Third Updated Version of the Attack Draft of the Operations Division of the General Staff of the Army:
OKH, Op. Sec.
(I), Revision due to New Information about Switzerland.
Part I: The German Attack on Switzerland; Part II: The Italian Attack. Aug. 12,1940
signed: von Menges, Captain on the General Staff
BA-MA, RH 2/46.5; Switzerland, vol. C.
Op. Sec. (1)
Aug. 12, 1940
Secret Command Matter
Only by Officers!
THE GERMAN ATTACK OF SWITZERLAND
The possibilities for a surprise occupation of Switzerland by German troops from Francs and Germany are to be examined assuming that Italian troops will attack Switzerland simultaneously from the south.
1.) Execution of Task:
In this enterprise it is imperative to achieve by a rapid surprise invasion from several directions:
a) The smashing of the enemy army in such a manner that a unified command and structuring for renewed resistance on individual lines, as well as an orderly evasion into difficult mountain terrain (thus delaying the outcome of the war) is prevented.
b) For political and morale reasons a rapid and undamaged occupation of the Capital and the region of the weapons industry around Solothurn and Zurich (Örlikon).
c) Gaining the most important rail and road junctions as well as the numerous bridges and tunnels undamaged, in order to be able to use the country as soon as possible as a transit area to southern France for all transports.
2.) The Country of Switzerland: Appendix 1
Switzerland is truly a mountainous country. Central and southern Switzerland are regions of high mountains with glaciers in the Alpine sections of the Valais, Bern, and Glarus. The Rhône and Rhine valleys are deeply cut in and narrow and thus easily blocked by the blasting of rocks.
The northern part of Switzerland is more flat. Its boundaries are Lake Constance, the Rhine (between Basel and Lake Constance it is 100-200 m wide) and the Jura mountains which are difficult to cross from the north. The industrial area of the country is northwest of Zurich as well as in the region of Fribourg-Bern-Solothurn.
3.) The Swiss Army:
a) According to the status of early August 1940, the Swiss army has a total strength of 220,000 men. It currently consists of: 6 infantry divisions, 3 mountain divisions, 3 mountain brigades, 1 border brigade, and border battalions. There is no armored force. The air force is weak and only partially modernized; the antitank forces are being built-up.
b) Demobilized are: the 3 light brigades (corps troops) and bicycle units, all territorial troops, the border brigades except for one along the southern border, and all rear services. For reasons of internal politics and due to joblessness, there are difficulties with further demobilization.
c) Mobilization may be preceded by measures in response to tensions (use of border forces). Mobilization itself requires only a short time. Ready to march are: parts of border patrols within 5 hours, corps staff, corps troops, and divisions on the second day of mobilization. Army staffs, light brigades, and border brigades on the first day of mobilization. Total strength of the mobilized army 278,000 men with 6 infantry divisions, 3 mountain divisions, 3 mountain brigades, and 9 border brigades (about 100 border battalions) and as corps troops 3 light brigades, and 75 battalions of "territorial troops" (type of riflemen).
d) Currently in internment camps in Switzerland (guarded by the 3rd and parts of the 7th divisions) are the following units, totaling 50,000 men, who came across the border during the western campaign:
-the French 67th division, third wave, moderate fighting spirit
Polish division ( 12,000 men)
-army supplies, artillery, and tanks.
Switzerland would like soon to get rid of the Poles and Spahis —among other reasons —to have the 1 1/2 guard divisions available again. In case of war, a crossover to the Swiss side by the Poles, the Spahis, and possibly a small part of the French can be expected. Total strength then about 1 division. The acquisition of the weapons and tanks taken from the interned troops is welcome to Switzerland. If the interned units are not fighting and are still in the country, guarding them means a weakening of the Swiss fighting force.
4.) Fortifications of Switzerland: Exhibit 2
Emphasis on reinforcement in the sector Basel-Constance-Rheineck-Sargans. Lighter reinforcement, only a few places medium reinforcement. Heavy development of the cornerstones Rheineck and Sargans, in between steep mountain slopes. Only weak safeguarding along southern shore of Lake Constance.
Thirteen Rhine bridges between Constance and Basel. Weaker points southwest of Basel, eastward to Waldshut and near Eglisau. Rear positions: Apparently so far only barricade fortifications in narrow sections of valleys. Reinforcement planned for line Olten-Aarau-Zurich-Sargans.
Reinforcement only starting early 1940, first only barricades at individual places and field-like firing positions.
Weakness of positions: around and west of Nyon, east of Pontarlier, north of La Chaux-de-Fonds; pass roads north and south of St. Maurice not fortified.
Rear positions between the lake narrows have not yet been developed.
Since July work on fortifications is at a standstill, except for those which have been started above ground. Work on fortifications and barricades along the northwest border continues without reduction. [See] Appendix 3
The shooting ranges are 6-8 m above ground, thus a good target; nothing known about antitank ditches. Road barricades to be expected everywhere (prepared concrete blocks, to be overcome by blasting or by prepared bridging structures). Border guard houses without combat value.
5.) Swiss Deployment and Fighting Strength:
According to the sparse reports currently available, 5 1/2 divisions are deployed along the German-Swiss border in the north and only 2 1/2 divisions in the west. Thus, no increase along the western border can be detected since last month; the divisions are only somewhat more removed from the border. The remainder are deployed in the south and southeast.
Fighting strength: A suitably organized, rapidly deployable, war[-ready] army. The state of training seems higher due to long-time mobilization. Only theoretically trained command. Methodical command. Deficiency in weaponry (artillery, tanks and antitank defenses, air force, flak). The individual soldier is a tough fighter and good rifleman. The mountain troops are said to be better than their neighbors to the south. The fighting value of the Swiss living in the west (French type) is moderate, while those who live south of Constance (Communists) will be bitter enemies. Conclusion: Army suitable for defense only, which is totally inferior to the German army.
6. ) Swiss Possibilities for [Strategic] Operations:
The enemy has no way of going on the attack due the necessity of protecting his long borders. He will try to defend his fortified positions near the border.
The weakness of his current positioning is along the French border. A possible repositioning to that region can occur only at the expense of safeguarding the German border.
After losing his positions along the border, the enemy will try to regroup on a line Lake Geneva-Lake Neuchâtel-Lake Biel-Olten-Zurich-Sargans.
Then, the possibility remains to defend in the high mountains.
7. ) The Neighboring Country of Liechtenstein.
Liechtenstein is an independent country which closely cooperates with Switzerland politically and financially (customs union). The prince is said to live mainly in Vienna. There is no army.
Own Deployment Appendix 4 and 5
8. ) Basic Ideas Regarding Deployment of Forces:
to destroy the enemy army as soon as possible,
to occupy the capital and the industrial areas around Bern and Zurich rapidly and undamaged,
to gain the most important rail lines, tunnels, and roads undamaged (see also above 1 a-c).
It has to be done so fast that Switzerland is really surprised by the attack. Thus, moving in: the motorized units only at the last minute, the infantry divisions at a distance from the border, of these the divisions designated for the attack from the north camouflaged as being in training.
c) The center of the attack has to come from France. Here are the weakest border fortifications, here is the weak point of the enemy deployment, from there it is possible to get most rapidly to the nearest large cities and industrial areas and, finally, the rear positions on both sides of Lake Neuchâtel have apparently not yet been reinforced.
d) Little deployment should be used for the attack across the Rhine. It is difficult and requires a lot of bridge convoys. There should only be deceptive maneuvers there along a wide front by one division. Parts of this division should be deployed at weak points of the enemy near Waldshut and Eglisau up to and beyond Zurich.
e) An attack from the east should be avoided due to the difficult mountain terrain, the strong enemy fortifications, and the unfavorable deployment possibilities.
f) For reasons of terrain, the invasion of the corner around Chur-Davos should be left to the Italians.
g) Attack possibilities for the Italians see page 4, Part II "The Italian Attack."
It is most favorable for us if the Italians use their forces, inclusive of the Rhône valley, in such a way that a clear frontier of interests between Germans and Italians across the crest of the Bernese and Glarus Alps can be drawn. This solution should be aimed for, hoping that the Italians will proceed rapidly and forcefully in the Rhône valley.
(It is less favorable for us if the Italian-Western wing is only deployed to and including the Simplon pass. In that case, German forces would have to advance also in the very important Rhône valley. The frontier of interests between Germany and Italy would then run south of the Rhône valley. The Italians would not have a lateral connection between their attack groups within Switzerland. Their attack groups, furthermore, could not deploy their full strength. Thus, this solution should only be considered in case of need.)
Threat from the Air:
We are far superior in the air so that the use of motorized and panzer divisions with the assignment of corresponding antiaircraft units will be possible without misgivings in spite of the narrow, deeply cut-in roads.
9.) Available Forces:
With deployment of some of the motorized, panzer, and mountain divisions assigned to "Seelöwe":
The AOK 12 is to be charged with the overall command, for
preparations it remains within Army Group C.
At the start of the attack, the AOK 12 will be put under the direct command of the OKH to shorten the chain of command.
b) The motorized and panzer divisions are used for the rapid occupation of Bern, Lucerne, and Zurich and tor the blocking of the enemy's roads of retreat leading south. They are to be drawn from the area of the 2nd army. The approach distance is measured as 200-350 km as the crow flies.
c) SS "AH." [Adolf Hitler] and I.R. [infantry regiment] "Grossdeutschland" are to be used as rapid reinforcement of the I.D. [infantry division].
d) There is a lack of mountain divisions (1st and 6th mountain divisions are stationed at the Pas de Calais). At least one mountain division is needed for crossing the Jura mountains and for possible later use in central and southern Switzerland. Replacing it by an infantry division with mountain equipment is impossible as this equipment is already fully in use for "Seelöwe." For this reason deployment of the 1st mountain division should be requested.
divisions are to be used for breaking through the line of
fortifications and for closer targets. Available are:
For the attack from the west and northwest: 5th, 73rd, then as reserve 23rd division (from the 12th army in their current, advantageous areas), for attack from the north: 260th div. (from 12th army near Belfort, foot march), the 262nd div. (from 1st army southwest of Saarbrücken, by rail).
(Their use is preferred compared to the divisions on leave to be called back within ten days and which have to be retrained—88th near Rothenburg, 95th near Frankfurt am Main.—Their recall is also hard to camouflage.)
10.) Employment and Orders in Detail: Appendix 4 and 5
Overall command: AOK 12
Orders for AOK 12: "AOK 12 —for preparation under Army Group C, from start of attack under direct command of OKH—starts on orders by the OKH on day X at hour Y with concentric attack on Switzerland from the west (center of action), north, and northeast, in order rapidly to occupy Switzerland north of the demarcation of interests [Germany and Italy]. For this purpose it breaks through the enemy border fortifications and takes possession, as soon as possible, of the capital as well as the industrial areas around Bern and Zurich. The goal is to defeat the Swiss army rapidly and decisively, before it can escape southward into the high mountains, while simultaneously blocking its retreat routes from the south and southwest, as well as north of the Glarus Alps by the use of parachute troops. Traffic routes should be taken with the least amount of damage possible. It is agreed that an Italian army will simultaneously attack south of the demarcation line of interests line from the south, centering across the Simplon and Splügen passes."
I) Should the German-Italian demarcation line of interest run south
of the Rhône valley: (Appendix 4: line b-b)
"1st attack group"
Forces: Reinforced 20th motorized division, 1 machine gun battalion, motorized (from 2nd army
Command: Directly under AOK 12.
Approach: via St. Laurent, St. Claude, Gex.
Putting on standby in the area around Ferney (south of Gex). The approach road runs in part west of the [French] line of demarcation, as the road from Morez towards Gex is fully used by the left adjoining division (29th motorized, see page 11), which is on standby in the area northwest of Gex for attack in the direction of Nyon. The approach through unoccupied territory west of the line of demarcation takes place without advance notification of the French during the night before the attack to the area of Geneva so that the division reaches the Swiss border only shortly before the start of the attack.
Orders: "Division—under the direct command of the AOK 12— makes a surprise seizure of Geneva on day X, hour Y, in order to advance from there in two attack groups, centered above Martigny, into the Rhône Valley in the direction of the St. Gotthard, and to open the Simplon pass to the Italians from the north, and later, to establish the connection in direction Schwyz and Brienz with the northern attack groups. Fort St. Maurice is to be seized from the north and the south."
II) Should the German-Italian demarcation of interests line run across the Bernese and Glarus Alps: (appendix 4 line a-a). If the demarcation of interests runs across the Bernese and Glarus Alps, this attack group is to be omitted. Instead, parts of the division (29th motorized-southern wing of the 2nd attack group; see below) placed formerly only north of Lake Geneva adjoining advance via Geneva, hard along the south of Lake Geneva, Aigle towards Thun.
c) "2nd Attack Group":
XVth army corps (motorized) 5th division (of 12th army), 29th motorized div. (of 2nd army), 4th armored division (of 2nd army), corps troops: 1 heavy field howitzer unit.
Approach: 5th division is already there. Motorized and panzer divisions no difficulties.
"XVth Army Corps breaks on day X, hour Y through enemy border fortifications between Nyon and Vervières (including towns), rapidly takes possession of the capital and blocks the enemy's retreat into the area of Lake Thun to the south.
The army corps stands ready possibly, on orders of the AOK 12, to attack with sections from the region of Bern in a generally northern direction in order to open to its left neighbor the path through the Jura mountains from the south."
Command of the Attack:
29th motorized attacks with strong units from the area east of Gex towards Nyon, as the mountain ridge there has already been passed before the border and there are apparently no enemy fortifications. Use here one motorized division in order to rapidly block the road of retreat near Thun.
4th tank as core group to Bern. Use only after parts of the 5th division have broken through the border fortifications. Later use of the 5th division for tl\e occupation of Bern, of the industrial area situated there and of the area seized by the XVth Army Corps appears necessary. Use of a small secondary section through Neuchâtel towards Bern may ease the breaking through the mountains near La Chaux-de-Fonds for the adjoining division. Putting it later under the command of the XVIIIth Army Corps is to be planned.
"3rd Attack Group":
Forces: XVIIIth Army Corps (from 12th Army), 1st mountain division (from 16th Army) 73rd mountain division (from 12th Army), infantry regiment "Grossdeutschland" (from 12th Army) SS. "A.H." (from 1st Army). Corps troops: 1 heavy field howitzer unit, 1 armored rifle battalion 4.7 cm (from army troops).
General Command XVIII and 73rd divisions are already in their areas.
1st mountain division arrives with its fighting parts on a truck transport regiment (made available by quartermaster general), its columns by rail transport. The purpose of this transport has to be camouflaged (use along line of demarcation). Corps troops: Approach on foot. No difficulties for infantry regiment "Grossdeutschland" and SS. "A.H." For reason of camouflage and because of their later use. they will be brought up last.
"XVIIIth Army Corps takes Lucerne on day X, hour Y—after breaking through the border fortifications and Jura in the sector Le Locle-Basel (including towns) —by rapidly advancing units from north and west and prevents the evasion of the enemy along a line Bern-Lucerne-Schwyz towards the south."
Command of the Attack:
Basel is to be bypassed on the west.
Infantry regiment "Grossdeutschland" and SS "A.H." should be sent forward as soon as possible after the first breakthrough. Use of paratroopers near Olten to open the mountain exits from the south should be considered.
“4th Attack Group.”
XIIth Army Corps (from 1st Army). 260th division (from 12th Army), 1 machine gun battalion (motorized) (from 2nd Army), 262nd division (from 1st Army). Corps troops. 1 heavy Field howitzer unit, 1 engineer battalion and bridge columns, 1 smoke mortar unit, 1 armored rifle battalion 4.7 cm (from army troops).
General Command XIIth Army Corps: foot march, 260th division: foot march for 140 km from area of Belfort to area Walds-hut/Rhine, 262nd division: embarkation around Saarbrücken. Rail transport to area of Constance and Friedrichshafen. Corps troops: march on foot.
"XIIth Army Corps-assembling on day X, hour Y —destroys the enemy in the area Zurich-Sargans-Lake Constance-Waldshut. For this purpose break through enemy fortifications between Waldshut and Romanshorn and, in cooperation with paratroopers having landed along the Lindt Canal and near Sar-gans, prevent evasion by the enemy via Schwyz-Sargans towards the south.
Between Basel-Constance (excluding towns) an attack across the Rhine on a wide front is to be feigned."
Command of the Attack:
A very desirable attack in itself across Rheineck (shortest path to the enemy flank) promises no success due to the very heavy enemy fortification. For the division deployed via Constance, the use of the car ferry Friedrichshafen-Romanshorn is envisioned for opening the fortifications there from the south and for the surprise landing of units with simultaneous use of assault boats.
are necessary behind the core sectors:
a) for taking rapid advantage of success, presumably of the XVth Corps (for this SS "T" [Totenkopf/Skull] from the 2nd Army) in the area south of Besançon,
b) for breaking possibly especially heavy resistance in the mountains west of Basel (for this 23rd division of 12th Army). In the area of Belfort it is to be kept mobile on the truck transport regiment which had earlier brought in the 1st mountain division.
They are under the command of the AOK 12.
11.) Total Forces Required: (the divisions marked by* are planned for use in "Sea Lion").
1 AOK: 12th
3 army corps: XVth* (motorized), XVIII and XII
5 infantry divisions: 5th, 23rd, 73rd, 260th, 262nd
1 mountain division: 1st*
3 motorized divisions: 20th* mot., 29th* mot., SS "T"*
2 motorized regiments: infantry regiment "Grossdeutschland,"* SS "A.H."*
1 panzer division: 4th *
battalions and bridge columns for XIIth Army Corps
b) machine gun battalions mot. for 20th mot. and 260th infantry divisions
c) 1 flak unit for each army corps,
d) 1 armored rifle unit 4.7 cm each for XVIIIth and XIIth Army Corps
e) I smoke mortar unit for XIIth Army Corps,
f) for each army corps a heavy field howitzer unit.
Army corps: 3
Mot. Regiments: 2
Air force (see No. 12)
12. ) Air Force:
of the operative air force:
Smashing of the enemy air force. Destruction of rail lines and bridges initially is not permitted!
b) Use of fighter planes in conjunction with army: for total attack XVth Army Corps and for breaking through fortifications with XVIIIth and XIIth Army Corps.
For use of parachute troops see "4th Attack Group".
d) Flak important on the few deeply cut-in roads. Assignment, to the extent that the situation across from the British coast permits at this time (see also items 8 h and 11). One flak unit for each army corps is to be requested.
1 reconnaissance squadron for each AOK, army corps, mot., and panzer division.
13. ) Tactical Command and Composition:
Make use of the experience made in Norway: Assignment of tanks, artillery and individual motorized troops to the vanguard; reinforcement of the marching units by machine gun company (motorized); increased use of infantry artillery and grenade throwers; formation of strong advance units, using vehicles of the antitank gunner units, here not that necessary for antitank defense.
14.) Time Requirement:
a) For approach:
I) of the furthest motorized units from the area of the 2nd Army: 2 days,
II) of the infantry divisions: march on foot: 2-3 days, of 260th div. up to 4 days,
III) of 1st mountain div.: truck and rail transport: 3 days,
262nd div. by rail transport: 3 days.
Added to this for III) and IV) 3 days advance warning for preparing rolling materials: 3 + 3 = 6 days. No later than 7th day before attack, advance warning has to be given to railroad.
b) for operations: Seizure of Bern, Lucerne, and Zurich has to take place no later than in the course of the 2nd day. Reaching the line of demarcation depends on the success of the first 2 days and the results of the battles around the St. Gotthard. In about 3-4 days the part of Switzerland assigned to us can be occupied (if demarcation line of interests runs across Bernese and Glarus Alps), otherwise in 4-5 days. The time requirements for the Italians depends on the type of their attack.
15. ) Time of Year:
Summer is favorable. October through March brings snowfall in the mountains and delays in marching times: fog prevents, among other things, the use of the air force. September is particularly favorable for the air force.
16. ) Requirements:
Discreet, reinforced closing of the Swiss border, also along the Italian and, to the extent possible, the French section. Corresponding press notices. Deceptive radio traffic and radio silence for individual units.
b) Use of spies to explore details of fortifications. What is the situation at rear positions? Are regroupings going on along the French border?
c) Improvement of particularly bad maps. Acquisition of maps about road conditions, possibly on the open market in Switzerland. Preparation of a condensed military-geographic description of the country.
d) The chief of transport must be listened to about his requirements for deployment and about especially important, and thus rapidly to be occupied, traffic routes. .
e) The Armistice Commission has rejected the shifting of the demarcation line Champagnole-St. Claude-Collonges-west of Martigny (including towns). As the advantages of a German and Italian attack south of Lake Geneva are great, request should now be made by the German political leadership that it permit the march of German and Italian troops through unoccupied territories and the fifty-kilometers zone (along the Italian/French border), that is create the precondition for it. The sooner the French/Swiss border segment Lake Geneva-Three-Country Corner (at the Great St. Bernard) is closed, the better, in order to cut off any movement from and to France.
f) Switzerland's request to be able soon to repatriate Poles and Spahis from their country should be granted expeditiously in order to prevent a possible reinforcement of the Swiss army (see No. 3d).
17. ) Given the momentary political situation in Switzerland, it is possible that it might accede peacefully to ultimatum demands, so that after a warlike crossing of the border, a rapid transition to a peaceful invasion must be assured.
Captain on the General Staff
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Comments to Item 10 f) Reserves:
Added to the duplicate copy in Vol. A: "Switzerland (Drafts. Situation Reports). Microfilm NA T-78, roll 649, 2097/441.
Mobility must also be requested of the 260th division or of the 23rd division. (If a mountain division is used instead of the 23rd, the 23rd division would be the reserve instead of the 260th division.)
The following possibilities exist:
a) revolving instead of the 260th or 23rd division: 2nd or 13th motorized division, which are both available at home as of August 31.
b) Replacement of the 29th (motorized) division by another panzer division (8th), so that the 29th (motorized) will become the reserve.
c) Release of a truck transport regiment for 23rd or 260th division for about 14 days by the quartermaster general. In the view of the Organization Division, this might be the best possibility because of the constantly improving rail situation.
d) Creation of a transport space based on captured vehicles in the area of Army Group C, which would presumably only be sufficient for 1/3 of a division. Given the variety of vehicles, a rapid and reliable loading use is doubtful.
e) Release of 2 supply columns each from the division, 2nd and 4th wave, of Army Group C, to the extent that they are not participating in "Seelöwe," provides transport space for 1/2 division. It is doubtful that these columns are not already otherwise taken and used by the quartermaster general.
f) The 5 armies not designated for "Seelöwe," each form until September 1 a supply column unit from captured vehicles = 5 units = more than 1 truck transport regiment. The armies make these or, as a replacement, a corresponding number of columns available for the Division to be moved.
a) is best if the time is before Aug. 31, followed by b) and c).
have the disadvantage that these vehicles are not designed for loads
and are very light, thus the need for many vehicles and long
For the transport of the Mountain Division this Truck Transport Regiment could then also be used in order subsequently to load the respective reserves at the disposal of AOK 12.
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Op. Sec. (1)
Secret Command Matter
Only by Officers!
THE ITALIAN ATTACK. Appendix 6
1.) The attack possibilities for the Italians against Switzerland are conditioned by.
passability of mountains and passes.
b) the Italian deployment possibilities by rail.
c) the weak points of the Swiss fortifications,
d) the enemy deployment.
Concerning a): The Lower Engadin with its few roads and small population, as well as the Valais Alps have to be ruled out for major operations due to altitude and impassability (except for the road across the Great St. Bernard to Martigny). For this reason, the mass of the Italian army should not be deployed on the outermost wing.
Concerning b): Possible for the deployment are the continuous rail lines across the Bernina Pass, St. Gotthard and Simplon Pass, as well as the railroad leading to Chiavenna. On all lines it is important to occupy the long tunnels on Swiss territory undamaged.
Concerning c): The Swiss fortifications have mountain and high mountain characteristics. They have been blasted into the rock, partly built into the stone. They are old, little modernized, but bomb-proof constructions. The weak points are: the old construction of the forts, the mortar-built infantry positions and the machinery of the armored turrets that can be lowered. The core of the fortifications is, at the St. Gotthard. There are several fortification groups which command all the passes towards east, south, and west. Added to this are the barricade fortifications south of this near Lugano and Locarno.
There are lesser fortifications on all the remaining passes of the southern front, of these (to the extent known) remarkably weak ones at the Splü-gen and Simplon passes. Both of those have the shortest routes to the Rhine and Rhône valley. It is then possible to cut off the eastern corner of Switzerland from Chur.
Evaluation of the fortifications thus seems to indicate that an attack in the direction of the St. Gotthard from the south would be difficult and time consuming, while there are better conditions at the Splügen and Simplon passes.
Concerning d): The Swiss deployment shows a core formation at the St. Gotthard with 1 1/2 divisions and strong border patrol (including mountain brigades), apparently only border patrol along Splügen and Simplon passes. The enemy apparently plans defense near the border (only in eastern Switzerland removed somewhat towards the west) and, after a breakthrough of this line, defense around Sargans and the St. Gotthard. The weakness of his position in the south and on the St. Gotthard itself provides the possibility for encircling from the Splügen and Simplon passes. If the enemy evades early from the border to the St. Gotthard, it will be unable to resist long a concentric attack from south, east, and west.
2.) It is important for the Italians to occupy as rapidly as possible the valleys of the Lower Rhine and Upper Rhine and the Rhône in order to
a) cut off the eastern part of Switzerland east and south of Chur,
b) advance on the roads leading north and towards the German forces (direction Sargans, Schwyz, and Lake Brienz).
The Italians reach these goals fastest across the Splügen and Simplon passes. The Italian border is closest at this point; a deployment by rail to the area of the border is possible. In order to tie down the enemy frontally at the St. Gotthard and to occupy the undamaged rail line, an advance via Lugano-Locarno is necessary. An advance across the Bernina pass only appears appropriate if the rail line there should be seized particularly quickly. An advance across the road at the Great St. Bernard and massed from Chamonix towards Martigny favors a rapid seizure of the Rhône valley, if a German column is not to be used in the Rhône valley. The latter may possibly make faster progress than an Italian column. When German and Italian troops meet in Brig, certain difficulties as to cooperation and the pursuit of goals may occur. In both cases, German or Italian troops would have to march through the demilitarized zone (a 50 km wide strip along the west of the Italian border) and be assembled in the area around Chamonix (France). (See also page 3, part I, item 8g).
3.) Thus, follows
for the Italians:
Deployment of the following troops:
a) possibly a small group across the Bernina pass, direction Davos,
b) a strong group across Splügen, direction Reichenau (on the Rhine), in order to cut off from there the eastern corner of Switzerland and to advance in the direction of the St. Gotthard to encircle the enemy,
c) a group on both sides of the Lago Maggiore direction St. Gotthard,
d) a strong group across the Simplon pass, Brig, direction St. Gotthard to encircle the enemy there and to seize the road to Brienz,
e) possibly a group (instead of a German one) from Chamonix via Martigny to Brig. It then has to march through the French-Italian demilitarized 50 km zone!
4.) From this follows that the demarcation line of interests between Germany and Italy has to run north of the Rhône valley south of Sargans, on the crest of the Glarus-Bernese Alps north of Martigny. This border is also to be recognized by the air force.
With a German attack in the Rhône valley, the demarcation line of interests between Germany and Italy would have to run as follows: north slope of the Valais Alps —directly south of Brig-north slope of St. Gotthard — Arosa-Schiers. The latter line is only an emergency solution!
5. ) A unified supreme command of German and Italian forces is not necessary, but rather a communications staff for each with the German and Italian army supreme command.
6. ) A radical closure of the Italian and Swiss border is already now necessary for reason of camouflage.
Captain on the General Staff
Maps regarding Swiss defense, not reproduced
Enclosure 4: Illustration XI
Enclosure 5: Illustrations VIII/IX
Enclosure 6: Illustration X