STATEMENT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. McNAMARA
ON THE RS-70

I greatly appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you again the adequacy of the strategic retaliatory forces planned through fiscal year 1967, with particular reference to the need for a B-70, or RS-70, weapon system. Because of the highly sensitive nature of some of the data involved in assessing the adequacy of the proposed forces, I did not feel free to discuss this problem in all of its detail when I appeared before your Committee last January. Since this matter has now become an issue between the Congress and the Executive Branch, I feel that it is essential to the national interest to place before this group, on a completely off-the-record basis, all the available pertinent facts and figures bearing on this problem. I know you will respect the highly classified nature of the sensitive data.

As you know, the B-70, in its long-range bomber configuration, has been a matter of intense controversy for a number of years. In reviewing the history of this project, I was impressed by the fact that the B-70 never enjoyed the full support of the President and his Scientific Advisory Committee, the Secretary of Defense and his principal civilian advisers, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a corporate body. In fact, the only consistent supporter of this program was the Air Force itself. The Secretaries and Chiefs of the other Services, whether under this Administration or the previous Administration, never supported the B-70 for full weapon system development or procurement and, indeed, many vigorously opposed it. So it is a matter of record that the B-70 has long been considered a very doubtful proposition, with the weight of competent scientific, technical and military opinion against it for many years.

Nevertheless, I approached the B-70 problem with a completely open mind and without any preconceptions one way or the other. I carefully studied not only all the arguments pro and con but also the specific facts and figures upon which these arguments were based. I was particularly concerned, for example, with the cost and effectiveness of other ways of doing the job proposed for the B-70. And, I would like to emphasize at this point that, in selecting a weapon system to accomplish a particular military task, we are dealing not with absolutes but with comparatives. We must always take into account not only the planned capabilities of the proposed weapon system but also its full cost in comparison to the cost and effectiveness of other weapon systems which can do the same job, perhaps in somewhat different ways. I believe we can all agree that the common objective of both the Legislative and the Executive Branches of our Government is to provide all of the forces we need for our security at the lowest possible over-all cost.

A careful study of the earlier B-70 proposal led to the conclusion that it was really no more than a manned missile. Indeed, a book about it was published under Just such a title. The old B-70 system offered none of the advantages of flexibility generally attributed to manned bombers. It could not look for new targets nor find and attack mobile targets or targets of uncertain location. It offered no option but pre-planned attack against previously known targets — a mission that can be effectively performed by missiles.

Moreover, the B-70 had important disadvantages when compared with ballistic missiles. It would have been vulnerable on the ground to surprise missile attack. It would not have been hardened and dispersed like MINUTEMAN, or continuously mobile and concealed like POLARIS. Rather, it would have had to depend on warning and ground alert response — a method of protection far less reliable in an era where large numbers of missiles exist, than hardening and dispersal or continuous peacetime mobility.

In answer to this it was argued that the B-70, like other manned bombers, could be launched subject to positive control on the basis of ambiguous warning — a property not possessed by missiles. But the important point here is not that bombers can be launched under positive control in response to warning; rather it is that they have to be launched on the basis of warning because they are vulnerable and cannot ride out an attack. We don't care whether or not POLARIS missiles, for example, can be launched subject to positive control because we are under no great compulsion to launch them until we are ready to make the final decision to destroy their targets.

Further, the B-70 is far less suitable than the B-52 for airborne alert measures. And attempts to maintain it on the ground in a widely dispersed posture and at a very high level of alert would have entailed all kinds of difficult and costly operating problems, problems that have effectively prevented the Air Force from operating any other of its bombers in this way.

Moreover, the B-70 was poorly designed from the point of view of penetration of enemy defenses. The B-70 would present a very large radar cross-section and the higher it flew the earlier it could be picked up by radar. For example, at 70,000 feet, the B-70 could be picked up by a ground search radar at a distance of about 250 nautical miles. But if it descended to low altitude to minimize radar detection, the B-70 could fly only at subsonic speed, not much faster than a B-52.

In fact, our studies have convinced us that the important factors in permitting a bomber to penetrate are prior defense suppression by missiles, payload for jamming equipment, and low altitude capability, and not the speed and altitude which caused the B-70 to be so expensive.

Furthermore, the B-70 had not been designed for the use of air-to-surface missiles such as HOUND DOG or SKYBOLT, and therefore could not attack while standing off several hundred miles, but would actually have had to fly into the target area to drop its bombs. Finally, the B-70 would have been an extremely expensive aircraft, particularly so in relation to its capability in the straight bomber version.

So, it is not surprising that previous Secretaries of Defense and the previous President have had very grave doubts as to the desirability of this particular weapon system. Even the Air Force is now no longer proposing the B-70 in a bomber configuration, implicitly admitting the correctness of many of these reasons.

What the Air Force is currently proposing, and has presented to the Congressional Committees, is a new and quite different version of the B-70; namely, a reconnaissance-strike aircraft Involving novel components and equipment. While this RS-70, if feasible, would be of considerably greater value to our over-all strategic power than the B-70, it would still suffer from some of the same shortcomings, including very high cost; and, in addition, would introduce entirely new problems which we have yet to explore fully.

The B-70, as it was formerly envisaged, was already a more technically complex vehicle than any of the ICBM's we are now developing. Because of its great speed, it required a mass of electronic components for bombing-navigation, for communications, and for controlling the environment within the aircraft. In contrast to an ICBM, these subsystems must operate with very high levels of reliability for periods of hours rather than minutes.

The RS-70 vould introduce, in addition, another new set of subsystems, including reconnaissance sensors, processing systems, display systems, communication systems, all requiring human interpretation and decision within very short times, a controllable air-to-surface glide missile and a powered missile. Many of these new subsystems, it should be recognized, have yet to be developed. Indeed, our technical review of this proposal, to date, indicates that some of the key elements may well lie beyond what can be done on the basis of present scientific knowledge.

In contrast to almost all recent important concurrent development programs like the ICBM's and the nuclear submarines, the mission which is conceived for the RS-70 requires that certain functions be performed to meet or better an absolute standard if the mission is to be performed at all. The other programs did not have the same restrictions. If the accuracy objectives for an ICBM were not met by even a factor of two, for example, the ICBM would still be of vital importance because of its flight time as compared to that of an airplane. But if the radar resolution of the RS-70 is even barely insufficient to perform damage assessment on interesting targets, the entire utility of the reconnaissance-strike concept would disappear.

Yet, the most attractive aspect of the RS-70 is its proposed reconnaissance-strike capability in a post-attack environment. This capability would require, first, the development of an extremely high resolution side-looking radar system — a system which, in combination with an operator, could "recognize" targets from an altitude of 70,000 feet out to a distance of fifty to a hundred miles. To appreciate what this involves, consider the fact that to separate visually two points 50 feet apart in a picture of a strip 50 miles by 50 miles (which is typical of the area this radar is supposed to observe) would require a screen 15 feet by 15 feet to present a television quality picture. This example is given only to illustrate the problem of display and is not, of course, a solution which anyone would consider.

At the present time we do not know how to specify a system which can gather, process and display the data at the rates and with the resolution necessary for the RS-70 mission, which involves firing a missile from an aircraft flying at thirty miles a minute before it moves out of missile range. At present, 30 to 50 feet is thought to be the resolution required under favorable conditions simply to determine that a crater exists near a target previously located by other means. To achieve the much higher resolution capability which would be required to "recognize," say, a hardened missile site or mobile missiles or to analyze damage on some types of recognizable targets is beyond any known technique.

Let me try to illustrate the severity of this problem. Picture the RS-70 flying at 70,000 feet and moving at 2,000 miles per hour. The proposed mission would require the gathering of radar reconnaissance data on the presence of new targets — or known targets which may not have been destroyed or neutralized, and the prompt processing and analysis of these data in flight. The proposed side-looking radar is looking at a strip on either side of the aircraft which might be 50 miles wide. The forward edge of this radar beam, moving with the aircraft at 2,000 miles per hour, would be seeing new area at the rate of 100,000 square miles per hour or 750 million square feet per second.

The upper limit of resolution which is proposed is 50 feet — meaning that two points 50 feet apart can just be distinguished from each other. My experts tell me this is nowhere good enough to identify targets such as mobile missiles, or possibly even to determine whether previously known targets have been destroyed or neutralized unless there is a recognizable crater (air bursts, which we plan to use on many if not most of the targets, would leave no craters). But with a 50-foot resolution it would be possible to locate an object within a block as small as 2,500 square feet in area -- that is a block 50 by 50 feet. But, there would be 300,000 such blocks being processed each second in this system. We cannot state today with any assurance that satisfactory equipment to perform this processing and display function in an RS-70 can be made operational by 1970, let alone by 1967, on the basis of any known technology, or whether the human interpretation Job required of the operator can ever be done. This last may well be the limiting system element because of the inherent physical and mental processes involved.

Thus, it Is clear that there are many very difficult technical problems yet to be solved — and, indeed yet to be fully understood --before we can have any reasonable expectation that the reconnaissance capability required by the RS-70 can actually be developed and produced within the 1967-1970 time period. We have started work on these problems and over $50 million has been separately provided for this purpose In the 1963 budget, but we are two or more years away from even a flight test of the reconnaissance subsystem in a form from which operational specifications can be drawn, and even farther away from blueprints for the production of hardware.

The RS-70, as proposed by the Air Force, is also to have the capability of transmitting to home base, via facsimile, high resolution processed radar data on important target areas. This capability, which is not now known to be possible, would be useful in retargeting follow-up strikes by other manned bombers or by ICBM's. However, the assured rate of transmission over intercontinental ranges in a wartime environment would be only l/1000 of the rate at which the data are being acquired and processed by the RS-70 radar.

The Air Force proposal would also require the development of two new strike missiles, one a glide missile and the other a powered missile. For use against hard targets, these missiles, because of their limited size and warhead yields, would have to be far more accurate (the Air Force states the CEP will be less than 600 feet) than any strategic air-launched missile now in production or development. This requirement would entail yet another set of problems. In fact, some of the most important missile subsystems cannot be designed until the missile command and guidance inputs from the radar-reconnaissance system can be defined. In other words; the missile size and warhead yield cannot be optimized until the limits of the command and guidance inputs are known.

Finally, the Air Force plans to deploy the proposed force of RS-70's on over 100 different bases, together with one KC-135 per RS-70, and maintain 75% of these aircraft on 3 to 5 minutes ground alert. We have never attempted anything like that with the B-52 force, and the RS-70 will involve operating problems far more difficult than that of the B-52.

Although the Air Force has not yet stated the ultimate size of the RS-70 force, a force of 200 B-70's was proposed at one time. Considering the capabilities the Air Force specifies for this aircraft, we can assume that a smaller number, say 150, would suffice. The Air Force estimates that the first wing of 45 RS-70 aircraft would cost $5 billion. A force of about 150 would probably cost, in excess of $10 billion — excluding the cost of the tankers and the annual operating costs. I think it is clear from what I have said that:

1. The RS-70, as proposed by the Air Force, is very far from being ready for production or even full weapon system development. The new subsystems which could provide the RS-70 with its damage assessment capability have been started in development, but we are not sure now that we know how to develop successfully the extremely high data rate, sharp resolution radar system required. Our best estimates now are that we could not have such a system early enough to produce an operational RS-70 force capable of useful reconnaissance-strike before 1970.

2. The RS-70, without these subsystems, would be nothing more than a B-70, the production of which it is now agreed would not be warranted.

3. Until we know much more about the proposed system — its technical feasibility, its military effectiveness and its cost — we have no rational basis for committing this aircraft to weapon system development or production

But regardless of whether or not the RS-70 will be ready for production or can be produced substantially as the Air Force describes it, the question still remains; Would the program be worth its cost? This question can be answered only in terms of the total job to be done and the various alternative ways of doing it in relation to their respective costs. In discussing this question I would like to use three tables, one of which you have already seen since I used it in my presentation to your Committee. The other two are new and contain highly sensitive information.

The first table shows the strategic retaliatory forces programmed through fiscal year 1967. You will note that by that time we will have over 700 manned bombers equipped with over 1400 HOUND DOG and SKYBOLT air-launched missiles. And in addition we will hare almost 2000 ICBM and POLARIS missiles.

The alert portion of this force, alone, will be able to carry more than 4,000 nuclear weapons with a yield of over 5,400 megatons. This is about three times the alert capability we had last June.

Now, how large a part of the Soviet target system could this force be expected to destroy? As I pointed out in my statement to your Committee in January, this calculation involves a number of factors of which the following are the most important:

1. The number of warheads that each type of vehicle can deliver.

2. The proportion of each weapon system expected to survive the initial all-out nuclear attack — the survival rate.

3. The degree of reliability of each system, i.e., the proportion of the ready operational inventory that we can count on getting off successfully within the prescribed time — the reliability rate.

4. The ability of each type of vehicle to penetrate the enemy's defenses — the penetration rate.

5. The warhead yield and degree of accuracy (CEP) that can be expected of each weapon system.

These factors are shown in the second table. I want to emphasize that they are based on a series of assumptions which, as a whole, are thought to be conservative. For example, we are assuming that only 5% of the ATLAS D and E missiles would survive the initial attack. Even in the case of the TITAN II, which will be heavily hardened and widely dispersed, we are assuming only 20% would survive. Similarly, on the basis of our experience to date, the reliability rates shown should he well within our capability by 1967. With regard to penetration rates, you will notice that we are assuming only 50% of the B-52 and B-58 alert bombers will reach their targets.

We have also included, at the bottom of the table, the factors assumed for both the B-70 and the RS-70. You will notice they compare quite favorably with the B-52 and the B-58. With regard to the penetration rate, we have assigned to these aircraft a considerably higher value — 70% compared to 50%. And in the case of the RS-70 air-to-surface missile we have assigned a very high degree of accuracy — one-quarter of a mile compared with eight-tenths of a mile for the HOUND DOG (GAM-77) and one and one-half miles for the SKYBOLT (GAM-87).

Let us now turn to the next table. The first column of figures, headed "Aim Points," reflects a present estimate of the composition of the target system in 1967. Applying the factors, shown on the second table, to the "alert" forces planned for 1967, we would expect that about 2,500 weapons, with a total yield of over 2,700 megaton, would actually reach their targets. These weapons would destroy about three-quarters of the urban-Industrial floor space and about nine-tenths of all the military targets except the hard ICBM's of which we could expect to destroy about one-third. This is a very impressive degree of destruction, except for the hard ICBM sites, some of which may, of course, be empty holes by the time our strike arrives.

Assuming, for purposes of analysis, that we could add four wings of B-70's to this force, by 1967 (which we could not actually do), the result would not be significantly better. The third column, "II DOD Plus B-70," shows the percentage of each category of targets which we estimate could be destroyed by this larger force. At the cost of more than $10 billion (for the four wings of B-70) we could expect to destroy only a few more hard ICBM sites and other military targets.

Assuming, although it would not be possible, that we could add three wings of RS-70's to this force by 1967 (at a cost of $10 billion) and that these aircraft could detect and fire three missiles at each surviving hard target, the percentage of hard ICBM sites which could be destroyed would be significantly increased.

However, we have under development a far less expensive and we think more certain and reliable way of accomplishing this same objective through what we call "Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment." This would involve the installation in each of our missiles of a transmitting device which would tell us at the moment the missile enters its ballistic trajectory (the point of power cutoff), whether the missile is on its prescribed course to its target. Since a warhead, once on its prescribed course, will have a very high probability of penetrating and destroying its target, the timely availability of this information would eliminate one of the major uncertainties of missile warfare. With this information in hand we could then retarget additional missiles to destroy those aiming points which we know could not have been hit. This would greatly reduce the need to target initially more than one missile per aiming point since we could determine whether or not the first missile had been accurately launched. The ability to accomplish such indirect bomb damage assessment would permit a much more effective application of our force to the target system. As a result, with the same number of weapons on target we could expect, as shown in the last column, to eliminate at least nine-tenths of the military targets, including the hard ICBM sites, although, as indicated earlier, the missiles may have been fired before the sites are destroyed.

The cost of such an indirect bomb damage assessment system would be only a small fraction of the cost of a three wing RS-70 force.

Admittedly, there is an assumption implicit in these calculations, namely, that we will have the means by 1967 to locate all or moot of the military targets, including hard ICEM sites; in other words, that there will be few, if any, unknown targets. This we are confident we will achieve, except of course for mobile targets. Our experience to date has demonstrated that we can get photographs of the target system with a sufficiently high level of detail to detect and locate new ICBM sites. These pictures have several times the resolution expected by the Air Force from the side-looking radar proposed for the RS-70, assuming that such a radar could actually be developed.

Furthermore, with any adequate high processing rate radar system which may be developed, the B-52's and B-58's could have a considerable reconnaissance and bomb damage assessment capability incident to their principal mission. We think that the B-52's and B-58's, arriving after our missiles have suppressed the enemy's air defense, could penetrate as well or almost as well as the RS-70.

A decision by the Soviet Union to produce and deploy an anti-ICBM system should not significantly change this over-all picture, and in any event would be no less effective against the RS-70 and its missiles. To ensure that our missiles can reach their targets even then, we have included a substantial sum in the 1963 budget for a "penetration aids program." We also have the option of increasing the MINUTEMAN program for which extra production capacity has already been provided.

It is clear, therefore that the RS-70 program, as we see it now, would not add significantly to our strategic retaliatory capability in the period after 1967. Interestingly enough, at the very time the Air Force is urging the production of another aircraft system on the grounds that nuclear-armed missiles are not dependable, General Norstad is requesting the production of a new nuclear-armed missile to replace his aircraft which he says are too vulnerable in a nuclear war environment. And, while the Air Force, in pressing its case for a new bomber, has questioned the dependability of nuclear-armed missiles, it is at the same time urging an aircraft (the RS-70) which itself depends for its strike capability on highly sophisticated nuclear-armed missiles.

While I am fully convinced that it is entirely premature to make any kind of commitment to weapon system development or production of the RS-70 in fiscal year 1963, I am not prepared to preclude such a commitment at a later date. By continuing our XB-70 program of three prototype aircraft at the cost of $1.3 billion, and by proceeding with the exploratory development of the key subsystems of the proposed RS-70 for which funds have been included in the 1963 budget (as shown in the last table), we will have open to us the option of producing and deploying an RS-70 system at a later time if the need for such a system should become apparent. Since the key subsystems have yet to be developed, delaying the decision for one year would not postpone, the real operational readiness of the first wing at all.

I have just recently reviewed this entire problem with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and again, except for the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, they all support the B-70 development program recommended by President Kennedy.

March 14, 1962

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Table 1

STRATEGIC RETALIATORY FORCES


End Fiscal Year


1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

Bombers (a)








B-52

555

615

630

630

630

630

630

B-47

900

855

585

450

225

0

0

B-58

40

80

80

80

80

80

80

Total Bombers

1,495

1,550

1,295

1,160

935

710

710

Air-Launched Missiles








HOUND DOG

216

460

580

580

480

408

408

SKYBOLT

0

0

0

0

322

690

1,012

Total GAM's

216

460

580

580

802

1,098

1,420

ICBM and POLARIS Missiles (b)








ATLAS

28

87

129

129

129

123

114

TITAN

0

53

91

114

114

114

114

MINUTEMAN, Hardened & Dispersed

0

0

150

600

800

950

1,100 (c)

POLARIS

80

144

192

304

454

560

656

Total ICBM/POLARIS

108

284

562

1,147

1,507

1,747

1,985

Other








QUAIL

224

392

392

392

392

392

392

KC-135 (d)

400

440

520

605

645

645

645

KC-97

600

580

340

240

120

0

0

RC-135

0

0

3

11

23

23

23

RB-47

90

45

45

45

15

0

0

Alert Force Weapons (e)








No. of Weapons

1,259

2,139

2,395

2,919

3,285

3,734

4,064

Megatons

1,692

2,833

3,517

4,154

4,681

4,974

5,428

a/ Numbers of aircraft are derived by multiplying authorized squadron unit equipment by the numbers of squadrons. They do not include command support aircraft. Effective 1 August 1961, the program provides for approximately 50% of the B-52 and B-47 forces, less those units assigned to training, to be on 15 minute ground alert. For the purpose of this table it has been assumed that 50% of the B-58's will be on 15 minute ground alert by the end of FY. 63. However, alert status of this program is not yet firm.

b/ ICBM numbers represent In-Commission missile launchers, that is, operational missile launchers which have been checked out and mount a missile. Numbers of POLARIS missiles represent the total number of missiles in operational submarines. Approximately 67% of these submarines will be at sea with 55% on station. The table excludes 17 REGULUS missiles in operational submarines from FY 61 to end FY 64 and 5 to end of FY 65. Also excluded are THOR and JUPITER missiles assigned to the UK and NATO. The THOR force includes 60 missiles through FY 67 and the JUPITER force now includes 38 increasing to 45 by the end of FY 62 and thereafter.

c/ MINUTEMAN rises to a force of 1200 launchers by end of FY 68.

d/ Includes National Emergency Airborne Command Post and Post Attack Command and Control System aircraft.

e/ Bombers have flexibility in choice of weapons. For purposes of this table, it was assumed that B-52's carry 4 x 1.1 MT bombs plus air-launched missiles. B-47's (excluding ECM aircraft) carry, on the average, 1.6 weapons and 2.5 MT. B-58's are assumed to carry 1 x 3.8 MT weapon.

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Table 2

Assumed Survival, Reliability and Penetration Factors by Weapon System

Weapon System

Weapons Per Carrier

Survival Rate

Reliability Rate

Penetration Rate

Yield/CEP
MT/n. mi.

Alert B-52


1.0

.90

0.50


Bombs

4




1.1/0.5

GAM-77

2


0.75

0.70

1.1/0.8

GAM-87

4


0.70

1.0

0.8/1.5

Alert B-58

1

1.0

0.90

0.50

3.8/0.5

ATLAS D

1

0.05

0.75

1.0

l.45/0.7

ATLAS E

1

0.05

0.75

1.0

4.5/0.7

ATLAS F

1

0.10

0.75

1.0

4.5/0.7

TITAN I

1

0.05

0.75

1.0

4.5/0.7

TITAN II

1

0.20

0.80

1.0

9/0.7

MINUTEMAN H & L (Wings 1-5)


1.0

0.80

1.0

1.2/1

MINUTEMAN H & L (Wings 6+)


1.0

0.80

1.0

1.2/0.5

POLARIS A-3

3

1.0

0.75

1.0

0.2/1.1

B-70 Bomber


1.0

.90

0.70


Bombs

4




1.1/0.5

GAM

2


0.70

1.0


RS-70


1.0

0.90

0.70


GAM

20


0.80

1.0

0.2/0.25

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Table 3

Comparison of Target Destruction Capabilities of Alternative Forces

End Fiscal Year 1967


Aim Points

Per Cent Expected Kill

I
DOD
Force

II
DOD
Plus
B-70

III
DOD
Plus
RS-70

IV
DOD
Plus
IBDA

Population and Industry






Urban-Industrial Floor Space





(or Urban Blast Fatalities)

-------------------- 78 --------------------

Total Population Fatalities:





Unsheltered, at least

-------------------- 30 --------------------

Partly sheltered, at least

-------------------- 25 --------------------

Military Targets






Bomber Bases

150

94

96

97

99

Support Airfields

50

91

94

96

98

Defense Suppression

300

94

95

99

94

Nuclear Storage/Production

50

78

86

96

94

Naval & Submarine Bases

50

91

94

99

99

Soft IRBM Sites (4 per site)

100

98

98

98

98

Soft ICBM Sites (1 or 2 per site)

360

97

97

97

98

Hard ICBM Sites (1 per site)

100

36

47

96

95







Alert Force Weapons


4,064

4,604

6,064

4,064

Alert Force Megatons


5,428

5,968

5,828

5,428

Alert Weapons Down


2,476

2,829

3,484

2,476

Alert Megatons Down


2,755

3,106

2,957

2,755

Force I : DOD Programmed Force End FY 1967

Force II Force I plus 4 wings of B-70

Force III: Force I plus 3 wings of RS-70 (RS-70 assumed to detect cratering ring at hard targets and to fire 3 missiles at each surviving hard target.)

Force IV : Force I plus Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment

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Table 4

THE B-70 AND RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM
RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT

($ Millions)

XB-70 Program

FY 1961 & Prior

FY 1962

FY 1963

FY1964

FY 1965

Total

800

220

171
1st flight XB-70 #1 (Dec 62)

81
1st flight XB-70 #2 (Sept 63)

29
1st flight XB-70 #3 (July 64)

1300

Reconnaissance and Reconnaissance Strike Program

FY 1961 & Prior

FY 1962

FY 1963

FY 1964

FY 1965

Total

0

7.1

52.0

27.0?

17.0?