ESTIMATE



ARMY REQUIREMENTS
SUPPORTING STUDY

prepared by:

WAR PLANS DIVISION
GENERAL STAFF



(SECTION II, PART II, APPENDIX II)

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ULTIMATE REQUIREMENTS STUDY
ESTIMATE OF ARMY GROUND FORCES

     1. The specific operations necessary to accomplish the defeat of the Axis Powers cannot be predicted at this time. Irrespective of the nature and scope of these operations, we must prepare to fight Germany by actually coming to grips with and defeating her ground forces and definitely breaking her will to combat. Such requirement establishes the necessity for powerful ground elements, flexibly organized into task forces which are equipped and trained to do their respective jobs. The Germans and their associates with between 11 and 12 million men under arms, now have approximately 300 divisions fully equipped and splendidly trained. It is estimated that they can have by 1943, a total of 400 divisions available in the European Theater.

     2. The important influence of the air arm in modern combat has been irrefutably established. The degree of success attained by sea and ground forces will be determined by the effective and timely employment of air supporting units and the successful conduct of strategical missions. No major military operation in any theater will succeed without air superiority, or at least air superiority disputed. The necessity for a strong sea force, consisting principally of fast cruisers, destroyers, aircraft carriers, torpedo boats and submarines, continues in spite of the increased fighting potential of the air arm. Employment of enemy air units has not yet deprived naval vessels of their vital role on the high seas, but has greatly accelerated methods and changed the technique in their employment. It appears that the success of naval operations, assuming air support, will still be determined by sound strategic concepts and adroit leadership. A sea blockade will not accomplish an economic strangulation or

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or military defeat of Germany. Nor will air operations alone bring victory. Air and sea forces will make important contributions but effective and adequate ground forces must be available to close with and destroy the enemy within his citadel.

     3. It is therefore imperative that we create the productive capacity to provide equipment for the following:

a. Appropriate forces distributed for the defense of the United States, outlying possessions and bases selected to facilitate the defense of the country and the Western Hemisphere.

b. Task Forces which can effectively conduct military operations, primarily in the European Theater, as well as in the Western Hemisphere and in other strategically important areas.

c. The military forces of associates and friendly Powers committed to the policy of opposing Nazi aggression. Quantities to be limited only by our own strategic requirements and the ability of the friendly Powers to use the equipment effectively.

     4. A sound approach to the problem of determining appropriate military means requires careful consideration of WHERE, HOW and WHEN, they will be employed to defeat our potential enemies and to assist our associates.

a. WHERE. Accepting the premise, that we must come to grips with the enemy ground forces, our principal theater of war is Central Europe. Possible subsidiary theaters include Africa, the Near East, the Iberian Peninsula, the Scandinavian Peninsula and the Far East; however, the operations in those theaters must be so conducted as to facilitate the decisive employment of Allied forces in Central Europe.

b. HOW. The combined and carefully coordinated operations of our military forces, in collaboration with associated Powers, must accomplish the following:

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(1) The surface and subsurface vessels of the Axis and associated Powers must be swept from the seas, particularly in the Atlantic and water areas contiguous to Europe

(2) Overwhelming air superiority must be accomplished.

(3) The economic and industrial life of Germany must be rendered ineffective through the continuous disruption and destruction of lines of communication, ports and industrial facilities, and by the interception of raw materials.

(4) The combat effectiveness of the German military forces must be greatly reduced by over-extension, dispersion, shortage of matériel, including fuel, and a deterioration of the Home Front. Popular support of the war effort, by the peoples of the Axis Powers must be weakened and their confidence shattered by subversive activities, propaganda, deprivation, the destruction wrought and chaos created.

(5) Existing military bases (the British Isles and the Near East) must be maintained. Additional bases, which encircle and close in on the Nazi citadel, must be established in order to facilitate air operations designed to shatter the German industrial and economic life. Such bases may also provide feasible points of departure for the combined operations of ground and air forces. In disposing of our forces, we must guard against dispersion of means in operations that do not make timely and effective contributions to the accomplishment of our main task, the defeat of Germany.

(6) The commitment of our forces must conform to our accepted broad strategic concept of active (offensive) operations in one theater (European), and concurrently, passive (defensive) operations in the other (Pacific).

d. WHEN. The following factors with regard to the time element are important in determining, the production capacity necessary to realize our national objectives:

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(1) The lag between plan and execution is considerable. Past experience indicates that from eighteen months to two years are required.

(2) How many months will Germany require to defeat Russia, to reconstitute her forces subsequent to Russia's defeat and to exploit to any perceptible degree the vast resources of Russia?

It is believed that Germany will occupy Russian territory west of the general line; White Sea, Moscow, Volga River, (all inclusive) by July 1, 1942, and that militarily, Russia will be substantially impotent subsequent to that date. Thereafter, Germany will "Coventry" all industrial areas, lines of communications and sources of raw materials east of the line indicated, unless a drastic Nazi treaty is accepted by Russia. Germany will probably require a full year to bring order out of chaos in the conquered areas, so that it will be July 1, 1943, before she will largely profit economically by her "drive to the east." The maintenance of huge armies of occupation has become unnecessary. By totally disarming the conquered people, maintaining splendidly organized intelligence and communications nets, and employing strategically located, highly mobile forces (parachute, air-borne, mechanized and motorized), Germany may control the occupied areas with relatively small forces, thu3 releasing the bulk of the military for other tasks. Obviously, our war effort time-table covering the production of munitions, the creation of trained military forces and the increase of transportation facilities (air, ground and sea), is strongly influenced by events transpiring in the Russian theater.

(3) We are confronted by two possibilities; first, a rapidly accelerated all-out effort with a view to conducting decisive, offensive operations against the enemy before he can liquidate or recoup from his struggle with Russia; second, a long drawn-out war of

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attrition. Under our present production schedule, we will soon have adequate military means to defend our outlying possessions and bases and to provide for the security of the Western Hemisphere, but we will not be able to provide sufficient appropriate forces for timely offensive action in the principal theater of operations. The urgency for positive action exists, particularly while the enemy is contained militarily in Russia, It would strongly contribute to the early and decisive defeat of the Axis Powers, if the Allied forces could seize and firmly establish military bases from which immediate air and subsequent ground and air operations might be undertaken.

(4) The United States is approaching its task in a logical manner, but the production of matériel must be greatly accelerated to permit its accomplishment. At present, the bulk of our production has to be devoted to the support of Great Britain and associates, rendering it impracticable for us to undertake offensive commitments. But time is of the essence and the longer we delay effective offensive operations against the Axis, the more difficult will become the attainment of victory. It is mandatory that we reach an early appreciation of our stupendous task, and gain the whole-hearted support of the entire country in the production of trained men, ships, munitions, and ample reserves. Otherwise, we will be confronted in the not distant future by a Germany strongly entrenched economically, supported by newly acquired sources of vital supplies and industries, with her military forces operating on interior lines, and in a position of hegemony in Europe which will be comparatively easy to defend and maintain.

(5) The time by which production can reach the levels defined by our national objectives is highly speculative, July 1, 1943, has been established as the earliest date on which the

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equipment necessary to initiate and sustain our projected operations can be provided. The ability of industry to meet this requirement is contingent upon many intangibles; however, the program can be definitely accomplished, in fact, greatly exceeded, if the industrial potential of the country is fully exploited. The urgency of speed and the desirability of employing our present great economic and industrial advantage over our potential enemies cannot be overemphasized.

     4. Strategic Employment of Ground Forces.

a. The future alignment of Powers and their respective combat capacities cannot be accurately predicted. In order to arrive at a plausible basis from which to determine our future requirements, the following assumptions pertaining to the world situation as of July 1, 1943, are made:

(1) Russia is substantially impotent militarily in Europe. Resistance in Siberia, to include the Maritime Provinces, probably continuing.

(2) The Axis military strength is materially weakened through economic blockade; by losses in the Russian campaign, by British air and sea operations; by the inability to exploit quickly the extensively sabotaged Russian industries and raw materials; by lowered morale of the people.

(3) The military forces of Japan are fully involved with or contained by campaigns against a somewhat strengthened China, by the Russian forces in the Far East Maritime Provinces, or by the threat of United States - British military and economic reprisals,

(4) Great Britain and associates have increased their fighting forces by creating and equipping additional combat units.

(5) The French will probably continue their passive collaboration with Germany.

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(6) Control of the Mediterranean Theater, including North Africa and the Near 2ast, remains disputed.

(7) The United States is an active belligerent and is collaborating in an all-out effort to defeat Germany.

b. If these assumptions are correct, or even reasonably sound, on July 1, 1943, there will be no military bases remaining in Allied hands, other than the United Kingdom, possibly the northern coast of Africa and the Near East. The establishment of additional bases, for example, in the Iberian Peninsula, the Scandinavian Peninsula and Northwest Africa will be bitterly contested by the Axis. However, to bring about the ultimate defeat of Germany, those bases and others even more difficult to establish, must be available to the Allies. Obviously, carefully planned action, involving appropriate sea, air and ground units must be undertaken. Allied success is directly contingent upon the coordinated employment of overwhelming forces, surprise and mobility, supported by sufficient reserves in materiel and manpower to insure a succession of effective impulses throughout the operations.

c. Latest information pertaining to the potential industrial capacities and military strengths of the opposing Powers, (excluding the U. S.) as of July 1, 1943, indicates that the Axis Powers will have about 400 divisions available in the European-Near East Theater and the Allied Powers approximately 100 divisions. To accomplish the numerical superiority, about 2 to 1, usually considered necessary before undertaking offensive operations, the Allies would have to raise about 700 divisions. A force of 700 divisions with appropriate supporting and service troops would approximate 22 million men. If Great Britain and the United States should induct so many men for military service, added to the tremendous numbers already under arms, the economic and industrial effort, necessary to conduct the

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war, would be definitely imperiled.

d. It is believed that the enemy can be defeated without creating the numerical superiority indicated. Effective employment of modern air and ground fighting machines and a tight economic blockade may create conditions that will make the realization of the Allied War Aims perfectly feasible with numerically less fighting men. Another million men in Flanders would not have turned the tide of battle for France. If the French army had had sufficient tanks and planes, and quantities of antitank and antiaircraft matériel, France might have remained a dominant power in Europe. In June, 1941, when the Germans launched their invasion of Russia, they know that their adversary was numerically superior and could maintain that superiority in spite of tremendous losses. They probably also knew that Stalin was creating a military force of great power, consisting primarily of effective modern fighting machines, and that if they delayed their "drive to the east" another year, Russia would possess armadas of air and ground machines which would not only render an offensive campaign impossible, but would make large demands upon the German military to secure her eastern frontier. The Crete campaign also presents illuminating evidence in favor of modern fighting means when opposed by superior numbers that are equipped with inappropriate means and are operating under World War I static tactical concepts. Approximately 17,000 Germans attacked and conquered the island which was defended by about 30,000 British.

e. Our broad concept, of encircling and advancing stop-by-stop, with a view to closing-in on Germany, will remain sound regardless of future developments in the European situation, for it envisages the only practical way in which military and economic pressure may be brought to bear effectively against Germany. The loss of potential bases of operation, presently available, would render the accomplish-

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ment of our strategic plans extremely difficult and costly. It is important, therefore, that the Allies take effective measures to hold the United Kingdom, the Middle East, and North African areas. Also the islands off the northwestern coast of Africa should be denied to the enemy. Before undertaking operations in connection with the establishment of additional military bases, for example, in the Scandinavian Peninsula, the Iberian Peninsula, Africa and the Low Countries, a careful survey of the areas of projected operations and a thorough examination of the enemy capabilities are mandatory. The unfortunate Norway campaign of 1940 is a glaring example of a total lack of appreciation of such realities on the part of those responsible for the British expedition. The Germans employed approximately 175,000 men, strongly supported by the Air Force, to conquer and secure their lodgement in Norway. Special Task Forces, including two Mountain divisions and numerous parachute units made effective contributions to the success of the operation. Having gained a foothold, the Germans quickly established themselves in order to hold their bases and to facilitate exploitation. The British Forces despatched against Norway totalled about 24,000 men, with no mountain troops and with inadequate air supporting units. The failure of the British expedition is directly attributable to insufficient and inappropriate means. If and when the situation indicates the feasibility of an Allied expedition, against Norway for example, powerful and appropriate means, especially trained and equipped for the task, must be provided. Large and effective reserves must be readily available to preclude dislogement of the initial forces and to facilitate subsequent exploitation. A careful study of Norway, including the terrain and communications net, and a survey of possible enemy capabilities, indicate the necessity for mountain, infantry foot and motorized divisions, numerous

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parachute, tank, antitank, antiaircraft and air-borne units. The force required for the entire operation may total several hundred thousand men. The execution of the plan would be predicated on sea and local air superiority. The size of this force may appear large. However, even though our enemy may not be strong initially in the area of projected operations, the mobility of modern fighting means will enable him to concentrate destructive forces against us with unprecedented speed and surprise effect. The foregoing considerations apply with equal emphasis to proposed forces for other theaters of operations. Careful studies, concerning the Scandinavian Peninsula, the Iberian Peninsula, the Near East and Africa, have been made by the War Plans Division of the General Staff, and these studies made important contributions in the determination of the estimated Ground Forces (See Tab A). The enemy capabilities in those theaters in 1943 would obviously be conjecture. Task Forces consisting principally of armored and motorized divisions, must be created for possible operations in North Africa, the Middle East, France and the Low Countries. The exact strength and the composition of the Task Forces, necessary to seize and maintain military bases, will be determined immediately prior to the operation. We can avoid the unfortunate disasters experienced by our potential allies in Norway, France, the Balkans and in Crete by planning now and creating quickly the production capacity necessary to equip the ground forces recommended (Tab A). We must not suffer ignominious defeat and be expelled from the bases that we elect to establish. If the premises and assumptions made earlier in this study are appropriate and sound, additional strategically located bases are vital to the splendidly conceived plans of the Air Force and finally may serve as areas of departure Tor the combined operations of air and ground forces. The seizure, retention, and effective utilization of these bases is predicated on the successful operations of adequate sea, air and ground forces.

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     5. Shipping was a bottleneck in the last war and again increased demands will be placed on all transportation facilities, particularly water, by constant troop movements and the expanded war industrial and economic effort. In order to transport and maintain effective forces in European areas, several million tons of shipping and adequate port facilities must be made available essentially for military service. To transport five million men with their modern air and mechanized equipment to European ports over a period of approximately one year would require about seven million tons of shipping or 1,000 ships. To maintain such a force in the theater of operations would require about ten million tons of shipping or 1,500 ships. But it is highly improbable that the situation in Europe will develop in such manner as to permit or to require operations involving the movement of so large a force across the Atlantic within the limited time of one year, even if the ship tonnage were available. The progressive building-up of large military forces in the theater will probably extend over a period of at least two years. This progressive movement would greatly reduce the demands upon maritime shipping for essentially military purposes and further would extend the period of time for the augmentation of maritime shipping now available. The realization of our present national policies may require operations in distant theaters by military forces of unprecedented strength.

It would be folly to create strong fighting forces without providing the transportation to move and maintain them in the contemplated theaters of operations. The maximum possible shipbuilding capacity of our country, coordinated of course with other essential demands upon industry and raw materials, must be exploited and continued in operation for the next several years.

     6. The foregoing considerations clearly indicate the importance of creating a productive capacity in this country, that will provide

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the most modern equipment designed to give mobility and destructive power to our striking forces. The forces that we now estimate as necessary to realize our national objectives and for which production capacity must be provided, may not be adequate or appropriate. No one can predict the situation that will confront the United States in July, 1943. We may require much larger forces than those indicated below, and correspondingly greatly increased quantities of equipment. Emphasis has been placed on destructive power and mobility, with a view to offensive maneuvers in our principal theater of operations (Europe). The forces deemed necessary to accomplish the role of ground units in the supreme effort to defeat our potential enemies, total 5 Field Armies consisting of approximately 215 divisions (infantry, armored, motorized, air-borne, mountain and cavalry) with appropriate supporting and service elements. The strategic concept outlined in this paper contemplates distribution of U. S. ground forces approximately as follows: (More specific data will be found in Tab A).

Iceland

29,000

Scotland

11,000

England

41,000

Ireland

25,000

Hawaii

61,000

Puerto Rico

34,000

Panama

42,000

Alaska

29,000

Philippine Islands

25,000

Smaller Outlying Bases

32,000

Potential Task Forces

First Army

775,500

Third Army

590,000

Fourth Army

710,000

Brazil

86,000

Colombia - Ecuador — Peru

37,000

Total

2,500,000

Strategic Reserves for which production capacity must be established but whose activation, location and training will be determined by developments in the international situation.

3,000,000

Troops in the Zone of the Interior and Fixed Defense Units (Ground)

1,200,000

TOTAL GROUND FORCES

6,700,000

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TAB A

The Ground Forces estimated as necessary to provide for the security of the U.S. outlying possessions, the Western Hemisphere and to make available appropriate forces for projected military operations follow:

     1. Units organized, fully equipped and trained as soon as practicable:

a. Military Bases and Outlying Possessions.


Newfoundland

5,090


Greenland

2,531


Caribbean Bases

40,199


Puerto Rico

34,757


Panama

42,614


Hawaii

61,337


Philippines

25,397


Alaska

28,823


Iceland

28,709


Bases in British Isles

   73,160   



346,217

b. Potential Task Forces

Brazil

1

Army Corps (1 Div. fot, 1 Div. Air-Borne)

42,392

2

Artillery Battalions Pack

1,804

1

Cavalry Regiment

1,591

5

Parachute Battalions

2,590

1

Antiaircraft Regiment and 2 Medium Battalions

3,619

2

Aircraft Warning Regiments

2,600

2

Tank Battalions (Light)

1,086

3

Anti-Tank Battalions

2,100


Services

   28,364   


Total

86,646

Colombia-Eucador-Peru

1

Division

15,345

2

Artillery Battalions

1,400

3

Parachute Battalions

1,554

1

Antiaircraft Regiment and 2 Medium Battalions

3,619

2

Tank Battalions (Light)

1,086

1

Aircraft Warning Regiment

1,300


Services

   13,035   


Total

37,239

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First Army

1

Army consisting of 3 Corps of 3 Divisions ea.

242,216

2

Armored Corps consisting of 2 Armd Div. ea.

53,556

8

Divisions (4 Mtzd, 2 Mountain, 2 Air-borne)

108,516

5

Parachute Bns.

2,590

13

Artillery Bns. (4 heavy, 6 (105mm), 3 (75mm How Pk)

9,906

20

Antiaircraft Regts and 10 extra Bns. 37mm

46,970

11

Tank Battalions (3 Medium and 5 Light)

4,839

12

Aircraft Warning Regts

15,600

10

Tank Destroyer Bns; and 10 anti-tank Bn (Gun)

14,000


Services (Ord., QM, Sig., Engr., Med.)

278,069


Total

776,262




Third Army

1

Army (3 Corps, 9 Divisions)

242,216

1

Armored Corps (2 Divisions)

26,778

2

Divisions Motorized

32,258

6

Artillery Battalions (Medium & Heavy)

4,300

1

Cavalry Corps and 2 H-Mecz. Regiments

26,867

2

Air-Borne Divisions

20,000

3

Parachute Battalions

2,590

5

Antiaircraft Regiments and three medium Bns.

12,166

3

Aircraft Warning Regiments

3,900

15

Tank Destroyers or Anti-Tank Battalions

10,500


Services

207,360


Total

589,435




Fourth Army

1

Army (3 Corps, 9 Divisions)

242,216

1

Armored Corps (2 Divisions)

25,394

4

Divisions, Motorized

64,516

8

Artillery Battalions (Medium or Heavy)

8,800

4

Divisions (2 Mountain, 2 Air-Borne)

44,000

2

Parachute Battalions

1,036

15

Antiaircraft Regiments and 10 Medium Bns.

37,345

8

Tank Battalions (Medium or Light)

4,839

6

Aircraft Warning Regiments

7,800

25

Tank Destroyers or Anti-Tank Battalions

17,500


Services

256,413


Total

709,859





Total Task Forces

2,199,441




     c. The troops considered necessary in the ground forces, i.e. organized, fully equipped and trained, for current and future employment as security forces in military bases and outlying possessions, and as striking forces in any theater, follows :


Military Bases and Outlying Possessions

346,217


Potential Task Forces

2,199,441


Total

2,545,658

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     2. Production capacity should be created to equip approximately 3 million for the reserve units indicated below. Activation. location and training of these units will depend upon the international situation.

a. Strategic Reserves.

2

Armies (10 Army Corps, 27 Divisions)


14

Armored Corps (53 Armored Divisions)


51

Divisions Motorized


115

Artillery Battalions, (Pack Medium or Heavy)


9

Divisions (2 Cavalry, 6 Mountain, 3 Air-Borne)


22

Parachute Battalions


129

Antiaircraft Regiments and 133 Medium Bns.


86

Tank Battalions (70 Medium, 6 Light, 10 Heavy)


29

Aircraft Warning Regiments


290

Tank Destroyer Battalions


262

Anti-Tank Battalions (Gun)



Total - approximately

3,000,000

     3. Ground troops required for the Zone of Interior and Fixed Defense Units 1,200,000

     4. Recapitulation of Ground Forces

Military Bases and Outlying Possessions

346,217

Potential Task Forces

2,199,441

Zone of Interior - Fixed Defenses

   1,200,000   

Total

3,745,658



Units in reserve to be activated when situation requires

   3,000,000   

Total Army Ground Forces

6,745,658

     5. Air Force requirements (details submitted in a separated study)

Air Force Combat

1,100,000

Zone of Interior Service Units

   950,000   

Total Air Force

2,050,000



6. Army Ground Forces

6,745,658

Army Air Forces

   2,050,000   

TOTAL ARMY FORCES

8,795,658

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SECRET

Brief of Strategic Concept of Operations Required to Defeat our Potential Enemies

(September 1941)

Strategic Objective: To defeat GERMANY and her Allies.

Purpose of the formation of a Strategic Concept of Operations: To evolve a basis for the determination of the United States over-all production requirements.

ASSUMPTIONS

1st Phase - (Until M-Day, or when hostilities begin)

2d Phase (M-Dav until prepared for final offensive action)

Final Phase

1. U.S. National Policy is:

a. Monroe Doctrine: Resist with all means Axis penetration in Western Hemisphere.

b. Aid to Britain: limited only by U.S. needs and abilities of British to utilize; insure delivery.

c. Aid to other Axis-opposed nations: Limited by U.S. and British requirements.

d. Far-Eastern policy: To disapprove strongly Japanese aggression and to convey to Japan determination of U.S. to take positive action. To avoid major military and naval commitments in the Far East at this time.

e. Freedom of the Seas.

2. That eventually the U.S. will employ all armed forces necessary to accomplish national objectives.

3. That potential enemies are Germany, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Romania, Vichy Prance, and Axis-controlled or occupied nations.

4. That our potential associates and friendly powers are the British Commonwealth, China, Russia, Free French, Latin American Countries, Governments In Exile, Netherlands East Indies and Turkey.

5. That the principal theater of operations is Europe, but other possible theaters may later appear desirable.

6. That operations will be in accordance with approved secret war plans.

7. That the defeat of our potential enemies is primarily dependent on the defeat of GERMANY.

8. That field forces (air and/or ground) will not be prepared for ultimate decisive modern combat before July 1, 1943 due to shortage of essential equipment.

9. That the strategic concept, based upon the implementation provided by the ultimate program, must be projected to the period subsequent to July 1, 1943.

10. That ultimate requirements, based on association with British Empire, will more than cover the quantitative requirements of the United States in case of British defeat. Qualitative changes in the production of certain articles will be necessary.

11. That the paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western Hemisphere, and that the United States must maintain dispositions to prevent the extension of European or Asiatic political or military power in the Western Hemisphere.

Objective: Insure delivery of supplies to the British Isles and provide munitions for other rations fighting the Axis, in order to preclude a diminution of their war effort and concurrently to prepare U.S. forces for active participation in the war.

Nature of Operations:
Continue to carry out present national policies, short of war.

Continue the training and equipping of armed forces.

Reinforce Atlantic bases, Alaska, and overseas garrisons.

Relieve British troops in Iceland.

Continue naval operations as provided in approved secret war plans.

Continue Joint training exercises to greatest possible extent.

Establish South American bases as soon as diplomatic arrangements are consummated.

Initiate at once the production program for the provision of ultimate requirements of armed forces and the necessary shipping for the armed forces.

To insure that the maximum number of troops are available to assist in the expansion program, the Secretary of War will determine from time to time the size, composition and projected employment of units deemed necessary for an emergency striking force. This fully equipped and highly trained force will be maintained to meet any emergency and the combat effectiveness of units in such force must not be jeopardized in the expansion of the Army.

All other units end equipment not required in emergency striking forces will be available for the training of new increments.

Objective: Prepare the way for eventual defeat of Germany by active participation as Associate of Great Britain and other nations fighting the Axis Powers.

Nature of Operations:
In general, a strategic defensive in all theatres.

Prevent Axis penetration into Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by denying use of bases.

Protect sea communications of Associated Powers and destroy Axis sea communications.

Defend continental U.S., bases, and overseas possessions.

Destroy Axis sea power.

Continue aid to Britain to keep her full man power equipped as to air and ground forces.

Destroy Axis communications, production facilities, and air forces by cooperation of U.S. air units with R.A.F. Intensify Air Force Program to insure early air superiority.

Defend U.S. naval and air bases wherever located.

Provide token force for defense of British Isles.

In the Far East, defend Philippines, and support forces of Associated Powers in accordance with approved secret war plans.

Take all necessary measures to inforce economic blockade of Axis Powers.

Continue to build up well-trained, modernly equipped military forces in the United States for eventual employment in decisive action against the Axis Powers.

Establish additional , strategically located sea and air bases to facilitate operations during this and the final phase.

Objective: Total defeat of Germany.

Nature of Operations:
Strategic offensive in Atlantic and European Theatres; strategic defensive in Far East.

Continue operations of Phase 2, greatly intensified.

Gain air superiority in Europe by conducting rigorous air operations, utilizing to the maximum the air base facilities in the British Isles.

Maintain sufficient reserves of land and air force with necessary shipping to apply pressure upon Germany wherever soft spots arise in Europe or adjacent areas; to seize air bases wherever opportunity offers; and to provide the final decisive task forces for offensive action in any appropriate overseas theatre.

Prior to the final offensive, the following conditions must be created:

(1) Axis surface and sub-surface vessels swept from the Atlantic and North Sea or their operations rendered ineffective in those waters.

(2) Axis air operations greatly restricted by active offensive action and passive economic deprivation.

(3) Support to Axis totalitarian governments weakened by subversive activities, prolongation of war, suffering caused by economic blockade.

(4) The effectiveness of the German combat team has been weakened by over-extension, air attack on production and communication facilities, and deprivation of essential supplies.



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ULTIMATE REQUIREMENTS - GROUND FORCES

(September 1941)

ASSUMPTIONS

I. That the world situation as of July 1, 1943 will be approximately as follows:

1. Russia is considerably weakened militarily in Europe. Resistance in Siberia, to include Maritime Provinces, continuing.

2. The Axis military strength is materially weakened through economic blockade; by losses in the Russian campaign; by British air and sea operations; by the inability to exploit quickly the extensively sabotaged Russian industries and raw materials; by lowered morale of the people.

3. The military forces of Japan are fully involved with or contained by campaigns against a somewhat strengthened China, by the Russian forces in the Far East Maritime Provinces, or by the threat of United States - British military and economic reprisals.

4. Great Britain and associates have increased their fighting forces by creating and equipping additional combat units.

5. The French continue their passive collaboration with Germany.

6. Control of the Mediterranean Theater, including North Africa and the Near East, remains disputed.

7. The United States is an active belligerent and is collaborating, militarily and economically with Great Britain and associates in an all-out effort to defeat Germany.

II. That before ground operations are undertaken in Continental Europe, the following conditions must be created by our sea and air forces in collaboration with the British and Associated Powers:

1.. The surface and subsurface vessels of the Axis must be swept from the seas, particularly in the Atlantic and water areas contiguous to Europe.

2. Overwhelming air superiority must be accomplished.

3. The economic and industrial life of Germany must be rendered ineffective through the disruption and destruc-tion of lines of communications, of port and industrial facilities, and by the interception of raw materials.

4. The combat effectiveness of the German air and ground units must be weakened by overextension, dispersion, and shortage of material, including fuel.

5. Popular support of the war effort by the peoples of the Axis Powers must be weakened and their confidence shattered by subversive activities, propaganda, deprivation and the destruction wrought.

III. That the scope and nature of the military opera-tions necessary to defeat the Axis Powers cannot be predicted at this time, but we must prepare to fight Germany by actually coming to grips with and defeating her ground forces and definitely breaking her will to combat.

IV. That the establishment of effective military bases, encircling the Nazi citadel, must be undertaken at appropriate means become available and when favorable conditions are created for the operations involved.

ULTIMATE GOAL - GROUND FORCES

I. Based on the foregoing assumptions, and on the military operations decreed necessary for the realization of our national national objectives, a production capacity must be created to accomplish the following:

1. To assist Great Britain, China. Russia and other associates in order to preclude a diminution of their war effort.

2. To provide the shipping required in order to sustain an all-out military effort, and concurrently, to provide for our commercial needs and to assist friendly Powers.

3. To equip and maintain forces for employment in Military Bases, Outlying Possessions, and Potential Task Forces as follows:

a. MILITARY BASES AND OUTLYING POSSESSIONS

Newfoundland

5,690

Greenland

2,531

Jamaica

876

Bermuda

3,741

Antigua

434

St. Lucia

434

Curacao - Aruba

5,951

British Guiana

352

Trinidad

28,411

Puerto Rico

34,757

Panama

42,614

Hawaii

61,337

Philippines

25,397

Alaska

28,832

Iceland

28,709

Scotland

10,147

Ireland

24,656

England

41,357

Total

346,217

b. POTENTIAL TASK FORCES

Brazil

1

Army Corps (HQ & HQ Co and Corps Troops)

17,147

1

Infantry Triangular Division

15,245

1

Air-Borne Division

10,000

2

Artillery Battalions (75mm How Pk)

1,804

1

Cavalry Regiment (H-M)

1,591

5

Parachute Battalions

2,590

1

Antiaircraft Regiment

1,925

2

Antiaircraft Battalions 37mm (Mobile)

1,694

2

Aircraft Warning Regiments

2,600

2

Tank Battalions (Light)

1,086

3

Antitank Battalions (Gun)

2,100


Services (Med. Ord. QM. Engr. Sig)

28,864


Total

86,646

Colombia-Ecuador-Peru

1

Infantry Triangular Division

15,245

2

Artillery Battalions (105mm)

1,400

3

Parachute Battalions

1,554

1

Antiaircraft Regiment

1,925

2

Antiaircraft Battalions 37mm (Mobile)

1,694

2

Tank Battalions (Light )

1,086

1

Aircraft Warning Regiment

1,300


Services (Med. Ord. QM. Engr. Sig)

13,035


Total

37,239



First Army

1

Army (HQ & HQ Co and Army Troops)

53,570

3

Army Corps HQ & HQ Co. and Corps Troops

51,441

9

Infantry Triangular Divisions

137,205

2

Armored Corps HQ and Corps Troops

2,768

4

Armored Divisions

50,788

4

Infantry Triangular Divisions (Mtsd)

64,516

6

Artillery Battalions (105mm)

4,200

2

Artillery Regiments (Heavy)

3,000

3

Artillery Battalions (75mm How Pk)

2,706

2

Mountain Divisions

24,000

2

Air-Borne Divisions

20,000

5

Parachute Battalions

2,590

20

Antiaircraft Regiments

38,500

10

Antiaircraft Battalions 37mm (Mobile)

8,470

3

Tank Battalions (Medium)

2,124

5

Tank Battalions (Light)

2,715

12

Aircraft Warning Regiments

15,600

10

Tank Destroyer Battalions

7,000

10

Antitank Battalions (Gun)

7,000


Service. (Ord. QM. Sig. Engr. Med)

278,069


Total

776,262

Third Army

1

Army HQ & HQ Co and Army Troops

53,570

3

Army Corp. HQ & HQ Co and Corps Troops

51,441

9

Infantry Triangular Divisions

137,205

1

Armored Corps HQ and Corps Troops

1,384

2

Armored Divisions

25,394

2

Infantry Triangular Division (Mtzd)

32,258

4

Artillery Battalions (105mm)

2,800

1

Artillery Regiment (Heavy)

1,500

1

Cavalry Corps HQ and Corps Troops

333

2

Cavalry Divisions

23,352

2

Cavalry Regiments (H-M)

3,182

2

Air-Borne Divisions

20,000

5

Parachute Battalions

2,590

5

Antiaircraft Regiments

9,625

3

Antiaircraft Battalions 37mm (Mobile)

2,541

3

Aircraft Warning Regiments

3,900

5

Tank Destroyer Battalions

3,500

10

Antitank Battalions (Gun)

7,000


Service. (Med. Ord. QM. Engr. Sig)

207,860


Total

589,435

Fourth Army

1

Army HQ & HQ Co and Army Troops

53,570

3

Army Corps HQ & HQ Co and Corps Troops

51,441

9

Infantry Triangular Divisions

137,205

2

Armored Divisions

25,394

4

Infantry Triangular Divisions (Mtxd)

64,516

4

Artillery Battalions (105mm)

2,800

4

Artillery Regiments (Heavy)

6,000

2

Mountain Divisions

24,000

2

Air-Borne Divisions

20,000

2

Parachute Battalions

1,036

15

Antiaircraft Regiments

28,875

10

Antiaircraft Battalions 37mm (Mobile)

8,470

3

Tank Battalions (Medium)

2,124

5

Tank Battalions (Light)

2,715

6

Aircraft Warning Regiments

7,800

10

Tank Destroyer Battalions

7,000

15

Antitank Battalions (Gun)

10,500


Services (Med. Ord. QM. Engr. Sig)

256,413


Total

709,856





Total Potential Task Forces

2,199,441



c. The total number of troops considered necessary in the ground forces, i.e. organized, fully equipped and trained, for current and future employment as security forces to military bases and outlying possessions, and as striking forces in any theater follow:

Bases and Outlying Possessions

346,217

Potential Task Forces

2,199,441

Total

2,545,658

5. Production capacity should be created to equip approximately 3 million additional men in the reserve pool indicated below. Activation, location, and training of these units will depend upon the international situation.

Strategic Reserves

2

Army HQ & HQ Cos. and Army Troops

10

Army Corps HQ & HQ Cos. and Corps Troops

27

Infantry Triangular Divisions

14

Armored Corps HQ & HQ Cos. and Corps Troops

53

Armored Divisions

51

Infantry Triangular Divisions (Motz)

24

Artillery Regiments (Heavy)

15

Artillery Battalions (75mm Pack)

52

Artillery Battalions (105mm)

2

Cavalry Divisions

6

Mountain Divisions

3

Air-Borne Divisions

22

Parachute Battalions

129

Antiaircraft Regiments

133

Antiaircraft Battalions, 37mm (Mobile)

70

Tank Battalions (Medium)

6

Tank Battalions (Light)

10

Tank Battalions (Heavy)

29

Aircraft Warning Regiments

290

Tank Destroyer Battalions

212

Antitank Battalions (Gun)

Total (approximately) 3,000,000

6. The Army Aviation Program is included in a separate study, which indicates the detailed organization and requirements in essential equipment.

Total Air Force Personnel (Zone of Interior troops excluded)

1,100,000

7. Zone of Interior and Fixed Defense Units

Army Ground Forces

1,200,000

Army Air Force

959,000

Total

2,150,000

8. Recapitulation

a. Army Ground Force

Military Bases and Outlying Possessions

346,217

Potential Task Forces

2,199,441

Zone of Interior and Fixed Defense (Ground)

1,200,000

Total Ground Forces (Activated)

3,745,658



Reserve Pool (Activated as situation requires)

3,000,000

Total of all Ground Units

6,745,658



b. Army Air Force

Combat Units

1,100,000

Zone of Interior and Service Units

950,000

Total Air Force

2,050,000



c. Grand Total

Army Ground Units

6,745,658

Army Air Units

2,050,000

Total Army Forces

8,795,658




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