COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN JAPAN

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COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN JAPAN

SUMMARY

While the Japan Communist Party (JCP) is, on the surface, only a minor political party, it wields an influence out of all proportion to its Diet strength through its domination of Japan’s largest labor federation and its ability to capitalize on the complaints of disgruntled groups suffering from the chaotic economic situation or perplexed by the postwar ideological confusion. The JCP has a membership reasonably estimated at 60,000 with additional strength to be found in the approximately 25,000-strong Young Communist League and the numerous and easily exploited Communist sympathizers. The Party holds four seats in each house of the Diet, an insignificant representation in terms of effecting legislation but useful from a propaganda viewpoint. The success of the JCP has been due in large part to its aggressive and well trained leaders while the interlocking relationship of the upper level committee membership makes for smooth coordination.

Communications between the Soviets and the Japanese Communists range from the open to the clandestine. In the latter category are the secret Moscow-planned directives which are channelled to the Party’s Soviet Fraction, which, in turn, attempts to implement these decisions through the group’s powerful position in the Party. The so-called Tokuda group occasionally has a doctrinaire difference of emphasis from the Soviet Fraction with the former generally favoring a more nationalistic and less of the international Communist approach. Despite protestations that the JCP is strictly nationalistic in outlook, it is now evident that the Party is in contact with other Asiatic Communist Parties and may be represented at a Far Eastern Communist Congress.

The JCP was largely responsible for organizing, and now makes no attempt to conceal its domination of, the National Congress of Industrial Unions, the largest of the labor federations with a claimed membership of approximately 1,200,000 and eighteen member unions in such vital industries as communications (government employees), steel, transportation, and electric and chemical workers. Communist influence is also exerted in varying degrees on some of the unaffiliated but large unions such as the National Council of Government Workers’ Unions, the All-Japan Coal Industry Workers’ Union, the Japan Teachers’ Union, and recently the Party has made gains at the expense of the anti-Communists in the Government Railway Workers’ Union. The Party and its labor federation have cooperated closely as is evidenced by their parallel activities in labor disputes including the “October Offensives” of 1946 and 1947, the abortive Communist-instigated general strike of February 1947, where SCAP’s prohibition of the strike caused both organizations to suffer a loss of prestige, and in March 1948, when prompt action by SCAP forestalled an acute party-inspired crisis.

Note: The information in this report is as of 23 August 1948.

The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report.
The JCP has aggressively attempted to penetrate other groups besides labor. The Party has found the leftist League of Koreans Residing in Japan, representing over half of the long oppressed 600,000 Korean minority in Japan, susceptible to infiltration and utilization by the Party. The Communists have given high priority to penetrating the Japan Farmers’ Union, the largest farmers’ union, but vigorous anti-Communist opposition has left the outcome of control deadlocked. The JCP has devoted time and energy to the successful development of cultural groups and has organized those of an obviously pro-Communist nature, as well as those of the “front” variety. The Party has energetically courted the returning repatriates from Soviet territory but apparently without any marked success.

The JCP has adopted a so-called “civil strife” campaign for discrediting the Government, blocking Occupation and US objectives, impeding the democratization program and hampering progress towards economic recovery. Appealing to cupidity, credulity, or nationalism, Communist strategy overlooks no angles or opportunities for promoting its aims.

An anti-Communist sentiment has been gradually but significantly crystallizing during the past fifteen months. The general public’s attitude has been influenced by the now soft-pedalled Communist attack on the Emperor, the USSR’s tardiness in repatriating POW’s, and the JCP’s tactics which helped impede economic recovery. Labor has become discontented with the Communist minority control and employment of violence. Not only has the Socialist-controlled labor federation rejected Communist overtures for a united labor front and launched a positive anti-Communist campaign, but even within the ranks of the Communist-dominated labor federation itself there has been a strong attempt to attack Party interference in trade union activities. A further manifestation of this anti-Communist sentiment is the small but growing, ultra-nationalistic groups which now attack Communism but might eventually be directed against all foreign interference.

The JCP gives no promise in the immediate future of altering its minor party status at the polls. Ideologically, the traditionally conservative USSR-fearing Japanese are not attracted to Communism. The JCP advantages in Japan are largely economic. Should trade with the West and US pump-priming fail to develop successfully, Japan might feel compelled to deal with the USSR (eventually on the Kremlin’s terms) in order to maintain markets and access to raw materials. Internally, until the public is shown tangible evidence of economic recovery, it will be susceptible to the Party’s anti-government and anti-Occupation propaganda, and without relatively stable living standards labor especially will find militant tactics attractive.

As long as the Occupation forces remain, Communism is no threat to the Japanese Government’s structural political stability although potentially a strong element in developing xenophobia. In the event of an early Occupation withdrawal, the Government will be handicapped by the economic problem, the psychological disadvantage of the USSR’s geographical proximity and a decentralized police force which is still ineffective. The Japanese Government, very much aware of the Communist problem, may, after repatriation from the USSR is considered completed and if permitted to act as a free agent, very likely outlaw Communism.
COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN JAPAN

1. **Size and Organizational Structure.**

   In October 1945, a SCAP directive ordered the release of all political prisoners. Among these were to be found the majority of those Communists who, along with the returned exile, NOZAKA Sanzo, have since formed the leadership of the Japan Communist Party (JCP). In the same month the JCP became a legal political party.

   The basic guide followed by the JCP is its first postwar directive from Moscow calling on the Japanese Communists to train and develop new leadership in order to expand the area of Communist influence, and cautioning the Party against activities which might jeopardize its legal status or give the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) cause to suppress it.

   a. **Size.**

      The JCP registered with the National Election Management Committee only 18,088 “official” members throughout Japan as of March 1948. This figure is deceptive as regards the Party's actual strength and power. A recent estimate, based on representation at the JCP's Sixth National Congress, places Party membership at approximately 60,000. The first figure obviously fails to include secret members, or the large but undetermined number of genuine Communists, who, although not actually members, are active in furthering the Party cause. There are also many sympathizers who are ever ready to permit themselves and their organizations to be exploited by the Communists. Another source of strength is the Young Communist League whose members per se do not hold Party membership and whose size might reasonably be estimated at 25,000. The JCP has political influence out of all proportion to its membership because of its able top leadership, the rigorous discipline and fanatical devotion of its membership, and also its ability to penetrate non-Communist groups and exploit postwar suffering.

      JCP success at the polls as contrasted with that of the Socialists is one yardstick for judging Communist strength. In the 1946 general elections the JCP polled slightly more than two million, or 3.8 percent, of the total votes as contrasted with the Socialists' 17.8 percent. Placing 142 candidates in the race for the 466 lower house Diet seats to the Socialists' 330 candidates, the JCP elected five, the Socialists 93. (Communist Diet strength was increased to six when a Communist runner-up was seated after the disqualification of a successful Liberal candidate.) One year later in April 1947, the JCP polled 3.7 percent to the Socialists' 26.3 percent. In this campaign the Communists put 120 candidates into the field to the Socialists' 285. Communist representation, however, dropped from six to four while the Socialists' increased to 143. The Party won four of the 250 seats in the Diet's Upper House in the April 1947 elections. Thus JCP strength in the Diet is insignificant in terms of effecting legislation and is useful primarily as a propaganda vehicle. Communist success in the 1947 local elections was also negligible, falling below that of the elections for the Diet.
b. Organization. (See Chart - Appendix B)

Theoretically the supreme power of the Japan Communist Party resides in the National Party Congress which meets annually. When not in session, the Congress is represented by a twenty-five-member Central Committee which the former elects. Supplementary to the Central Committee is the Central Committee Candidate Pool whose ten members are similarly elected and whose function it is to fill any vacancies that may occur in the Central Committee. Actually, superior even to the Central Committee is the Supreme Council, top policy organ of the JCP, whose very existence is concealed from most Party members. Of the nine members, the names of only six are to be found on the Central Committee. A Control Committee is responsible for Party discipline. Real executive power, however, lies in the Political Bureau of nine members and the five-man Secretariat with the former making all important Party decisions and the latter handling routine administration. The Political Bureau and the Secretariat supervise the activities of some sixteen departments into which the work of the Central Headquarters is broken down.

The Party's bureaucratic structure has a chain of command from the Central Committee through 9 Regional Committees to 46 Prefectural of Metropolitan Committees, to the District Committees, the Squads and the Groups. Far-reaching structural reorganization took place after the 6th National Party Congress of December 1947. A major innovation was the introduction of the Regional Committee to the chain of command in an effort to improve local leadership, liaison between Headquarters and the lesser committees, and possibly to decentralize command looking forward to the possible future necessity of going underground.

Behind the JCP's activities is a complex organization of men who have qualified for their present positions of leadership through long experience in Communist tactics and a belief in their ideology, unflinching even through long imprisonment. The leadership is aggressive, well trained, and hardened. Of the 53 members of the JCP headquarters all but five have been behind bars; seven have had experience and training in the USSR and 13 are graduates of university-level institutions. The close interlocking relationship of the membership on upper level committees makes for a tight, well disciplined organization and for smooth coordination. The top level leadership rests in the hands of the "Big Three": TOKUDA Kyuichi, NOZAKA Sanzo, and SHIGA Yoshio. All three are members of the Supreme Council, the Central Committee, and the Political Bureau. TOKUDA and NOZAKA are members of the Secretariat and each of the three heads up at least one of the Central Headquarters' departments. JCP policy is very largely controlled by these three who have retained their top positions through the reshuffling of officials at headquarters.

The JCP obtains its financial life blood for carrying on its countless activities from illegal as well as legal sources. In this legal bracket there are the customary membership fees, subscriptions to various publications, and the donations of sympathizers. On the local level, party members have organized business concerns from which the profits are deposited in the Party coffers. Should the firm plan to engage in the blackmarket, the organizers will ostensibly divorce themselves from the JCP in
order to save the Party embarrassment in case the activities should be disclosed. Japan’s economic condition, rudimentary police force, and long coast line offer a sizable profit in smuggling. Evidence indicates that the JCP has resorted to this type of enterprise. The traffic in Santonin offers an interesting example of JCP enterprise. Santonin is a product prepared largely in the USSR from domestic plants and is widely prized in Japan as a verminicide. The limited quantity introduced since the War and the origin of the drug have offered the JCP a near monopoly position.

c. Factionalism.

Available evidence indicates that there are two major factions within the JCP—one identified with the theories of NOZAKA Sanzo and one with the policies pursued by TOKUDA Kyuichi, the Party’s Secretary General, and his group of adherents. TOKUDA’s theory, relying on leadership by the trusted few and the orthodox Marxist principal of revolution by violence, distrusts united front tactics and the parliamentary methods of the bourgeois democrats which it is felt will impair Party purity and virility. The TOKUDA group, sometimes referred to as the “Prison Communists,” although decidedly pro-Soviet, apparently desires to establish a communized but independent Japan which will cooperate closely with the USSR and with Communist Parties in other countries but which will not become an integral part of an international Communist machine. Reportedly TOKUDA’s nationalism makes him wary of joining a “Far Eastern Cominform,” since he is doubtful of the advisability of too closely identifying the JCP with the USSR in the Japanese mind.

As contrasted with TOKUDA, NOZAKA favors a slower, more parliamentary approach with the use of united front tactics while simultaneously preparing for the ultimate revolution by violence. There appears to be growing antagonism to TOKUDA’s “bōssist” rule of the Party organization and disappointment with his leadership of the abortive general strike of February 1947. Even though the 6th Party Congress adopted NOZAKA’s outline for “Revolution by Peaceful Means” after heated debate, TOKUDA was re-elected the Party’s Secretary General which position largely governs party appointments. It would be naive to over-emphasize “factionalism” as an internal factor inhibiting the growth of the Japan Communist Party. It is rather a doctrinaire difference of approach and emphasis.

d. External Relationships.

Channels of communication between the Soviets and the Japanese Communists are numerous and naturally range from the obvious and somewhat open to the clandestine. In the latter category are the Moscow-planned directives for the JCP which are channeled to the Party’s Soviet Fraction from the Soviet Mission’s Intelligence Section via TASS representatives. Available evidence indicates that the membership of the Soviet Fraction is largely identical with that reported for the Supreme Executive Council and that it is, therefore, in a position to implement Soviet directives at the highest party levels. At the same time overt communications take place through the Office of the Soviet Delegate to the Allied Council and of the USSR Representative at the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo. These are principal centers for intelli-
gence reports and for the giving of instructions and advice to Japanese Communist leaders. Copies of anti-US and anti-Occupation Japanese newspapers as well as Pravda, Izvestia, and other Soviet propaganda vehicles are disseminated. TASS news service is made available while the Soviet broadcasts beamed to Japan are monitored and made available to the Japanese. Considerable Soviet propaganda effort is conducted in accordance with SCAP directives designed to give the Japanese access to foreign information, while supplementary activities are conducted in violation of regulations.

There has been considerable speculation about Japanese participation in a congress of Asiatic Communist parties frequently referred to as the "Far Eastern Cominform." Despite the protestations of JCP leaders that the Party is organized on national lines and would not consider participation in an international Communist organization, it appears from recent directives that Japanese Communists are at least in contact with other Far Eastern Communist Parties and may be represented at a Far Eastern Communist Congress. These recent directives evidence a desire to implement policy which appears to have been decided upon by the Far Eastern Communist Parties jointly.

2. ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY.

At the time of Japan's surrender the Government rigidly controlled or suppressed every form of activity of an organized nature. The freedoms introduced by SCAP and the lack of widespread understanding of the meaning and aims of democracy combined with Japan's economic deterioration have made it possible for the Communist Party, with its newly legalized status, to infiltrate almost every phase of Japanese life.

a. Labor.

The Japan Communist Party has placed its greatest emphasis on the penetration of organized labor. Except for the short-lived severely government-restricted proletarian movement of the twenties and thirties, the Japanese have had little experience with labor unions. SCAP has actively encouraged the organization of trade unions and the period of the Occupation has witnessed a phenomenal growth of organized labor, presently numbering over six million. Union leadership, however, was to be found only among the organizers of the earlier proletarian movement who now form the nucleus of the present Communist and Socialist parties. JCP leaders were largely responsible for organizing the National Congress of Industrial Unions, the "Sanbetsu," which has become the largest of the labor federations with eighteen member unions and a claimed membership of approximately 1,200,000 as contrasted with the Socialist-dominated Sodomei's claimed membership of over 1,100,000. Communist influence is also exerted in varying degrees on certain unaffiliated unions including the National Council of Government Workers' Unions (105,000 approximately) which closely follows the Sanbetsu line; the Japan Teachers' Union (475,000 approximately) in which JCP influence has declined; Party influence may now be decisive in the All-Japan Coal Industry Workers' Union (215,000 approximately); and recently the JCP has gained somewhat at the expense of anti-Communist elements in the Government Railway Workers' Union (565,000 approximately).
It is reliably estimated that of the rank-and-file membership of the unions affiliated with the Sanbetsu, not more than 5% are believed to be party members and even the inclusion of sympathizers brings the figure to not more than 10%. The explanation of how such a minority of the Sanbetsu's total membership controls the national leadership is to be found in the so-called "pyramid system" of electing leaders. The "pyramid system" may be defined as one wherein those in authority on each level elect those who are to take the positions of authority on the next higher level, enabling a bare majority on a lower level to be converted into a near-unanimous majority at the top. A review of the leadership of the Sanbetsu as the situation existed in February 1948, is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central Executive Committee</th>
<th>63% Communist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Dept. Chiefs</td>
<td>91% Communist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat</td>
<td>81% Communist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials</td>
<td>75% Communist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The situation is now generally recognized and neither the Party nor Sanbetsu make any attempt to conceal the Communists' dominant position in the labor federation's central organization.

The Sanbetsu's eighteen national member unions include unions in such vital industries as steel, communications, transportation, electrical equipment and power distribution, publishing and printing. Reliable authority lists seven of these eighteen unions as Communist dominated, seven are probably Communist infiltrated, while the remaining four are dominated by non-Communists. Among these seven Communist-dominated member unions are the large and strategically located Communication Workers (government employees), Electric Workers, and Chemical Workers.

The first major dispute of the Sanbetsu involving political action came with the "October Offensive" of 1946 when the federation demanded the resignation of the YOSHIDA Cabinet. The close relationship between the Party and its labor federation is apparent in their parallel activities in labor disputes. The projected 1 February 1947 abortive general strike, originally included the Socialist-dominated Japan Federation of Labor as well as the Sanbetsu. Immediately prior to the deadline the former withdrew, leaving the Communist-dominated Sanbetsu in complete control. The strike was organized under Communist slogans and political policies. Over two-thirds of the top general strike leaders were Party members or sympathizers. SCAP's prohibition of the strike caused both Sanbetsu and the Party to suffer a serious loss of prestige and touched off a wave of public criticism at both organizations. The delayed "October Offensive" of 1947 was carried out with some measure of success, very little effort being made to disguise Communist instigation and guidance. Only prompt action by SCAP in March 1948, forestalled coordinated nationwide walkouts by Sanbetsu's Communications Workers and some other groups of government workers' unions.

The ban on general strikes has created new strike techniques of which the "piston strike" is characteristic. In the "piston strike," under orders from union headquarters, regional branches declare in turn twenty-four hour mass "vacations."
staggered system of striking is repeated in other regions until the cumulative effect is that of a general strike.

b. Farmers' Organizations.

The JCP gives high priority to penetrating the large agricultural population. An independent Communist farmers' union, even if organized, however, probably would not be effective because of the native conservatism of the rural Japanese. The Party's efforts have been concentrated on the Japan Farmers' Union, the largest farmers' union, which they entered easily due to prior affiliation with groups incorporated into the Union and because of the Union's policy of political neutrality. This organization has offered a medium for exerting a modicum of influence on the rural community. The Union has been torn by the issue of Communism during the past year, and the conflict between the pro- and anti-Communists is presently deadlocked.

c. Koreans.

The Koreans, numbering approximately 600,000, are the largest non-Japanese minority group in Japan and are divided politically into right-wing groups and the leftist League of Koreans Residing in Japan, with the latter considerably larger than the former. Resentment over their long persecution at Japanese hands, coupled with the new freedom brought them by the Occupation, and the economic and social discrimination from which they still suffer makes the Koreans susceptible to infiltration tactics and renders the League a useful tool in JCP hands. The Communists have been the only political party sympathetic to the Koreans' problems, and in its role of self-appointed protector of the oppressed the JCP has endeavored to stimulate Korean unrest and utilize it for party aims.

Communism as a political factor within the Korean population in Japan dates back to 1928 when the Korean Communist Party was organized around a nucleus of 43 members. Communism then being outlawed, the Party was forced underground and shortly thereafter its principal leaders including KIN Ten Kai, the most able of the group, were imprisoned. Loss of leadership and the influence of the Third International led to the Party's gradual dissolution and its absorption by the JCP. This merger brought the Korean Communists under the virtual domination of the Japanese Communists in the "class struggle." The release of all political prisoners from Japanese jails in October 1945 returned KIN and the other leaders to active Communist agitation. Within a matter of months KIN became the supreme adviser of the League and in conjunction with Korean Communist colleagues he has been responsible for its leftist complexion and constant espousal of the Communist cause. The importance placed on organizing and controlling the Koreans in JCP policy is demonstrated by KIN's place on the JCP's Central Committee and Political Bureau.

d. Young Communist League and Youth Organizations.

Youth organizations, particularly the Young Communist League (YCL), and similar youth groups provide the Communist Party with an effective organization for indoctrinating prospective Party members, training future leaders, and for providing
strong-arm squads for the Party. The YCL has centered its activities around labor unions, schools, universities, and farm villages. These groups appeal to the malcontent youthful elements of the population and to the unsettled ex-servicemen; they also serve as rallying points for the most aggressive and irresponsible elements of society.

The YCL was organized in the fall of 1945 as a Party subsidiary and although technically separated in February 1946, the organization, plans, policies, and actions of the two are too closely parallel to be accidental. The paper separation was intended to make the YCL appeal to a wider range of prospective members and to improve its position in efforts for a united youth front. Open to youths from 14 to 25, estimates on membership vary from 10,000 to 36,000 with the figure of 25,000 being reasonably reliable. The YCL has been used effectively in the Party's "civil strife" campaign and in labor disputes. Likewise, the Youth Action Corps and The Assault Corps are both Communist-inspired youth groups working primarily within the labor unions as goon "squads."

e. Cultural Front Organizations.

The end of the War removed the police restrictions on all associations (of other than an ultra-nationalist nature). Cultural groups, always popular in Japan, have mushroomed as a result. The JCP has devoted time and energy to the development of cultural groups, both those of an obviously pro-Communist nature and also those of a "front" nature with a heavy non-Communist membership which offers "cover" for activities which might be repudiated by the non-Communists if they realized their nature. In the former category are such organizations as the Soviet Study Association and the Japan-Soviet Cultural Relations Association. Ostensibly free of political or economic interests, they provide the Soviet Mission with a seemingly harmless cover for close personal contact with the JCP and for the dissemination of propaganda.

The Japan Democratic Cultural League heads the "front" groups and is an alliance of 21 member organizations with numerous branches. It is additionally supported by 38 non-member cultural organizations and cultural departments of labor unions not directly affiliated with the League. Seven of the eight top officials of the League are Party members and many member groups have almost equally strong Communist leadership. These societies appeal to different age groups with varied but ostensibly non-political interests.

The League is currently promoting an ambitious program to unite all Japanese cultural organizations for the announced purpose of establishing a thorough "democratic" revolution of Japan but naturally to facilitate over-all Communist control. Approximately 140 groups responded, out of an invited list of 950, to a nationwide cultural convention in July 1947, which made some progress looking to the establishment of the over-all control group. Progress in infiltrating cultural organizations has partly offset the Party's loss of prestige at the failure of the February 1947 strikes and the repudiation at the polls the following April. Cultural groups have served as powerful propaganda vehicles and as "cover" for activities hostile to the Occupation and to the successful democratization of Japan.
SECRET

f. Other Groups.

The JCP has been extremely zealous and untiring in its efforts to organize any disgruntled group whose activities could either be so guided as to give increasing strength to the Party's voice or to engage in activities detrimental to the Occupation and embarrassing to the Japanese Government. A potentially fertile field for Communist penetration which the Party has not overlooked is the "Eta," the Japanese outcast class. Estimated by the Government as numbering a million, and by their own leaders as three million, this socially and economically stigmatized group is a "natural" for Party equalitarian propaganda. In the 1947 general elections, the Eta organization supported the Socialists and there has as yet been no indication of the Eta having been won over en masse by the JCP.

The USSR has taken a direct hand in encouraging the growth of the JCP by indoctrinating the Japanese prisoners awaiting repatriation from Soviet territory. While the indoctrination has not been markedly successful, the program has returned a number of converts. In Japan, the Party has energetically courted this group with the general economic situation playing into Communist hands.


The so-called "Civil Strife" campaign is the strategy adopted by the Party for discrediting the Government, harassing officials, blocking Occupation and US objectives, impeding the democratization program, engineering chaos, and disrupting Japanese progress towards economic recovery. Appealing to cupidity, credulity, or nationalism, the Party seizes every opportunity, whether logical or illogical, to promote its aims. The tactics are typical of Communist-seized opportunities the world over to take advantage of unpleasant realities to prove to the working masses that the Party champions their cause against the oppressive and reactionary "capitalist" leaders.

Communist strategy, overlooking no angles for disruption of the national life, makes it mandatory for the Party either to disapprove or to attempt to dominate any non-Communist movement, particularly those likely to obtain popular support. The Community Chest fund-raising campaign, for instance, received a "thumbs-down" decision. The tactics briefly discussed hereafter are not an all-inclusive list but are typical of the popular issues adopted by the JCP.


The Japanese Government has recently been investigating individuals and organizations which may be responsible for the illegal disposal of vast amounts of Japanese Army and Navy supplies which were returned to the Japanese by Occupation authorities for civilian use. The JCP has exploited on a wide scale to its own advantage this Government-sponsored campaign to expose hoarded goods. Hiding behind the ostensible objectives of reconstructing the national economy and revealing those individuals blocking recovery, the Communists, usurping police functions, have agitated mobs to storm business enterprises under the guise of unearthing illegally acquired property. With the average Japanese suffering financial difficulties the expo-
sures have wide appeal and the large-scale “investigations” bear many of the characteristics of mob rule—predecessor to the breakdown of law and order.

b. Anti-Tax Movement.

The KATAYAMA Cabinet's increase in tax assessments in June 1947, brought a spontaneous wave of non-Communist-inspired popular resentment on which the JCP has been able to capitalize. The Party has found in the anti-tax drive a movement which provides a common ground for uniting the interests of both agrarian and urban communities, labor unions in the latter category being particularly susceptible. The campaign became evident shortly after the tax increases were announced, and reached nation-wide proportions by the end of 1947. Employing petitions, posters, public hearings, organizing anti-tax “strife” committees and holding demonstrations, which occasionally ended in violence, the Party has bolstered its prestige with lower-income groups which would otherwise be indifferent to the JCP. The movement has gained the frequent cooperation of the Communist-infiltrated National Finance Workers' Union, the government tax office employees, whose members have even encouraged the non-payment of taxes. The Party may be expected to intensify its campaign prior to the next general election. The drive also has provided the JCP with a vehicle for attacking the Occupation on the grounds that payment of Occupation costs are responsible for higher taxes.

c. Rice Deliveries.

The Communists have adopted a program of duplicity in dealing with the government's rice delivery plans. In rural areas farmers have been encouraged not to meet Government-assigned rice delivery quotas. This message has appeal for the farmer since any amounts not sold to the Government may be disposed of on the black-market at several times official prices. In urban areas, however, the Party has held rallies to demonstrate against delays in the delivery of rice rations or the Government's inability to supply the full rice ration. The program has, on occasion, boomeranged on the JCP, when those farmers who had accepted Party advice were then compelled by the Government to meet the assigned quota. The quota could sometimes be met only by purchasing blackmarket rice and naturally the farmers blamed the JCP for their financial frustration.

d. Promotion of the “Race” Issue.

Paradoxically the Communists, usually associated with the struggle for the world-wide “emancipation” of the working masses, have adopted as their most recent issue in Japan the formation of a “democratic racial (Japanese national) front.” This ingenious strategy is a revival of the plea for a united front with other “democratic” groups and an appeal to the deeply rooted nationalism of the Japanese masses lost in the ideological confusion of postwar Japan. As a psychological stimulus to patriotism the race issue is devised to combat the importation of foreign, particularly US, capital which the JCP claims will reduce Japan to a semi-colonial status. There is no indication that other parties such as the Socialists will not continue to reject the united front appeal while the effect of race issue on the masses should be severely limited by:
(1) the traditional relationship in Japanese minds between nationalism and the Emperor system which the Party is on record as opposing; (2) the introduction of American capital which appears to most Japanese to be the best chance of improving Japan’s current economic plight; and (3) US assistance which is seen as promoting rather than obstructing the restoration of Japan’s former international position.

e. **Anti-US and Anti-Occupation Attitude.**

Initially the Occupation and the Party enjoyed a “honeymoon” period engendered by the release of the political prisoners and the Soviet directive to the JCP not to incite any action which would offer SCAP reason for suppressing the Party. The campaign originally attacked by indirectness, taking the form of criticising Occupation expenses in the Diet’s budget sessions or the Occupation’s use of rolling stock and communications facilities. SCAP’s attitude, however, has gradually stiffened toward politically inspired strikes while the Communists have become increasingly outspoken.

The attack is now directed quite openly against economic aid as being the vanguard of imperialism, and typical of the JCP line is the statement of a labor leader that “the actual enemy of labor is not the present government, but the US.” Even more recently the JCP attacks on the US give the appearance of being coordinated with the anti-US directives of a “Far Eastern Cominform.” Should the withdrawal of the Occupation be indefinitely postponed, the race issue may be expected to have some appeal to latent Japanese xenophobia. In the near future the anti-Occupation propaganda of the Party, such as the “race issue,” will lack wide appeal.

4. **ANTI-COMMUNISM.**

During the past fifteen months there has been a gradual and significant crystallization of anti-Communist sentiment in Japan. The Occupation’s release of all political prisoners in October 1945 was widely misinterpreted as representing SCAP approval of Communism. More recently the clearly expressed opposition of the Occupation to Communism and the educational activities of SCAP’s Labor Division warning against minority control of unions have undoubtedly been influential in encouraging the growth of anti-Communism. Socialist Party attempts to limit Communist activities have become particularly marked since the left wing of the Party repudiated cooperation with the JCP in May 1947. The rank and file of labor has grown significantly discontented with undemocratic methods of minority control and with the Communist employment of violence. The general public’s attitude has been influenced by the now soft-pedalled Communist attack on the Emperor, the USSR’s tardiness in repatriating and treatment of Japanese prisoners, and the Communists’ constant engagement in “civil strife” which has obviously retarded the rehabilitation program.

The growth of anti-Communism has been particularly marked within the labor movement itself. The Socialist-controlled Sodomei (National Federation of Labor) has launched a positive anti-Communist campaign and has consistently rejected Sanbetsu overtures for a united labor front. The anti-Communist element gradually appeared to be gaining control over the government railway workers, the largest independent union, until recently when it suffered a serious set-back. The anti-Commu-
nists, however, continue to remain very influential within the union. Even the Sanbetsu has not been immune to this type of activity. By the end of 1947, developments among press, mine, and railroad workers, as well as less dramatic manifestations of the movement in other unions, have opened the way for a campaign to eradicate Communist influence from the trade-union movement as a whole. That the Sanbetsu is aware of the dangers to itself of this campaign is amply demonstrated by its defensive cries for trade-union unity. Within labor the anti-Communistic movement has organized on a nation-wide basis the Trade Union Democratic League for the furtherance of trade-union democracy and the rejection of Communist interference in trade-union activities.

Outside the limits of the labor movement, anti-Communistic feeling is growing, although unorganized. Responsibility for this may be credited in large part to the repatriation problem. The dilatory Soviet tactics have aroused resentment against the USSR as well as anxiety among relatives of prisoners still in Soviet hands. This resentment has reflected upon the JCP, especially as the Party feels called upon to whitewash the USSR. As a whole, the repatriates themselves, although undoubtedly many have succumbed to Communist propaganda, appear bitter over their treatment in Soviet hands and are unyielding opponents of Communism. The JCP, considering repatriation a serious handicap, has, with its customary aggressiveness, sought as a countermeasure to claim credit for the successful arrival of the returnees.

Another form of activity typical of the growing anti-Communism is the Japan Revolutionary Chrysanthemum Flag Comrade Society, a youth group which is opposed to the JCP because of the latter's threat to the Emperor system. While this and similar groups suffer from a lack of members, financial backing, and cooperation with one another, interest in them is increasing. Even though their ultra-nationalistic fervor is now being directed against the JCP, these groups, many of which have Japanese veteran appeal, bear a strong resemblance to Japan's prewar super-patriots' organizations and could possibly be directed against all foreign influences.

5. **COMMUNIST POTENTIAL IN JAPAN.**

The Japan Communist Party is essentially a minor party and it gives no promise in the immediate foreseeable future of altering this status at the polls. From a purely ideological viewpoint the masses are not attracted to the banner of Communism because of their innate conservatism and their traditional fear of the USSR which amounts to a virtual obsession. The Japanese relationship with the US on the other hand has historically been a friendly one. The Occupation has revived in large part this traditional friendship. By and large the Japanese are only too aware of the inimical relationship between the US-USSR. The differences between the Soviet claims to large reparations and demands for a relatively low level of industry as contrasted with US plans for aid and actual shipments of food have not been lost on the Japanese. Further handicaps to JCP progress are Soviet delays in repatriation which have soured public opinion, and the Communist threat to the Emperor system.

Communism's advantages in Japan lie largely in the economic field. In the realm of foreign trade, while a very large part of Japanese import and export trade was with
areas now under Communist domination, the possibility of re-creating her prewar lucrative trade with the "West" combined with US rehabilitation, leave Japan oriented toward the US, initially at least. Should a successful combination of western trade along with US pump-priming fail to develop, and should the USSR "open the door," Japan might, against her will, feel forced to deal with the USSR (eventually on the Kremlin's terms) in order to maintain markets and access to raw materials.

Domestically, until the Japanese people are shown tangible evidence of economic recovery they will remain susceptible to Communist anti-government and anti-Occupation propaganda. The economic desperation of labor, especially, caught in the usual wage-price race of a violent inflation leaves this field wide open to Communist guidance. The unions of the low-paid government employees will be particularly susceptible.

Anti-Communism, on the other hand, will be a growing factor both with the general public and with organized labor. The less radical elements of labor are showing a growing maturity, a rising discontent with the unrest created by minority control, and a growing awareness that Japan's economic recovery rests in large part with the smooth operation of the industrial machine uninterrupted by labor strife. The JCP will continue to find little response to its appeals for a united front, either from more conservative labor leaders or from political parties. For so long, however, as economic conditions in Japan make it impossible for either management or the government to satisfy labor's demands for improved and relatively stable living standards, militant tactics may become increasingly attractive and prevent the elimination of Communist influence from the ranks of labor. Anti-Communistic labor leaders may also be pushed into a movement for labor union unity as a defensive measure should the Government attempt to adjust the present labor regulations over-hastily or without moderation.

As long as Occupation forces remain, Communism is no threat to the Japanese Government's structural political stability, although a constant economic handicap because of the JCP's vigorous promotion of civil strife. The Party's constant oral sniping at the Occupation will remain a thorn in the flesh and potentially a strong element in developing xenophobia in the event of a too-prolonged Occupation. In the event of an early withdrawal of Occupation forces, however, the Japanese government will be severely handicapped in dealing with its Communist problem not only by the economic problem but by the proximity of the USSR. That geographical factor is one of which Japanese officialdom is very conscious and remains a threat-in-being on which the JCP relies as a psychological weapon. The weak and decentralized police, in their present state of effectiveness, give no promise of being strong enough to cope with any large-scale Communist-fomented trouble. The police force requires more adequate equipment, higher-calibre personnel, and possibly a greater numerical strength before the Government could be expected to control the JCP.

The Japanese Government is very much aware of the Communist handicap to Japan's recovery and has believed for many months that the Communists have been playing an important role in impeding the execution of many government policies such as the taxation program, rice deliveries, and the discharge of duties by Government and public employees. As long ago as January 1948, officials indicated Government
consideration of an offensive against Communist influence. More recently Premier
ASHIDA has indicated that the Government is studying the exclusion of Communists
from public office. It is believed, however, that with over five hundred thousand
Japanese remaining as hostages in Soviet-dominated areas, no Japanese Government
will risk the USSR's cancellation of repatriation because of the outlawing of the JCP.
After repatriation is completed, however, or when the Japanese feel that the USSR will
return no more Japanese, and if the Government is permitted to act as a free agent, the
outlawing of the JCP is a strong possibility.
APPENDIX A

OUTLINE OF JCP ACTIVITIES

The Japan Communist Party became an independent body in 1921. At this time Bolshevik successes in Russia had convinced a number of Japanese radicals of the merits of Communist ideology and a small underground group was formed. In 1922, the JCP received the blessings and instructions of the Comintern at the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East. Counsels of violence emanating from the Comintern representatives were not lost upon the Japanese government, however, and in June of 1923 a number of arrests were made. The effects of these arrests and further attacks upon the Left were disastrous for party organization and for some years thereafter those who escaped imprisonment, as well as those subsequently released, met in Shanghai and Moscow in attempts to draw up plans for the reorganization of the Party.

A reorganization was effected by the end of 1926, but this did not serve to end internal dissension arising from ideological differences. In 1927, therefore, the Executive Committee of the Communist International adopted Theses which were to guide the JCP until 1932. A long-range program prescribed revolutionary perspective and absolute party independence, with proletarian organizations to be regarded only as sources of and channels through which new membership might be drawn. Despite this and subsequent precedents established by the Comintern, however, discord within the JCP continued. The conditions of economic distress which faced Japan in the period between 1928 and 1931 and which might otherwise have given impetus to left-wing activity were countered not only by the continued disunity and dissension within the party but also by increasingly repressive government measures. In early 1928, a systematic police campaign against suspected Communists and their sympathizers was inaugurated which resulted in the jailing of a large proportion of Communist leadership. Finally, by means of an emergency ordinance, the Government revised the Peace Preservation Law thereby drastically increasing the penalties for leadership of, or membership in, organizations having as their objective the alteration of the national polity.

In the spring of 1932, the Comintern once again intervened in the troubled affairs of the JCP. The Theses issued at this time were in part a scathing denunciation of the Japanese Communists and in part a restatement of the then current Communist doctrine calling for penetration of socialist parties and reformist trade unions in an attempt to split them and win their members away from the leadership. By 1935, however, the Soviet Union's position in the international scene was reflected in a reversal of international Communist policy which, in turn, was immediately echoed in the program of the JCP. The principal features of this policy consisted of a new interpretation of the nature and dangers of fascism and, in consequence, a new attitude calling for a united front with democrats and other democratic elements.
Japanese expansion into North China in 1937 marked the beginning of a period in which the proletarian movement was to disappear entirely as a political force. In part this disappearance was the direct consequence of continued suppressive government action; in part, due to the growing conviction that Japan's overseas policy could not be successful without stronger government control and an end to bickering between parties and interest groups. By 1940, the government-sponsored one-party movement ended in the dissolution of all political parties and the organization of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

While labor disturbances and slackening morale in Japan Proper were occasionally attributed to Communist or other leftist activities, no evidence has emerged of any significant wartime underground. In China a handful of exiled radicals did seek to keep the Japanese left-wing tradition alive and to lend their efforts to the defeat of the Japanese Government. Here two centers of Japanese radicalism developed—one of very modest proportions in the Kuomintang area and one in the area under Communist control. In the Communist area, the use of Japanese prisoners in psychological warfare led to the organization of a movement that, although small and limited in its activities, was important because of the training it gave its members in organizational and indoctrination techniques and the groundwork it established for present-day Communist united front efforts.