MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Basis for preparation of attached outlined plan for Invasion of Western Europe.

1. Western Europe has been selected as the theater in which to stage the first great offensive of the United Powers because:

   It is the only place in which a powerful offensive can be prepared and executed by the United Powers in the near future. In any other locality the building up of the required forces would be much more slowly accomplished due to sea distances. Moreover, in other localities the enemy is protected against invasion by natural obstacles and poor communications leading toward the seat of the hostile power, or by elaborately organized and distant outposts. Time would be required to reduce these and to make the attack effective.

   It is the only place where the vital air superiority over the hostile land areas preliminary to a major attack can be staged by the United Powers. This is due to the existence of a network of landing fields in England and to the fact that at no other place could massed British air power be employed for such an operation.

   It is the only place in which the bulk of the British ground forces can be committed to a general offensive in cooperation with United States forces. It is impossible, in view of the shipping situation, to transfer the bulk of the British forces to any distant region, and the protection of the British islands would hold the bulk of the divisions in England.

   The United States can concentrate and use larger forces in Western Europe than in any other place, due to sea distances and the existence in England of base facilities.
The bulk of the combat forces of the United States, United Kingdom and Russia can be applied simultaneously only against Germany, and then only if we attack in time. We cannot concentrate against Japan.

Successful attack in this area will afford the maximum of support to the Russian front.

2. Decision as to the locality of the main effort must be made now. This is true even if the actual attack cannot be launched during this year. A major attack must be preceded by a long period of intensive preparation. Basic decision is necessary so that all production, special construction, training, troop movements and allocations can be coordinated to a single end. Until this process of coordinated and intensified effort is initiated it is difficult to calculate even the approximate date at which a major offensive can be undertaken.

The element of time is of the utmost importance. We must begin an offensive on a major scale before Russia, now practically alone, can be defeated and before Vichy France, Spain, Portugal and Turkey are drawn into the ranks of our enemies.


The plan more fully outlined in later paragraphs provides for an attack by combined forces against Western Europe at the earliest possible moment that the necessary tactical forces can be accumulated -- estimated at April 1, 1943, provided decision is made now and our men, materiel and shipping are not further dispersed. (An earlier date for an "emergency" offensive is set for the fall of 1942 as will be explained later)

Combined forces required, exclusive of Naval support, are:

Three thousand fighter planes.
Twenty eight hundred planes (other combat types)
Forty eight Divisions (all types - 30 of them U.S.)
Paratroops; airborne troops; A.A. - etc.
Total U.S. personnel to be transported to England: 1,000,000 by the date of initiating the attack.

The plan contemplates three main phases.

a. Preparatory. Beginning now, to date of initiating main attack.
b. Cross channel movement and seizure of beachhead between Le Havre and Boulogne.

c. Consolidation of beachhead and beginning of further operations.

4. An added feature of this plan is that, during the preparatory period it provides means to act promptly under either of the following eventualities:

(a) If the imminence of Russian collapse requires desperate action, a sacrifice attack could be made.

(b) If German forces are almost completely absorbed on the Russian front, a prompt movement to the continent might be undertaken with much smaller forces than would otherwise be justified.

Included, later in this paper, is an outlined plan for an attack about September 15, 1942.

5. Limitations as to time and as to strength of attack are imposed upon both plans by the shortage of shipping, and, secondarily, by the difficulty in the production of landing craft. Further limitations are imposed by the necessity for executing certain commitments and requirements, already of record, which absorb a certain amount of shipping. These include:

2 Divisions to Australia
1 Division to New Zealand
Sufficient shipping to England to transport 40,000 troops and equipment to the Middle East.
Continuance of material aid to Russia and to others of the United Nations.

PLAN FOR OPERATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE

6. Assumptions.

g. That the line, Alaska - Hawaii - Australia will be held and Pacific garrisons increased from a present approximate strength of 175,000 to an approximate strength of 300,000.
b. That present U. S. commitments will be executed. These include dispatch of the 1st and one additional division to Australia, one division to New Zealand, and the loan of sufficient shipping to the British to move 40,000 troops to the Middle East, and the building up of a small air force in China - India. Providing the British furnish the necessary planes from aircraft now allotted to them, two groups pursuit, one group medium bombardment and two groups light bombardment should be sent to the Middle East as the only additional U. S. commitment to theaters other than Western Europe. This will have a corresponding effect in diminishing the U. S. planes available for the offensive in Europe.

c. That Russia is still effective in the war to the extent that the bulk of the German forces are required on the Russian front.

d. That Axis forces in Western Europe remain at approximately their present strength.

7. From an examination of the hostile situation, it is concluded that a successful attack can be made only with combat power as follows:

a. Adequate air superiority over the enemy involving the use by the Allies of a minimum of 3,000 fighters and 2,850 combat planes other than fighters. (Combined British and U. S.).

b. Ability to land in the first wave the major combat elements of an infantry and armored force of at least six divisions. At the beginning of the actual invasion, U. S. land forces in England or en route should be approximately: six armored, five motorized, 18 infantry and one air-borne division.

c. An ability to land on the western coast of Europe behind the leading wave, a weekly increment initially of at least 100,000 troops, and, after the invasion forces have landed, a continuous flow of reinforcements from the United States at the maximum rate that shipping will permit.

a. This plan provides for the movement to the British Isles of U. S. air and ground forces comprising approximately one million men to participate with the British in an invasion of France between Le Havre and Boulogne. Logistic factors fix the earliest possible date for an attack on this scale at about April 1, 1943. Bottlenecks, as to time, will be shipping and landing craft, which will not be available in sufficient quantity by the time that aircraft, ground equipment and ammunition can be supplied.

b. The operation proper is divided into three phases:

(1) Preparatory phase. (From now until April 1, 1943).
(2) The cross-channel movement and seizure of the beach head.
(3) The consolidation of the beach head with a view to further operations.

(1) Preparatory Phase.
During the preparatory phase maximum effort to be made to complete the organization, equipment and training of the air and ground forces involved, and to coordinate all productive effort toward this objective. This includes the early establishment of additional air installations in England, and the movement to the British Isles of air and ground forces to complete their training in conjunction with the British. A continued air offensive against vital Axis targets on the mainland of Europe should be carried out prior to April 1, 1943. In addition to the destruction accomplished this will enable American and British air forces to work together and so develop a coordinated combat team. Likewise, participation of U. S. ground troops in raids against the coast of continental Europe from Norway to the souther limits of occupied France will not only harass the German occupying forces, but will aid materially in the training of U. S. and British ground forces, and will obtain information concerning the organization of the German defenses along the coast. Above all, it will produce the coordinated combat methods vital to success. During the final two weeks just prior to the land invasion, an intensification of air activities against the invasion front will be carried out with the view to neutralizing the Axis air forces on that front and to beating down the Axis defensive system.

(2) The cross-channel movement and later consolidation.
The invasion itself will consist of a cross-channel movement and the seizure of a beach head between Le Havre and Boulogne,
strongly supported by combat aviation. The main landing should be made on a six division front. Parachute and air-borne troops to be employed in addition to combat aviation in assisting the ground forces in establishing the beach head and in preventing rapid movement of German reinforcements toward the coast. As soon as a beach head is established, strong armored forces are to be ferried across the channel to break the German resistance along the coast and to seize the line of the Oise-St. Quentin. A movement towards Antwerp will then follow to widen the salient and permit the movement of additional forces across the channel between Boulogne and Antwerp. (See Map A).

9. U. S. and British forces as follows should be in Great Britain or en route when the land attack begins:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>British</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(can be available)</td>
<td>(Numbers of British aircraft shown are minimum requirements. Information is not at hand as to how many the British can make available.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,450 Fighters</td>
<td>1,550 Fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,800 Combat other than fighters</td>
<td>1,000 Combat other than fighters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400 Transport aircraft)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Infantry Divisions</td>
<td>200 Transports. (It is estimated that the British can make available.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Armored Divisions</td>
<td>15 Infantry Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Motorized Divisions</td>
<td>3 Armored Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Air-borne Division</td>
<td>1 Parachute Brig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Parachute Ens.</td>
<td>3 A.A. Gps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 A.A. Regts.</td>
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9. General Comments.

a. Some protective effect will be felt in the Atlantic Ocean as a result of a major attack against West Europe. The garrisons in the Atlantic will not require material reinforcement. This does not apply to the Pacific, to India, and to the Middle East, consequently our protective measures in those regions must be adequate.

b. U. S. troops will be equipped and trained in time for the operation.
American shipping available for movement overseas of the U. S. troops will transport approximately 40% of the number involved by April 1, 1943. If this movement must depend entirely on available U. S. shipping, the date of initiating the invasion of France must be postponed until late summer 1943, by which time U. S. shipping can effect the overseas movement of the entire force.

d. An accurate estimate of the availability early in 1943 of all Allied shipping is being made by the CO, SOS. However, it is believed that when the movement of British reinforcements to the Middle and Far East now projected for 1942 has been effected, and the situation in those areas stabilized, sufficient passenger transports can be made available for the movement of U. S. troops to England to meet the requirements of this plan. Additional cargo vessels will have to be diverted after January 1, 1943 to support this operation.

e. Landing craft necessary for the operation is not available at present in sufficient quantities to support the cross-channel movement. Provision for some 7,000 landing craft considered essential for this operation has been initiated. However, only through intensification of this construction program, immediately after agreement in principle has been reached, can this number possibly be procured.

f. One of our current tasks is to send to Russia sufficient material aid to keep that nation in the war as an active participant. Since the execution of the contemplated plan is not feasible in 1942, other means of rendering assistance to Russia will have to be undertaken. This definitely involves air support to the Middle East; although this is a British responsibility, our vital interests are involved.

Development and construction of air fields, bases, cantonments, etc., in the British Isles in preparation for invasion of Western Europe in 1943 must be substantially completed in 1942.

g. An advantage of this plan is that, while it is still in the preparatory stages, if the German army should show signs of imminent collapse, an invasion of Western Europe can be carried out on a limited scale.
10. Modified Plan.

The following represents what can be accomplished to effect an invasion of France on or about September 15, 1942 should a decision be made to advance the date of execution of the operation.

a. U. S. troops that can be made available and arrive in England in time to participate. (Figures include 34th Division and 1st Armored Division).

Air Forces.

400 Fighters
333 Combat other than fighters
200 Transport

Ground Forces.

2 1/2 Infantry Divisions and 1 Armored Division, or
1 1/2 Infantry Divisions and 2 Armored Divisions, or
1 3/4 Infantry Divisions, 1 Armored Division, 4 Parachute Bns., and 10 Antiaircraft Regiments.

b. Inclusive of the above, a total of six Infantry, three Armored, and two Motorized Divisions, four Parachute Battalions, and ten Antiaircraft Regiments will be equipped and trained in the U. S. in time to participate in this operation. Shortage in shipping precludes transporting more than the number indicated unless shipping is diverted from another commitment.

c. British troops estimated to be available to participate.

Air Forces.

No data is at hand as to how many planes the British can make available. The minimum considered essential, exclusive of U. S. air forces, is 2,600 fighters, 2,400 combat other than fighters, and all available transport aircraft.

Ground Forces.

15 Infantry Divisions
3 Armored Divisions
1 Parachute Brigade
3 Antiaircraft Groups.
d. THIS LIMITED OPERATION CAN BE JUSTIFIED ONLY IN CASE

(1) THE SITUATION OF THE RUSSIAN FRONT BECOMES DESPERATE, i.e., the success of German arms becomes so complete as to threaten the imminent collapse of Russian resistance unless the pressure is relieved by an attack from the west by British and American troops. In this case the attack should be considered as a sacrifice in the common good.

(2) THE GERMAN SITUATION IN WESTERN EUROPE BECOMES CRITICALLY WEAKENED.

11. The details of necessary Naval support are under study.

12. There is attached a paper commenting upon the employment of U. S. troops in Syria, in Libya, and in Northwest Africa.

Chief of Staff.