NIE 11-5-60
MAY 1960

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 11-5-60

(Supplement NIE 11-5-59)

SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES



Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

on 3 May 1960. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the director of the National Security Agency. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.





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SOVIET CAPABILITIES IN GUIDED MISSILES AND SPACE VEHICLES

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable programs for the development of guided missiles, and the major performance characteristics and dates of operational availability of such missiles. In addition, to estimate the technical capabilities of the Soviets in space, including the earliest possible dates of achievement of important future space ventures. (The period covered runs through about 1965, except where otherwise stated.)

NOTE

This estimate entirely supersedes the Summary and Conclusions of NIE 11-5-59, dated 3 November 1959, and the Memorandum to Holders of NIE 11-5-59, dated 19 January 1960. In addition, it updates and should be used in conjunction with the Discussion in NIE 11-5-59, pertinent paragraphs of which are cross-referenced at the beginning of each section in this estimate.

Annexes to this estimate entirely supersede the following portions of NIE 11-5-59: Annex A supersedes Table 3 of Section VIII (Possible Soviet Space Development Program); Annex B supersedes Section IX (Summary Tables).

THE ESTIMATE

1. During the last six months we have acquired new evidence on Soviet guided missile capabilities and programs, generally confirming progress along the lines indicated in NIE 11-5-59 and in some cases resulting in refinement or modification of our estimates. Our principal acquisitions relate to: (a) Soviet ICBM characteristics and continued test-firing activities; (b) characteristics and deployment of Soviet surface-to-air missiles; (c) Soviet surface ships for missile launching; and (d) Soviet research and development in cruise-type surface-to-surface systems. Despite this improvement in our knowledge of some Soviet missile programs, serious gaps in our information still exist, especially regarding Soviet ballistic missile production and concepts of deployment, research and development on second generation ICBMs and other ballistic missiles, Soviet programs for submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the USSR's approach to the problem of defense against ballistic missiles, and Soviet space programs.

The Soviet ICBM Program
(See paragraphs 69-84, NIE 11-5-59)

2. Recent test firing activities indicate that the ICBM development program continues in an orderly fashion rather than on a "crash" .basis. Since early November 1959, there have been seven generally successful ICBM firings, including two 6,500 n.m. shots to the Johnson Island area in the Pacific. This brings to 25 the total number of firings to ranges of 3,500 n.m. or more.

3. IOC Date. Evidence derived from flight tests is considered adequate to gauge the general progress of the program, but we cannot state with certainty the precise timing of the USSR's initial operational capability (IOC); that is, the date at which a few—say 10—series produced ICBMs could have been placed in the hands of one or more trained units at existing launching facilities. We also consider the IOC as marking the beginning of the planned buildup in operational capabilities.

[ PARAGRAPH DELETED ]

We believe, however, that this does not preclude an earlier Soviet decision that the system was satisfactory for initial deployment. Limited number of operational personnel could have received training in conjunction with the test firings. We believe that for planning purposes it should be considered that the IOC had occurred by 1 January 1960.

[* The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence. Department of the Navy, believes there is insufficient information to judge that the conditions for IOC as described in paragraph 3 have been met. He believes therefore that an IOC date of not earlier than mid-1960 should be used for planning purposes.
** The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army, wishes to clarify his position with respect to the Soviet ICBM IOC date. He believes that as of 1 January 1960 the Soviets had an emergency capability to launch a few series-produced ICBMs against North America, but that these ICBMs probably would have had to have been launched from R&D facilities, rather than from a separate operational facility. However, he agrees that for planning purposes, it is prudent to assume that the IOC had occurred by 1 January 1960.]

4. Production and Deployment. An exhaustive re-examination has failed to establish Soviet ICBM production rates or to provide positive identification of any operational ICBM unit or launching facility other than the test range. Our belief that series production of ICBMs is under way is based on the time elapsed since the start of test firings in 1957, the generally successful results of the test program, and particularly the increased rate of firings since early 1959, all of which lend credibility to Khrushchev's claim of early 1959 that series production was then beginning. Final assembly of ICBMs may be taking place at more than one plant in the USSR; we now have limited evidence pointing to two Soviet cities as possible production sites.

5. There is no new evidence to establish the Soviet ICBM deployment concept. The available evidence suggests that the Soviet ICBM could be rail mobile, but we do not know whether the deployment pattern as a whole will comprise rail mobile units, hard or soft fixed installations, or some combination of these methods. In any case, Soviet ICBM sites are not likely to be found at locations remote from rail support.

6. Configuration. On the basis of data obtained from ICBM and space vehicle launchings, we believe the Soviet ICBM to be a one and one-half staged (Atlas type) vehicle or a parallel staged vehicle, with the former now considered somewhat more likely. It almost certainly employs nonstorable liquid propellants. Data acquired on the re-entry vehicles used on the shots to the Johnson Island area indicate that the nosecones employed in those tests were of the ablative rather than heatsink type. We therefore estimate that the Soviet ICBM employs an ablative nosecone. Use of such a nosecone would permit the delivery of a 6,000 pound nuclear warhead to a range of about 6,500 n.m., that is, from virtually any point in the USSR to virtually any point in the US. A reduction in warhead weight would permit a greater range or the incorporation of penetration aids in the nosecone.

7. Accuracy. [ SENTENCE OF 1.5 LINES DELETED ] the Soviet ICBM probably has radio-inertial and not all-inertial guidance. The guidance system is believed to employ radar tracking with radio command, and to include inertial components within the missile. The data available for estimating Soviet CEPs are far from exact; considerable reliance has been placed on general state of the art and US analogy. These factors, together with our estimate of Soviet capabilities in related components such as gyroscopes and accelerometers, point to a theoretical CEP at IOC date of about 2 n.m., which we believe would be degraded to about 3 n.m, under operational conditions.

[Under operational conditions, theoretical CEPs will be degraded by several factors such as: (a) re-entry errors induced by undeterminable winds and air density over the Impact area; (b) human and experience factors; and (c) geophysical errors including gravitational anomalies, geoidal uncertainties, and uncertainties of target location relative to launch point and local verticals.]

This is an approximate figure and we apply it to all ranges to which ICBMs arc likely to be fired.

8. We believe that operational considerations will lead the Soviets to incorporate an all-inertial system in their ICBM sometime during 1961-1962 or possibly earlier. A Soviet all-inertial system, as of today, would probably have a theoretical CEP of about 3 n.m., degraded to about 5 n.m. under operational conditions. Units already equipped with radio-inertial guidance probably would not be retrofitted with the all-inertial system.

9. We estimate that over the next few years, probably not later than during 1963, the operational CEP for a Soviet ICBM system with all-inertial guidance could be reduced to about 2 n.m., and that with radio-inertial guidance, the operational CEP could be made somewhat better. ICBM accuracy under operational conditions could probably be still further improved to about 1 n.m. in 1965-1970. The element of uncertainty in our estimate of CEPs for future years is very great.

10. Reliability Factors. The strategic significance of an ICBM force is heavily dependent on the reliability of the system under operational conditions, and on the percentage of missiles which can be kept in commission. We have again reviewed the factors which would affect Soviet ICBM reliability and in-commission rates under various circumstances, taking into account what little intelligence is available, general state of the art, and US analogy. The uncertainties are such that figures can be provided as working assumptions only.

[For missiles other than the ICBM, the table of missile reliabilities in NIE 11-5-59 provides the best working assumptions we have been able to derive.]

11. On this basis, we believe it reasonable to assume that in mid-1960, some 60-80 percent of the USSR's operational ICBM inventory could be in commission. The lower limit of this range approximates the percentage which might be maintained in commission for an indefinite period. The upper limit might be achieved if the Soviets prepared their force for an attack at a specific time. The in-commission rate would improve as the system matured. Ranges comparable to those given above might approximate 70-85 percent in 1961 and 85-90 percent in 1963.

12. With respect to reliability on launcher and in flight, we assume that in mid-1960, some 50-60 percent of the ICBMs in commission and on launchers could successfully go through count-down, leave their launchers at scheduled times or not later than 15-30 minutes thereafter, and detonate in the vicinity of assigned targets. As in the preceding paragraph, the lower limit of this range approximates the reliability which might be maintained indefinitely, while the upper limit might be achieved if the Soviets prepared their force for an attack at a specific time. The percentage of successful missiles might increase to 55-65 percent in 1961 and 65-75 percent in 1963.

13. Follow-on System. During the next few years, the Soviets will probably have under development a follow-on ICBM system, although there is no direct evidence that such a development program is now under way. We are unable to estimate when the USSR could achieve an IOC with a new ICBM system, but we would expect first flight tests to precede IOC date by some 18 months to two years. Desirable characteristics for such a system might include fast reaction time, storable liquid or perhaps solid propel-lants, greater flexibility, and less bulk than the present system.

Other Ground-Launched Ballistic Systems
(See Paragraphs 50-68, NIE 11-5-59)

14. Missiles in this category which we know the USSR has developed and continues to improve include those with maximum ranges of about 75 n.m., 200 n.m., 350 n.m., 700 n.m., and 1,100 n.m. (designated SS-1 through SS-5 by US intelligence). All these systems are considered to be operational, but there is little evidence as to their deployment.

[ 2 LINE SENTENCE DELETED ]

Although our information points to several plants which may be engaged in the series production of short and medium range ballistic missiles, it is insufficient to establish production rates.

15. There is no new evidence to cause any major change in our estimates of the characteristics of the foregoing ballistic missile systems. We continue to believe that systems with ranges of 700 n.m. and less are road mobile, although missile carriers and support vehicles are readily adaptable to rail transport. The 1,100 n.m. missile is considered suitable for road or rail mobile employment.

Ground-Launched Cruise-Type System

16. Recent Soviet statements, as well as other information, indicate that the USSR has a current interest in cruise-type vehicles. We estimate that the Soviets are developing and could have available for operational use in 1961-1963, a ground-launched, ramjet propelled vehicle, with a speed of about Mach 3, an altitude of 65,000-70,000 feet, and a range in excess of 4,000 n.m. Such a system could be employed for weapon delivery or reconnaissance, and would further complicate Western air defense problems. Although unlikely, it is possible that such a system could be employed as a research vehicle for investigation of structures and propulsion systems in the Mach 3 region.

Air Defense Missile Systems
(See paragraphs 16-39, NIE 11-5-59)

17. Surface-to-Air. The flexible, mobile, surface-to-air missile system (SA-2) first identified in East Germany and now extensively deployed in the USSR, is believed to be the mainstay of the Soviet missile defense system against aircraft. The early Moscow system (SA-1) is now apparently being bolstered by the partial introduction of the more effective .SA-2 missile (GUIDELINE) into the original herring bone sites and by the addition of sites of the new type. Both systems are capable of interceptions at medium and high altitudes up to 60,000 feet, and would have some capability up to about 80,000 feet, particularly if carrying a nuclear warhead. The SA-1 system has a low altitude limit of about 3,000 feet. The low altitude limit of the SA-2 is approximately 1,000 feet under ideal siting and engagement conditions. Under usual conditions, it would be considerably higher, and under unfavorable conditions it might be as high as 7,000 feet.

18. Each SA-2 site appears capable of 360° coverage. The system possibly can handle two targets simultaneously, with more than one missile in the air against each target. However, these targets must be within the approximate 12° radar look angle (both horizontal and vertical) of the system's guidance radar during the period from acquisition to intercept. Maximum intercept range will vary depending upon type of target, approach angle, and other operational factors; for example, against a directly incoming, high-flying B-52, SA-2 range would be on the order of 25 n.m. The CEP will also vary under different conditions, but probably approximates 100 feet on the average.

19. The SA-2 system does not appear to be designed or sited to cope with low-level attacks. We continue to estimate that the Soviets are probably developing a surface-to-air system (SA-3) specifically designed for defense against targets down to about 50 feet. It is still possible that such a system could become available for operational use late in 1960, but an initial capability in 1961 now appears more likely.

20. For defense against advanced aircraft and cruise-type missiles, the USSR will probably incorporate technical improvements into the SA-2 system to increase its altitude and range capabilities. Significant improvements could appear in about 1961. In view of the widespread deployment and estimated growth potential of the SA-2, we now consider it very unlikely that the Soviets will develop in the near term an entirely new high-altitude system (previously estimated as SA-4). It remains possible, however, that such a system will be developed at a later date, and we believe it could become operational 2-3 years after the initiation of flight tests.

21. Antiballistic. We believe the Soviets are pursuing a very high priority program to develop defenses against ballistic missiles. Solution of the problems of an antimissile missile would involve the development of complex and costly components and their integration into a weapon system with high capabilities for distant detection, discrimination, identification, and interception. The net result would be heavily dependent on tactics, deployment, and the effectiveness of Western countermeasures. While such a system (SA-5) is probably being developed and could become operational in the 1963-1966 period, we cannot estimate what its capability would be against Western ballistic missiles.

22. The USSR is probably also exploring unconventional techniques for active defense against ballistic missiles. We cannot predict the nature or success of such studies. In any case, continuous research and development in antimissile defenses will be under way during the next five years and beyond.

23. Antisatellite. The USSR may also develop a ground or air launched system to counter Western satellites with relatively low, established orbits. However, the Soviets could adapt for this purpose an antiballistic missile system such as that discussed in the preceding paragraph.

24. Air-to-Air. We continue to estimate that the Soviets have several types of short range (up to 6 n.m.) air-to-air missiles with HE warheads, for employment with their interceptors. There are some indications that one or more of the foregoing types are now operational with Soviet interceptors, and it is possible that they have been supplied to the East German and Chinese Communist Air Forces. The USSR will probably develop, during the period of this estimate, additional types with longer ranges, more sophisticated guidance, and larger payloads (including nuclear).

Air-to-Surface Missiles
(See paragraphs 40-19, NIE 11-5-59)

25. The current Soviet air-to-surface missile (the subsonic, 55 n.m. AS-1) is designed primarily for use against ships. It could also be used against well-defined radar targets such as prominent coastal installations. It imposes severe limitations on the launching medium bomber aircraft. We believe, however, that a new, transonic missile (AS-3), designed for similar purposes and with a range of about 100 n.m., will probably be ready for operational use in about 1961. It should overcome the limitations of the AS-1, and may be intended to supplement and eventually replace it. We continue to estimate that the USSR will also have available in about 1961 a supersonic missile (AS-2) of at least 350 n.m. range, primarily for use against land targets. This system will probably be compatible with currently-operational Soviet heavy bombers and possibly medium bombers, as well as any follow-on bombers entering service in the next few years. The Soviets could also have in current use an air-launched decoy to simulate medium or heavy bombers, but evidence is still lacking on such a vehicle.

Naval-Launched Missile Systems
(See paragraphs 86-94, NIE 11-5-59)

26. Submarine-Launched. Recent evidence continues to indicate an emphasis on ballistic missile armament in Soviet submarines. There has been no additional information on the few submarines believed to have been converted some years ago to topside stowage of cruise-type missiles (SS-7), and they may have been supplanted for operational use by ballistic missile types. A total of about four long range, conventionally-powered "Z" class submarines have been modified by enlarging the sail and installing hatches, probably to accommodate ballistic missiles. Each can probably launch two ballistic missiles (SS-11) against land targets at ranges of 200 n.m. and possibly 350 n.m.

[The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe it probable that a 350 n.m. missile is used with both the "Z" and "G" class submarines. It is believed that the modified "Z" class submarine served as a prototype for the "G" class submarine, and that the 350 n.m. ground launched missile (SS-3), with minor modifications, could bo accommodated by vertical tubes observed in the "Z" class submarine and believed to be in the "G" class submarine.]

More recently, the USSR has undertaken construction of a comparable new class of submarine, designated "G" class, at least six of which may now be operational. This class is probably also designed to accommodate ballistic missiles. Considering the size and configuration of the "G" class submarines, we estimate that each can probably launch about six missiles (SS-12) with 350 n.m. range. It is possible, but less likely, that the missile has a range of 700 n.m. Although we have no specific information on ballistic missiles employed by these submarines, we estimate that both the SS-11 and SS-12 systems would be capable of achieving 1 to 2 n.m. CEPs under operational conditions. For missile launching, both the "Z" and "G" class submarines would need to be surfaced or more likely with the sail awash. We believe that their missiles do not use solid propellants.

27. We continue to believe that the USSR will develop a system capable of delivering ballistic missiles against land targets from a submerged submarine, although there is still no firm evidence of its development. Assuming that an active program is well under way, a 500-1,000 n.m. system of this type (SS-9) could become operational in 1961-1963.

28. Other Naval Systems. The USSR has made further progress in its program of arming surface ships with missiles. Some destroyers have been modified and others newly constructed to launch surface-to-surface cruise-type missiles. Two types of cruise missiles are utilized, with speeds in the Mach 1 region and with effective ranges of about 30 n.m. against ships at sea. With the use of forward sea or airborne observation stations, the range of one (SS-8) could be increased to about 100-150 n.m. against ships or land targets, and the range of the other (SS-13) could be increased to 60-60 n.m.

29. The Soviets are also constructing a new class of motor patrol craft which may be equipped with guided missiles or free rockets. We continue to believe that Soviet ground-launched surface-to-air missiles can be adapted for use by surface ships, but there is no indication that this has yet been done. Although there is no evidence, we estimate that the USSR will probably also develop missile systems for antisubmarine warfare. Such a system. (SS-10) could probably enter service between 1962 and 1965.

Space Program
(See paragraphs 107-132, NIE 11-5-59)

30. The USSR's space program to date has been characterized by a series of spectacular "firsts," demonstrating a high degree of technical competence and capitalizing on Soviet possession of very powerful propulsion systems. Nevertheless, the number of launchings to date has been less than we previously expected, and the Soviets do not seem to have followed a systematic program designed to achieve maximum progress toward clearly-defined scientific goals. Partly for this reason we are unable to predict with confidence the future course of the Soviet program.

31. The Soviets could at any time undertake a variety of new ventures, including, for example, the launching of very large satellites containing instrumentation or animals. Such attempts would be useful for scientific purposes, and would undoubtedly be exploited by the Soviets to serve general purposes of policy and propaganda. Other projects, however, and especially that of putting a man in space, would require more preparation and preliminary experimentation than we believe the Soviets have accomplished. We believe the Soviets capable of achieving, within about the next year, one or more of the following:

a. vertical or downrange flight and recovery of a manned capsule;
b. unmanned lunar satellite or soft landing on the moon;
c. probe to the vicinity of Mars or Venus;
d. orbiting and recovery of capsules containing instruments, animals, and thereafter, perhaps a man.

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ANNEX A

SUMMARY TABLE, SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM









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ANNEX A
POSSIBLE SOVIET SPACE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

These dates represent our estimate of the earliest possible future time period in which each specific event could be successfully accomplished. We believe that some could have been accomplished in 1959 or earlier, though the Soviets did not choose to do so. Competition between the space program and the military missile program as well as within the space program itself makes it unlikely that all of these objectives will be achieved within the specified time periods.

SPACE PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

EARLIEST CAPABILITY DATE

Unmanned Earth Satellites

5,000-10,000 pounds, low orbit satellites

1960

Recoverable (Including biological) satellites

1960

Military Satellites—The dates shown are the earliest in which feasibility demonstrations could begin. After feasibility demonstration, militarily useful systems could generally become available in two to three years.

Surveillance: weather, mapping, and force deployment

1960

Navigation, geodesy, and communications

1960

Early warning

1960

ECM and ELINT

1960

Unmanned Lunar Rockets

Biological probe

1960

Satellite of the moon

1960

Soft landings

1960

Lunar landing, return, and earth recovery

1963-1964

Planetary Probes

Mars

About October 1960

Venus

About January 1961

Manned Vertical or Downrange Flight

1960

Manned Earth Satellites—The specified time periods for manned accomplishments are predicated on the Soviets having previously successfully accomplished a number of similar unmanned ventures.

Capsule-type vehicles (*)

Late 1960 or 1961

Glide-type vehicles (*)

1 to 2 years after above

Maneuverable (minimum; conventional propulsion)

1963

Maneuverable (nuclear propulsion)

About 1970

Space platform (minimum, non-ecological, feasibility demonstration)

1965

Space platform (long-lived)

About 1970

Manned Lunar Flights

Circumlunar

1964-1965

Satellites (temporary).

1965-1966

Landings

About 1970

* – Recovery would probably be attempted after the first few orbits but life could probably be sustained for about a week.

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ANNEX B

SUMMARY TABLES, SOVIET MISSILE PROGRAM









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SUMMARY TABLE I
PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS
(GROUND AND NAVAL LAUNCHED) (b)

ARBITRARY REFERENCE DESIGNATION

INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATE (e)

MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE ALTITUDE
(IN FEET) (d)

MAXIMUM HORIZONTAL RANGE (NM) (d)
AND
SPEED CLASS

OPERATIONAL ACCURACY
(CEP IN FEET) (e)

GUIDANCE

MAXIMUM WARHEAD
(LBS. AND TYPE) (f)

REMARKS

SA-1

1954

60,000
(minimum about 3,000).

20 against incoming B-52's at high altitudes

Mach 2.5.

65 – 120

Track-while-scan radar/radio command.

450-700 HE
or
Nuclear

B-200 guidance system with the single stage V-301 missile deployed only around Moscow at Fixed Sites. Boosted Guideline also apparently utilized in SA-1 system as a partial replacement for single stage V-301.

SA-2

1957

60,000
(minimum about 1,000).

25 against incoming B-52s at high altitudes.

Mach 3.

100

Track-while-scan radar/radio command.

450-700 HE
or
Nuclear

System being widely deployed, typified by Glau site employing Guideline missiles. Suitable for employment with field forces and could be adapted for use by surface ships.

SA-3

1961. Possibly latter half 1960

40,000
(minimum 50).

25—med. alt
10—low alt.

Mach 2-3.

20-50

Semi-active radar homing all the way way.

150-250 HE
or
Nuclear

Static or mobile system primarily for low altitude defense. Could be adapted for use by surface ships.

SA- 4

No longer estimated as a probable development, at least in the near term. Instead, SA-2 will probably be improved to increase its altitude and range capabilities. Significant improvements to the SA-2 system could appear in about 1961.

SA-5

1963-1966.

Static anti-ballistic missile system with undetermined capability. Could be used for interception of satellites with relatively low, established orbits.

OTHER

It is possible that the Soviets will develop and place in operation:

  • A surface-to-air missile system capable of delivering a nuclear or HE warhead to a range of about 100 nm and to altitudes up to about 90,000 feet (previously estimated as SA-4), could become operational two-three years after fist flight test.

  • A mobile system for defense against reconnaissance drones and aircraft, helicopters, etc (about 1965).

  • A mobile system for field force defense against ballistic missiles (by 1967).

  • A shoulder fired guided missile capable of defending small units against slow aircraft and helicopters to a range of about 3,000 meters (1961).

a) We evaluate this program as "probable" with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. Each missile listed will probably go through various stages of development which are not necessarily reflected in this table.

b) Adaptations of SA-2 and SA-3 would be suitable for cruisers and destroyers and SA-3 for destroyer escorts.

c) Date at which one or more series produced missiles could have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit.

d.) Maximum altitude is not necessarily achieved at maximum range. A limited capability will exist above the indicated altitude. Range will vary with the size, direction of approach, and altitude of the Attacking aircraft.

e.) Accuracy varies with target size, speed, altitude, and range.

f) Warhead includes the explosive device and its associated fusing and firing mechanism.

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SUMMARY TABLE II
PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS

ARBITRARY REFERENCE DESIGNATION

INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATE (b)

GUIDANCE

OPERATIONAL ACCURACY (CEP IN FEET)

MAXIMUM WARHEAD (LBS AND TYPE) (c)

APPROXIMATE GROSS WEIGHT (US.)

COMPATIBLE AIRCRAFT

REMARKS (a)

AIRCRAFT

ATTACK CAPABILITY

RANGE (NM) (d)

AA-1

1955-1956

Radar beam rider.

20

40 HE

200

Flashlight and modified Flashlight.

Rear quarter 360°

2.5 (Tail)
5 (Head-on).

All-weather. Soviet designation "ShM."

Fresco D, E

2 (Tail only)

Farmer B

2 (Tail only)

AA-2

1955-1956

Infrared homing.

10

25 HE

175

Fagot

Day Fighter.

Limited by radar range to approximately 1 nm.

Limited to clear air mass (f) and tail cone attack.

Fresco A, B, C

Farmer A

Faceplate

Fitter

Fresco D

Limited all-weather.

2.5 Sea Level.

Farmer B

Flashlight

Modified flashlight.

All-weather.

4 at altitude.

Fishpot

AA-3

1953

Semiactive radar homing.

15

25 HE

200

Fresco D

Rear.

6 (Head-on)
2.5 – 3 (Tail).

All-weather.

Farmer B

Flashlight and modified Flashlight.

AA-4

1960

Semi-active radar homing.

60

200 HE or Nuclear.

800

Modified Flashlight.

Fishpot


15-20 (Head-on)
5 (Tail).

All-weather.

1960

Infrared homing.

10


5 (Tail only).

Limited to clear air mass. (f)

OTHER

It is possible that additional types with longer ranges, more sophisticated guidance, and greater resistance to counter-measures will become available later in the period.

a. We evaluate this program as "probable" with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. Each missile listed will probably go through various stages of development which are not necessarily reflected in this table.

b. The date at which one or more series produced missiles could have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit.

c. Warhead includes the explosive device and its associated fusing and firing mechanism.

d.  Range is here defined as the distance between launching aircraft and target at the instant of missile launch.

e.  Speed for these missiles has not been indicated on the chart. Mach 2 plus the speed of the launching aircraft is considered reasonable speed for all the missiles estimated except for AA-1 which probably has a speed of Mach 1.7.

f. Clear Air Mass is here defined as absence of clouds and precipitation between missile and target. The term is equally applicable to day or night operations. In addition, an infrared system is also degraded by bright background such as white clouds and attack angles close to the sun.

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SUMMARY TABLE III
PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS

ARBITRARY REFERENCE DESIGNATION

INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATE (b)

MAXIMUM RANGE (NM)

OPERATIONAL ACCURACY (CEP)

MAXIMUM WARHEAD (LBS, AND TYPE) (c)

CRUISE SPEED (MACH NO.)

GUIDANCE

REMARKS

AS-1 (d)

1958-1957

55

150 feet against ships.

1 nm against coastal targets.

3,000 HE
or
Nuclear.

0.8

Beam riding with semiactive radar homing.

Beam riding only against coastal targets.

Primarily antiship missile "Komet."

AS-2 (e)

1961

At least 350

2 nm against land targets.

3,000 Nuclear

1.5 to 2.0

All-inertial.

For use against land targets.

AS-3 (f) (g)

1961

100

150 feet against ships.

1 nm against coastal targets.

3,000 HE
or
Nuclear.

1.1

Beam riding with semiactive radar homing.

Beam riding only against coastal targets.

Primarily antiship missile.

Decoys

The USSR is probably developing and may now have operational air launched decoys to simulate medium or heavy bombers.

a. We evaluate this program as "probable" with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. Each missile listed will probably go through various stages of development which are not necessarily reflected in this table,

b. The date at which one or more series produced missiles could have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit.

c Warhead includes the explosive device and its associated fusing and firing mechanism.

d The BADGER is believed to be the carrier aircraft for the AS-1. Launch altitude is about 15,000 feet. The BADGER's radius is 1,250 nm when carrying one missile, 1,000 nm with two. This radius can be increased by about 35 percent by a single prestrike aerial refueling.

e The AS-2 will probably be compatible with the BEAR and BISON, and possibly with the BADGER. The AS-2 will probably weigh 9,000 to 10.000 pounds; two could be carried by both the BEAR and BISON. The BADGER could carry one and possibly two. A range degradation of 8-10 percent for these aircraft when carrying one missile, and 15-20 percent when carrying two is estimated.

f The BADGER probably would be used as the carrier aircraft for the AS-3. Launch altitude is about 35,000 feet. The BADGER's radius would be about the same as with AS-1.

g The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, believes that the AS-3 warhead weight should be 1,000 pounds, and that guidance should be inertial with active radar homing and a provision for command override of the inertial guidance system.

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SUMMARY TABLE IV
PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR GROUND-LAUNCHED SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS

ARBITRARY REFERENCE DESIGNATION

INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATE (b)

MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL RANGE (NM) (e)

GUIDANCE

OPERATIONAL ACCURACY (CEP) (d)

MAXIMUM WARHEAD (LBS. AND TYPE) (e)

CONFIGURATION

REMARKS

SS-ANTITANK

Prior to 1958

About 5,000-6,000 yards.

Command wire link

2 feet

20-40 HE-shaped charge.



SS-1

1954-1957

75

Radar track-radio Command/inertial with terminal correction or all-inertial.

1,200 feet

1,500 HE, Nuclear, CW.

Ballistic

SCUD—Launched from self-propelled tracked vehicle. Road mobile.

SS-2

1954

200

1954:
Radar track-radio command/inertial.

1958-1960:
All-inertial.

1/3 to 2/3 nm

2,000 HE, Nuclear, CW.

Ballistic

Second generation missile—outgrowth of V-2. Road mobile.

SS-3

1954

350

1954:
Radar track-radio command/inertial.

1958-1960:
All-inertial.

0.5 to 1 nm

2,000 HE, Nuclear, CW.

Ballistic

Outgrowth of V-2. Probably based on German designed R-10 and Soviet developed Korolov missiles. Road mobile.

SS-4

1955

700

1956-1958:
Radar track-radio command/inertial.

1958-1960:
All-inertial
(retrofit optional).

1-2 nm.

3,000 Nuclear, possibly CW.

Ballistic

SHYSTER—Road mobile.

SS-5

Late 1958 or early 1959.

1,100

Radar track-radio command/inertial or all-inertial.

2 nm.

3,000 Nuclear

Ballistic

Road and/or rail mobile.

SS-6 (ICBM)

For planning purposes it should be considered to have occurred by 1 January 1960. (f)

6,500

Radar track-radio command/Inertial.

1961-1962, or possibly earlier:
All-inertial
(retrofit unlikely).

About 3 nm at IOC

See paragraphs 7-9

6,000 Nuclear (g)

Ballistic

Could be rail mobile with rail mobile units, fixed installations or a combination of the two.

OTHER:

The Soviets probably are developing and could have available for operational use in 1961-1963 a ground-launched, ramjet-propelled vehicle with a speed of about Mach 3, an altitude of 65,000-70,000 feet, and a range in excess of 4,000 n.m. Such a system could be used for weapon delivery and/or reconnaissance. Although unlikely, it is possible that such a system could be employed as a research vehicle for investigation of structures and propulsion systems in the Mach 3 region.

a) We evaluate this program as "probable" with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. Each missile listed will probably go through various stages of development which are not necessarily reflected in this table. We estimate that considerable energy will be expended on second generation longer range missiles, particularly on an ICBM of greatly improved operational characteristics.

b) Date at which one or more series produced missiles could have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit. In the ease of the ICBM, it is the date on which a, few—say 10—series produced missiles are in the hands of one or more trained units at existing launching facilities.

c) Generally a ballistic missile can be fired to ranges as short as approximately one-third the maximum operational range without serious increase in CEP and to even shorter ranges with degraded accuracy.

d) CEP is the radius of a circle within which, statistically, one-half of the impacts will occur. Inherent missile accuracies are somewhat better than the accuracies specified in the table which take into consideration average degradation factors. The accuracies specified are approximate figures which we apply to all ranges to which the missiles are likely to be fired.

e) The type of warhead employed with Soviet ballistic missiles will vary with the specific mission of the missile. In general, however, we believe that for missiles with maximum ranges of 350 nm or less, high explosive (HE), nuclear, or chemical warfare (CW) warheads will be employed in accordance with Soviet military doctrine, depending upon nuclear stockpiles, missile accuracy, character of the target, and results desired. We estimate that for missiles with ranges of 700 nm and over, only nuclear warheads will be employed, although we do not exclude the possibility of CW use in 700 nm missiles for certain limited purposes. We believe that the USSR is capable of developing techniques for missile dissemination of biological warfare (BW) agents, although we have no specific evidence relating BW and missile research and development. In view of operational considerations we consider BW use in ballistic missiles unlikely, although possible for certain special purposes.

f) The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, believes that an IOC date of not earlier than mid-1960 should be used for planning purposes. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, agrees that it is prudent to assume for planning purposes that the IOC had occurred by 1 January 1960, but believes that the Soviets actually had only an emergency capability at that time. See footnotes to par-graph 3.

g) The current missile is believed to employ an ablative rather than a heat-sink nosecone. A reduction in warhead weight would permit a greater range or the incorporation of penetration aids in the nosecone.

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SUMMARY TABLE V
PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR NAVAL-LAUNCHED SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS

ARBITRARY REFERENCE DESIGNATION

INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATE (b)

MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL RANGE (NM)

OPERATIONAL ACCURACY (CEP) (c)

CONFIGURATION

MAXIMUM WARHEAD (LBS. AND TYPE) (d)

GUIDANCE

REMARKS

SS-7

1055-1956

150-200

2-4 nm

Cruise

2,000 lb. Nuclear

Inertial

Speed subsonic, low altitude operation. For launch from surfaced "W" class submarine which can carry two missiles. Possibly no longer operational.

SS-8

1958

100-150 (e)

150 ft. against ships. 2 nm against land targets.

Cruise

1,000 lb. Nuclear or HE.

Inertial with radar override during mid-course phase. Active radar terminal homing used against ships.

Speed high subsonic, low altitude operation. Launched from destroyers and cruisers.

SS-9

1961-1963

500-1,000

1-3 nm

Ballistic

1,000 lb. Nuclear

All-inertial

Launched from submerged submarine.

SS-10 (ASW)

1962- 1964:
(Surface ship-launched).

20

400 yds. at water re-entry.

Ballistic Launched depth bomb.

450 Nuclear

Inertial

Primarily for use against submarines. May possibly be used against surface ship targets. Both configurations available for both submarine and ship launching.

1963- 1965:
(Submarine launched).



Ballistic Launched, homing torpedo.

150 HE

Inertial w/self-contained acoustic homing.

SS-11

1958

200 (possibly 350) (f)

1-2 nm

Ballistic

2,000 lb. Nuclear

All-inertial

Launched from sail awash "Z" class sub. Carrying capacity, two missiles.

SS-12

1959

350 (possibly 700) (f)

1-2 nm

Ballistic

2,000 lb. Nuclear.

All-inertial

Launched from sail awash "G" class submarine. Carrying capacity, six missiles.

SS-13

1958

60-80 (e)

150 ft. against ships.

Cruise

1,000 lb. Nuclear or HE.

Inertial with radar override during mid-course phase. Active radar terminal homing.

Speed low supersonic with very low altitude operation. Launched from destroyers and cruisers and used against ship targets.

OTHER:

The Soviets now have operational a large motorboat which may be equipped with guided missiles of about 30 nm range, or with free rockets. Feasibility studies indicate that a submarine launched 100 nm ballistic missile could be developed for antishipping use.

a. We evaluate this program as "probable" with varying degrees of confidence concerning detailed characteristics. Each missile listed will probably go through various stages of development which are not necessarily reflected in this table.

b. Date at which one or more series produced missiles could have been placed in the hands of trained personnel in one operational unit.

c. CEP is the radius of a circle in which, statistically, one-half of the impacts will occur. Inherent missile accuracies are somewhat better than the accuracies specified in the table which take into consideration average degradation factors.

d. Warhead includes the explosive device and its associated fusing and firing mechanism. The weight of the structure and the heat protection of the nosecone are not included in "payload."

e. These ranges can be obtained against ship targets only if the launching ship has forward seaborne or airborne observers. Otherwise a maximum range of 30 nm can be attained.,

f. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believe it probable that a 350 nm missile is used with both the "Z" and "G" class submarines.