NSC Registry (Permanent File)

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NSC 76

COPY NO. 51

A REPORT

TO THE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

by

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

on

U. S. COURSES OF ACTION
IN THE EVENT SOVIET FORCES ENTER KOREAN HOSTILITIES

July 21, 1950

WASHINGTON

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NSC 76
July 21, 1950

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
on
U.S. COURSES OF ACTION IN THE EVENT SOVIET FORCES ENTER KOREAN HOSTILITIES

Reference: NSC Action No. 308-c.

Pursuant to NSC Action No. 308-c., the enclosed memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject, forwarded by the Secretary of Defense with the statement that he concurred in their recommendations, is submitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its next regularly scheduled meeting on Thursday, July 27, 1950.

Pending Council consideration of the enclosure this report is also being referred to the NSC Consultants and Staff for the preparation of recommendations for Council action thereon.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury







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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

10 July 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:

Subject: U. S. Courses of Action In the Event Soviet Forces Enter Korean Hostilities.

1. In accordance with your memorandum dated 30 June 1950, the joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their recommendations as to the course of action to be adopted by the United States in the event that Soviet forces enter Korean hostilities.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that USSR armed forces should be considered to have entered Korean hostilities when major Soviet combat units engage or clearly indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities against U. S. and/or friendly forces in the Korean hostilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned, however, lest political considerations demand excessive commitments of United States military forces and resources in those areas of operations which would not be decisive. In the event the USSR should decide to undertake global war, that nation would be in a position to exploit such United States deployments and commitments and could thus render more effective Soviet overall war strategy.

3. Preliminary to, or in the initial stages of a global war, it would be militarily unsound for the United States to commit large forces against the USSR in an area of slight strategic importance, as well as one of Soviet choice. Therefore, if major USSR combat units should at any time during military operations in the Korean area of hostilities engage or clearly indicate their intention of engaging in hostilities against U.S. and/or friendly forces the U. S. should prepare to minimize its commitment in Korea and prepare to execute war plans. These preparations should include initiation of full scale mobilization.

4. In connection with the preceding paragraphs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would advise that, by their direction, the matters set forth therein are being kept under continuing study with a view to timely submission in accordance with development of suitable recommendations.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/S/ OMAR N. BRADLEY

OMAR N. BRADLEY
Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

NSC 76

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