JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

Note by the Secretaries

The attached report, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

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OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. An analysis has been made of possible UNITED NATIONS courses of action in the PACIFIC-Asiatic area in 1943 and 1944 to conform to the objectives set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in J.C.S. 290/1. The analysis is contained in Enclosure "A."

2. The courses of action examined and conclusions reached are as follows:

a. Far Eastern theater

   (1) ANAKIM and Revised ANAKIM
       Retained as suitable. Vital to implementing the strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN and to keeping CHINA in the war.

   (2) Air operations in and from CHINA
       Retained. Close coordination with other elements of plan are essential.

   (3) Operations to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA
       Retained for implementation subsequent to the recapture of BURMA as a vital part of the strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN.

b. PACIFIC theater

   (1) Operations in the SOLOMONS and BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO
       Retained. Provides for retaining the initiative, maintaining pressure on JAPAN, and the defense of AUSTRALIA.

   (2) Operations in NEW GUINEA
       Retained. The capture of NEW GUINEA will facilitate the opening of a line of communications to the CELIBES SEA and contribute to the defense of AUSTRALIA.
3) Operations in eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES
Retained. Due to limitation of forces, operations other than air warfare should be restricted to the seizure of those islands necessary to the capture of NEW GUINEA.

4) Operations in the MARSHALL ISLANDS
Retained. Shortens line of communications to SOUTHWEST PACIFIC and CELEBES SEA.

5) Operations in the CAROLINE ISLANDS
Retained. Necessary to gain control of central PACIFIC, thereby facilitating establishment of line of communications to CELEBES SEA. Will enable UNITED NATIONS forces to directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.

6) Operations in the northern PACIFIC, after the ejection of Japanese from the ALEUTIANS
Rejected. Not in accordance with strategic concept.

3. Conclusions:

a. Offensive operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST in 1943-1944 should have the following objectives:

1) Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA.

2) Seizure of BURMA.

3) Ejection of the Japanese from the ALEUTIANS.

4) Seizure of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS.

5) Seizure of the SOLOMONS, the EISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, and Japanese held NEW GUINEA.

b. Operations to gain these objectives will be restricted by the availability of trained amphibious divisions and amphibious craft.
ENCLOSURE "A"

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

4. To prepare an analysis of possible UNITED NATIONS courses of action in the PACIFIC-Asiatic area in 1943 and 1944, in conformity with UNITED NATIONS strategy.

ASSUMPTIONS

5. It is assumed that:
   a. CHINA will continue in the war against JAPAN.
   b. It is the intention of JAPAN to invade SIBERIA at a time advantageous to her and disadvantageous to RUSSIA, and before GERMANY is defeated.

6. After a thorough estimate of the situation for 1943-44 was made, it was concluded that in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST:
   a. The UNITED NATIONS should conduct limited offensive operations in order to maintain pressure on JAPAN, retain the initiative, and attain or retain positions of readiness for a full-scale offensive against JAPAN, and in order to keep CHINA in the war.
   b. For these purposes, UNITED STATES naval forces should be increased to a maximum consistent with the minimum requirements in the ATLANTIC, and with due regard to the requirements of the main effort against the European AXIS, air and ground forces should be provided so as to facilitate joint action and make optimum use of the increasing strength of UNITED STATES naval forces.

7. J.C.S. 287/1 sets forth a strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN. Based on this strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN, the following courses of action are open to the UNITED NATIONS:
a. In the Asiatic theater:
   (1) Operations ANAKIM and Revised ANAKIM.
   (2) Air operations in and from CHINA.
   (3) Initiation of operations to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA.

b. In the PACIFIC theater:
   (1) Operations in the SOLOMONS and in the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.
   (2) Operations in NEW GUINEA.
   (3) Operations in the eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.
   (4) Operations in the MARSHALL ISLANDS.
   (5) Operations in the CAROLINE ISLANDS.
   (6) Operations in the northern PACIFIC.

PART I

OPERATIONS IN ASIA

8. The operation ANAKIM and Revised ANAKIM
   This operation is discussed in J.C.S. 303.

9. Air operations in and from CHINA
   a. General examination of this course of action.
      (1) This course of action is suitable.
      (2) The feasibility of the current plan for air operations in CHINA is limited by the problem of supply. Air transport is the only route of supply leading into CHINA and air operations in CHINA during 1943 and 1944 will expand in size and scope of operations, in direct proportion to the increase in the amount of supplies made available to the air force in CHINA.
   b. In the event that the operation ANAKIM or a Revised ANAKIM is successful, it is estimated that supplies to CHINA will begin to move by land routes in approximately six months. A rapid expansion of the capacity of the air route will be
immediately practicable, due to the added facilities available at the western terminus, and the existence of more favorable operating conditions.

2. Current plans for the air transport route to CHINA contemplate that its present capacity of approximately 3,000 tons per month may be expanded to approximately 10,000 tons per month by the end of 1943. Due to physical limitations imposed by the area in which this line operates, it is doubtful whether this latter figure can be exceeded until ANAKIM or a Revised ANAKIN has been accomplished.

3. The Commanding General, 14th Air Force, estimates that the forces required to conduct planned combat operations in CHINA are as follows:

- 4 Fighter Groups: 300 airplanes
- 2 Medium Bomber Groups: 125 "
- 1 Heavy Bomber Group: 95 "
- 1 Recon. Squadron: 24 "

**TOTAL**: 473 airplanes

4. The Commanding General, 14th Air Force, estimates that this force can be operated on a monthly supply of 7,128 tons. This is only possible by cutting the ground echelon T/O approximately in half and utilizing local sources of supply to the utmost.

5. It is believed that the operation of this force will accomplish the following objectives:

   1. Subject the Japanese Air Force to a very costly attrition.
   2. Permit sustained and damaging attacks against Japanese shipping on the YANGTSE RIVER, along the CHINA coast, and out to sea to include all of the islands of FORMOSA and HAINAN and the sea lane between JAPAN and SHANGHAI.
   3. Permit damaging air attack on Japanese industrial targets as far north as SHAN-HAI-KWAN and east to include NANKING, SHANGHAI, and the island of FORMOSA.
(4) Permit limited bombardment attacks on the mainland of JAPAN.

(5) Make extensive preparations for the eventual operation of large air forces to be used in the air offensive against JAPAN proper.

(6) Give support to Chinese ground forces.

g. Air operations in and from CHINA are considered a vital and necessary step in the "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of JAPAN," J.O.S. 287/1. The scale and tempo of the air operations must be carefully gauged as they progress, in the light of probable Japanese reaction. If advanced too rapidly they might precipitate a large scale land offensive by the Japanese in CHINA, at an earlier date than we consider desirable.

h. Following these limited operations, the large scale, sustained air offensive against JAPAN proper becomes feasible when supply routes to CHINA are developed to the point where the forces involved can be logistically maintained. This latter phase will undoubtedly require logistic support through a CHINA port in order that it may be conducted on the scale we contemplate.

10. Operations to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA.

a. After the recapture of BURMA, operations should be initiated to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA. Such operations will compel JAPAN to disperse her forces and will provide an additional front in which Japanese forces may be engaged. These operations probably will extend from the RANGOON area down the JAVA PENINSULA towards SINGAPORE and to SUMATRA.

b. The operations should be undertaken by British Commonwealth Forces because the area is one of British strategic
responsibility. These operations should be undertaken after
the recapture of BURMA and should commence in 1944.

PART II

OPERATIONS IN PACIFIC

11. Operations in the SOLOMONS and in the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

a. Operations now directed.

(1) Operations for the seizure of the SOLOMONS-BISMARCK
ARCHIPELAGO have been under way since July, 1942 (about
nine months). The tasks prescribed by the latest directive
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (March 28, 1943) are quoted
below:

"TASKS

4. (a) Establish airfields on KIRIWINA and
WOODLARK ISLANDS.

(b) Seize LAE - SALAMANCA - FINSCHAPEN - MADANG
area and occupy western NEW BRITAIN.

(c) Seize and occupy SOLOMON ISLANDS to include
the southern portion of BOUGAINVILLE.

5. PURPOSE. To inflict losses on Japanese forces,
to deny these areas to JAPAN, to contain Japanese
forces in the PACIFIC Theater by maintaining the
initiative, and to prepare for the ultimate seizure
of BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO."

b. Present status of operations.

(1) General.

The Supreme Commander, SWPA, gives June 15, 1943, as
the target date for the occupation of KIRIWINA and WOOD-
LARK ISLANDS. No date is indicated for subsequent phases
of the entire operation.
(2) Forces required.

It is estimated that on July 1, 1943, UNITED NATIONS forces in the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC areas will total 14 offensive divisions and 2,106 combat aircraft. These forces, together with naval forces in the area, are considered adequate for the operations directed.

(3) Time of completion.

The exact timing of the successive operations is impracticable at this time to predict, since the enemy reaction to the plans is indeterminate, and limited topographical intelligence may result in unexpected hindrances. The operations may run well into 1944.

c. Subsequent operations.

(1) Capture BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

(a) General.

UNITED NATIONS strategic plans envisage the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO (including ADMIRALTY ISLANDS) following the completion of tasks indicated in paragraph a above.

The existing concept of operations provides initially for the capture of KAVIENG, in order to isolate sea communications to RABAUL. After the establishment of airfields in NEW BRITAIN and NEW IRELAND, the defenses of RABAUL will be heavily attacked by land-based aviation. When the enemy defenses are softened up, capture of the area will be made by two amphibious forces. One force will be mounted from the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC and one from the SOUTH PACIFIC.

After the seizure of the NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND area, the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS can be neutralized by land-based aviation operating from NEW GUINEA and NEW BRITAIN. Seizure will be made by amphibious forces.
(b) Forces required.

The Supreme Commander, SWPA, estimates that 7 infantry divisions, 5 of which are amphibious, will be required to seize KAVIENG and capture RABAUL. It is believed, however, that with effective air neutralization of the RABAUL area, the foregoing estimate may be reduced to 5 divisions, 3 of which would be amphibious.

The timing of the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO will determine to a great extent the availability of ground forces. Provided there is sufficient time for reorganization and recuperation of units, it appears the 5 divisions can be provided from the 18 offensive divisions allocated to the area as of January 1, 1944. This figure will be subject to revision after the operations now projected for the area get under way.

The ground forces required for the successive operations in the BISMARCK-NEW GUINEA area must take into account the losses from malaria and battle casualties which necessitate withdrawal of troops to rear areas for rehabilitation after four to six months.

It appears that 2,579 combat aircraft allocated to the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC as of January 1, 1944, will be sufficient to complete the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

(c) Time required for operation.

Assuming the UNITED NATIONS establish positions in western NEW BRITAIN and southern BOUGAINVILLE by December 1, 1943, it is estimated that, exclusive of medical rehabilitation of personnel, at least two months will be required to reorganize amphibious units, develop the advance air bases, and make the complete preparations.
for the amphibious attack on the RABAUL area. It is estimated that a minimum of two months will be required to complete the operations subsequent to the landing attack on RABAUL. From the foregoing, it appears that the most optimistic estimates indicate that the BISMARCK operations cannot be completed before April 1, 1944.

12. Operations in NEW GUINEA.

a. Capture NEW GUINEA.

After the seizure of the HUON PENINSULA and the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, our strategic plans contemplate operations to extend our line of communications through the PACIFIC to the HALMAHERA-northwest CELEBES area. The control of NEW GUINEA to include the VOGELKOP area is obviously essential to accomplishing this objective.

The concept of operations for the seizure of NEW GUINEA envisages the projection of our line of communications to the VOGELKOP region by the successive seizure of air bases along the north and southwest coasts.

The initial phases of operations along the north coast consist primarily of air-ground action, covered by air and fleet operations to prevent interference by enemy counter-attacks. Ground forces will be employed in the seizure of air bases by shore-to-shore amphibious operations.

In order to gain control of the ARAPURA-BANDA seas and of the south coast of NEW GUINEA, it will be necessary to seize AROE, KRI, and possibly TANIMBAR Island.

b. The operations to capture NEW GUINEA will consist of two phases as follows:

PHASE I

(1) Seizure of north coast of NEW GUINEA to include CAPE D'URVILLE.

(2) Establishment of an air base on southwest coast of NEW GUINEA as a preliminary to seizure of TANIMBAR Islands.

Possible occupation of TANIMBAR Island.
PHASE II

(1) Capture of the VOGELKOP area to include the Island of WAIGEO.

This phase will be accomplished by the seizure of SCHOUTEN and JAFEN Islands on the north coast. The southern and western portion of the VOGELKOP will be seized after we have established positions in McIver Gulf and Ambonia.

c. The capture of NEW GUINEA envisages a movement along the coast line 1,200 miles in length. The forces required for this operation, so distant in the future, cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy. After the loss of the HUON PENINSULA and the RABAUL area, the enemy may decide to withdraw to a more advantageous defensive position in the CELEBES SEA area. On the other hand, he may be able to build up his defenses in depth along the entire north coast.

The extent of our control of the sea to the north of NEW GUINEA will in a great measure determine the ease with which we eject him from the area.

d. Estimate of enemy forces.

(1) Ground forces

It is estimated that the Japanese now have approximately 5 divisions deployed in the area. It is assumed that this force could be augmented to a total of 8 divisions. Port facilities and enemy shipping will be limiting factors.

(2) Air forces

It is estimated that the Japanese now have approximately 807 operative aircraft deployed in this area (SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC). It is assumed that the Japanese could reinforce to a total of 1,000 to 1,200 aircraft, depending on the state of their activity and requirements on other fronts.

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c. Estimate of UNITED NATIONS forces required.

(1) Ground forces (assault units)
   2 air-borne divisions
   16 infantry divisions (including 5 amphibious)
   2 parachute regiments

(2) Air forces
   (a) Assault

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<th>Aircraft</th>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>L/DB</td>
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   (b) Area defense

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<td>Troop Carrier</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>739</strong></td>
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</table>

   (3) Naval forces
   Sufficient forces to
   (a) Cover advances along the north and south coasts of NEW GUINEA.
   (b) Protect line of communications.
   (c) Provide naval defense in ARAFURA-BANDA Seas.

13. Further operations to eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

a. Paragraph 12 discussed the implications of a campaign through the ARAFURA-BANDA sea area for the purpose of seizing the VOGELKOP region. If those operations are not conducted, other offensive-defensive operations should be undertaken in the TIMOR-Celebes-Ceram area in order to maintain the security of AUSTRALIA and subject enemy forces to attrition.
b. These operations will consist of air and amphibious action. In view of other operations more pressing in attaining our strategic objectives, it is considered that the availability of forces will limit our activity primarily to air action.

14. Operations in the MARSHALL ISLANDS

a. The capture and occupation of the MARSHALL ISLANDS is a preliminary objective in establishing a line of communications to the CELEBES SEA. It also secures and shortens the line of communications to the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. The occupation of these islands extends our control of the sea two thousand miles into the central PACIFIC. Land-based aircraft from bases in the MARSHALLS will facilitate the operation of naval surface craft against enemy lines of communication. Operations in this area will force attritional losses on enemy aircraft and shipping. It may also compel the Japanese Fleet to accept battle. It is in conformity with the strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN.

b. Operations against enemy positions in the MARSHALLS consist of amphibious operations initially supported by carrier aircraft. The success of the operation will be greatly enhanced by the use of amphibious tractors which are capable of crossing coral reefs.

c. To control the MARSHALLS it will be necessary to occupy or neutralize all of the major atolls in the group and WAKE ISLAND. The amphibious troops will have to be relieved by garrison troops, and then reorganized and trained for the CAROLINE operations. A minimum estimate of the periods required are as follows:

- 13 -
Control of the MARSHALLS
Relief by garrison force
Rehabilitation in HAWAII
Training new replacements and
rehearsals for CAROLINES
Movement, HAWAII to MARSHALLS
and preparation for assault
on PONAPE

TOTAL

6.75 months

d. It is estimated that forces required for capture of
the MARSHALLS are as follows:

(1) Ground

2 Infantry Amphibious Divisions, reinforced

(2) Air

2 Groups, Bombardment (H)
2 Groups, Fighter
Carrier-based aircraft in 4 CVs and 4 ACVs
(72 VT, 192 VSB, 156 VF)

(3) Naval

4 BB, 4 CV, 7 ACV, 8 CA, 8 CL, 63 DD,
24 APA, 44 LST, plus landing craft.

e. The following forces will be required to garrison the
islands:

(1) Ground

1 Infantry Division, reinforced
10 Defense Battalions

(2) Air

<table>
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<th>B (H)</th>
<th>B(W)</th>
<th>VF</th>
<th>VSB</th>
<th>VT</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>72</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>168</td>
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Seaplanes

72 VF
24 YSO

(3) Naval

18 PT, miscellaneous craft.
15. Operations in the CAROLINES

a. Purpose

Operations in the CAROLINES will be for the purpose of
wresting control of the central PACIFIC from the Japanese.
The establishment of a mainfleet base at TRUK, adequately
protected by outlying air bases, is required in order to
maintain control, and thus be in a position to continue west-
ward across the PACIFIC or directly threaten the Japanese
Archipelago.

b. Operations required

The following operations are required in a campaign to
capture the CAROLINES:

TASK ONE. To capture PONAPE and TRUK, and to
establish air and garrison forces thereon.

(1) Operations

(a) Capture PONAPE.

(b) Destroy or neutralize enemy air on atolls within
radius of 250 miles and as far west as WOLEAI.

(c) Prevent interference with landing operations by
major naval forces.

(d) Prevent strong reinforcement of TRUK garrison
after landing operations have been initiated.

(e) Capture TRUK, by attack launched from the
MARSHALLS and PONAPE, in three phases with several days
elapsing between initial landing and final assault and
capture, during which time considerable naval support
must remain in the vicinity. The capture should not be
envisioned as placing a landing force ashore and then a
departure of naval forces.

(f) Movement of garrison forces to TRUK.
TASK TWO. To secure control of the western CAROLINES.

1. Operations
   a. Neutralization of enemy air establishments in the western CAROLINES in which there are five probable seaplane bases.
   b. Aerial raids against GUAM and SAIPAN.
   c. Aerial raids against KAPINGAMARINGI, if enemy occupies RABAUL.
   d. Establishment of air and garrison forces on NOMI, WOLEAI, and GAFERUT.

TASK THREE. To establish a main fleet operating base on TRUK.

1. Availability of mobile operating and repair facilities such as LIONS, CUBS, and ACORNS must be assured prior to execution of TASK TWO.

2. Operations
   a. Assembly of this material at PEARL HARBOR and western coast of the UNITED STATES.
   b. Movement of this material to TRUK and assembly thereof.

g. Factors influencing the campaign

1. The campaign should be launched from the MARSHALLS even though we hold RABAUL. It should follow the capture of the MARSHALLS as quickly as possible. It appears that the controlling factors in this respect will be:
   a. Length of time the two amphibious divisions which captured the MARSHALLS are held thereon before being relieved by the garrison division.
   b. The availability of a third amphibious division and its transports.

2. A study of the time required to complete the operations enumerated in Tasks One, Two, and Three, above, clearly indicates that the capture of the CAROLINES will require a campaign of several months duration.

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- 16 -
d. Estimate of forces required

(1) In determining forces required, estimates are based on tasks to be performed and a considerable increase of the Japanese garrisons. At TRUK, the garrison is estimated to be one reinforced division.

(2) For the capture of the CAROLINES
(a) Ground
(b) Air
   Land-based
      2 Groups, Bombardment (H)
   Carrier-based (10 CV's ENTERPRISE-ESSEX Class and 7 ACV's)
   VF  VSB  VT  VSTB
   Sq.  Sq.  Sq.  Sq.
   23-1/2 23 7 4-1/2
(c) Naval
   4 BB, 9 GBB, 10 CV, 7 ACV, 3 CA, 10 CA or CL,
   18 CL, 106 DD, 20 SS, 55 APA, 15 AKA, 6 LSD,
   3 Hq. Ships, Misc. aux.
(3) For garrisoning the CAROLINES
(a) Ground
   2 Infantry Divisions, reinforced
   3 Defense Battalions
(b) Air
   Land-based
      1 VP Wing
      3 VSO (Naval) Squadrons
      1 Group, Bombardment (H)
      1 Group, Bombardment (M)
      1 Group, Bombardment (L and D)
      2 Groups, Pursuit
(c) Naval
   Misc. Harbor and Local Defense Craft
16. Operations in the north PACIFIC

a. General

Operations are now in progress for the capture of ATTU and the occupation of SHEHKA. These operations envisage cutting the enemy line of communications from JAPAN to KISKA. The seizure of this area will provide additional bases for the air offensive against KISKA and will enable us to base our submarine operations further to the westward.

Until the Japanese are driven out of KISKA, the UNITED STATES must keep large air and ground forces in the ALEUTIANS and is forced to disperse naval forces to that area. The Japanese must be expelled from KISKA. It may be that the air offensive and blockade will force them to evacuate or surrender. Based on the results of the aerial offensive which has been in progress for several months past, it is probable that landing operations will be required.

The Japanese reaction to our seizure of ATTU will determine the strength of forces and length of time required for operations in the north PACIFIC.

b. U. S. forces now engaged

(1) Ground

3 Infantry Regiments, reinforced
1 Engineer Regiment

(2) Air

2 Sq. Heavy Bombardment
2 Sq. Medium Bombardment
6 Sq. Pursuit
54 Patrol planes

(3) Naval

3 OBB, 3 CA, 4 CL, 19 DD, 3 DM, 11 OSS, 1 ACV, 4 APA, 1 APD, 4 AP, 1 AT, 1 XAP, 3 XAK, 3 XAPc, 6 AO, 2 AD, 11 MTE, 1 AVP, 2 DE, 1 FG, 3 AM, 4 LST.

- 18 -
2. Our present strategic concept does not contemplate further amphibious operations west of the ALEUTIANS. Our forces there will assume a defensive role until conditions are favorable to operations in support of RUSSIA in the KAMCHATKA PENINSULA-Siberian area.

17. Naval operations in the PACIFIC

Both ANAKIN (discussed in J.O.S. 297) and the Revised ANAKIN Plan (J.O.S. 303) provide for naval operations in the PACIFIC to hold Japanese naval forces in those waters. A positive naval operation in the fall of 1943 will have to be undertaken for this purpose. It is unlikely that operations in the SOLOMONS-NEW GUINEA area will have the desired effect. Probably a carrier-based air attack on JAPAN will be required.

Availability as to Means

18. General

One of the controlling factors for the operations discussed above is the availability of amphibious divisions and amphibious equipment.

a. Amphibious divisions

The only amphibious divisions available in May 1943 are two Marine Corps divisions in the SOUTH PACIFIC and one in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. Readiness for action dates are:

1st Marine Division, (Southwest Pac) June 1
2d Marine Division, (SoPac) June 1
3d Marine Division, (less 1 Regt.) (SoPac) June 1
1 Regt., 3d Marine Division July 15

Commander SOUTHWEST PACIFIC has set June 15 as target date for commencing operations designed to continue as far as MADANG (NEW GUINEA) - western NEW BRITAIN - BOUGAINVILLE, and has stated that sequence and timing is subject to fluctuation of tactical circumstances. Three amphibious divisions are required in these operations.
A most optimistic view, excluding the capture of Rabaul, can not envisage relief of amphibious divisions from the Solomon - Bismarck - New Guinea area before February, 1944. Any division relieved will require four to six months for rehabilitation.

The 4th Marine Division is scheduled to depart United States in December, 1943. It could be earmarked as one of the two amphibious divisions required for the capture of the Marshall Islands, provided excessive losses are not encountered in Southwest Pacific operations prior to the completion of the Madang (New Guinea) - Western New Britain - Bougainville campaign.

Therefore, for the capture of the Marshall Islands there is available one Marine Corps amphibious division from the United States in December, 1943, while the other must be provided from the Southwest Pacific or by training an Army division in the United States.

(1) Summary of availability of amphibious divisions

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Campaign number</th>
<th>Area (See par. 11 a)</th>
<th>Divisions required</th>
<th>Possible sources of divisions required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>MADANG - western New Britain - Bougainville</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 Marine Corps Divisions in South Pacific and Southwest Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bismarck Archipelago (See par. 11 c)</td>
<td>(possibly reduced to three)</td>
<td>3 Marine Corps Divisions used in Campaign No. 1, after 4 - 6 months rehabilitation. 1 Marine Corps Division from U. S. in Dec., 1943. 1 Army Division must be trained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>NEW GUINEA (See par. 12)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>CASE I Army and Marine Corps Divisions used in Campaign No. 2, after 4 - 6 months rehabilitation or CASE II Train 5 Army Divisions during Campaign No. 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign number</td>
<td>Area</td>
<td>Divisions required</td>
<td>Possible sources of divisions required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Further operations in eastern NEI (see par 13)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Same as for Campaign No. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>MARSHALL ISLANDS (see par 14)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CASE I 1 Marine Corps Division in U. S. in 1943 in which case 2 Army Divisions must be trained for Campaign No. 2. 1 Marine Corps Division from SOUTH PACIFIC upon completion Campaign No. 1 in which case other provisions must be made for 1 Division if Campaign No. 2 is to follow No. 1 without delay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CASE II 1 Marine Corps Division in U. S. in December, 1943 with same implications as noted in Case I. 1 Army Division or a new Marine Corps Division must be trained in U. S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>CAROLINES (See par. 15)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>CASE I 2 Divs. used in Campaign No. 5. 1 Army or a second new Marine Corps Division must be trained in U. S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CASE II 2 Divisions used in Campaign No. 5. 1 Division from SOUTH PACIFIC about after Campaign No. 2, and possibly after 4 - 6 months rehabilitation; in which circumstances Campaign No. 3 (Case I) will be short 1 Division and arrangements must be made to provide it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: It should be emphasized that in transferring divisions from SOUTH or SOUTHWEST PACIFIC to central PACIFIC an additional load will be placed on shipping.

(2) Conclusions based on above summary

A minimum of four additional amphibious divisions must be organized. Consideration should be given to organizing:
Experiences to date in NEW GUINEA and the SOLOMON ISLANDS indicate that combat units can carry on offensive operations for approximately 3 months, after which they must be withdrawn to rear positions for recuperation. For each division (or similar combat unit) actually engaged with the enemy, it is essential that an additional division be located in the combat zone in order to insure the availability of combat units to meet counter-attacks or recoup an unfavorable situation. Due to the distances involved, the recuperative period will be about 6 months. It follows that one-third the combat units will at all times be in, or enroute to, recuperative bases too far from the combat zone to be available for an emergency. For planning purposes, it can therefore be assumed that not over one-third of the offensive divisions actually in the area will be available for operations at any given date. The foregoing estimate is substantiated by experiences thus far in the PACIFIC Theater.

Estimates of requirements for subsequent operations are therefore based on the foregoing analysis.

19. Operations in CHINA

a. Air

The estimated aircraft requirements for CHINA as listed in paragraph 9 above, totals 473 airplanes.

Present deployments indicate the following total aircraft available, and shortages, not classified by types:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aircraft available</th>
<th>Shortage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1, 1943</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1, 1944</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1, 1944</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1, 1945</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
20. Operations in BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO

a. Ground

It was noted in paragraph 11 c (1) (b) that a minimum of 5 divisions will be required for the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO. Assuming the occupation of the MADANG-western NEW BRITAIN-BOUGAINVILLE area is accomplished with the forces now planned, it is estimated there will be sufficient infantry divisions available in the area to complete the BISMARCK operation. The availability of amphibious forces has been discussed in paragraph 18 e above.

b. Air

2579 combat airplanes are estimated to be required in the area. This number will be available as of January 1, 1944. This includes Army, Navy, R.A.A.F., and R.N.Z.A.F. Some adjustment as to types may be necessary.

c. Naval

Sufficient naval forces will be made available for this operation.

21. Operations in NEW GUINEA

a. Ground

It is estimated that 18 offensive divisions will be required to capture NEW GUINEA. In addition a minimum of 5 divisions will be required to secure vital bases on the line of communications, making a total of 23 divisions. Tentative deployments as of January 1, 1944 indicate that the UNITED NATIONS will have 18 divisions in the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. This number is exclusive of Australian and NEW ZEALAND defense divisions.

It would appear, therefore, that a minimum of 5 additional offensive divisions will be required to provide the necessary divisions to capture NEW GUINEA.
It should be pointed out that the 18 divisions include 3 U. S. Marine Divisions. The withdrawal of these units to the central PACIFIC would require their replacement with 3 Army Divisions.

The status of the availability of the amphibious equipment for this operation cannot be determined until after the RABaul campaign.

b. Air

A total of 304 planes combat aircraft are estimated to be required for this operation. As of January 1, 1945, 2579 will be available. This includes Army, Navy, R.A.A.F., and R.N.Z.A.F. This indicates a shortage of 469 aircraft. In addition some adjustment as to types may be necessary.

c. Naval

In view of the other operations which may be conducted in the PACIFIC, such as the BISMARK, CAROLINE, or MARSHALLS operations, the requirements and availability of naval forces for the capture of NEW GUINEA cannot be determined.

22. Operations in the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS

a. Ground

The defense of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS will require 3 Army Divisions. One division may be obtained from HAWAII by reducing the strength of the garrison to 2 divisions. The remaining 2 divisions must come from the UNITED STATES.

b. Air (MARSHALLS)

(less carrier-based)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Assault</th>
<th>Garrison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B (H)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (K)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (L/D)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ftr</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>296</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As of January 1, 1944 the U. S. Navy will have 714 combat aircraft of all types (exclusive of carrier-based), deployed for special assignment by CINCPAC. Required aircraft should be available for this operation.

3. Naval (MARSHALLS)

The situation in cruisers to mount the MARSHALL ISLANDS operation (12 CL plus 8 CA) will be tight until early in 1944. As of January 1, 1944, there will be 9 CA, 12 CL, and 4 OCL in the PACIFIC. If all cruisers which become available for assignment in the first quarter of 1944 (1 CA and 4 CL) are assigned to the PACIFIC and, assuming no attrition after January 1, 1944, there would be available on April 1, 1944, 10 CA 12 CL, and 4 OCL. After meeting the requirements for this operation 2 CA, 4 CL, and 4 OCL would be available to meet all other requirements in the PACIFIC. One CL and one CA become available for assignment during the second quarter of 1944.

4. Air (CAROLINES)

(exclusive of carrier-based)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Assault</th>
<th>Garrison</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VSO</td>
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<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (N)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (M)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (L/D)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pfr</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>96</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of January 1, 1944, the U. S. Navy will have 714 combat aircraft of all types (exclusive of carrier-based) deployed for special assignment by CINCPAC. No deployments have been made for later dates, but it is assumed that this figure of 714 will be increased after January 1, 1944, and that the CAROLINE operation is not likely to occur until
after this date. It therefore appears that sufficient aircraft will be available for this operation.

e. Naval (CAROLINES)

The CAROLINES operation requires 4 BB and 9 OBB, total 13. Assigned to the PACIFIC as of January 1, 1944, are 6 BB and 8 OBB, total 14. One additional BB becomes available for assignment in the 3rd quarter of 1944.

Thirty-one cruisers are required for this operation. Assigned to the PACIFIC as of January 1, 1944, are 9 CA, 12 CL, 4 OCL, a total of 25. Assuming, the 2 CA and 5 CL which become available in the first half of 1944 are all assigned to the PACIFIC, and no attrition after January 1, 1944, there will be 32 cruisers in the PACIFIC on July 1, 1944, available to meet all the requirements of that area.

Ten CV are required for the CAROLINES. Nine will be available for the PACIFIC on January 1, 1944. Assuming the 5 which become available in the first half of 1944 are all assigned to the PACIFIC, and no attrition after January 1, 1944, on July 1, 1944 there will be 14 CV available to meet all the requirements of that area. Seven ACV will be required and will be available.

It is estimated that destroyers and other types can be made available.

25. Summary as to availability of means

a. Ground

From the above, it is estimated that the capture of NEW GUINEA, and the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS will require the shipment of 7 additional Army divisions to the PACIFIC.
b. Air

Air operations in CHINA will require additional aircraft as shown in paragraph 19 a above.

Air deployments to SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC (2579 aircraft), January 1, 1944, have been made in accordance with requests for forces by the Commander, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, to perform tasks assigned, exclusive of capture of RABAUL.

It is entirely possible that attrition of Japanese aircraft during the preliminary phases of operations under way will permit the taking of RABAUL and completion of subsequent operations in NEW GUINEA, with the forces allocated.

However, for planning purposes, and assuming JAPAN has not been evacuated from the CAROLINES, it is estimated that for operations to complete the capture of NEW GUINEA, including defense forces, 3048 aircraft will be required. This indicates a shortage of 469 aircraft as of January 1, 1944.

There will be sufficient land-based aircraft available to CINC PAC for the operations in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES during 1944.

c. Naval

It is concluded that there are not sufficient naval forces to carry on a major operation in the central PACIFIC and a major operation in the SOUTH PACIFIC simultaneously during 1943-44. Preceding discussions of the naval requirements for individual operations make it apparent that consideration must be given to the sequence of assigned tasks.

d. Logistics

The logistical implications for supporting major operations such as those in NEW GUINEA or the CAROLINES have not been assessed in this paper. Among these implications would be the shipping required to support the additional ground, air, and naval forces moved to the theater. Furthermore, as the forces advance there will be increasing demands for cargo shipping due to the extension of the line of communications, such as from HAWAII to the MARSHALLS, the MARSHALLS to the CAROLINES, or from RABAUL to NEW GUINEA.
26. Sequence of operations in the PACIFIC

Operations in the northern PACIFIC are in progress.

The MADANG-western NEW BRITAIN-BOUGAINVILLE campaign will commence about June 15, and will probably take the remainder of 1943 to complete.

Prior to the completion of the above campaign, a decision must be made whether to launch the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO or MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign. The MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign cannot be launched before early 1944.

The relative value, as well as the magnitude, of further operations in NEW GUINEA with respect to operations in the CAROLINE ISLANDS must be assessed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the progress of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO or MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign, depending on which had been previously selected.

When the direction of the main effort has been determined, a firm decision on the sequence of operations can be made.

COORDINATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC WITH OPERATIONS IN ASIA

27. Coordination and timing of all military operations in the PACIFIC-Asiatic Theater must be directed and controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in some instances by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, in order that each operation will not be considered as an independent operation, but as a part of a larger picture. This is particularly important in our war against JAPAN where the enemy is operating on interior lines.

28. Specifically, coordination should be prescribed for operations in the PACIFIC with those projected for the INDIA - CHINA Theater. In addition, all raids by naval task forces should be coordinated, insofar as practicable, with other current operations in order that maximum benefit may be achieved. Such coordination can be accomplished without infringing on the prerogative of
theater commanders to plan, organize, and execute such operations. The necessity for such coordination will become increasingly apparent as the war progresses.

29. A definite policy as to the timing of any bombing offensive or bombing raid against JAPAN proper from bases in CHINA should be announced at once, because of the probability of a premature raid jeopardizing the success of the desired diversionary effect in connection with some other operation at a later date, such as the MARSHALL ISLANDS operations. Again the initiation of bomber raid against JAPAN proper from bases in CHINA before sufficient means to make a sustained bomber offensive are available may result in JAPAN making intensified efforts to end Chinese resistance, such as an attack on KUNMING from HANOI.

CONCLUSIONS

30. From the above discussion, it is concluded that the objectives in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST in 1943-44 should be:
   a. Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA.
   b. Seizure of BURMA.
   c. Ejection of Japanese from the ALEUTIANS.
   d. Seizure of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS.
   e. Seizure of the SOLOMONS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, and Japanese held NEW guinea.
### APPENDIX "A"

#### AMPHIBIOUS CRAFT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ATLANTIC</th>
<th>PACIFIC</th>
<th>1st Qtr. 1944</th>
<th>2nd Qtr. 1944</th>
<th>3rd Qtr. 1944</th>
<th>4th Qtr. 1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>APA</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKA</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>LSD</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
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<td>123</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>183</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX "E"

ATTRITION LOSSES OF AMPHIBIOUS LANDING CRAFT

Plans which involve using landing craft for successive operations must take account of losses. In planning for HUSKY, the British are assuming 20% of those initially assigned will be unavailable for the assault due to operational and training attrition; the UNITED STATES is assuming 10% operational and training loss prior to assault. Both the British and UNITED STATES are assuming 30% loss in the attack. On basis of UNITED STATES assumed loss figures, out of 100 landing craft assigned to an operation, 90 will be available for the initial assault and 63 will be available for assignment to a second operation. Of these 63, fifty-seven will be available for the second assault and 40 will remain after the second assault. After a third operation, 25 out of the original 100 will remain.