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Minutes of Meeting held at 1500
The White House on 18 June 1945 at 11:30.

PRESENT

The President
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy
The Army
General G. C. Marshall
Fleet Admiral E. J. King
The Navy
General I. C. Eaker
(Acting for General Arnold)

The Secretary of War
Mr. Henry L. Stimson

The Secretary of the Navy
Mr. James R. Forrestal

Mr. J. J. McCoy

Secretary
Brig. General A. J. McFarland
THE PRESIDENT stated that he was interested in informing himself in connection with the proposed operations against Japan. He had called the meeting for the purpose of informing himself with respect to the details of the campaign against Japan, and on the point raised in his memorandum which he had given to Admiral Leahy. He asked General Marshall if he would express his opinion.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the situation now with respect to operations against Japan was—practically identical—with the situation which had existed in connection with the operations proposed against Normandy. He then read, as an expression of his views the following digest of the memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for presentation to the President (JCS 1388):

"Our air and sea power has already greatly reduced movement of Jap shipping south of Korea and should in the next few months cut it to a trickle if not choke it off entirely. Hence, there is no need for seizing further positions in order to block Japanese communications south of Korea.

General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz are in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff in selecting 1 November as the target date to go into Kyushu because by that time:

a. If we press preparations we can be ready.

b. Our estimates are that our air action will have smashed practically every industrial target worth hitting in Japan as well as destroying huge areas in the Jap cities."
c. The Japanese Navy, if any still exists, will be completely powerless.

d. Our sea action and air power will have cut Jap reinforcement capabilities from the mainland to negligible proportions.

Important considerations bearing on the 1 November date rather than a later one are the weather and cutting to a minimum Jap time for preparation of defenses. If we delay much after the beginning of November the weather situation in the succeeding months may be such that the invasion of Japan, and hence the end of the war, will be delayed for up to 6 months.

An outstanding military point about attacking Korea is the difficult terrain and beach conditions which appear to make the only acceptable assault areas Pusan in the southeast corner and Keijo, well up the western side. To get to Pusan, which is a strongly fortified area, we must move large and vulnerable assault forces past heavily fortified Japanese areas. The operation appears more difficult and costly than assault on Kyushu. Keijo appears an equally difficult and costly operation. After we have undertaken either one of them we still will not be as far forward as going into Kyushu.

The Kyushu operation is essential to a strategy of strangulation and appears to be the least costly worth-while
operation following Okinawa. The basic point is that a lodgement in Kyushu is essential, both to tightening our stranglehold of blockade and bombardment on Japan, and to forcing capitulation by invasion of the Tokyo Plain.

We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations.

It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.

With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japa
in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop out their own country.

Casualties. Our experience in the Pacific war is so diverse as to casualties that it is considered wrong to give any estimate in numbers. Using various combinations of
Pacific experience, the War Department staff reaches the conclusion that the cost of securing a worth-while position in Korea would almost certainly be greater than the cost of the Kyushu operation. Points on the optimistic side of the Kyushu operation are that: General MacArthur has not yet accepted responsibility for going ashore where there would be disproportionate casualties. The nature of the objective area gives room for maneuver, both on the land and by sea. As to any discussion of specific operations, the following data is pertinent:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>U.S. Casualties</th>
<th>Jap Casualties</th>
<th>Ratio U.S. to Jap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killed, wounded missing</td>
<td>Killed and prisoners (Not including wounded)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leyte</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>1:4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luzon</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>156,000</td>
<td>1:5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>1:1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>34,000 (Ground)</td>
<td>81,000</td>
<td>1:2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,700 (Navy)</td>
<td>(not a complete count)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normandy (1st 30 days)</td>
<td>42,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
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The record of General MacArthur's operations from 1 March 1944 through 1 May 1945 shows 13,742 U.S. killed compared to 310,165 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22 to 1.

There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon. It is a grim fact that there is not an easy, bloodless way to victory in war and it is the thankless task of the leaders to maintain their firm outward front which holds the resolution of
their subordinates. Any irresolution in the leaders may result in costly weakening and indecision in the subordinates. It was this basic difficulty with the Prime Minister which clouded and hampered all our preparations for the cross-channel operation now demonstrated as having been essential to victory in Europe.

An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.

In considering the matter of command and control in the Pacific war which the British wish to raise at the next conference, we must bear in mind the point that anything smacking of combined command in the Pacific might increase the difficulties with Russia and perhaps with China. Furthermore the obvious inefficiencies of combined command may directly result in increased cost in resources and American lives.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had asked General MacArthur's opinion on the proposed operation and received from him a telegram, which General Marshall proceeded to read:

"I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested and that its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating
wasteful operations of nondecisive character. I regard the 
operation as the most economical one in effort and lives that 
is possible. In this respect it must be remembered that the 
several preceding months will involve practically no losses in 
ground troops and that sooner or later a decisive ground attack 
must be made. The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an 
attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently ahead of our target 
date to commit the enemy to major combat. I most earnestly 
recommend no change in Olympic. Additional subsidiary attacks 
will simply build up our final total casualties."

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was his personal view that 
the operation against Kyushu was the only course to pursue. He 
felt that air power alone was not sufficient to put the Japanese 
out of the war. It was unable to do it in Germany. General 
Eaker and General Eisenhower both agreed to this. In operation 
Against the Japanese, living in scattered mountainous country, 
the problem would be much more difficult than it had been in 
Germany. He felt that this plan promised the only way in which 
the Japanese could be forced into that feeling of utter helplessness, in the face of the might against them and which could result 
in surrender. The operation would be difficult but not more 
so than the assault in Normandy. He was convinced that every 
individual moving to the Pacific should be indoctrinated with the 
determination to see the job through.
ADMIRAL KING agreed with General Marshall's remarks and stated that the more he studied the matter, the more he was impressed with the strategic location of Kyushu, which he considered the key to the success of any siege operations. He pointed out that within three months the effects of air power based on Okinawa will begin to be felt strongly in Japan. It seemed to him that Kyushu followed logically after Okinawa. It was a natural next step: Okinawa, then Kyushu, with the possible action to be expected from the Russians and from the Chinese seemed to be a natural step. It was his opinion that we should decide now to do Kyushu, after which there would be time to judge the effect of possible operations by the Russians and the Chinese. The weather constituted quite a factor. So far as preparation was concerned, we must prepare now for the battle for Tokyo Plain; otherwise we will never be able to accomplish it. Unless preparations go forward now, they cannot be arranged for later. Once started, they can always be stopped if desired.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that Kyushu was a necessity and pointed out that it constituted a landing in the Japanese homeland. Kyushu having been arranged for, the decision as to further action could be made later.

THE PRESIDENT inquired if a later decision would not depend on what the Russians agree to do. He agreed that this would have considerable influence.
THE PRESIDENT then asked Admiral Leahy for his views of the situation.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that the President had been interested in knowing what the price in casualties for Kyushu would be and whether or not that price could be paid. He, Admiral Leahy, was interested in finding out how many troops will be used in Kyushu with a view to determining therefrom the number of casualties which might be expected. He pointed out that the troops on Okinawa had lost 35 percent in casualties. If this percentage were applied to the number of troops to be employed in Kyushu, he thought from the similarity of the fighting to be expected that this would give a good estimate of expected casualties to be expected. He was interested, therefore, in further consideration to Admiral King pointed out what he considered an important difference in Okinawa and Kyushu. There had been only one way to go on Okinawa. This meant a straight frontal attack against a highly fortified position. On Kyushu, however, landings would be made on three fronts simultaneously and there would be much more room for maneuver. It was his opinion that a realistic casualty figure for Kyushu would lie somewhere between the number experienced by General MacArthur in the operations on Luzon and the Okinawa casualties.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that total assault points out that total assault were shown assigned to the Kyushu campaign as set out in the memorandum prepared for the President. The total combat troops were
766,000. In answer to the President's question as to what opposition could be expected on Kyushu, General Marshall said that there were eight Japanese divisions on Kyushu now or about 350,000 troops and 200 (?) aircraft. He said that reinforcement from other areas was possible but it was becoming increasingly difficult and painful. Divisions were still being raised in Japan, and that was asked about.

The President said he was interested in the possibility of moving reinforcement of Kyushu south from the other Japanese islands. General Marshall stated that it was expected that all communications with Kyushu would be destroyed.

Admiral King described in some detail the land communications existing between the Japanese islands and Kyushu and stated that as a result of operations already planned, the Japanese would have to depend on sea shipping for any reinforcement.

Admiral Leahy stressed the fact that Kyushu was an island, crossed by a mountain range, which would be difficult for either the Japanese or the Americans to cross. The Kyushu operation was contemplated as constituting in effect taking another island from which to bring increased air power against Japan.
THE PRESIDENT said as he understood it, it was practically creating another Okinawa closer to Japan. The Chiefs of Staff agreed, that this was.

THE PRESIDENT then asked General Eaker for his opinion of the operation as an air man. Said General Eaker stated that he agreed completely with the statements made by General Marshall in his digest of the memorandum prepared for the President. He said that in addition he had just received from General Arnold a cable in which he also expressed complete agreement. He stated that any blockade of Honshu was dependent upon airdromes on Kyushu; that the air plan contemplated employment of 40 groups of heavy bombers against Japan and that these could not be deployed without the use of airfields on Kyushu. He said that those who advocated the use of air power alone against Japan overlooked the very impressive fact that air casualties are much heavier when the air force faces the enemy alone and that these casualties never fail to drop as soon as the ground forces come in. He stated the present air casualties were averaging about 2 percent per mission, or 30 percent per month. He wished to point out and to emphasize that delay favored only the enemy and he urged that there be no delay.

THE PRESIDENT said that as he understood it, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had considered all other possibilities in of
The President stated that the possibility was being worked out to come to a quick solution. Any possible influence they might have before it was decided that something should be done to arouse them to protect the ground. He was concerned and right consciously it attacked on the ground. This line yet been felt. He felt sure that this suppression of class would rise.

The President was the President's full opinion and influence had never been the President's full opinion and influence. He was out of the President and whose full opinion and influence had never been the President's full opinion and influence. He was out of the President and whose full opinion and influence had never been the President's full opinion and influence.

The President he was personally more responsible to the President for political than military considerations. It was his opinion that the President, suited for a war of movement. He felt that there was no other choice. He said that the President's full opinion was on this occasion. He agreed with the President's full opinion on this occasion.
MR. STIMSON thought there was a very large chance. He agreed with the plan proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that as being the best thing to do, but he still hoped for some additional accomplishment through other means. He thought it would be found through efforts that could be made from the outside.

THE PRESIDENT then asked for Mr. Forrestal's views. Mr. Forrestal pointed out that even if the decision were to be a siege of Japan for a year or a year and a half, that the capture of Kyushu would still be essential. Therefore, the sound decision is to proceed with the operation against Kyushu. There will still be time thereafter for the main decision can be made in the light of subsequent events.

MR. McCLOY said he felt that the time was propitious now to study closely what efforts could be brought to bear in bringing out the influence of the submerged group in Japan which had been referred to by Mr. Stimson.

THE PRESIDENT stated that one of his objectives in connection with the conference would be to get all the assistance from Russia in the war that was possible. To this end he wanted to know all the decisions that he would have to make in advance in order to occupy the strongest position possible in the discussions.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he could not agree with the opinion...
who said to him that unless we forced the Japanese into unconditional surrender, that we will have lost the war. He feared no menace from Japan in the reasonable future, even if we were unsuccessful in forcing unconditional surrender. What he did fear was that our insistence on unconditional surrender would only result in making the Japanese desperate and thereby increase our casualty lists. He did not think that this was at all necessary.

THE PRESIDENT stated that he had had that thought in mind that he had left the door open for Congress to take appropriate action with reference to unconditional surrender. However, he did not feel that at this time it was possible for him to take any action with reference to public opinion on this matter. He considered with reference to the Kyushu plan that he considered it all right from the military standpoint and, as far as he was concerned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff could go ahead with it; that we could do this operation and then make decision as to the final action later.

The conversation then turned on the situation in China.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that General Wedemeyer's operations were pointing towards Canton. He thought it was already evident that the Japanese would hold fortress troops there and in other places. It might be necessary to go around these fortress
troops as had been done in France, or to take other courses with respect to them.

In reply to a question from the President, GENERAL MARSHALL outlined the present status of Chinese divisions with respect to completeness of personnel and equipment. He said the prospects of the ability of the Chinese generals were not very good. He had already asked General Wedemeyer whether it would be possible to use with the Chinese troops one or more of the U.S. Army commanders with their staffs, who were now returning from France. General Wedemeyer's reply, while not conclusive, had been in general favorable. General Marshall thought that if the Generalissimo would effect the use of these commanders for control of Chinese groups, it would be a very excellent thing.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired as to the prospects of an overall commander in the Pacific, which he thought would be a good thing. Both GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING explained that under the circumstances existing in the Pacific with the variety of troops to be operating there, with the number of nations involved, that it was undesirable to accept divided command with the British and that we would lose more than we would gain if we brought about
in the Pacific the same condition as had existed in France.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated the American commander would always have to think of his government's policies. In connection with this, he recounted the difficulty obtaining British agreement to General Eisenhower's plan for the invasion of Germany. Their reluctance in the matter was due to their belief that General was influenced by the American commanders.

THE PRESIDENT said that it was simply his idea to find out whether an over-all commander for the Pacific would be an advantage or a liability.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that from the large point of view there was no question about being a liability. In connection with British participation in the Pacific, General Marshall said that the President would find the Prime Minister very articulate. He is interested in showing that the British Government has played a full part in the defeat of Japan and that it had not been necessary for them to wait for the United States to recapture Singapore for them. The Americans, of course, were glad to have any real help or any assistance that would strike a real blow, but that British participation in some way would constitute an embarrassment. However, the British were under American over-all command in the Pacific. He stated that the British wanted the Australians to take over as far as possible. The Australians wanted to take over their own.
THE PRESIDENT referred to the Portuguese participation in the Southwest Pacific and stated that he wished to get the air program definitely settled with the Portuguese before we do anything more about Timor.

THE PRESIDENT reiterated that his main reason for this conference with the Chiefs of Staff was his desire to know definitely how far we could afford to go into this operation. He had hoped that there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other. He was clear on the situation now and was quite sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should proceed with the Kyushu operation.

With reference to operations in China, GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the opinion that we should not seek an over-all commander in China. The present situation in which the Generalissimo was supporting General Wedemeyer, acting as his Chief of Staff, was entirely satisfactory. The suggestion of the appointment of an over-all commander might cause some difficulty.
ADMIRAL KING said he wished to emphasize the point that, regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, they were not indispensable and that he did not think we should go to any great lengths to beg them to come in.

While the cost of defeating Japan would be greater, there was no question in his mind but that we could handle it alone. He thought that the realization of this fact should greatly strengthen the President's hand in discussing matters with the

2. Reinstatement of Lease Lease Supplies to the French

ADMIRAL LEAHY read a telegram in which General McNarney had recommended that the reinstatement of supplies to the French be reinstituted after the French withdrawal from northern Italy had been completed. He asked the President's views. THE PRESIDENT stated that he agreed with General McNarney's recommendations and felt that he should be supported.

THE PRESIDENT expressed his appreciation of the results of his conference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said that cleared up a great many points in his mind and that he now felt satisfied and reassured.

The President and the Chiefs of Staff then discussed certain other matters.