SUBJECT: TITLE OF REFERENCE WISE-37: LIKELIHOOD OF A SOVIET ATTACK ON JAPAN (draft for IAC Representatives consideration)

THE PROBLEM

To assess the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Japan during 1951.

PART ONE: SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR INVADING JAPAN

ASSUMPTION

That Soviet and US forces in the Far East at present will remain roughly the same for the remainder of 1951.

We believe that in assessing the likelihood of Soviet invasion of Japan, we must take into consideration the USSR's own probable evaluation of its capabilities for successful
invasion. Therefore a realistic examination of probable
Soviet capabilities must give due consideration to the prob-
able opposition from the US forces which the USSR knows are
available or can be made available during 1951.

I. WHAT COMMUNIST FORCES ARE AVAILABLE?

A. What is Soviet strength in the Far East?

1. Order of battle (at divisional level), loca-
tion, and combat effectiveness of ground
forces?

2. Strength and disposition of naval forces,
merchant fleet, and auxiliary forces? Ca-
pacity of merchant shipping?

3. Order of battle of air forces and air facilities?

B. What portion of the above forces would be avail-
able for invasion of Japan in 1951, assuming that
Soviet forces maintain a strategic defensive along
the Korean frontier? In view of logistical dif-
culties, the necessity of defending key strategic
and industrial areas in the Far Eastern USSR, supporting
Communist China, garrisoning Dairen, etc., the USSR ob-
viously could make available only a portion of its over-
all strength.
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C. What other Communist forces might be available?

How firm do we consider the reported existence of Japanese pro-tsars? Would they be sufficiently reliable to be used? Would the USSR either need Chinese Communist ground forces or consider it politically desirable to use such forces?

II. WHAT ARE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ABOVE FORCES, ASSUMING US OPPOSITION?

A. What are Soviet ground force capabilities for amphibious and ashore seizure of a firm lodgemen area(s) in Japan?

B. Would Soviet naval forces be able to (1) secure the contiguous waters around the invasion area; (2) screen a landing; and (3) protect the lines of communication?

C. Could the Soviet air forces achieve and maintain local air superiority over the beachhead, intercept the land and sea approaches, or protect Soviet staging bases and lines of communication?

Since this would probably be a critical factor in
a Soviet decision, such factors as air facilities, sortie rates, and combat effectiveness might be analyzed in detail.

D. What are Soviet capabilities, in terms of amphibious and airborne lift, for mounting and maintaining an amphibious operation of the size indicated above? How would the USSR logistically supply and resupply an invasion force, especially with POL? Are Soviet Far Eastern stockpiles adequate for the purpose and for how long? How much Soviet shipping will be necessary, with due allowance for attrition?

III. OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING SOVIET CAPABILITIES?

A. Where and how could Soviet forces invade Japan?

What is the most probable invasion pattern (a) assuming the US still holds South Korea; (b) assuming US loss of Korea? Would not the overriding necessity for land-based air cover almost require invasion from the North at present?
B. What landing beaches and ports could the Soviets seize initially in order to bring in the bulk of the assault forces? Are these adequate?

C. How would the poor weather, especially around Hokkaido, affect invasion prospects? When would be the best time of year to invade?

D. Could the USSR expect to achieve tactical surprise? How much warning might the US expect to achieve and how might this affect Soviet capabilities?

E. Would the USSR estimate that possible diversions, such as a simultaneous Chinese Communist threat to or invasion of Formosa or Hong Kong, would split US air and naval forces? Might a simultaneous Chinese Communist offensive in Korea be expected to pin down the Eighth Army and hamper reinforcement of Japan?

F. Would the majority of Japanese actively support the US forces? How would this affect Soviet capabilities? How significant an increment to Soviet capabilities would be Japanese Communist subversive, sabotage, and guerrilla activities?
IV. COULD THE USSR SUCCESSFULLY MAINTAIN AND EXPAND ITS
INITIAL BIDDEFIT IN JAPAN?

We consider this a crucial question on which any
Soviet estimate might well turn. Assuming the Soviet forces
could seize a substantial beachhead, could they expand it and
occupy the remainder of Japan?

A. How vulnerable are the long Soviet overland and
sea borne supply lines, including the Trans-
Siberian, to US attack following an invasion?

B. Could the Soviet forces expect to maintain them-
selves logistically in the face of US surface
and submarine attacks, carrier strikes, and
other air attacks on invasion shipping, key ports,
and rail lines, perhaps including use of atomic
bombs?

C. Would the USSR estimate that it could build up
decisive strength in the beachhead faster than
a US defensive build-up? Assuming the capture
of Hokkaido, could the forces on Hokkaido be
expected to invade Honshu successfully?
D. Does the terrain, especially in Hokkaido and Northern Honshu, favor the invader? Are there natural obstacles which would facilitate the defense of Honshu in particular against invasion from the North?

V. HOW DOES THE KOREAN CAMPAIGN AFFECT SOVIET CAPABILITIES?

Assuming that the Chinese Communists can contain the US forces in Korea, to what extent does US involvement in Korea make it more feasible for the USSR to invade Japan? On the other hand, to what extent would Communist seizure of Korea facilitate invasion of Japan?

VI. IN SUMMARY, CONSIDERING THE ABOVE FACTORS, HOW WOULD THE USSR ESTIMATE ITS CAPABILITIES TO INVADE AND OCCUPY JAPAN?

What portions of Japan might the USSR estimate it could successfully seize and hold: Hokkaido alone, Hokkaido plus northern Honshu, all of Japan, etc.?
PART TWO: PROBABLE SOVIET INTENTIONS

VII. WHAT ARE SOVIET OBJECTIVES RE JAPAN?

Vary briefly, how does Japan fit into overall Soviet strategy in the Far East? How important is control or neutralization of Japan to the USSR?

VIII. TO WHAT EXTENT MIGHT THE USSR HOPE TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES BY MEANS SHORT OF EARLY INVASION?

Obviously the USSR seeks to pose a continuing threat to Japan. Could the USSR expect by threats, subversion, propaganda, etc. to: (1) achieve first a neutral and then a Soviet-dominated Japan; or (2) sufficiently soften Japan for attack subsequent to 1951? Might the USSR expect the US to eventually pull out of Japan, leaving it more exposed to the USSR?

IX. WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE—PRO AND CON—RE SOVIET INTENTIONS TO INVADE JAPAN IN 1951?

To what extent do Soviet Far Eastern preparations appear defensive rather than offensive and vice versa? To what extent do these preparations appear geared to a 1951 invasion, as opposed to later?
X. WHAT IS THE PROBABLY SOVIET ESTIMATE OF THE US AND WESTERN REACTION TO SOVIET INVASION OF JAPAN?

A. Would the USSR estimate that it could invade Japan without gravely risking a global war? Would it estimate that hostilities could be confined to the Far East?

B. Even if willing to accept the risk of war with the US, would the USSR estimate that it could split the US from its allies? However, in the Soviet view might not such a development if the USSR did not attack Western Europe, actually be unfavorable to the USSR?

C. Would the USSR estimate that the US would make an all-out effort to hold Japan, including deployment of large naval and ground forces, and strategic air attacks, including atomic bombing, at least on Soviet Siberia?

D. What would be the Soviet estimate of the political and psychological advantages and disadvantages of an invasion in 1951?
XI. IF THE USSR ESTIMATED THAT IT COULD NOT SEIZE ALL OF JAPAN, BUT ONLY THE NORTHERN PENINSULA, HOW WOULD THIS AFFECT SOVIET INTENTIONS?

XII. WHAT NEW DEVELOPMENTS MIGHT SERIOUSLY AFFECT SOVIET INTENTIONS?

A. Would the USSR probably invade Japan in event of general war beginning elsewhere in 1951?

B. What would be the effect of accelerated Japanese rearmament on Soviet intentions?

C. What would be the effect on Soviet intentions of a US disaster in Korea?

D. How would Soviet intentions be affected by a de facto or negotiated restoration of the status quo in Korea?

XIII. CONCLUSIONS

In the light of (1) the probable Soviet estimate of their own capabilities; (2) the probable Soviet estimate of the situation resulting from an attack on Japan; and (3) over-all Soviet intentions globally as well as in the Far East, what is the likelihood of a Soviet invasion of Japan in 1951?