1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

a. The Soviet armed forces are in an advanced state of readiness for war and would initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. Military and political indications are that the Communists intend to insist upon a solution of problems of controversy strictly along lines which further Communist world objectives. There are no indications that the Soviets and their Communist allies in pursuing their major objectives intend to avoid future actions which might precipitate global hostilities.

b. Available intelligence indicates that the Communist objective in Korea is to drive out the U.N. forces. There are indications that the Chinese Communists would accept a political settlement only in return for major concessions including the withdrawal of U.N. forces in Korea, termination of the current U.S. policy of protecting Formosa, and U.N. recognition of the Chinese Communist Government as the representative of China in the U.N.

c. There are indications of continuing Chinese Communist preparations for war, of increased Chinese Communist support to the Viet Minh and of probable increased support to other Communist movements in Southeast Asia.

d. Soviet propaganda suggests that the U.S.S.R. is laying the groundwork for some demand involving the status of Japan and there are unsubstantiated reports of Soviet preparations to attack Japan with Japanese PWS.

e. Continuing Communist demands for a German settlement and other propaganda against the West may indicate only increased political pressure but may also indicate Soviet intentions to secure their ends by force if necessary. There are no indications of the probability of imminent Soviet or Satellite military action in Europe, but there are indications of Soviet military activity and continuing evidence of increased Satellite military preparations.
2. SUMMARY OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

a. KOREA.—In addition to the continued presence of an estimated 277,000 Chinese Communist troops in Korea, there are indications of the southward movement of reconstituted North Korean units which may spearhead enemy action south of the 38th parallel. There are continuing indications of a buildup of the Communist air potential in China and Manchuria and there is a possibility of a major Communist air effort at any time. The Chinese Communists apparently remain adamant in their demands and political and military indications are that the Communists intend to drive the U.N. forces from Korea.

b. CHINA.—There are continuing indications of major Chinese Communist military preparations, and several recent reports have stated that the Chinese Communists are convinced of the inevitability of world war and are preparing for further action to weaken the Western military position in Asia.

c. JAPAN.—Soviet propaganda continues to stress that the U.S. is utilizing Japan as a base of aggression. There have been several recent unconfirmed reports that Japanese P.O.W. units have been formed by the U.S.S.R. in preparation for an attack on Japan from Sakhalin, Korea, or possibly from the Soviet mainland.

d. INDO-CHINA.—Viet Minh preparations for an attack on Hanoi are increasing. There are reliable reports of increased Chinese Communist aid from Hainan and South China, and unconfirmed reports of the movement of Chinese Communist forces closer to the Indo-China border indicate a continuing possibility of direct intervention.

e. BURMA-THAILAND.—There are some indications of increased Chinese Communist aid to the Burmese Communists and reports of possible Communist guerrilla landings in Thailand.

f. GERMANY.—Soviet rehabilitation of a barracks area south of Berlin which is capable of housing 35,000 to 40,000 troops may indicate a planned Soviet reinforcement of Germany, the move of the Soviet command headquarters or the establishment of an additional or alternate command headquarters. Heavy Communist propaganda demands for the unification of Germany and for the prevention of West German rearmament present a parallel to the type of propaganda which preceded military action in Korea.

g. AUSTRIA.—It is reported that Soviet troops may conduct winter exercises during January.
h. EASTERN EUROPE—There are reports of increased Czech military strength on the western border of that country, and of the call-ups of some Czech reservists. The Polish army has been receiving additional Soviet equipment for the past several weeks. There is some additional evidence of the continuing buildup of the Hungarian and Bulgarian armies. East German trawlers have been reconnoitering in Swedish waters. Greek Communist propaganda charging the U.S. with aggressive designs in the Balkans has again been intensified.

i. GENERAL.—the Communist propaganda line may be shifting to a justification of the necessity of direct Soviet offensive action because of the alleged imminence of imperialist attack.

3. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES.—The Chinese and North Korean Communists retain their capabilities for major offensive ground and air action in Korea. Viet Minh capabilities continue to increase with Chinese Communist assistance. There are indications of preparations for an increase in Soviet ground strength in Germany and the European Satellite military potential continues to increase.
REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
13 December 1950

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. Communist military action in Korea, the continuing intransigent attitude of the Chinese Communists and evidence that the Chinese Communists are continuing their offensive and defensive preparations all indicate that the Communists are not preparing for any reasonable settlement on Korea but intend to continue their aggressive policy in the Far East.

(1) Chinese Communist military strength in Korea is presently estimated to be approximately 277,000, with additional combat forces in excess of 300,000 in Manchuria, not including Military District troops. The 20th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 42d, 50th, and 66th Chinese Communist Armies and two unnumbered cavalry divisions are in Korea and elements of three other Chinese Communist Armies are tentatively accepted in Korea. The 41st, 43d, 44th, 46th, 55th, 56th, 57th, and 23d Chinese Communist Armies with an artillery division and a cavalry division are located in Manchuria and elements of eight other Chinese Communist Armies are also in Manchuria.

(2) There were strong indications during the week that reconstituted North Korean forces will be committed in much greater strength in future operations. The strength of North Korean forces is presently estimated at 155,000 including 65,000 in identified units, approximately 70,000 in newly organized or reconstituted units, and 20,000 stragglers and remnants. There are indications of considerable improvement and reorganization of the by-passed North Korean forces on the right flank of the U.S. 8th Army generally north of the 38th parallel and reports of the southward movement of other reconstituted North Korean units in the central and eastern corridors with the probable immediate objective of attacking Seoul. The reappearance of North Korean regular units and reports of their southward movement may indicate that enemy action south of the 38th parallel is to be conducted largely by North Korean forces, but there are no firm indications that the Chinese Communists will not also cross the parallel. Reports continue to indicate a considerable movement southward from the Manchurian border, but whether this represents only a continuing supply movement or a further
reinforcement of Chinese Communist troops in Korea cannot be determined. An overextension of supply lines, lack of mobility and necessity to regroup their forces could account for the recent lack of aggressive Chinese Communist action.

(3) Although major enemy air action in Korea failed to develop during the week, there were continuing indications of a build-up of the Communist air potential in Manchuria and China. Recent estimates of both the Far East Command indicate that there are about 600 aircraft immediately available to the Communists, including fighters, ground attack planes, twin- and single-engine bombers and transports. Unconfirmed reports further state that twelve airfields in Manchuria have been turned over to the Soviets for their exclusive use, that one is equipped with large underground hangars for fighter aircraft, and that there is a Soviet air division with 250 aircraft in Manchuria. Operational reports of the past week indicate that enemy air forces over North Korea are again engaging in more frequent attacks and are showing increasingly aggressive tactics. There are also reports of considerable ground activity at the Pyongyang airfields. Indications continue to point to the possibility of an early and substantial air effort on the part of the Chinese Communists against U.N. forces in Korea. Further information on the Soviet Il-10 attack bombers, reported last week to have arrived in Manchuria, now indicates that some of these planes have moved southward to Suchow in East-Central China.

(4) Despite the fact that the Chinese Communists apparently have been encouraging the Indian Delegation at the U.N. to believe that they intend to stop their offensive in Korea at the 38th parallel, Chinese Communist propaganda continues to indicate that their intention is to drive the U.N. forces from Korea. The repeated Chinese Communist demands for the withdrawal of U.N. forces from Korea, the withdrawal of U.S. "aggressive" forces from Formosa and the admission of Communist China to the U.N. strongly indicate that the Chinese Communists do not intend to reach a peaceful settlement on Korea except in return for major concessions on these points.

b. Within the past several weeks there have been a number of reports of undetermined reliability with regard to over-all Chinese Communist strategy in the Far East and the nature of Soviet-Chinese agreements for the prosecution of war. These reports, which have usually purported to emanate from high-level policy discussions, have generally stated
either that the Soviets have convinced the Chinese Communists that the
U.S. will be incapable of waging war against China for the next few
months at least and that they will therefore secure most of their demands,
or that the Chinese Communists consider a third world war to be inevitable
and are preparing now for a campaign of further aggression in the Far East
to secure Southeast Asia and Japan before global hostilities commence. One
recent report states that at a Chinese Communist policy meeting in Canton
in early November it was declared that: (1) The Chinese Communist
Government considers a world war inevitable; (2) the Chinese must prepare
for winter warfare because the Soviets prefer winter fighting; (3) threats
to the Pacific area must be eliminated and Japan must be defeated before it
can rearm; (4) allied Communist troops in Indo-China, Burma and the
Philippines must be mobilized and aided by the Chinese Communists; (5) the
Chinese Communists must prepare for an attack on the mainland from Formosa;
(6) a Sino-Soviet command system is to be established; and (7) the Chinese
Communists' objectives in Korea are to drive the U.N. forces out of Asia so
that the Chinese Communists and the Soviets may obtain permanent military
bases in Korea. A separate report states the the
East German Ambassador in Peking was informed by Chinese Communist Foreign
Minister Chou En-lai on 5 December that a third world war is inevitable
and that Communist China has therefore made herself ready for this eventu-
ality. There are continuing reports of Chinese air defense measures,
evacuations from coastal cities, formation of local militia forces, the
instituting of conscription on a broad basis, continuing rapid expansion
of air facilities, and other measures indicative of substantial war prepa-

ations.

a. In addition to indications of Communist strategy to prevent
Japanese rearmament, there have been several recent reports that Japanese
PWs are being organized by the Soviet Union for an attack on Japan. Reports
received within the past week have stated that: (1) some 100,000 uniformed
Japanese were moved into the Vladivostok area between 3 - 7 November; (2)
Fumimaro Konoye, son of the late Japanese Premier, is in Sakhalin with
between 100,000 and 200,000 Japanese PWs ready to invade Hokkaido; (3)
55,000 Japanese PWs organized into regular army units are in Manchuria and
include some paratroopers; and (4) the U.S.S.R.'s intends to use Japanese
troops trained in the U.S.S.R. to cross the Tsushima Strait (between Korea
and Japan) to liberate Japan. It is emphasized that all of these reports
are of low reliability and that none is confirmed by other reliable evidence
but their recurring nature compels their consideration as possible indica-
tions. The whereabouts and activities of some 370,000 Japanese PWs un-
accounted for by the U.S.S.R. are not known and the possibility that some
of them have been organized into military units cannot be discounted. With
regard to the possible use of Sakhalin as an invasion base, it is possibly
significant that the southern tip of Sakhalin is reportedly a restricted
military area and that the Perouse Strait between Sakhalin and Hokkaido is
the narrowest crossing point between Soviet territory and Japan, except
for the southernmost of the Kuriles. The previously reported Soviet propa-
ganda charges that the U.S. is using Japan as a base of aggression in the
Far East and that Japan has been drawn into the Korean war continue, and
it would appear that the U.S.S.R. is laying the groundwork for some demand
involving the status of Japan.
e. In Indo-China, Viet Minh operations and movements indicate continuing preparations for the launching of attacks against the French defense zone in Tonkin. In particular, Viet Minh concentrations north-east of Hanoi point to a probable early attempt to cut the Hanoi-Haiphong line of communication, an operation which might accompany, or be a prelude to, an attack on Hanoi itself. Indications of Chinese Communist preparations for an imminent intervention in Indo-China remain nebulous. There are, however, some additional unconfirmed reports of a recent shift of Chinese Communist regular army forces towards the Indo-China border.

There continue to be numerous reports of an acceleration of work on South China airfields (including Canton and Hainan), on roads in South China and in Tonkin and on the railroad from Nanning to the southwest. Shipments of material from Hainan Island to the Viet Minh are increasing and the airdrop of supplies and possibly of personnel to Viet Minh forces in Laos has been reliably reported.

f. Reports of negotiations between the Burmese Communist Party and the Chinese Communists are again being received and it is possible that some sort of agreement for the extension of material aid to the Burmese Communist forces from China has been reached. In addition, some Burmese Communist forces have moved out of their customary areas of operation, reportedly to areas closer to the China border.

g. In Thailand, officials are taking extraordinary security measures in view of repeated rumors that Communist guerrillas would land on the lower Thai peninsula to create a diversionary threat in conjunction with a coup in Bangkok to overthrow the present anti-Communist regime.

h. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

(1) Present military and political indications are that the Communist objective is to drive the U.N. forces from Korea and that the Chinese Communists would accept a political settlement only in return for major concessions including a withdrawal of U.N. forces from Korea, termination of the current U.S. policy of protecting Formosa, and Chinese Communist entry into the U.N.
(2) Persistent reports that the Chinese Communists consider a third world war to be inevitable and are preparing for it are supported by numerous indications of extensive Chinese Communist military preparations.

(3) Soviet propaganda suggests that the U.S.S.R. is laying the groundwork for some demand involving the status of Japan, and there are unconfirmed reports of Soviet preparation to attack Japan with Japanese POW's.

(4) There are continuing indications of increased Chinese Communist support of the Viet Minh and a possibility of direct Chinese Communist intervention at any time.

(5) There are fragmentary indications of increased Chinese Communist aid to the Burmese Communists and of possible Communist guerrilla action in Thailand.

2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East

a. In Germany, repair work has reportedly been under way on a number of barracks in the vicinity of Zossen/Wunsdorf (15 miles south of Berlin) since August and the work is now almost complete. The area is estimated to have a capacity of 35,000 to 40,000 troops and the apparently rather elaborate rehabilitation work includes construction of a 1,000-seat theater. Supervision of the work by officers from the Headquarters of the Soviet Occupation Forces in Potsdam and the scope of the undertaking indicate probable Soviet use of the facilities, contrary to some earlier suggestions that the East German Alert Police might move into the area. There are known to be large underground facilities in the area (which was a former German Army installation) and which would offer excellent protection from air attacks. At present, there are no firm indications of the use the Soviets intend to make of these facilities but the following are possibilities: (1) a Soviet reinforcement of Germany; (2) a move of the Headquarters Soviet Occupation Forces into the area which might be a better tactical location in case of hostilities; or (3) the establishment of an alternate or additional Soviet command headquarters.

b. Heavy East German propaganda calling for discussions between East and West Germany continues. A prominent theme of the propaganda is that because of the failure of the U.S. in Korea the U.S. will shift the bulk of its power to Europe "for new warlike ventures," and that it is therefore urgent that "the division of Germany be ended to avert the danger of war in Europe." This continuing propaganda, together with Soviet charges that the West is rearming Germany in preparation for war, may represent only an intensified propaganda effort to intimidate West Germany and play on Western indecision on the question of rearming Germany, but it could also indicate a Soviet intention for more drastic action. Of interest is the view[25X1] that there is a definite parallel between Chinese Communist threats to move into North Korea and Soviet statements

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that the rearming of West Germany would create a situation which the U.S.S.R. could not accept.

There is no doubt that present Soviet and East German propaganda does present a striking parallel with both North Korean and Chinese Communist propaganda prior to their attacks, and it is also apparent that these threats are not without effect in fostering neutralistic tendencies in Western Europe.

c.

Soviet troops are scheduled to move back into their summer training area in Austria in mid-January, and that the original date intended for this move was 15 December. This would seem to indicate that winter exercises, which have not hitherto been stressed in Soviet training in Europe, are intended. The recent movement of nearly 100 heavy flat cars from Austria to Hungary may indicate that some movement of equipment in the area is intended. No unusual Soviet military activity has been reported in Hungary.

d. Reports continue to indicate increasing military preparedness measures in the European Satellites. A series of reports from Czechoslovakia has indicated a reinforcement of the western Czech border and the movement of army units, weapons and ammunition into the western frontier area. There are reports that Czech reserve technicians and specialists are being called up for refresher training on a successive basis until February 1951 and that company grade officers of all branches are being summoned for three-year service. The situation is not entirely clear but it is clear that some reserve call-ups are under way, that the Czech defensive position is being strengthened and that U.S.S.R. is devoting increasing attention to the Czech Army. There are also reports of increased security measures in Czechoslovakia and of the expansion of air depot facilities at Trencin in Central Czechoslovakia. In Poland, there has been a steady build-up of material for the Polish Army over the past six weeks with the receipt of anti-tank guns, AA guns, tanks and armored cars from the U.S.S.R. Observations in Hungary indicate that Hungarian mechanized troops are disposed in the area northeast of Budapest and that barracks construction continues in the area south of Budapest. There were additional call-ups to the Bulgarian Army during the first week of December, reportedly including some reservists as well as more conscripts. The bulk of the 1930 class has been called up by this time and there are indications that the 1928 class will not be released before April 1951. The strength of the Bulgarian Army is now estimated at 145,000, compared with the previous estimate of 105,000. The reported release of the 1928 class from the Yugoslav Army, however, would appear to indicate that the Yugoslavs do not anticipate imminent military action in the Balkans.
f. Greek Communist propaganda is becoming increasingly bellicose. Communist penetration agents are reportedly being told that the time has come to rise openly against the American imperialists and to fight for the independence of Greece, and there have been renewed Greek Communist statements that the Americans have chosen the Balkans as the area for a new attack. The step-up in this propaganda, like that in Germany, may be only a part of the increased war of nerves against Western Europe or it may be in preparation for renewed Communist action. There is no firm evidence, however, that the Greek guerrillas are preparing for any immediate intensified military activity.

On 3 December, the Secretary General of the Trieste Pro-Communist Communist Party is reported to have stated that special emphasis must be made to the masses to the U.S.S.R. favors peace but that the imperialists may attack at any time and will use the atom bomb. Because of this, the masses must be prepared for the possibility that the U.S.S.R. (which has, he said, enough atom bombs to pulverize the principal U.S. cities) may attack first, an action which would be necessary as a matter of life and death. He reportedly stressed that war may break out at any moment. This would be the first instance of Communist propaganda justification for direct Soviet offensive rather than defensive action, but there is as yet no indication that such propaganda is being disseminated by the Western European Communist Parties.

h. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

(1) Although there are no definite indications of imminent Soviet or Satellite military action in Europe, there are reports of Soviet military preparations in both Germany and Austria and continuing indications of the strengthening of the Satellite armed forces.

(2) Intensified propaganda against West German rearmament, insistent demands for German negotiations and other Communist propaganda may represent only a Soviet effort to prevent the rearmament of West Germany and foster Western defeatist and neutrality sentiments, but it may also indicate Soviet intentions to secure her objectives in Europe by force if necessary.

John W. Weckerling
Brigadier General, GSC
Chairman, Joint Intelligence Indicators Committee

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