study10 found that distillate stocks (diesel fuel, primarily) could be the petroleum fraction in shortest supply after attack. These heavier fractions could be stored indefinitely on tankers with little likelihood of fire.

2. Funds would have to be made available for dredging (estimated at $30,000/tanker).

3. The tankers could be relocated, perhaps adjacent to emergency food supply centers (cf. 3.8.4) which are out of target areas.

The 8,000,000 barrels of distillate that might be stored in NDRF tankers would represent an appreciable addition to the estimated 95,500,000 barrels that would survive a 1965 military and population attack (Ref. 14, Table 12). Moreover, diesel fuel is such a vital factor in our economy and would continue to be in any postattack recovery scheme, that this potential additional storage source should not he overlooked.

The storage of water on dead tankers does not appear promising because (1) all tanks would have to be cleaned and coated at considerable expense prior to such use, and (2) the water in the tanks would either have to be specially purified or changed every few months. Either process would be quite expensive.

The 47 T2 tankers in the NDRF could be used for generating electrical power for shoreside use. Assuming that these ships would be available for such service, activation would be advisable, since these ships, if fueled, could serve indefinitely as floating utilities, easing the strain on what might be a critical link in the recovery chain.

3.3.7 Naval Reserve Fleets

The locations of the Naval Reserve Fleets, generally naval shipyards or other military installations, are shown on Fig.4. These fleets contain the combat vessels (battleships, cruisers, destroyers, etc.) that are not currently needed for our military mission. These so-called "mothball" fleets are characterized by webbing and plastic sprayed on exposed elements of the ship. These ships have cathodic protection of the hulls; corrosion of the interiors is inhibited by maintaining low relative humidity throughout the ship. The latter is accomplished by dehumidification (d-h) machines that circulate dry air to all spaces. This regime practically eliminates corrosion and the interior of a d-h'd ship can be expected to be spotless, even to the mattresses on the bunks. Shore electrical power is available on each ship for lighting and for the d-h machines, but the sanitary, firefighting and ventilation systems are not operable. It would require several days of concerted effort, plus the availability of a water supply (the sea chest, the normal source of water, might be blanked off) to put the ship in shape for normal habitation. The reactivation of the engineroom and the power plant would be considerably more time consuming. It is probable that few of these reserve ships would be activated in the days immediately following an attack. However, most or all of the ships in such reserve fleets have assigned priorities and will probably be unavailable for long-range civil defense utilization.

It is perhaps presumptuous to discuss the use of fighting ships for civil defense, since such ships, even though inactive, have well-defined roles to play in wartime. If available, however, larger ships, such as a cruiser, could (1) make excellent civil defense headquarters, (2) provide appreciable utility service to a shore contact, and (3) provide, in their present condition, a vast amount of dry storage space for civil defense items. In one area, however, it appears that Naval Reserve Fleets could be most useful for civil defense purposes without disrupting their intended mission: "as is" shelters. The rugged construction, ready accessibility, and inherent livability make Naval Reserve Fleets most attractive for this use. It is somewhat surprising that the Navy has not utilized this potential, but at bases visited by the senior author this use, although contemplated, has not been implemented. On the other hand, several negative elements enter into the use of Naval Reserve Fleets for shelters; shore power might fail, and plunge the ships into darkness, sanitation and firefighting systems are inoperable, and ventilation is inadequate. However, considering the thousands of excellent shelter spaces that each reserve fleet represents, further investigation seems merited.

3.3.8 Miscellaneous

Several other types of "vessels" may also be considered for possible civil defense use. Surplus submarine hulls (cf. 1.1) could be buried, at a cost of about $220 per occupant, to provide small but rugged blast and fallout shelters. Unfortunately, the number of surplus hulls is small, probably less than 50, so that the total shelter capacity would only be of the order of 10,000 persons. For this reason, as well as the high cost, this program is not recommended. However, some communities might find it expedient to use a buried submarine for the local civil defense headquarters.

A few floating metal drydocks are still available, but will probably be scrapped in the near future; such docks might conceivably be used in a variety of civil defense functions. A typical dock15 is 410 ft in length and 100 ft in width and can lift a small ship. The interior of a dry dock is hollow (to give the necessary buoyancy), and a portion of this space is devoted to enginerooms, machine shops, and crew's quarters. In an emergency, these spaces could undoubtedly be used to house personnel; also, some of the ballast spaces could be converted to housing facilities. A dry dock has elaborate utilities-electrical generators, pumps, air compressors, and steam, that might be of value for shore use. The usefulness of floating dry docks in the civil defense effort can be properly evaluated only with considerable additional study.

A third possibility is the "double bottoms" left after a Liberty ship has been partially scrapped.

[A double bottom would result from the removal of all of the structure above the Load Water Line (Fig. 9).]

The Maritime Administration has suggested2 that these double bottoms, which are currently being cut up and disposed of, be retained in the NDRF for possible future emergency use as pontoons or finger piers. Double bottoms could also be used to store a small amount of liquid fuel, but because they offer no overhead cover, would be unsuitable for dry-cargo storage. None of the purposes envisioned for the double bottoms is particularly noteworthy, and when compared to the utility of a whole Liberty ship (which would only cost $40,000 more), it can only be concluded that it would be far better to utilize the entire Liberty ship than to try and get some residual value from the double bottoms.

SECTION 4

CIVIL DEFENSE UTILIZATION OF SHIPS AND BOATS - BY FUNCTION

4.1 GENERAL

An evaluation of the potential use of ships and boats in the total civil defense effort is discussed in this section. Although this appraisal is preliminary, such an overall presentation will be helpful in elucidating those areas of endeavor of particular interest upon which further research seems merited.

4.2 SHIPS FOR LIFESAVING

4.2.1 Active Ships

Active shipping has an appreciable potential in the evacuation of persons from target areas, this mission being superimposed on the primary goal of saving the ships themselves. Passenger liners could offer some degree of shielding from fallout and also provide housing, but their potential is minor with respect to total shipping activity. A very rough approximation of the nationwide evacuation potential can be obtained from Table 2. Passenger and dry-cargo ships with a total capacity of 1.027 x 109 net tons (l net ton = 100 cu ft) passed through all continental U.S. ports in the year 1960. This figure includes domestic and foreign ships and does not indicate the amount of cargo loaded or unloaded, only the capacity of the ships in terms of volume space available. Assuming for simplicity that ship movement is constant throughout the year and that a ship stays in a given port for an average of 2.5 days (see 2.3), we find:

Assuming that, at the time of an alert, evacuees would hoard all ships in port, and using a capacity of 1 person per net ton (of 100 cu ft), we find that 7,000,000 persons could theoretically evacuate to the safety of open waters. An additional 2,000,000 might be evacuated on inland waterways using tugs, non-self-propelled dry-cargo vessels, and pleasure cruise ships. The estimated 560,000 larger boats (cf. 3.2.5), carrying an average of six passengers each, would account for another 3,500,000 evacuees. The approximately 4,500,000 small boats (rowboat to 15 ft cabin-cruiser class) are not deemed to be of sufficient value in an evacuation scheme to be considered here. The total number of persons who might be evacuated from target areas over water routes is then:

Ocean-going vessels

7,000,000

Inland vessels

2,000,000

Boats

3,500,000

Total

12,500,000

Such a total is impressive but is immediately open to criticism, ranging from the validity of the evacuation concept to the number of people who would actually be able to use this escape route. Callahan et al,1 estimated a total ship and boat shelter space capacity of 19,000,000, which agrees reasonably well with our value, especially since we discount the use of boats under l6 ft for evacuation use while they did not. Callahan's concept of using ships and boats as "isolation" shelters is questioned, since it was shown in 2.1.1 and Appendix A that deposit and transit doses are much more important than the water or land doses that he considered. Time has not permitted a detailed study to be made of the possible availability of ships and boats throughout the nation. For such a study, information on population distribution, available shelter distribution, number and type of vessels available in a port, and their cyclic pattern, length of shipping season, probable evacuation routes, etc., would have to be obtained and analyzed. Table 4 gives some such data for selected port cities, but does not attempt to fully analyze their significance. Future work, therefore, might well be concentrated on a detailed analysis of several of those ports that show, qualitatively, a potential for evacuation by ships and boats. A rough index of this potential can be obtained as follows:

Maximum population - Shelter spaces available
Inbound waterborne commerce, net tons (excluding tankers)

Of those ports listed in Table 4, Brooklyn, Seattle, New Orleans, and Norfolk might merit further study, based on this index.

In summary, we find that as many as 12,000,000 persons could he evacuated from port cities via water routes using available ships and boats. This figure, however, is not directly useful because of the many variables involved, and we have recommended that, if evacuation by water is deemed acceptable, an intensive study of selected port cities be made.

4.2.2 Inactive Ships

The 8 National Defense Reserve Fleets include a total of 260 passenger-type vessels that, with considerable modification of existing preservation techniques, could be made available as "as is" shelter spaces for a population of nearly a million persons. These people would almost certainly have to use small boats to reach the reserve fleets. Naval reserve fleets, which can be reached from nearby population centers by overland routes, could house perhaps half as many persons as the NDRF, but with greater comfort and protection.

The greatest shelter potential exists for ship shelters made by converting surplus Liberty ships. If 800 of the Liberty ships in the NDRF were converted and emplaced, at an approximate cost of $860,000 per ship, firm fallout shelter spaces for 8,000,000 persons would be created. These spaces could be distributed in those locations where conventional shelters are in shortest supply and where underground construction costs are unusually high. The few remaining battleships do not represent many shelter spaces, but they do offer a unique opportunity to construct massive underground headquarters at a reasonable cost.

The logical sequence in further evaluation of ship shelters would be to actually undertake such a conversion in order to evaluate concepts and determine realistic construction costs. Under the auspices of some organization, such as the National Association of Civil Defense Directors, the converted ship could serve as a model shelter and a training center. Because of its mobility, the ship shelter could be moved about coastwise and inland.

4.3 SHIPS AS STOREHOUSES

4.3.1 Active Ships

In calendar year 1960 approximately 66,000,000 tons (2000 lbs.) of edible animal and vegetable products passed through U.S. ports.16 Assuming that all ships that are headed for port, in port, and leaving port safely evade any nuclear damage, approximately 1,000,000 tons of edible food products would be available for consumption. In actuality, the amount of food available might be much smaller because of ship losses or return of foreign ships to their home ports. However, these mobile food reserves could well serve a lifesaving role in destitute areas.

Appreciable stores of petroleum products could likewise be salvaged from tankers and barges. Of the 440,000,000 tons of petroleum products that pass through U.S. ports each year (Table 10) , a 1 week's supply, equivalent to 8,400,000 tons (56,000,000 barrels) might be saved.

4.3.2 Inactive Ships

Inactive ships could be used for the storage of grain and petroleum products without any modification of the vessels involved, hence at minimum cost. Considering first the storage of grain, we find that sufficient wheat to supply most of the diet for 60,000,000 people for 6 months could be stored in 800 Liberty ships. Further, these Liberty ships could be dispersed among the established reserve fleets or, if required, at newly prepared sites in order to serve as food supply-centers for metropolitan areas located on waterways (23 of the largest SMSA's are so located—see Table 3). The cost of the entire program, at an estimated l6¢/bushel per yr. (3.3.2), would be $30,000,000 per year. This figure includes cost of movement and emplacement of the ships, their maintenance, the cost of the wheat (which must be rotated every 5 years), loading, unloading, and inspection costs.

Petroleum products could be stored in all of the 77 tankers while at their present locations in the various MARAD fleets, although dredging to accommodate the 30-ft draft would be required at most sites. However, if the tankers were dispersed in conjunction with the grain-laden Liberty ships, either in the established MARAD and Naval reserve fleets or in specially created nests, the postattack distribution problem would be considerably lessened. Further, the 47-T2 tankers could be located near major population centers where their power generating capacity might be most useful in time of disaster. The implementation of such a program, including the filling and dispersal of all 77 tankers, might cost between 30 and 40 million dollars; of course the fuel cost, which is the major item, is ultimately recoupable. The 8,000,000-barrel fuel reserve so created could be an appreciable addition to the nation's fuel reserves following enemy attack, especially if it consisted of those fuels that preplanning indicated might be in shortest supply.14

4.4 SHIPS AS FLOATING UTILITIES

4.4.1 Active Ships

It has not been possible to make an estimate of the nationwide potential of ships as floating utilities, but it may be just as well since the more important consideration is not "How Much?" but "Where?". For example, 10,000 kw of power may be inconsequential in a port that has suffered little or no damage, whereas the same amount of power might be all-important in a badly damaged target area where power lines are down. Some indication of the relative importance of using ships as floating utilities might be obtained by briefly considering the Port of New York. Assume a total of 100 ships in the port of which 4 are passenger liners, 6 are T2 tankers, 14 are larger tankers, 16 are modern cargo ships, 40 are Victory or Liberty ships of various flags, and 20 are miscellaneous types. The estimated usable power that these 100 ships might deliver to shore is 58,000 kw; the estimated water-distillation capacity is 1,630,000 gal/day. Such use, of course, does not take into account the normal utilization of the ship or the efficiency of the individual vessel as a utility source.

4.4.2 Inactive Ships

Only two types of inactive ships, the T2 tankers and the S4's, have sufficient utility potential to consider reactivating them for use as floating utilities. The total capacity of all 47 T2's plus all 40 S4s is 425,000 kw of power and 800,000 gal/day of distilled water. The distilling capacity of these ships is appreciable though not outstanding; but their power output is most significant (compare with the Port of New York above), and future planning for civil defense should recognize this most important resource.

SECTION 5

CONCLUSIONS

Ships and boats offer both a lifesaving and a life-sustaining potential to large numbers of people. Much of this potential is not being considered in current civil defense planning. Specifically, it is concluded (following the listing of Pig. 5) that:

1. Merchant ships are presently limited to a doctrine of "ship saving" which eliminates any civil defense use. However, if merchant ships were available, they could be extensively used in an alert for the evacuation of personnel from possible target areas.

2. Larger boats could be used for the evacuation and housing of evacuees; a washdown system would be of value for such usage.

3. With minor expenditure, Naval Reserve Fleet ships could be made into excellent shelters at their respective bases. The 8 Maritime reserve fleets could, at best, serve only as mediocre shelters and then only with considerable expenditure of money.

4. Surplus vessels could be converted into excellent ship shelters or headquarters. The cost for the conversion of a Liberty ship, including emplacement into a ship shelter, is approximately $860,000. The converted ship would provide accommodations for up to 10,000 persons.

5. Civil defense headquarters could be set up to good advantage in an active passenger or cargo ship following an attack, or in a converted Liberty ship prior to an attack. The best civil defense headquarters, however, would be a buried battleship which would be highly resistant to both blast and radiation. The estimated total cost: $1,000,000.

6, Active ships, by virtue of water supplies carried for internal consumption and cargos carried for hire, represent a reserve of food, water, and fuel that could survive nuclear attack.

7. Inactive ships from the Maritime reserve fleet could be utilized very effectively to create emergency food and fuel centers near population centers. Such utilization would entail moderate expenditure of funds, but would not destroy the usefulness of the ships.

8. Active ships could provide shoreside populations with significant quantities of potable water by use of their distillation equipment. Storage of water in inactive tankers does not appear justified.

9. Most active ships can supply only limited quantities of 60-cycle power to shore installations. However, some passenger liners and all T2 tankers are individually capable of powering small cities.

10. Those T2 tankers and S4 vessels currently in the NDRF could, if activated, provide a total of 425,000 kw to shoreside installations.

11. Many of the programs found to have promise for the civil defense effort are based on the availability of surplus ships. Hence, a moratorium should be placed on the scrapping of nonpriority ships, particularly Liberty ships and battleships, until a decision can be made on their value in the civil defense effort.

12. In many areas, further study is required before final judgments can be made.

13. In all areas, it was found that many government agencies and, often, private firms are involved; utilization of ships would require working agreements between OCD and the interested parties.

SECTION 6

FUTURE RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study has revealed several problem areas that appear to merit further investigation. Listed below are some possibilities that are recommended for future study.

1. Comprehensive Study of a Port City. If the various suggested uses of ships and boats are to have real value, they must be applicable to the civil defense needs of an actual situation. An evaluation of such needs was attempted on a small scale for New York and San Francisco, but only the surface could be touched in a broad-scope study, such as this one. A future study in depth of one or two port cities should be undertaken in which as many as possible of the considerations discussed in this report should be investigated. Such a study should include: population distribution in relation to accessibility to waterways; availability of ships and boats for evacuation of personnel, taking into account cyclical variations; possible sites for ship shelters; utilization of reserve fleets as shelters; requirements for emergency storage centers (including food, fuel, and utilities) and dispersal points for such centers near the subject city. Port cities that appear to have special qualifications for a study of the magnitude indicated include Brooklyn, New Orleans, Norfolk, and Seattle.

2. Shielding Provided by Ships and Boats. The shielding studies done for a Liberty ship and the SS INDEPENDENCE should be extended to include living and engineroom spaces on modern cargo ships and tankers. These results are needed to fully evaluate the radiation hazards to the crews of merchant ships caught in a fallout field. The shielding provided by small boats should be more fully analyzed to establish the useful limits of these craft in a fallout situation.

3. Washdown Systems for Ships and Boats. It was shown that washdown systems could be profitably used on passenger ships and small boats. In order to ascertain engineering requirements and costs, a feasibility study should be made using available data.

4. S4 Utilization. The feasibility and economics of utilizing the 40 surplus S4 vessels in a dual role as personnel shelters and power-generating stations, or only as a floating utility, should be evaluated.

5. Reserve Fleets as Shelters. Naval Reserve Fleets, which possess excellent features for shelter use, should be further evaluated as to the economics and logistics involved in such use. The utilization of troop and hospital ships in the NDRF as in situ shelters might be of limited research interest.

6. Blast Effects on Ship Shelters. Although the effects of blast on ships moored in deeper water or at sea are known, blast effects in the situations here envisaged (at a pier, beached, landlocked, in a reserve fleet configuration, etc.) need investigation. In addition, the possible effects of a weapon-created tidal wave should be considered.

7. Conversion of a Liberty Ship to a Ship Shelter. The feasibility of converting a Liberty ship into a shelter has been demonstrated. The construction of such a ship shelter should be undertaken to fully evaluate the economic, political, engineering, physiological, and psychological factors involved. An additional study should be made to determine the locations throughout the nation where such ship shelters could be best used.

8. A. Buried Battleship as a Blast-Resistant Civil Defense Headquarters . A detailed engineering feasibility study of the conversion of a battleship to an underground headquarters should be made.

9. Emergency Storage Centers. The use of NDRF vessels to store food and fuel supplies near population centers appears very attractive, but further studies of the following are indicated:

(a) Food. Possible foods for bulk storage, including bulgur, or one of its derivatives, should be considered from stability and cost aspects.

(b) Fuel. The problems associated with the storage of fuel should be further evaluated and postattack utilization considered.

(c) Power generation. The usefulness of the turboelectric generator vessels (T2s and S4s) for providing shoreside power should be fully evaluated.

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REFERENCES (All Unclassified)

1. Callahan, E.D., Rosenblum, L., and Coombe, J.R., Shelter from Fallout, Technical Operations, Inc., Report No. TO-B-60-30 (revised), 7 April 1961.

2. Rubenstein, B., A Task Force Report on the Use of the National Defense Reserve Fleet for Civil Defense Purposes, CCD, 1961.

3. Mobile Treatment Units, Public Health Service, Submitted to CCD as completed research project 2409 on June 30, 1962.

4. Swalley, R.F., Submarine Hulks as Protective Shelters, U.S. Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory Report No. 120, 21 February 1961.

5. Brown, W.M., Strategic and Tactical Aspects of Civil Defense with Special Emphasis on Crises Situations, Hudson Institute, 7 January 1963.

6. TM 3-225 or NAVDOCKS TP-PL-13, Radiological Recovery of Fixed Military Installations, 16 April 1958.

7. Executive Order 10999; Assigning Emergency Preparedness Functions to the Secretary of Commerce, 16 February1962.

8. Powell, C.A., Principles of Electric Utility Engineering, New York, John Wiley, 1955.

9. Boating, 1962; A Statistical Report on America's Top Family Sport, Presented jointly by the Nat. Assoc. of Eng. and Boat Manufacturers et al.

10. Recreational Boating in the United States, Annual Report 1 January to 31 December 1961, GG-357, 1 May 1962, U.S. Coast Guard, Treasury Dept.

11. Porteous, L.G., Design Modifications and 1962 Cost Analysis for a Standardized Series of Fallout Shelters, USNRDL-TR-582, 17 September 1962.

12. Private communication from A.D. Shepherd, Western Regional Research Laboratory, Albany, California.

13. Dixon, H.L., et al., A Systems Analysis of the Effects of Nuclear Attack on Railroad Transportation in the Continental United States, Stanford Research Institute, IU-3084, April 1960.

14. Thayer, S.B., and Shaner, W.W., The Effects of Nuclear Attacks on the Petroleum Industry, Stanford Research Institute, IU-3084, July 1960.

15. NAVDOCKS DM-29, Design Manual: Drydocking Facilities, Vol. II.

16. Waterborne Commerce of the United States, Calendar Year 1960, Part 5, National Summaries, Dept. of the Army, Corps, of Engineers.