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PRESENT

The President
Admiral William D. Leahy
General G. C. Marshall
Admiral E. J. King
General I. C. Eaker
(Acting for General Arnold)
Mr. Henry L. Stimson
Mr. James R. Forrestal
Mr. J. J. McCloy

Secretary
Brig. General A. J. McFarland
THE PRESIDENT stated that he was interested in informing himself in connection with the proposed operations against Japan on the points raised in the memorandum which he had given to Admiral Leahy. He asked General Marshall if he would express his opinion.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that the situation existing now with respect to operations against Japan was practically identical with the situation which had existed in connection with the operations proposed against Normandy. He then read the following digest of the memorandum prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for presentation to the President:

1. Our air and sea power has already greatly reduced movement of Jap shipping south of Korea and should in the next few months cut it to a trickle if not choke it off entirely. Hence, there is no need for seizing further positions in order to block Japanese communications south of Korea.

2. General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz are in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff in selecting 1 November as the target date to go into Kyushu because by that time:

   a. If we press preparations we can be ready.

   b. Our estimates are that our air action will have smashed practically every industrial target worth hitting in Japan as well as destroying huge areas in the Jap cities.
c. The Japanese Navy, if any still exists, will be completely powerless.

d. Our sea action and air power will have cut Jap reinforcement capabilities from the mainland to negligible proportions.

Important considerations bearing on the 1 November date rather than a later one are the weather and cutting to a minimum Jap time for preparation of defenses. If we delay much after the beginning of November the weather situation in the succeeding months may be such that the invasion of Japan, and hence the end of the war, will be delayed for up to 6 months.

3. An outstanding military point about attacking Korea is the difficult terrain and beach conditions which appear to make the only acceptable assault areas Fusan in the southeast corner and Keijo, well up the western side. To get to Fusan, which is a strongly fortified area, we must move large and vulnerable assault forces past heavily fortified Japanese areas. The operation appears more difficult and costly than assault on Kyushu. Keijo appears an equally difficult and costly operation. After we have undertaken either one of them we still will not be as far forward as going into Kyushu.

4. The Kyushu operation is essential to a strategy of strangulation and appears to be the least costly worth-while
operation following Okinawa. The basic point is that a lodgement in Kyushu is essential, both to tightening our strangle hold of blockade and bombardment on Japan, and to forcing capitulation by invasion of the Tokyo Plain.

5. We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations. It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.

6. With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japanese in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop out their own country.

7. Casualties. Our experience in the Pacific war is so diverse as to casualties that it is considered wrong to give any estimate in numbers. Using various combinations of
Pacific experience, the War Department staff reaches the conclusion that the cost of securing a worthwhile position in Korea would almost certainly be greater than the cost of the Kyushu operation. Points on the optimistic side of the Kyushu operation are that: General MacArthur has not yet accepted responsibility for going ashore where there would be disproportionate casualties. The nature of the objective area gives room for maneuver, both on the land and by sea. As to any discussion of specific operations, the following data is pertinent:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>U.S. Casualties Killed, wounded missing</th>
<th>Jap Casualties Killed and prisoners (Not including wounded)</th>
<th>Ratio U.S. to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leyte</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>1:4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luzon</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>156,000</td>
<td>1:5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>1:1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>34,000 (Ground) 7,700 (Navy)</td>
<td>81,000 (not a complete count)</td>
<td>1:2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normandy (1st 30 days)</td>
<td>42,000</td>
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</tbody>
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The record of General MacArthur's operations from 1 March 1944 through 1 May 1945 shows 13,742 U.S. killed compared to 310,165 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22 to 1.

There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon. It is a grim fact that there is not an easy, bloodless way to victory in war and it is the thankless task of the leaders to maintain their firm outward front which holds the resolution of
their subordinates. Any irresolution in the leaders may result in costly weakening and indecision in the subordinates. It was this basic difficulty with the Prime Minister which clouded and hampered all our preparations for the cross-channel operation now demonstrated as having been essential to victory in Europe.

8. An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.

9. In considering the matter of command and control in the Pacific war which the British wish to raise at the next conference, we must bear in mind the point that anything smacking of combined command in the Pacific might increase the difficulties with Russia and perhaps with China. Furthermore the obvious inefficiencies of combined command may directly result in increased cost in resources and American lives.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had asked General MacArthur's opinion on the proposed operation and received from him a telegram, which General Marshall proceeded to read:

"I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested and that its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating..."
wasteful operations of nondecisive character. I regard the operation as the most economical one in effort and lives that is possible. In this respect it must be remembered that the several preceding months will involve practically no losses in ground troops and that sooner or later a decisive ground attack must be made. The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently ahead of our target date to commit the enemy to major combat. I most earnestly recommend no change in Olympic. Additional subsidiary attacks will simply build up our final total casualties."

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was his personal view that the operation against Kyushu was the only course to pursue. He felt that air power alone was not sufficient to put the Japanese out of the war. It was unable to do it in Germany. GeneralEisenhower and General Eisenhower both agreed to this. In operations against the Japanese living in scattered mountainous country the problem would be much more difficult than it had been in Germany. He felt that this plan promised the only way in which the Japanese could be forced into that feeling of utter helplessness in the face of the might against them and which could result in surrender. The operation would be difficult but not more so than the assault in Normandy. He was convinced that every individual moving to the Pacific should be filled with the determination to see the plan through.
ADMIRAL KING agreed with General Marshall's remarks and stated that the more he studied the matter, the more he was impressed with the strategic location of Kyushu which he considered the key to the success of any siege operations. He pointed out that within three months more the effects of air based on Okinawa will begin to be felt strongly in Japan. It seemed to him that Kyushu followed logically after Okinawa. Okinawa, then Kyushu, with the possible action to be expected from the Russians and from the Chinese seemed to be a natural setup. It was his opinion that we should decide now to do Kyushu, after which there would be time to judge the effect of possible operations by the Russians and the Chinese. The weather constituted quite a factor. So far as preparation was concerned, we must prepare now for the battle for Tokyo Plain; otherwise we will never be able to accomplish it. Unless all preparations go forward now, they cannot be arranged for later. Once started they can always be stopped if necessary.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that Kyushu was a necessity and pointed out that it constituted a landing in the Japanese homeland. Kyushu having been arranged for, the decision as to further action could be made later.

THE PRESIDENT inquired if a later decision would not depend on what the Russians agree to do. There was concensus that this would have considerable influence.
THE PRESIDENT then asked Admiral Leahy for his views of the situation.

ADMIRAL LEAHY pointed out that the President had been interested in knowing what the price in casualties for Kyushu would be and whether or not that price could be paid. He, Admiral Leahy, was interested in finding out how many troops will be used in Kyushu with a view to determining therefrom the number of casualties which might be expected. He pointed out that the troops on Okinawa had lost 35 percent in casualties. If this percentage were applied to the number of troops to be employed in Kyushu, he thought from the similarity of the fighting to be expected that this would give a good estimate of expected casualties.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out what he considered an important difference in Okinawa and Kyushu. There had been only one way to go on Okinawa. This meant a straight frontal attack on a highly fortified position. On Kyushu, however, landings would be made on three fronts simultaneously and there would be much more room for maneuver. It was his opinion that a realistic casualty figure for Kyushu would lie somewhere between the number experienced by General MacArthur in the operations on Luzon and the Okinawa casualties.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out called attention to the troops allotted to the Kyushu campaign as set out in the memorandum prepared for the President. The total combat troops was
766,000. In answer to the President's question as to what
opposition could be expected on Kyushu, General Marshall said
that there were eight Japanese divisions on Kyushu now or about
350,000 troops and 200 (?) aircraft. He said that reinforce-
ment from other areas was possible but it was becoming increas-
ingly difficult and painful. Divisions were still being raised
in Japan.

THE PRESIDENT said he was interested in the possibility
of any reinforcement of Kyushu south from the other Japanese
islands.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that it was expected that all
of the communications with Kyushu would be destroyed.

ADmiral KING described in some detail the land communications
existing between the Japanese islands and Kyushu and stated that as
a result of operations already planned, that the Japanese would haveto depend on sea shipping for any reinforcement.

ADmiral LEAHY stressed the fact that Kyushu was an island
crossed by a mountain range, which was difficult for either th
Japanese or for the Americans to cross. The Kyushu operation
constituted in effect taking another island from which to bring
increased air power against Japan.
THE PRESIDENT said, as he understood it, it was practically creating another Okinawa closer to Japan. The Chiefs of Staff agreed that this was so.

THE PRESIDENT then asked General Eaker for his opinion of the operation as an air man.

GENERAL EAKER stated that he agreed completely with the statements made by General Marshall in his digest of the memorandum prepared for the President. He said that in addition he had just received from General Arnold a cable in which he also gave his agreement. He stated that any blockade of Honshu was dependent upon airdromes on Kyushu; that the air plan contemplated employment of 40 groups of heavy bombers against Japan and that these could not be deployed without the use of airfields on Kyushu. He said that those who advocated the use of air power alone against Japan overlooked the very impressive fact that air casualties are very much heavier when the air forces face the enemy alone and that these casualties never fail to drop as soon as the ground forces came in. He stated the present air casualties were averaging 2 percent per mission, or 30 percent per month. He wished to point out and to emphasize that delay favored only the enemy and he urged that there be no delay.

THE PRESIDENT then stated that as he understood it the Joint Chiefs of Staff had considered all other possibilities in
the situation, all other possible plans, all contingencies, and as a result had reached the unanimous conclusion that the Kyushu operation was the best solution under the circumstances.

The Chiefs of Staff agreed that this was so.

THE PRESIDENT then asked the Secretary of War for his opinion.

MR. STIMSON stated that he agreed with the Chiefs of Staff that there was no other choice. He said that he was personally acquainted with the terrain between Tokyo and Osaka and it was not, in his opinion, suited for a war of movement. He felt that he was personally more responsible to the President for political considerations than military considerations. It was his opinion that there was a large submerged class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and influence had never yet been felt. He felt sure that this submerged class would fight and fight tenaciously if attacked on the ground. He was concerned that something should be done to arouse them in order to develop any possible influence they might have before it came to grips on the ground.

THE PRESIDENT stated that this possibility was being worked on all the time. He was interested to know the extent to which the invasion of Japanese homeland by the white man in uniting the Japs (to be rewarded)
MR. STIMSON thought there was a very large chance. He agreed with the plan proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that being the best thing to do, but he still hoped for some additional means to be found through efforts that could be made from the outside.

THE PRESIDENT then asked for Mr. Forrestal's views. Mr.

MR. FORRESTAL pointed out that even if the decision were to be a siege of Japan for a year or a year and a half, that the capture of Kyushu would still be essential. Therefore, the sound decision is to proceed with the operation against Kyushu. There will still be left time thereafter for the main decision, which can be made in the light of subsequent events.

MR. McCLOY said he felt that the time was propitious now to study closely what efforts could be brought to bear in bringing out the influence of the submerged group in Japan which had been referred to by Mr. Stimson.

THE PRESIDENT stated that one of his objectives in connection with the conference would be to get all the assistance from Russia in the war that was possible. To this end he wanted to know all the decisions that he would have to make in advance in order to occupy the strongest position possible in the discussions.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he could not agree with the opinion
of May who said to him that unless we force the Japanese into unconditional surrender that we will have lost the war. He feared no menace from Japan in the reasonable future, even if we were unsuccessful in forcing unconditional surrender. What he feared was that our insistence on unconditional surrender would simply result in making the Japanese desperate and thereby result in large casualties. He did not think that such a result was necessary.

THE PRESIDENT

THE PRESIDENT stated that he had had that thought in mind when he had left the door open for Congress to take appropriate action with reference to unconditional surrender. However, he did not feel that at this time it was possible for him to take any action with reference to public opinion on this matter. He said with reference to the Kyushu plan that he considered it all right from the military standpoint and, as far as he was concerned the Joint Chiefs of Staff could go ahead with it; that we could do this operation and then make decision as to the final action later.

The conversation then turned on the situation in China.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that General Wedemeyer's operations were pointing towards Canton. He thought it was already evident that the Japanese would hold fortress troops there and in other places. It might be necessary to go around these fortress
troops as had been done in France or to take other courses with reference to them.

In reply to a question from the President, GENERAL MARSHALL outlined the present status of Chinese divisions with respect to completeness of personnel and equipment. He said the prospect with respect to the ability of the Chinese generals were not very good. He had already asked General Wedemeyer whether it would be possible to use with the Chinese troops one or more of the U.S. Army commanders with their staffs who were now returning from France. General Wedemeyer's reply, while not conclusive, had been, in general, favorable. General Marshall thought that if the Generalissimo would effect the use of these commanders for control of Chinese groups, that it would be a very excellent thing.

THE PRESIDENT then inquired as to the prospects of an overall commander in the Pacific, which he thought would be a good thing.

Both GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING explained that under the circumstances existing in the Pacific with the variety of troops to be operating there, with the number of nations involved, that they thought there were no prospects for it. As was pointed out, it was undesirable to accept divided command with the British and that we would lose more than we would gain if we brought about
in the Pacific the same condition as had existed in France.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated the American commander would always have to think of his government's policies. In connection with this, he recounted the difficulty obtaining British agreement in Malta to General Eisenhower's plan for the invasion of Germany. Their reluctance in the matter was due to their belief that General Eisenhower must be influenced by the American commanders.

THE PRESIDENT said that it was simply his idea to find out whether an over-all commander for the Pacific would be an advantage or a liability.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that from the large point of view there was no question about this being a liability. In connection with the British participation in the Pacific, General Marshall said that the President would find the Prime Minister very articulate. He is interested in showing that the British Government has played a full part in the defeat of Japan and that it had not been necessary for them to wait for the United States to recapture Singapore for them. The Americans, of course, were glad to have any real help or any assistance that would help strike a real blow but that British participation in some way would constitute an embarrassment. However, the British were under American over-all command in the Pacific. He stated that the British wanted the Australians to take over as far as the Celebes. The Australians wanted to take over their own
Mandated Island area (check with Planners). The Australian Deputy Prime Minister had recently conferred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the Australian role in the war and that the British had suffered some embarrassment because they have not yet been able to agree definitely with the Australians. 

THE PRESIDENT referred to the Portuguese participation in the Southwest Pacific and stated that he wished to get the air program definitely settled with the Portuguese before we do anything more about Timor.

THE PRESIDENT reiterated that his main reason for this conference with the Chiefs of Staff was his desire to know definitely how far we could afford to go into this operation. He had hoped that there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other. He was clear on the situation now and was quite sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should proceed with the Kyushu operation.

With reference to operations in China, GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the opinion that we should not seek an over-all commander in China. The present situation in which the Generalissimo was supporting General Wedemeyer, acting as his Chief of Staff, was entirely satisfactory. The suggestion of the appointment of an over-all commander might cause some difficulty.
ADMIRAL KING said he wished to emphasize the point that regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, they were not indispensable and that he did not think we should go to any great lengths in begging them to come in. While the cost of defeating Japan would be greater, there was no question in his mind but that we could handle it alone. He thought that the realization of this fact should greatly strengthen the President's hand in discussing matters with the Russians.

ADMIRAL LEAHY read a telegram in which General McNarney had recommended that the reinstatement of supplies to the French take place after the French withdrawal from northern Italy. THE PRESIDENT stated that he agreed with General McNarney's recommendations and felt that he should be supported. THE PRESIDENT expressed his appreciation of the results of his conference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said this cleared up a great many points in his mind and that he now felt satisfied and reassured.