July 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL
ADMIRAL KING
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR LONDON CONFERENCE — JULY, 1942.

1. O.K.

2. The military and naval strategic changes have been so great since Mr. Churchill’s visit to Washington that it becomes necessary to reach immediate agreement on joint operational plans between the British and ourselves along two lines:

   (A) Definite plans for the balance of 1942.

   (B) Tentative plans for the year 1943 which, of course, will be subject to change in the light of occurrences in 1942, and which should be initiated at this time in all cases involving preparation in 1942 for operations in 1943.

3.

   (A) The common aim of the United Nations must be the defeat of the Axis Powers. There cannot be compromise on this point.

   (B) We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.

   (C) Absolute coordinated use of British and American forces is essential.

   (D) All available U.S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably used.

   (E) It is of the highest importance that U.S. ground troops be brought into action against the enemy in 1942.
4. British and American material to Russia must be carried out in good faith. If the Persian route of delivery is used, preference must be given to combat material. This aid must continue as long as delivery is possible and Russia must be encouraged to continue resistance. Only complete collapse, which seems unthinkable, should alter this determination on our part.

5. In regard to 1942, you will carefully investigate the possibility of executing SLEDGEHAMMER. Such an operation would definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the turning point which would save Russia this year. SLEDGEHAMMER is of such grave importance that grave reasons are to accomplish it. You should strongly urge immediate all-out preparations for it, that it be pushed with utmost vigor, and that it be executed whether or not Russian collapse becomes imminent. In the event of probable Russian collapse, SLEDGEHAMMER becomes not merely advisable but imperative. The principle objective of SLEDGEHAMMER is the positive diversion of German Air Forces from the Russian Front.

6. Only if you are completely convinced that SLEDGEHAMMER is impossible of execution with reasonable chances of serving its intended purpose, inform me.

7. If SLEDGEHAMMER is finally and definitely out of the picture, I want you to consider the world situation as it exists at that time.

   It is my present view of the world picture that:

   (a) If Russia contains a large German force against her, ROUNDUP becomes possible in 1943, and plans for ROUNDUP should be immediately considered and preparations made for it.

   (b) If Russia collapses and German air and ground forces are released, ROUNDUP may be impossible of fulfillment in 1943.

8. The Middle East should be held as strongly as possible whether Russia collapses or not. I want you to take into consideration the effect of losing the Middle East. Such loss means in series:

   (1) Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal.

   (2) Loss of Syria.

   (3) Loss of Mosul oil wells.

   (4) Loss of the Persian Gulf through attacks from the north and west, together with access to all Persian Gulf oil.
(5) Joining hands between Germany and Japan and the probable loss of the Indian Ocean.

(6) The very important probability of German occupation of Tunia, Algiers, Morocco, Dakar and the cutting of the ferry route through Freetown and Liberia.

(7) Serious danger of all shipping in the South Atlantic and serious danger to Brazil and the whole of the East Coast of South America. I include in the above possibilities the use by the Germans of Spain, Portugal and other territories.

(8) You will the best methods of holding the Middle East. These methods include definitely:

(a) Sending aid and ground forces to the Persian Gulf, to Syria and to Egypt.

(b) A new operation in Morocco and Algiers intended to drive in against the backdoor of Rommel's armies. The attitude of French Colonial troops is still in doubt.

(9) I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible unless no plan can be worked out for British and American unity of action in Europe and Africa beginning in 1942. It is of the utmost importance that we appreciate that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete German domination of Europe and Africa. On the other hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany, or the holding of Germany in 1943 or in 1943 means probable, eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatres and in the Near East. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life.

(10) Please remember three cardinal principles — speed of decision on plans, unity of plans, attack combined with defense but not defense alone.

(11) I hope for total agreement within one week of your arrival.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF a39e03