

21 February 1958

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DECISION ON J.C.S. 2101/294

A Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee

on

PROVISION OF BLAST SHELTERS AT SAC BASES (U)

Note by the Secretaries

1. At their meeting on 21 February 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendation in paragraph 8 of J.C.S. 2101/294.
2. The memorandum in Enclosure "A", dated 21 February 1958, was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of J.C.S. 2101/294.

R. D. WENTWORTH,
 H. L. HILLYARD,
 Joint Secretariat.

3/1/58 (1-31-58)

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20 February 1958

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

HOLDERS OF J.C.S. 2101/294
(Provision of Blast Shelters at SAC Bases (U))

CORRIGENDUM

At the request of the originator, holders of J.C.S. 2101/294 are requested to change the date of the Note to Holders of J.C.S. 2101/287 from "26 December 1957" to "3 January 1958" where appearing in the footnotes on pages 2584, 2585, and 2586.

R. D. WENTWORTH,
H. L. HILLYARD,
Joint Secretariat.

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Corrig. to JCS 2101/294

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2-17-58

19 February 1958

Pages 2582 - 2587, incl.

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH

DATE: 13 July 79.....

REPORT BY THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS COMMITTEE

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

PROVISION OF BLAST SHELTERS AT SAC BASES (U)

- References:
- a. J.C.S. 2101/282
 - b. J.C.S. 2101/283
 - c. J.C.S. 2101/284
 - d. J.C.S. 2101/287
 - e. J.C.S. 2101/293

The Secretary of Defense should be furnished the guidance contained herein not later than 1200, 25 February 1958.

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See Decision on dtd 2-21-58.

See Corrig. dtd 2-20-58.

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- 2582 -

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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

Rec-2-26-58

PROVISION OF BLAST SHELTERS AT SAC BASES (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To consider the Security Resources Panel recommendation* 1
concerning the provision of blast shelters for a large part 2
of SAC planes, weapons, personnel, supplies and facilities. 3

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 7 November 1957, the Executive Secretary, NSC, cir- 4
culated* the Report to the President by the Security Resources 5
Panel of the Science Advisory Committee on "Deterrence & Sur- 6
vival in the Nuclear Age". This report contains, among others, 7
the following recommendation: 8

"2. To lessen SAC vulnerability to an attack by Russian 9
ICBMs (a late 1959 threat): 10

"d. Protect a large part of SAC's planes by providing 11
100 to 200 psi shelters, and equivalent protection for 12
weapons, personnel, and other needed supplies and 13
facilities." 14

3. On 4 December 1957, in a memorandum** for the Secretary 15
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed their views 16
in regard to certain recommendations in the Report*. With 17
respect to the recommendation cited in paragraph 2 above, the 18
Joint Chiefs of Staff commented as follows: "This is a field 19
requiring considerable design research; its feasibility appears 20
questionable in view of the difficult problems associated with 21
providing high levels of blast protection to large span struc- 22
tures, their doors in particular. The problem must consider 23
a balanced hardness for the air base related to the probability 24
of a burst which will render the runway unusable. The cost 25
estimate contained in the Report appears low. Greater insur- 26
ance for cost appears for now to lie with a dispersal program." 27

* Dated 7 November 1957; NSC 5724; Enclosure to J.C.S. 2101/282
** Enclosure to J.C.S. 2101/284

4. On 10 February 1958, the Secretary of Defense announced* 1
that the Department of Defense has been requested to discuss, 2
among other things, at the 27 February National Security Coun- 3
cil meeting, the Security Resources Panel recommendation** 4
concerning the provision of blast shelters for a large part of 5
SAC planes, weapons, personnel, supplies and facilities. To 6
provide a basis for a Defense report on this subject, the 7
Secretary of the Air Force was invited to submit to the Secre- 8
tary of Defense, any comments he might wish to make additional 9
to those already provided in response to a previous memorandum.***10

5. For additional facts, see Enclosure "B". 11

DISCUSSION

6. No additional information has been developed which would 12
warrant any basic modification to the Department of Defense 13
position**** with respect to the Security Resources Panel re- 14
commendation to provide blast shelters for a large part of SAC 15
planes, weapons, personnel, supplies and facilities. 16

CONCLUSION

7. The Department of Defense position**** with respect to 17
the Security Resources Panel recommendation to provide blast 18
shelters for a large part of SAC planes, weapons, personnel, 19
supplies and facilities is still valid. 20

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. It is recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff forward 21
the memorandum in Enclosure "A", which reflects the above con- 22
clusion, to the Secretary of Defense. 23

9. No recommendation is made as to the distribution of this 24
paper to commanders of unified or specified commands. 25

- * Enclosure to J.C.S. 2101/293
- ** Enclosure to J.C.S. 2101/282
- *** Enclosure to J.C.S. 2101/283
- **** Enclosure to J.C.S. 2101/287; see also Note to Holders of
- * J.C.S. 2101/287 dated ~~26 December 1957~~
3 January 1958

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JCS 2101/294

- 2584 -

* Per. Contig. at 2-20-58

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ENCLOSURE "A"

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Provision of Blast Shelters at SAC Bases (U)

1. Reference is made to memorandum* by the Secretary of 1
Defense, dated 10 February 1958, subject:"Report** to the 2
President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science 3
Advisory Committee", which, in part, stated that the Depart- 4
ment of Defense has also been requested to discuss, at the 5
27 February National Security Council meeting, the Security 6
Resources Panel recommendation concerning the provision of 7
blast shelters for a large part of SAC planes, weapons, person- 8
nel supplies, and facilities. 9

2. With respect to the Security Resources Panel recommenda- 10
tion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the view that no ad- 11
ditional information has been developed which would require 12
any basic modification to the Department of Defense position***13
on this subject. Any program to harden other than the SAC 14
numbered Air Force command control centers does not appear to 15
be warranted at this time. 16

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 2101/293

** Enclosure to J.C.S. 2101/282

*** Enclosure to J.C.S. 2101/287; see also Note to Holders of
J.C.S. 2101/287, dated ~~26 December 1957~~

* 3 January 1958

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JCS 2101/294

- 2585 -

Enclosure "A"

Per Corr. ltr 2-20-58.

ENCLOSURE "B"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Department of Defense comments* on the recommendation cited in paragraph 2, page 2 were: "Blast shelters for SAC planes are not now programmed or considered feasible, although design studies and research and development on such shelters are underway. To harden one B-47 wing to 200 psi would cost approximately \$55 million in addition to normal base costs. Moreover, hardening would not protect runways or reduce base radiation. Pending the development of further information, it appears that greater insurance of SAC for cost can be obtained from SAC alert and dispersal measures."

2. On 21 December 1957, the Secretary of the Air Force, in a memorandum** for the Secretary of Defense, commented on the subject recommendation as follows:

"15. Protective construction to provide 100-200 psi shelters for SAC aircraft, and equivalent protection for weapons, personnel, and other needed facilities, except numbered Air Force command control centers, is not considered feasible. A protected facility for the 8th Air Force is under construction, and Headquarters, SAC, underground command post and communications center recently became operational. A contract for a control center at Headquarters, 15th Air Force, is expected to be let within a few months. The control center for the 2nd Air Force is currently included in the FY 1959 program.

"16. The costs of hardening are very high. For example, to harden one B-47 wing (70 per cent of the aircraft, personnel, POL, water and utilities, communications, the command center, ground handling equipment, bomb storage, and flyaway

* Enclosure to J.C.S. 2101/287; see also Note to Holders of J.C.S. 2101/287, dated ~~26 December 1957~~ 3 January 1958

** On file in Joint Secretariat - *gjs*

kits) would total \$42 million to 100 psi and approximately \$55 million to 200 psi. This is in addition, of course, to normal base costs.

"17. Furthermore, even if funding could be provided in the FY 1959 program for such a massive construction program, the facilities would not be completed until the 1961-65 time period, due to construction lead time. In addition while protective construction could be built to withstand 100-200 psi for the above-named items, runways cannot be so protected. Cratered runways would have to be filled in and surfaced, and blast debris would have to be removed from runway surfaces prior to attempting aircraft operations after an attack. Also, radiation over the runway and shelter area would have to be reduced before any of the repair and clean-up could be started or before aircraft could use the runways. These are time-consuming operations and could very easily give an enemy adequate time for succeeding attacks.

"18. The most acceptable alternative to the hardening proposal is believed to be in providing alert and dispersal facilities required for the SAC force at the earliest possible date. In this configuration, with adequate warning, the alert force can be airborne before an enemy bombing attack. This is a retaliatory force of real significance when considering that a force of approximately 580 bombers will constitute this alert force capability, if all proposed alert and dispersal facilities are approved and funded on a timely basis. Concurrent with any consideration given to the hardening of SAC it is imperative that the possibility of hardening CINCNORAD also be considered. CINCNORAD's command control and communications center facilities are vital to conduct the air battle and to collect and disseminate intelligence."

Enclosure "B"

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JCS 2101/294

- 2587 -