CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

LIGHT METALS

PLANT REPORT

NO 4

GEBRUDER GIULINI GmbH

LUDWIGSHAFEN-AM-RHEIN

GERMANY

Dates of Plant Survey:

21 June 2 2 June 1945

[20 SEPT WRITTEN ON PAPER IN PENCIL]

COPY NO 38

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

LIGHT METALS

PLANT REPORT NO 4

GEBRUDER GIULINI GmbH

LUDWIGSHAFEN-AM-RHEIN

GERMANY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I SUMMARY
II THE PLANT AND ITS FUNCTION IN ENEMY ECONOMY
III ATTACKS
IV EFFECTS OF BOMBING
V INTELLIGENCE CHECK
VI EVALUATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS
     REFERENCE NOTES

EXHIBITS - A - Plant layout, showing alumina area and air raid bunkers (not included in this scan)
                  - B - Coal and electrical power consumption
                  - C1- Employee record (Chart) C2- Employees 1941-1944
                  - D - Bomb Plots, raids of 16-17 April, 9-10 August, 5-6 September and 20-21 December 1943 (Not included in this scan)
                  - E - Bomb Plots, raids of 20 March, 22-23 April, 3 September and 21 September 1944 (Not included in this scan)
                  - F - Bomb plots, raids of 19 October and 5 November 1944, and 5 January and 21 January, 1945 (Not included in this scan)
                  - G - Bomb plots, raids of 1 February, 18 February, 1 March and 8 March 1945 (Not included in this scan)
                  - H - Tabulation of bomb damage
                  - I - Alumina production data
                  - J - Receipts of raw materials

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I SUMMARY

1. The plant of Gebrüder Giulini GmbH was located at Mundenheim, a suburb of Ludwigshafen-am-Rhein, about two miles south of Ludwigshafen proper. It occupied an area of about 218 acres, approximately rectangular in shape, bordering on the Rhine river. The alumina works proper occupied about 30.5 acres of the plant area.

2. This plant was originally built as a chemical plant; bauxite reduction was later incorporated as a principal process. Its maximum reduction capacity was 145,000 tons of alumina per year, or about 22 percent of Germany's total estimated production. However, the plant never operated at full capacity.

a. A small pilot plant for the reduction of alumina to aluminum also located in the Ludwigshafen plant area was leased to, and operated by the Durener Metallwerke AG at the instigation of the German government. This unit had a maximum productive capacity of 500 tons of aluminum per year.

3. Since this plant study is primarily concerned with the light metal operations of Gebruder Giulini, this report will deal only with those aspects except where otherwise specifically noted.

4. The following air attacks either hit the light metal section of the plant or damaged it by near misses;

a. Six attacks were directed against the plant in 1940 but no knowledge of them existed at the plant. Ten other raids hit the plant in parts other than the light metal section.

5. Despite the fact that damage to the plant as a whole was fairly extensive, the alumina unit suffered vital damage in only two raids. In the 21 September 1944 raid, the resulting four-week shutdown of the Bayer unit caused a production loss of about 1,000 tons of alumina. The 18 February 1945 raid caused extensive physical loss by the destruction of the alumina reduction pilot plant, but bauxite reduction was virtually unaffected.

6. Generally the plant would have been able to recover its alumina production within two to six weeks after bombing, but was never in haste to do so, since other factors, such as transportation difficulties and delays in obtaining coal and bauxite, controlled plant operation level.

7. The most vulnerable part of the plant was the electrical transformers, since none was held in reserve and new transformers were exceedingly difficult to obtain. Second in vulnerability were the water supply pumps. The third sensitive spot was considered to be the gas producer. Both inside and outside the plant area, destruction of railroad spurs and main lines seriously affected plant production through the denial of raw materials.

8. The alumina production capacity of Gebrüder Giulini GmbH was determined to be 22 per cent of the German total, as opposed to the 60 per cent production reported in Intelligence information, photo significance of local coal stockpiles was not stressed. These were determined by Team 145 to be worthwhile targets as they were large-sized, and easily fired by incendiary action, also extensive labor was involved because large stockpiles had to be moved in order to reach focal points of the fire.

II THE PLANT AND ITS FUNCTION IN ENEMY ECONOMY

1. The light metal activities of Gebruder Giulini were primarily the reduction of bauxite into alumina. Its alumina capacity of 145,000 tons per year was about 22 per cent of the estimated total capacity of Germany. A small pilot plant for the reduction of alumina into aluminum had a capacity of about 500 tons of aluminum per year; this was a negligible amount in Germany's aluminum production.

2. Description

a. Gebruder Giulini GmbH is located in the town of Kundenheim, a suburb about two miles south of Ludwigshafen-am-Rhein, on the bank of the Rhine River. The entire plant occupied an approximately rectangular shaped area of 218 acres. Of this, the aluminum unit occupied about 30.5 acres and consisted of eight large building units. These are identified in Exhibit A. They have no outstanding physical characteristics which would serve to distinguish them from other buildings of the plant, and are of steel frame, brick wall and tile roof construction.

b. Principal means of transportation of materials was by rail. Brown coal and furnace coal were received by barge as well as by rail; barge deliveries, however, were never dependable enough to insure independence from rail transport.

c. Industrial water was pumped from a nearby Rhine river basin; this basin and pumping station were plant-owned facilities.

d. A company-owned 14,000 KWH coal-generating power station, in the plant area, provided all required electrical power. Coal for electricity was supplied by the Rhinesche-Westphalian Coal Syndicate of Mannheim. (Exhibit B)

e. Bauxite was reduced to alumina by two methods; the Pyrogen process and the Bayer process, in the former the bauxite was dry-roasted with caustic soda. In the latter method a rotating steam pressure drum was used for the separation of the aluminate from the residue.

f. Air raid precautions in the area were well organized. Bunkers were easily accessible, and generously and uniformly located throughout the plant. Workers were allowed five minutes before the time of expected attack to reach their bunkers. A full-time air raid chief warden supervised all air raid precautions and programs. The entire plant was divided into four parts, each under a deputy warden, who also worked as a regular employee. An ambulance, a first aid expert, and six firemen (five at night) were on full time duty. Fire fighting was facilitated by water supply from wells drilled specifically for that purpose, located throughout the plant area. Fires were fought with sand, water and standard types of fire extinguishers.

3. Ownership and Management

a. Gebruder Giulini GmbH was said to be one of the few family-controlled companies in Germany. Baron Curt von Salmuth controlled 40 per cent of the stock, en other 40 per cent was in Italian hands and 20 per cent was owned by German nationals.

b. Dr Edgar Giulini, one of the owners, was managing director. His cousin, Dr Renzo Giulini, was in charge of all technical and chemical matters. Baron von Salmuth was general manager. Dr Franz Bauer was in charge of accounting, personnel and legal matters. Dr Hermann Ruether managed the alumina plant. Dr Hans Benzinger managed the alumina reduction plant for Durener Metallwerke A.G. Baron von Salmuth and Dr Bauer were interviewed.

c. Baron von Salmuth joined the German army in 1914 as an officer and served until 1920. He studied economics and law, and was then employed by Roechlin Brothers at Voelkingen, near Saarbrucken, in the iron and coal trade. In 1932, he married into the Giulini family and became a member of Gebrüder Giulini. In January 1945, von Salmuth stated that he was arrested for a political offense by the Gestapo; this was alledgedly for declaring at a Wehrmacht officers' party that Germany had lost the war and should have quit long ago. He was held in a Gestapo jail in Heidelberg, and was informed by his lawyer that he was to be executed. Allied occupation occurred before the scheduled execution.

d. Dr Bauer graduated from universities at Frankfurt, Heidelberg and Mannheim. He became a chartered accountant in 1925, from 1925 to 1929 working for the German finance ministry. He joined Gebrüder Giulini in 1932 as chief accountant, and in 1933 was appointed legal advisor. Dr Bauer claimed that in 1938 or 1939 he filed an application to become a Nazi party aspirant, but was never approved as a party member and stopped paying dues in 1943.

4. Personnel

a. Gebruder Giulini GmbH had 2,858 people in their employ in January 1945. Of these, 1,000 were employed in the alumina plant. Durener Metallwerke employed about 40 in its leased aluminum reduction plant. No women were employed in the foundries. About 34 per cent of the employees were German, 54 per cent were foreigners, and 12 per cent prisoners of war. (Exhibit C) The plant operated on a three-shift schedule; from 0600 to 1400, from 1400 to 2200, and from 2200 to 0600. About 42 per cent of the employees worked on the first shift, 29 per cent on the second shift, and 29 per cent on the third shift.

III ATTACKS

1. The following tabulation of attack data covers the 23 raids in which the Giulini plant was attacked or hit. The seven attacks that affected the light metal section are indicated by an asterisk.

ATTACK DATA

NOTE: In the above table, clusters of 110 4-lb IBs are referred to as 500-lb IBs.

IV EFFECTS OF BOMBING

1. The Ludwigshafen-Mannheim area was bombed over 200 times from June 1940 till March 1945, when American troops occupied the area. A large percentage of these raids were directed against other plants and installations in the general vicinity; these resulted in varying amounts of blast damage to walls, windows, doors and roofs in the Giulini plant. However, this damage was not extensive and is not analyzed in detail in this report. Six raids were directed against the plant in 1940 but no bombs fell in the plant area. In 17 other raids bombs fell on the Giulini plant area. Damage to the light metal section occurred in seven of the raids.

a. During attacks affecting the light metal section of the plant, three of the 61 production buildings were destroyed, 13 received structural damage and the remainder were superficially injured. In addition, railroad tracks, power lines, sewage lines and water mains were damaged, and stored electrical equipment was destroyed. Also made unusable were 1,580 tons of caustic soda, 120 tons of crystal soda, 540 tons of bauxite, 1,500 tons of limestone and 40 tons of hydrated alumina. Fire destroyed about 2,070 tons of brown coal. Twenty-eight employees were killed within the plant area. Seven hundred and eighty-four tons of alumina, the finished product, were unsalvageable after the raid of 21 September 1944.

2. Production loss

a. In only two raids was any material production loss attributed to bombing of the plant itself. As a result of Raid 9 on 9/10 August 1943, about 5,000 tons of alumina production were lost, and Raid 15, 21 September 1944, accounted for about 4,000 tons of alumina production being lost. it should be noted that in 1943 and 1944 the plant operated at about 60 per cent of maximum capacity. It was not determined how much of this unused plant capacity was through general disruption of transportation by bombing, and how much the result of governmentally-directed policies. The drop in production in January 1945 to 15 per cent of capacity was entirely caused by bombing of transportation facilities in western Germany. The plant manager stated that no close production schedules were possible after 1943, as they were not able to predict the receipt of raw materials. (Exhibit I shows the plant's alumina production from 1942 to the end of the war.)

3. Causes for Loss

a. Specific causes for the production loss of the 9/10 August 1943 raid were the destruction of two caustic hoppers in the alumina precipitation plant. This, together with damaged water and power lines, resulted in the clogging of the alumina lines and machinery. In the 21 September 1944 raid, the caustic soda concentrating plant, the caustic soda recovery plant, electric cables along side the precipitation plant, two water mains, and three rotating kilns were damaged and one kiln destroyed. This damage caused the Bayer unit to shut down for four weeks. The loss of raw materials mentioned in paragraph 14a resulted in a negligible production loss the exact extent of which could not be determined.

b. Records covering the man-hours diverted for reconstruction were destroyed by fire and looting. However, it was believed that these labor expenditures were unimportant. When the production units were rendered inoperative through damage, the use of available, unemployed labor was not considered as a diversion.

c. Approximately 820,100 man-hours were lost as a result of air raid alerts and raids from 1941 until occupation in 1945. In addition to this, 17 men were employed in full-time air raid precaution duties; over a period of three years, this involved a cost of about 140,000 man-hours.

(1) Man-hours lost per year as a result of air raids were as follows:

1941 - 47,500
1942 - 76,000
1943 - 126,600
1944 - 380,000
until occupation in March 1945 - 190,000

d. This was the only industrial unit visited by this team at which the management admitted that bombing adversely affected morale and efficiency. The amount of its effect was impossible to estimate, and no attempt to record this had been made. Absenteeism was increased by bombing, and for the year 1944, was recorded as a loss of about 23,358 man-hours for wage workers and 15,379 man-hours for salaried employees. These figures are for the entire plant - no detailed breakdown for the aluminum unit was kept.

e. Bombing of rail and barge transportation facilities in western and southern Germany was the major cause of Giulini's constantly decreasing production. Raw materials required for alumina production are: bauxite, sodium sulphate, soda ash, limestone (Na₂CO₃), caustic soda (NaOH), brown coal anthracite, and boiler coal. These were shipped by rail and/or barge from Hungary, Yugoslavia, France, Albania, and western and southern Germany. As railways and canals were bombed, the flow of these raw materials became more and more erratic, stockpiles were reduced, and the non-receipt of any single raw material could—and did--become the controlling item of production. Exhibit J shows the receipts of bauxite, sodium sulphate, soda ash, limestone, caustic soda, brown coal, anthracite and boiler coal. It is to be noted that caustic soda and limestone receipts were practically non-existent for months. This reduced Giulini's production to about 15 per cent of capacity in January 1945. Beginning in the summer of 1944, rail delivery of coal became uncertain and erratic. However, because of the plant's stockpiles, this did not affect production until about January 1945.

4. Recuperability Cycle

a. Pre-raid production levels were restored in six weeks following the 9/10 August 1943 raid, and in four weeks following the 21 September 1944 raid. No dispersal was undertaken, and pre-raid standards of alumina were maintained. Since the plant had not been producing at maximum capacity prior to each case, the use of undamaged portions of the plant facilitated return to pre-raid production levels.

5. Vulnerability

a. Inside the plant area, the power plant (particularly transformer stations), water pumping stations, the gas plant, and caustic-treatment buildings appeared to be the most vulnerable parts of the industrial process. Firing of coal stockpiles by incendiary action was of high nuisance value. Combined with raw material shortages caused by transportation disruptions, this latter proved an effective point of attack.

b. The operation of the plant was vulnerable to damage to rail and barge transportation because scheduled receipts of raw materials were disrupted and eventually reduced production.

c. Transportation disruptions also affected the plant's ability to ship finished alumina to users. No detailed figures are available.

V INTELLIGENCE CHECK

1. Air Ministry Information sheet No 5 (b) 10a, dated 26 November 1942, stated of this plant, "It is one of the key plants of the aluminum industry in Germany, whose combined output accounts for 60 per cent of the production of Axis-controlled Europe." However, the production of Gebruder Giulini GmbH at Ludwigshafen was determined by Team 145 to be about 22 per cent of the total German production of alumina. Products were correctly reported in the Information Sheet. In Air Ministry Ill ustration No 5 (b) 10 a/9, dated August 1944, Bldgs B5, B6, C6, C7 and C8 were incorrectly reported to be parts of the alumina unit. Unidentified Bldg 5, in Illustration 5 (b) 10 a/9 was a fertilizer plant. Vital units were determined to be transformers, water supply, and caustic processing buildings. No photo interpretation damage or recuperation reports were available for checking.

VI EVALUATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS

1. Survey of Gebruder Giulini GmbH further confirmed the impressions received at other such plants that power and transportation were the most vulnerable points in the attack of alumina or aluminum reduction units.

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REFERENCE NOTES

No 1 - Coal and electric power consumed for light metals production and for other plant operations, 1942 -1945

No 2 - Distribution of employees as of 1 January 1942 -1945

No 3 - Alumina production and production costs 1942 -1945

No 4 - Receipts of raw materials showing source and supplier

(Reference notes are filed with the records of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, War Department, Washington, D.C., care of The Adjutant General)

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EXHIBIT A

PLANT LAYOUT, SHOWING ALUMINA AREA AND AIR RAID BUNKERS

(Not Included, due to being hugely oversize for my scanner)

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EXHIBIT B

COAL AND ELECTRICAL POWER CONSUMPTION

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EXHIBIT C

C1 EMPLOYEE RECORD (CHART)
C2 EMPLOYEES 1941-1944

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EXHIBIT C-2

EMPLOYEES 1941 - 1944

a) Total
b) Alumina Plant

EMPLOYEE RECORD REFERENCE DATA 2

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EXHIBIT D

BOMB PLOTS, RAIDS OF 16-17 APRIL, 9-10 AUGUST, 5-6 SEPTEMBER AND 20-21 DECEMBER 1943

(Not Included, due to being hugely oversize for my scanner)

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EXHIBIT E

BOMB PLOTS, RAIDS OF 20 MARCH, 22-23 APRIL, 3 SEPTEMBER AND 21 SEPTEMBER 1944

(Not Included, due to being hugely oversize for my scanner)

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EXHIBIT F

BOMB PLOTS, RAIDS OF 19 OCTOBER AND 5 NOVEMBER, 1944, AND 5 JANUARY AND 21 JANUARY 1945

(Not Included, due to being hugely oversize for my scanner)

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EXHIBIT G

BOMB PLOTS, RAIDS OF 1 FEBRUARY, 18 FEBRUARY, 1 MARCH AND 8 MARCH, 1945

(Not Included, due to being hugely oversize for my scanner)

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EXHIBIT H

TABULATION OF BOMB DAMAGE

TABULATION OF BOMB HITS AND BOMB DAMAGE IN THE LIGHT METAL SECTION OF THE PLANT

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EXHIBIT I

ALUMINA PRODUCTION DATA

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EXHIBIT J

RECEIPTS OF RAW MATERIALS

J-1
J-2