MEMORANDUM FOR: General LeMay  
General Wheeler  
Admiral McDonald  
General Greene

Subject: Review of the SIOP Guidance (U)

1. As a follow-up action of the meetings of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Director, Strategic Target Planning at Omaha, 22-23 October 1963, I requested the Director, Joint Staff to undertake a review of the guidance for SIOP-64 as an initial study in the development of guidance for SIOP-65. This initial study (Enclosure hereto) has now been completed.

2. After reviewing the enclosure, I have questions in my mind with regard to the following:

a. The validity of that portion of the answer at the top of page 9 which states: "The primary concern should continue to be directed toward destroying or neutralizing the enemy's military capabilities in order to minimize damage to the US and our allies. The secondary concern should be to extend the attack to include the enemy's urban/industrial system, as required."

b. The conclusion on pages 12 and 15 which indicates that the priority for the allocation of force, when US forces are alerted or pre-empt, should continue to remain on military targets. Can this conclusion be substantiated or is it in consonance with the JSCP-65 military objectives for general war indicated on page 4?

c. Does the Joint War Games Agency's Report of the SIOP-64 War Game substantiate the need for attacking the fifty Chinese cities discussed on page 15?
d. Should SIOP-64 be revised, subject to review of the weight of effort redistribution analyses to be submitted in accordance with SM-349-64, to provide a greater weight of effort against urban/industrial targets?

3. I would appreciate receiving your views on the substance of the Enclosure.

MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
ENCLOSURE A

REVIEW OF THE GUIDANCE FOR THE
PREPARATION OF SIOP-64 (U)

THE PROBLEM
1. To review the guidance for SIOP-64 as an initial study in the development of the guidance for the next SIOP.

DISCUSSION
2. General
   a. As an initial step in the development of the guidance for the next SIOP, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, requested that the guidance for the preparation of SIOP-64 be reviewed giving attention to certain specific points. The points raised by the Chairman in his memorandum are contained in Appendix A hereto.
   b. Guidance for the preparation of SIOP is contained in Annex C to JSCP. The objectives, concept, and definition of the job to be accomplished are derived from the basic JSCP document. Guidance for the current SIOP was prepared in conformance with JSCP-64. Since JSCP-65 has recently been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this review should give due consideration to the conformity of the instructions with the content of this new JSCP.
   c. The formulation of the SIOP can be divided into three parts:
      (1) Guidance provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
      (2) Preparation of the plan by JSTPS.
      (3) Approval of the plan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
      The degree to which the ultimate plan is responsive to the objectives stated in JSCP is determinant upon the interaction of all three parts. The acceptability to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of a SIOP submitted for approval is dependent to a considerable extent upon both the adequacy of the...
guidance in expressing the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the degree to which the guidance can be and has been followed. Specific changes to the resultant SIOP, in terms of application of forces, to meet the specific requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is logically a function of the review associated with the approval process. The review presented herein is restricted to consideration of the adequacy of the SIOP guidance. Concurrent actions, directed toward improvement of SIOP-64 within the terms of the existing guidance, will not be addressed in this review.

d. Since guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the first step in the sequence of preparation of a SIOP, due consideration should be given to the fundamental part which this guidance plays in order to place it in proper perspective. The SIOP is a capabilities plan, and thus, the results attainable are a function of the forces available, their employment, and the current threat. All of these factors are subject to change over a relatively short period of time. For this reason, the guidance must be sufficiently broad and flexible to be compatible with the dynamic character of these factors. For example, guidance for the preparation of SIOP-64 was prepared on the basis of higher missile reliabilities than those which ultimately were promulgated and used in the plan. Thus, had the guidance been more specific it may not have been possible to satisfy entirely the requirements within the reduced capability of the force.

e. The significant elements of the SIOP guidance are the objectives, concept, definition of the job to be done in terms of a target list, the division of this target list into separate tasks and target categories, target
priorities within and between tasks, required target 1
destruction by categories, and broad flexibility of 2
implementation in terms of options and withholding require- 3
ments. Analysis pertaining to each of these significant 4
elements is provided herein in the order in which they 5
appear in the current guidance document. Each question 6
posed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff is addressed 7
at the end of the major paragraph to which the particular 8
question appropriately applies.

OBJECTIVES

3. The first of the significant elements to be considered 11
in the review of SIOP guidance is the objectives.

a. The military objectives of the United States for the 13
employment of US nuclear offensive forces in a major 14
strategic attack against the Sino-Soviet Bloc contained 15
in the guidance for SIOP-64 are quoted as follows: 16
"United States plans for nuclear offensive operations 17
in the event of general war will be designed to achieve, 18
in concert with other US and Allied offensive and defensive 19
operations, the objectives listed below:

a. Destruction or neutralization of the military 21
capabilities of the enemy, while retaining ready, 22
survivable, effective, and controlled US strategic 23
capabilities adequate to assure, to the maximum 24
extent possible, retention of US military superiority 25
over the enemy, or any potential enemies, at any 26
point during or after the war.

b. Minimum damage to the United States and its 28
Allies, and in all events, limitation of such damage 29
to a level consistent with national survival and 30
independence.

c. Bring the war to an end on the most advantageous 32
possible terms for the United States and its Allies."

Enclosure A
b. The foregoing statement of objectives stems from the objectives section of JSCP-64. In addition to the objectives quoted above, the JSCP included the objective of destroying or neutralizing the enemy's war supporting and industrial recovery capability. It is noted that the translation of JSCP-64 objectives into SIOP-64 objectives omitted this requirement. However, detailed instructions for the attack of urban/industrial targets is contained in other portions of the guidance.

c. The military objectives for general war as contained in the recently approved JSCP-65, which reflect priority rather than substance changes to the objectives contained in JSCP-64, are as follows:

"General War. In addition to the limited war objectives which are applicable, the military objective in general war is to defeat the Soviet Bloc alone or in combination with the Asian communist Bloc as required to terminate hostilities on terms advantageous to the United States. In achieving this objective, military forces of the United States:

(1) Will defend the United States and assist its allies against enemy attack.

(2) While providing the ability to accomplish (3), below, will, when directed, destroy or neutralize, on a selective basis if required, the military capabilities of the enemy, as necessary to limit damage to the United States and its allies to the maximum extent practicable.

(3) Will maintain an assured capability, under all conditions, and will, when and as directed, destroy, on a selective basis, the war supporting and urban/industrial resources of the enemy. When directed, this undertaking may be carried out concurrently or separately with (2), above."

Enclosure A
d. The objectives as stated in the foregoing paragraph will be included in their entirety in future SIOP guidance in order to ensure that the specific requirement for an assured capability to destroy the enemy's war supporting and urban/industrial resources is stated clearly.

**QUESTION:** Is the language expressing objectives appropriate from the point of view of realism and practicability?

**ANSWER:** Except for the omission of the objective of attack of urban/industrial targets, the language is appropriate. Guidance for the next SIOP will include the specific requirement for attack of urban/industrial targets to conform to the objectives as stated in JSCP-65.

**QUESTION:** What should be the objective of the attacks on:

1. the USSR?
2. Red China?

**ANSWER:** The objectives of the attack on the USSR and Red China should be as stated in JSCP-65. The objectives are general in nature and apply equally to the USSR and Red China. Moreover, the specific instructions contained in the guidance can be stated in such a way as to accommodate equally the different characteristics of the individual target systems of the two countries.

**CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

4. The second significant element to be considered in the review of SIOP guidance is the concept of operations.

a. In broad terms, SIOP guidance provides that under conditions of general war the United States will launch a strategic nuclear attack capable of execution under all reasonably foreseeable conditions under which hostilities may begin. Additionally, the SIOP will provide for selective response to the extent possible with due consideration to the degree of survivability and capability of the committed forces.
b. This concept is derived from JSCP-64 and will remain the same since JSCP-65 is essentially the same in this regard.

c. SIOP guidance has established two basic conditions for the employment of strategic nuclear forces - pre-emption and retaliation. A plan for the attack of the enemy target system is required under each of the foregoing conditions, tailored to permit selectivity of response commensurate with the circumstances of execution.

d. To provide for the desired flexibility and selectivity of response, five options are identified; Options I and II in pre-emption, and III, IV and V in retaliation.

e. Broadly speaking, the results to be accomplished by each of the options as the initial effort in the execution of the nuclear strike plan are:

(1) Attack Option I - Assure a high degree of probability of damage to the enemy nuclear capability, yet provide for a more discriminatory attack than any other option. Minimize collateral damage against urban/industrial centers to the extent possible consistent with the military objectives.

(2) Attack Option II - Attack the enemy's military target system to emphasize thoroughness of attack but still minimize collateral damage against urban/industrial centers where possible.

(3) Attack Option III - Retaliate against the most urgent enemy military nuclear targets in response to an ambiguous attack on an apparently limited scale.

(4) Attack Option IV - Retaliate against a more complete military target system than that in Option III, still keeping collateral damage to a minimum consistent with the military requirement.
(5) Attack Option V - Retaliate against the full spectrum of target categories in order to destroy the will and ability of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to wage war, remove the enemy from the category of a major industrial power, and assure a post-war balance of power favorable to the United States.

f. In application, the options provide for the selective release, or stated another way, the selective withholding of strikes against certain categories of targets. For example, selection of Option I would result in the execution of strikes against the enemy strategic nuclear threat in accordance with the over-all pre-emptive plan, while withholding planned strikes against the other target categories. Inherent in the option is the capability for the subsequent release of all, or a portion, of the withheld force to carry out strikes in accordance with the over-all pre-emptive plan. Selection of Option II would result in the initial execution of a larger portion and the withholding of a smaller portion of the over-all pre-emptive plan than in Option I. There is no pre-emptive option which provides for the execution of the entire pre-emptive plan as an initial effort. However, if required, this objective can be approximated by executing Option II and immediately releasing the withheld portion of the force to carry out the remainder of the attack plan. Under conditions of retaliation, the selection of Option III would result in the initial execution of strikes against the enemy nuclear capability in accordance with the over-all retaliatory plan, while withholding planned strikes against other target categories. Withheld forces could be released subsequent to the initial
execution of the option, if required. Thus, in effect, there is inherent in all options the capability to execute essentially the over-all attack plan, if the circumstances dictate.

**QUESTION:** Is the language expressing the concept appropriate from the point of view of realism and practicability?

**ANSWER:** The language expresses the intent of the objectives and concept as contained in JSCP and appears to be realistic and practicable.

**QUESTION:** Is there a requirement for more than two options, pre-emption and retaliation?

**ANSWER:** If it is assumed that regardless of the manner in which general war is initiated, both sides will respond over a short period of time with the maximum capability available, then only two options, pre-emption and retaliation, would be required. On the other hand, if it is assumed that more discrimination in attack will be required to respond to a variety of circumstances of initiation of general war, then additional options are required. JSCP-65, recently approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides that the SIOP will be capable of total execution under all reasonably foreseeable conditions that hostilities may begin, and will provide for selective response, to the extent possible, with due consideration to the degree of survivability and the capability of the committed forces.

**QUESTION:** Should we continue to have options to attack only military targets rather than attacking a combination of military and urban/industrial targets in all options?
ANSWER: Yes. All options now provide a capability to attack both military and urban/industrial targets. However, except for Option V, the attack of urban/industrial targets is withheld for subsequent execution as required. The primary concern should continue to be directed toward destroying or neutralizing the enemy's military capabilities in order to minimize damage to the US and our allies. The secondary concern should be to extend the attack to include the enemy's urban/industrial system, as required.

Attacking military and urban/industrial targets in all options denies us any selectivity in our attack and could dictate automatically the destruction of US urban/industrial areas by the enemy.

QUESTION: Should these options give more stress to population as the main target?

ANSWER: The revised objectives in JSCP-65 place additional emphasis on the attack of the urban/industrial target system by stating a requirement for an assured capability to destroy the enemy's war supporting and urban/industrial resources. This should result in greater population casualties in that a larger portion of the urban population may be placed at risk. In a recent study conducted by the Joint Staff, assisted by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, on the effect of placing greater emphasis on the attack of urban/industrial targets in order to destroy the USSR and China as viable societies, it was indicated* that the achievement of a 30 per cent fatality level (i.e., 212.7 million people) in the total population (709 million people) of China would necessitate an exorbitant weight of effort. The magnitude of effort required to achieve the 30 per cent national fatality level

* Enclosure A to JCS 2056/414-1
is attributed to the population distribution of China, which is basically an agrarian nation with 84 per cent of its population in rural areas. Thus, the attack of a large number of place names would destroy only a small fraction of the total population of China. The rate of return for a weapon expended diminishes rapidly after accounting for the 30 top priority cities. In view of the many complexities involved in the reapportionment of available forces and weapons from one target category to another, the Joint Staff has been directed to examine*, with the assistance of DSTP as appropriate, alternative examples of redistribution of targeting weights of effort between the various categories of targets and to derive theoretical consequences of execution of a SIOP thus retargeted. Results of this study should provide the basis for possible change to the priority assigned population as the main target.

5. The third significant area of interest in the review of the SIOP guidance is the analysis of the job to be done in terms of a target list, and the division of this target list into separate tasks.

a. The current SIOP guidance defines two groups of targets which must be subject to attack: (1) military targets and (2) urban/industrial and war supporting resource targets. The military targets are divided into two target lists identified as Tasks Alpha and Bravo. Task Alpha targets are those nuclear delivery forces posing a threat to the United States and its Allies and to United States and Allied forces overseas. Task Bravo targets are the other elements of the Sino-Soviet Bloc military forces and resources in

* Enclosure B to JCS 2056/414-1
being. The urban/industrial and war supporting resources target list is identified as Task Charlie. Separation of 
the target list comprised of nuclear delivery forces posing a threat to the United States and its Allies from the 
target list comprised of other Sino-Soviet Bloc military forces provides the mechanical means to accommodate the 
desired degree of discrimination in attack. Moreover, since Task Alpha targets are of a higher priority in their entirety than Task Bravo targets, this separation provides a convenient tool for aligning the military targets into two priority groups.

**QUESTION:** Is there a requirement for Task Bravo or may its essential elements be blended into Task Alpha?

**ANSWER:** On the basis of preliminary analysis of the JWGA war gaming of SIOP-64, it appears that Tasks Alpha and Bravo may be combined with little increase in complexity of planning or execution. However, by so doing, selectivity of response and convenience of priority groupings would be negated. Unless final analysis of SIOP-64 war gaming should dictate to the contrary, it is considered that a requirement for Task Bravo does exist.

**Target Priorities and Damage Expectancies**

6. The fourth significant element in the review of SIOP guidance is target priorities within and between tasks, and required target destruction by categories.

a. SIOP guidance establishes the relative priority for the allocation of forces between the tasks and within the tasks, and the damage expectancies required on Task Alpha and Task Charlie targets.

b. The guidance provides that Tasks Alpha and Bravo be provided a higher priority in their entirety than Task Charlie for the allocation of forces. This guidance will
require adjustment to satisfy the new objectives contained in JSCP-65. Specifically, Task Charlie objectives should be given equal priority with the Task Alpha objectives for the allocation of forces to achieve prescribed damage levels, particularly in retaliation under conditions in which United States forces are in a normal alert posture. In the pre-emptive options under conditions in which the United States forces are in a normal alert posture and in all options under conditions of tension during which a larger portion of the force would be on alert, priority for the allocation of force should continue to remain with the Task Alpha and Bravo targets.

c. The current guidance makes no distinction between tasks with regard to the priority of allocation of rapid reaction US offensive forces to time sensitive enemy targets. Since the Task Alpha targets are in the main time sensitive while the Charlie targets are not, priority in the application of the rapid reaction offensive forces should be given to the Alpha targets. On the other hand, since the objectives require that an assured capability must be provided under all conditions to destroy urban/industrial targets, systems which are also highly survivable should be allocated to the destruction of Charlie targets. This latter consideration is provided for in the current guidance in that the instructions direct the establishment of a secure retaliatory force for this purpose.

d. The priorities within Task Alpha established in the guidance are as follows:

(1) Active heavy and medium bomber home bases and primary staging bases.
(2) Soft ICMB sites.
(3) Known and fixed IREBM/MREBM sites.

(4) Primary missile launching submarine bases (or their access to the sea).

(5) Primary heavy and medium bomber dispersal bases and active light bomber home bases.

(6) Primary nuclear and CBR weapons storage facilities outside of major urban centers.

(7) Known active local control centers that exercise control over nuclear delivery forces which present a threat to the United States or its Allies, not co-located with those forces, but located outside of major urban centers.

e. This priority is established as a guide for the allocation of forces to target categories within Task Alpha and does not address the question of time sensitivity of application. With increasing numbers of missiles becoming available to the strategic delivery forces, it is believed that time sensitivity should be considered in establishing priority of attack. On this basis, the priorities as currently stated should be revised to place control centers ((7) above) to a position immediately following known and fixed IREBM/MREBM sites ((3) above), and ahead of primary missile launching submarine bases ((4) above). This would provide a more suitable priority listing by order of importance for the allocation of forces based on the application of rapid reaction offensive forces against time sensitive targets.

f. In the current SIOP guidance, a 90% damage expectancy is established as a goal against all but the hard targets in the Alpha target list. This goal is stated as neither a maximum nor a minimum, but one which is highly desirable and probably attainable with the available forces. In
addition, recognizing the possibility that the forces might not be capable of accomplishing these objectives, guidance is provided to the effect that lower damage levels will be accepted with due regard to the established order of priority of individual target categories.

g. Recognizing that damage expectancies within target priorities may fluctuate as a function of many variables associated with weapon application and operational requirements, the guidance stipulates that over-all damage expectancy to any single DOZ should not exceed approximately 95% except for those targets of highest priority. In this latter instance the guidance may be questionable in that the attainment of 95% probability of damage may not be consistent with economical weight of effort. Thus, it appears desirable to consider revising the guidance to provide more specific instructions in this regard.

h. The current SIOP guidance provides that the force to be applied to achieve the desired damage level against Task Charlie targets will be that force necessary to inflict significant damage to 70% of the floor space in the 100 largest of the Sino-Soviet cities. The use of the floor space criteria is intended only to define the size/weight of the force to be allocated to Task Charlie and not to define the target objectives. A study was conducted recently by the Joint Staff, assisted by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, to determine the effect upon the USSR and China if the forces in SIOP-64 were applied in accordance with the current guidance. The study reported* that destruction of the USSR as a viable society would be achieved by accomplishment of the targeting objectives now provided in the current guidance.

* Appendix D to JCS 2056/414-1

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 2808
Analogous criteria applied to China would require the targeting of 50 cities. Reduction from 70 per cent to 50 per cent in industrial capacity (floor space) would permit the targeting of only 30 cities in China, which is essentially the targeting level currently programmed in Task Charlie in SIOP-64. If 30 per cent of the urban population and 50 per cent of the industrial capacity are the criteria, then the execution of Attack Option V in SIOP-64 would destroy such a level of the Chinese urban population and industrial capacity that China would no longer be a viable nation. Based on the foregoing, it appears desirable to consider specifying the per cent floor space damage and number of cities placed at risk for each the USSR and China.

**QUESTION:** What relative weight of effort should be expended in accomplishing Tasks Alpha, Bravo and Charlie, assuming these three tasks should be retained?

**ANSWER:** The guidance will require revision to satisfy the objectives as contained in JSCP-65. Specifically, Task Charlie objectives should be given equal priority with the Task Alpha objectives for the allocation of forces to achieve prescribed damage levels, particularly in retaliation under conditions in which US forces are in a normal alert posture. In the pre-emptive options under conditions in which the US forces are in a normal alert posture and in all options under conditions of tension during which a larger portion of the forces would be on alert, priority for the allocation of force should continue to remain with the Task Alpha and Bravo targets.

**QUESTION:** Is Task Charlie properly stated so as to emphasize that its main effort should be directed at the urban/industrial structure of the enemy with a maximization of population casualties?
ANSWER: On the basis of a recent study* conducted by the Joint Staff, assisted by the Joint Strategic Planning Staff, it appears desirable to specify the per cent floor space damage and number of cities placed at risk for each the USSR and China. In view of the many complexities associated with the apportionment of available forces and weapons from one target category to another, the Joint Staff has been directed to examine alternative examples of redistribution of targeting weights of effort between the various categories of targets and to derive theoretical consequences of execution of a SIOP thus retargeted. Results of this study should provide a basis for determination of whether or not additional emphasis should be placed on urban/industrial damage and population casualties in the Task Charlie guidance.

QUESTION: Are the targets under Task Alpha grouped in the proper categories and order? For example, are we directing too much attention to bomber bases, staging and dispersal bases, and nuclear and CBR weapons storage with insufficient attention being paid to those elements of control which direct the functioning of the enemy military apparatus?

ANSWER: It is considered that Task Alpha targets are properly grouped in categories. In view of the increasing US strategic missile inventory, however, the order should be revised to accommodate considerations of time sensitivity. Specifically, the priorities as currently stated should be revised to place control centers (currently #7 priority) to a position immediately following known and fixed IREM/IREM sites (currently #3 priority), and ahead of primary missile launching submarine bases, primary heavy and medium bomber dispersal bases and active light bomber home bases, and primary nuclear and CBR weapons storage facilities.

* Appendix D to JCS 2056/414-1

Enclosure A
Flexibility

7. The fifth and last significant element to be considered in the review of SIOP guidance is the broad flexibility of implementation in terms of options and withholding requirements.

a. The current SIOP guidance provides a requirement for a flexible plan capable of execution through implementation of any one of five attack options. Options I and II in pre-emption and III, IV and V in retaliation permit selective response to or initiation of hostilities over the broad spectrum of foreseeable conditions, considering the degree of survivability and capability of the committed forces. In addition, the guidance requires that there also be a selective capability to withhold under each option, all strikes against Red China and its satellites and against the Soviet Bloc satellites, either individually or collectively.

QUESTION: Would it be desirable to have options which will permit striking in isolation (a) the USSR, (b) Red China, and (c) targets of interest to NATO in the Soviet Satellites, as well as the Sino-Soviet Bloc as a whole?

ANSWER: The number of options which would be required to provide the full range of selectivity suggested by the question would render it infeasible from the standpoint of planning. The current withholding capability provides for striking in isolation the USSR and Red China. The proposal regarding an option which would permit striking in isolation the targets of interest to NATO in the Soviet Satellites was the subject of a report* to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This report was concurred in by the services but was withdrawn prior to consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The report essentially concluded that such an option was not required.

* JCS 2056/396

Enclosure A
QUESTION: Review the operational problems concerned and procedures for executing country withholds. Should there be a capability to withhold all attacks in Albania, Bulgaria and Rumania?

ANSWER: To provide for full flexibility of response to the broad spectrum of circumstance under which war may be initiated, the capability should exist to withhold attacks against Soviet satellites (either individually or collectively). The operational withhold procedures are directly tied to the release procedures; that is, forces are directed to carry out or to withhold their assigned strikes. Regardless of the mechanics of the planning procedure, the operational procedure would remain essentially the same. There presently exists a capability to withhold all attacks in all countries for which such a requirement exists, including Albania, Bulgaria and Rumania.
FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS ON THE MEETINGS OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WITH THE DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING AT OMAHA, 22 - 23 OCTOBER 1963

1. Review the guidance for SIOP-64. This review to be undertaken now as an initial study in the development of guidance for SIOP-65. Give particular attention to the following points:

   a. The language expressing the objectives and the concept of the SIOP.
      (1) Is the language appropriate from the point of view of realism and practicability?
      (2) What should be the objective of the attacks on
          (a) the USSR?
          (b) Red China?

   b. The statement of the options.
      (1) Is there any requirement for more than two options, preemption and retaliation?
      (2) Should these options give more stress to populations as the main target?
      (3) Should we continue to have options to attack only military targets rather than attacking a combination of military and urban/industrial targets in all options?
      (4) Would it be desirable to have options which will permit striking in isolation (a) the USSR, (b) Red China, and (c) targets of interest to NATO in the Soviet Satellites, as well as the Sino-Soviet Bloc as a whole?

   c. The statement of the tasks.
      (1) Are the targets under Task Alpha grouped in the proper categories and order? For example, are we directing too much attention to bomber bases, staging and dispersal bases, and nuclear and CBR weapons storage with insufficient attention being paid to those element of control which direct the functioning of the enemy military apparatus?
(2) Is there a requirement for Task Bravo or may its essential elements be blended into Task Alpha?

(3) Is Task Charlie properly stated so as to emphasize that its main effort should be directed at the urban/industrial structure of the enemy with a maximization of population casualties?

d. Damage levels.

(1) What relative weight of effort should be expended in accomplishing Tasks Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie, assuming these three tasks should be retained?

(2) There should be a review of desired damage levels for each category of target within each task, taking into account the probable effect of human casualties in putting physical plants and facilities out of action without need for severe physical damage to the plant or facility. Consideration should be given to the hardness or relative vulnerability of targets as well as utilizing population loss as the primary yardstick for effectiveness in destroying the enemy society with only collateral attention to industrial damage.

e. Options and flexibility.

Review the operational problems concerned and procedures for executing country withholds. Should there be a capability to withhold all attacks in Albania, Bulgaria and Rumania?
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force
                Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
                Chief of Naval Operations
                Commandant, Marine Corps

Subject: Review of the SIOP Guidance (U)

1. As a follow-up action of the meetings of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Director, Strategic Target Planning at Omaha, 22-23 October 1963, I requested the Director, Joint Staff to undertake a review of the guidance for SIOP-64 as an initial study in the development of guidance for SIOP-65. This initial study (Enclosure hereto) has now been completed.

2. This study is interim in nature and must be reviewed upon completion of the final report of the Joint War Games Agency on war gaming of SIOP-64. However, I believe it will prove useful in formulating the guidance for the preparation of the next SIOP.

3. I would appreciate receiving your views on the substance of the Enclosure.