JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN VLR BOMBING OF JAPAN

References: a. C.C.S. 691 Series
b. J.C.S. 1120 Series
c. J.C.S. 742/12
d. J.C.S. 1406/2

Report by the Joint Staff Planners

THE PROBLEM

1. To further inform the British Chiefs of Staff as to the proposed United States command of the British very long range (VLR) force, and the status of plans for receiving and supporting this force.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. In C.C.S. 691/4, the United States Chiefs of Staff proposed a British force on the order of 10 squadrons of some 220 aircraft to be based in the Ryukyus in order to make the most timely and profitable use of British land-based air power against Japan. The assumption was made that this force would come under U.S. command. It was stated that, upon acceptance in principle of this proposal, immediate steps could be taken to prepare and implement plans for the logistic support of this force by the British, including the time of deployment and utilization of British construction personnel.

DISTRIBUTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Copy No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Admiral Leahy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>General Norstad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Marshall</td>
<td>2 &amp; 5</td>
<td>Admiral Gardner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral King</td>
<td>3 &amp; 6</td>
<td>General Cabell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Arnold</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>General Lincoln</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Handy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Captain Campbell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral Edwards</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Secy, JCS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral Cocke</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Secy, JPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Hull</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Secy, JSCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secy, JWPO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.C.S. 1120/4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

COPY NO. 21 (SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION)
3. In C.C.S. 691/5, the British Chiefs of Staff accepted in principle the proposal of the United States Chiefs of Staff to include the force coming under U.S. command.

4. In C.C.S. 691/6, the British Chiefs of Staff informed the United States Chiefs of Staff that the first echelon of the TIGER force had sailed from the United Kingdom and was due to pass through the Panama Canal about the 6th or 7th of July. This first echelon was given the code name of SHIELD force. The second echelon (VACUUM force) was said to be due for sailing between the 14th and 16th of July. The British Chiefs of Staff requested that destination and convoy instructions be given for SHIELD force and that the United States Chiefs of Staff give approval to the sailing of VACUUM force as scheduled.

5. In C.C.S. 691/3, the United States Chiefs of Staff informed the British that SHIELD and VACUUM forces would be accepted and could sail as scheduled. Instructions as to routes and convoy arrangements were also communicated to the British.

6. On or about 4 July Air Marshal Lloyd proceeded to Guam and Manila to make detailed arrangements with U.S. commanders for receiving and scheduling elements of the British VLR force. Certain agreements were reached at Guam with Admiral Nimitz and representatives of the U.S. Army and the U.S. Army Air Forces as outlined in the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area's radio, No. 150718, 15 July 1945. These agreements have not received confirmation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nor have they been formally communicated to the British Chiefs of Staff.

DISCUSSION

7. It is now apparent that "U.S. command" of the British VLR force, as referred to in C.C.S. 691/4, must be further
defined and clarified to allow plans and preparations for resolving this force to proceed along orderly lines understood by all concerned.

8. By directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S. 742/12), the U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces (USASTAF) was established on 16 July 1945 with command thereof to be exercised by General Spaatz from his headquarters in Guam. With the establishment of this command, we now have a tangible U.S. organization in the Pacific which can properly be designated to command the British VLR force on its deployment.

9. A recent decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at TERMINAL (J.C.S. 1406/2) transferred control of U.S.-held areas in the Ryukyus, and responsibilities pertaining to USASTAF units vested in the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (CINCPAC).

CONCLUSIONS

10. The British VLR force, when deployed to the Ryukyus, should come under the operational command of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces (COMGENUSASTAF).

11. The British VLR force should be self-supporting, except as agreed upon by COMGENUSASTAF with CINCPAC, subject to approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when necessary.

12. The use of British engineers should be as agreed upon by the COMGENUSASTAF and CINCPAC.

RECOMMENDATION

13. That the memorandum in the Enclosure be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

BRITISH PARTICIPATION IN VLR BOMBING OF JAPAN
Reference: C.C.S. 691 Series

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. On 16 July 1945, command of the Twentieth Air Force was transferred from Washington to the Pacific. Headquarters, U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces (USASTAF) was established at Guam. General Spaatz has been designated to command the U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces, consisting initially of the Twentieth Air Force based in the Marianas, and the Eighth Air Force to be based in the Ryukyus.

2. The Commanding General, USASTAF is charged with the primary responsibility for the conduct of land-based strategic air operations against Japan with the object of accomplishing the progressive destruction and dislocation of Japan's military, industrial, and economic systems to a point where her capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. This responsibility will be discharged in accordance with directives which have been or which may be issued from time to time by the United States Chiefs of Staff through the Commanding General, Army Air Forces as executive agent.

3. With the establishment of this force in the Pacific, it is now possible to further define the term "U.S. command" as contemplated in paragraph 3, of C.C.S. 691/4 and agreed in principle in paragraph 1, of C.C.S. 691/5. Hence, it is now proposed that the British very long range (VLR) force to be deployed in the Ryukyus will be commanded operationally by General Spaatz, retaining its entity as a British command under the commander designate, Air Marshal Lloyd.

JCS 1120/4 - 23 - Enclosure
4. The following agreement has been made between Admiral Nimitz and Air Marshal Lloyd and is confirmed with the understanding that it may require change from time to time as conditions dictate:

a. To receive the first echelon SHIELD as now constituted.

b. To receive the second echelon VACUUM without modification.

c. To receive the third echelon FORTIFY with modification of troop lift to insure a balanced force.

d. To receive subsequent echelons, code names not yet designated, for estimated time of arrival in the Ryukyus, 30 November and 31 December respectively.

e. Discharge of personnel and cargo will be a joint U.S.-British operation.

f. U.S. Army will provide petrol, oils and lubricants, rations and engineer stores. Subject to the foregoing the British will be administratively self-supporting.

This agreement contemplates the use of the British engineers to develop at Kume the additional airfields primarily for the use of the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force or associated British units.